collateral consequences exception in Texas

2026The collateral consequences exception, which applies only in “rare circumstances,” allows courts to decide cases “when vacating the underlying judgment will not cure the adverse consequences suffered by the party seeking to appeal that judgment.” Id. at 883–84 (quoting Marshall v. Housing Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 779 (Tex. 2006)).

2026Relying on the collateral consequences exception, Marshall argued that the case was not moot because the trial court’s eviction judgment had caused her to lose her federal rent subsidy and the “loss of the subsidy might last for up to five years.” Id. at 788 .

2023See, e.g., State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1980) (applying the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine in a case involving involuntary commitment to a mental hospital); 8 Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612 , 616–17 (Tex. 1972) (applying the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine in a case involving a minor’s adjudication as a juvenile delinquent).

2010NOTES [1] There is no indication in the record that the mother was represented, nor that the juvenile's attorney was present during this exchange. [2] Other cases where Texas courts have found judgments to be moot, but reviewable under the collateral consequences exception include Cockerham v. Cockerham, 218 S.W.3d 298, 303 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (family protective order); In re Salgado, 53 S.W.3d 752, 757-58 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding) (family protective order); State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.1980) (order for inpatient mental health services); In re M.E.G.,

2023Land Office, 789 S.W.2d at 571 (noting that the collateral consequences exception is invoked only when prejudicial events have occurred whose effects will continue to stigmatize after dismissal of the case as moot). 7 To invoke the collateral consequences exception, then, Gallegos must show both that a concrete disadvantage resulted from the injunction and that the disadvantage will persist now that the injunction has been dissolved.

2019Land Office v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990)); see also Ex parte Sewell, 495 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“The collateral-consequences exception is often applied by federal courts in criminal cases in which the adverse collateral consequences of a criminal conviction are viewed as preserving the existence of the dispute even though the convicted person has completely served the sentence imposed.”).

2023See Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Reynolds, 764 S.W.2d 16 , 18–19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (cases applying the collateral consequences exception are for acts such as wrongful conviction of a crime, wrongful adjudication as a juvenile delinquent, and wrongful commitment to a mental institution).

2020See Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Reynolds, 764 S.W.2d 16, 18-19 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.)(cases applying the collateral consequences exception are for acts such as wrongful conviction of a crime, wrongful adjudication as a juvenile delinquent, and wrongful commitment to a mental institution).

2026FDIC v. Nueces County, 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1994).

2016Corp. v. Nueces Cty., 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1994). 11 We also conclude that the collateral consequences exception does not apply.

2023See, e.g., State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1980) (applying the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine in a case involving involuntary commitment to a mental hospital); 8 Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612 , 616–17 (Tex. 1972) (applying the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine in a case involving a minor’s adjudication as a juvenile delinquent).

2011The Texas Supreme Court applied the collateral consequences exception in Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612, 616-17 (Tex. 1972) where a juvenile was discharged from probation while his case was on appeal.

2021While a matter of first impression for this Court, other intermediary courts of appeal have concluded that, under the collateral- consequences exception, an expired protective order based on a finding of family violence is reviewable because the “effects of a protective order carry significant collateral legal repercussions and a social stigma . . . .” Martin v. Martin, 545 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.); Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.); Schaban- Maurer v. Maurer-Schaban, 238 S.W.3d 815, 823 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007

2015However, several intermediate courts of appeals have reviewed challenges to expired protective orders under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine on the ground that the “effects of a protective order carry significant collateral legal repercussions and a social stigma even though the protective order has expired.” State for Prot. of Cockerham v. Cockerham, 218 S.W.3d 298, 303 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (Texas Family Code requires commission of family violence be considered in determining child custody); see Amir-Sharif v. Hawkins, 246 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App

2019Texas courts have applied the collateral consequences exception when the courts “have recognized that prejudicial events have occurred ‘whose effects continued to stigmatize helpless or hated individuals long after the unconstitutional judgment has ceased to operate.’” In re Salgado, 53 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding) (quoting Gen.

2010NOTES [1] There is no indication in the record that the mother was represented, nor that the juvenile's attorney was present during this exchange. [2] Other cases where Texas courts have found judgments to be moot, but reviewable under the collateral consequences exception include Cockerham v. Cockerham, 218 S.W.3d 298, 303 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (family protective order); In re Salgado, 53 S.W.3d 752, 757-58 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding) (family protective order); State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.1980) (order for inpatient mental health services); In re M.E.G.,

2026See Cannon v. Cannon, No. 02- 21-00404-CV, 2023 WL 1859881 , at *2 n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 9, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Amir-Sharif v. Hawkins, 246 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (providing that the Texas Family Code “requires [] information in a protective order be entered into the state-wide law information system where it presumably remains for various purposes” (citing Tex. Fam.

2015However, several intermediate courts of appeals have reviewed challenges to expired protective orders under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine on the ground that the “effects of a protective order carry significant collateral legal repercussions and a social stigma even though the protective order has expired.” State for Prot. of Cockerham v. Cockerham, 218 S.W.3d 298, 303 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (Texas Family Code requires commission of family violence be considered in determining child custody); see Amir-Sharif v. Hawkins, 246 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App

2022See id.; see also Kitchen v. Lutcavage, No. 03-19-00421-CV, 2020 WL 3468147 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin June 24, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The ‘collateral consequences’ exception is applied when prejudicial events have occurred and the effects continue ‘to stigmatize individuals long after the judgment has ceased to operate.’” (quoting Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– 11 Edinburg 2008, no pet.))); cf. Phillips v. Phillips, 651 S.W.3d. 112, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (explaining that courts apply this exception to review expired protecti

2021While a matter of first impression for this Court, other intermediary courts of appeal have concluded that, under the collateral- consequences exception, an expired protective order based on a finding of family violence is reviewable because the “effects of a protective order carry significant collateral legal repercussions and a social stigma . . . .” Martin v. Martin, 545 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.); Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.); Schaban- Maurer v. Maurer-Schaban, 238 S.W.3d 815, 823 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007

2012General Land Office of State of Texas, 789 S.W.2d at 571 ; In re R.M., 234 S.W.3d at 104 .

2012General Land Office of State of Texas , 789 S.W.2d at 571 ; In re R.M. , 234 S.W.3d at 104 .

2005"The public-interest exception allows appellate review of an issue of considerable public importance if that issue is capable of repetition between either the same parties or other members of the public, but for some reason evades appellate review." Ngo, 133 S.W.3d at 692 ; accord Securtec, 106 S.W.3d at 810-11 ; see also FDIC, 886 S.W.2d at 767 .

2005“The public-interest exception allows appellate review of an issue of considerable public importance if that issue is capable of repetition between either the same parties or other members of the public, but for some reason evades appellate review.” Ngo, 133 S.W.3d at 692 ; accord Securtec, 106 S.W.3d at 810-11 ; see also FDIC, 886 S.W.2d at 767 .

2019See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 , 53–55, 88 S. Ct. 1889 , 1898–99 (1968); State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910 , 9 912 (Tex. 1980) (noting that adjudication of juvenile delinquency is stigmatized and “carried with it deleterious collateral effects and legal consequences”).

2019See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 , 53–55, 88 S. Ct. 1889 , 1898–99 (1968); State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910 , 9 912 (Tex. 1980) (noting that adjudication of juvenile delinquency is stigmatized and “carried with it deleterious collateral effects and legal consequences”).

2018However, “[t]here are two exceptions that confer jurisdiction regardless of mootness: (1) the issue is capable of repetition, –9– yet evading review; and (2) the collateral consequences doctrine.” City of Dallas v. Woodfield, 305 S.W.3d 412, 418 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (citing Gen.

2015For the reasons stated in his initial briefs, Applicant disagrees with this assertion and believes his claims are not moot.2 However, should this Court agree with TDCJ that his claims are moot, Applicant’s claims would also be cognizable under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine. 3 “There are two exceptions to confer jurisdiction regardless of mootness: (1) the issue is capable of repetition, yet evading review; and (2) the collateral consequences doctrine.” City of Dallas v. Woodfield, 305 S.W.3d 412, 418 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2 For example, Applicant argued that the notice t

2021While a matter of first impression for this Court, other intermediary courts of appeal have concluded that, under the collateral- consequences exception, an expired protective order based on a finding of family violence is reviewable because the “effects of a protective order carry significant collateral legal repercussions and a social stigma . . . .” Martin v. Martin, 545 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.); Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.); Schaban- Maurer v. Maurer-Schaban, 238 S.W.3d 815, 823 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007

2016Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79 ,0 84 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.); Schaban-Maurer v. Maurer-Schaban, 238 S.W.3d 815, 822-23 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth .2007, no pet.), disapproved of on other grounds by Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex.2011); .Cockerham, 218 S.W.3d at 302 .

2021While a matter of first impression for this Court, other intermediary courts of appeal have concluded that, under the collateral- consequences exception, an expired protective order based on a finding of family violence is reviewable because the “effects of a protective order carry significant collateral legal repercussions and a social stigma . . . .” Martin v. Martin, 545 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.); Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.); Schaban- Maurer v. Maurer-Schaban, 238 S.W.3d 815, 823 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007

2016Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79 ,0 84 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.); Schaban-Maurer v. Maurer-Schaban, 238 S.W.3d 815, 822-23 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth .2007, no pet.), disapproved of on other grounds by Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex.2011); .Cockerham, 218 S.W.3d at 302 .

2007The Texas Supreme Court has determined that the effects of an order for temporary inpatient mental-health services continued to stigmatize the subject of the order even though the commitment order had expired on its own terms; Lodge , 608 S.W.2d at 912 ; see also Campbell v. State , 68 S.W.3d 747, 753-54 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001), aff'd , 85 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. 2002) (applying Lodge to order for extended mental-health services) and that the effects of a juvenile-delinquency adjudication continued to stigmatize the person adjudicated even though the person had served his sentence and h

2007See Johnstone v. State , 22 S.W.3d 408 , 409 n.l (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) (applying mootness doctrine's collateral consequences exception to temporary mental health commitment orders); Campbell v. State , 68 S.W.3d 747 , 753 B 54 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2001), aff = d 85 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. 2002).

2007See Johnstone v. State, 22 S.W.3d 408, 409 n. 1 (Tex.2000) (per curiam) (applying mootness doctrine’s collateral consequences exception to temporary mental health commitment orders); Campbell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 747, 753-54 (Tex.App.-Hous *534 ton [14th Dist.] 2001), aff'd 85 S.W.3d 176 (Tex.2002).

2007See Johnstone v. State , 22 S.W.3d 408 , 409 n.l (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) (applying mootness doctrine's collateral consequences exception to temporary mental health commitment orders); Campbell v. State , 68 S.W.3d 747 , 753 B 54 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2001), aff = d 85 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. 2002).

2025Flores, 130 S.W.3d at 102–03, 105.

2015However, several intermediate courts of appeals have reviewed challenges to expired protective orders under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine on the ground that the “effects of a protective order carry significant collateral legal repercussions and a social stigma even though the protective order has expired.” State for Prot. of Cockerham v. Cockerham, 218 S.W.3d 298, 303 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (Texas Family Code requires commission of family violence be considered in determining child custody); see Amir-Sharif v. Hawkins, 246 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App

2021While a matter of first impression for this Court, other intermediary courts of appeal have concluded that, under the collateral- consequences exception, an expired protective order based on a finding of family violence is reviewable because the “effects of a protective order carry significant collateral legal repercussions and a social stigma . . . .” Martin v. Martin, 545 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.); Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.); Schaban- Maurer v. Maurer-Schaban, 238 S.W.3d 815, 823 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007

2015However, several intermediate courts of appeals have reviewed challenges to expired protective orders under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine on the ground that the “effects of a protective order carry significant collateral legal repercussions and a social stigma even though the protective order has expired.” State for Prot. of Cockerham v. Cockerham, 218 S.W.3d 298, 303 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (Texas Family Code requires commission of family violence be considered in determining child custody); see Amir-Sharif v. Hawkins, 246 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App

2007The Texas Supreme Court has determined that the effects of an order for temporary inpatient mental-health services continued to stigmatize the subject of the order even though the commitment order had expired on its own terms; Lodge , 608 S.W.2d at 912 ; see also Campbell v. State , 68 S.W.3d 747, 753-54 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001), aff'd , 85 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. 2002) (applying Lodge to order for extended mental-health services) and that the effects of a juvenile-delinquency adjudication continued to stigmatize the person adjudicated even though the person had served his sentence and h

2007See Johnstone v. State , 22 S.W.3d 408 , 409 n.l (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) (applying mootness doctrine's collateral consequences exception to temporary mental health commitment orders); Campbell v. State , 68 S.W.3d 747 , 753 B 54 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2001), aff = d 85 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. 2002).

2025But, in doing so, the court did not hold that standing trial on a subsequently dismissed charge was a collateral consequence that could nevertheless be appealed from a conviction for a different charge. 5 held that the collateral-consequences principle “does not apply to this case in which [the] appellant was not convicted, and has not identified an adverse collateral consequence that he would suffer if his issues on appeal are not addressed.” Sewell, 495 S.W.3d at 57 ; see also Tex. R.

2019Land Office v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990)); see also Ex parte Sewell, 495 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“The collateral-consequences exception is often applied by federal courts in criminal cases in which the adverse collateral consequences of a criminal conviction are viewed as preserving the existence of the dispute even though the convicted person has completely served the sentence imposed.”).

2021There are two exceptions to the doctrine of mootness: “(1) the issue is ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review[,’] and (2) the collateral consequences doctrine.” Trulock, 277 S.W.3d at 924 .

2020See Trulock, 277 S.W.3d at 924 (citing Gen.

2018In regard to the public interest exception, among Huerta’s arguments is a contention that “review of state and local practices and procedures is of considerable public importance. . . . [G]uidance to sheriffs, jail personnel, police officers, and other 5 The United States Supreme Court’s analysis of the collateral consequences exception in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 , 118 S. Ct. 978 , 140 L.

2018In regard to the public interest exception, among Huerta’s arguments is a contention that “review of state and local practices and procedures is of considerable public importance. . . . [G]uidance to sheriffs, jail personnel, police officers, and other 5 The United States Supreme Court’s analysis of the collateral consequences exception in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 , 118 S. Ct. 978 , 140 L.

2025App. P. 44.2 (providing that constitutional errors are not reversible unless they affect the “conviction or punishment” and that nonconstitutional errors are not reversible unless they affect “substantial rights”); Ex parte Bowens, 572 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.) (“As a general rule, a criminal defendant’s right of appeal is limited to an appeal from a final judgment of conviction.”).

2023Nevertheless, “Texas courts have routinely applied the collateral consequences exception to an expired protective order issued for family violence because of the stigma and attendant legal consequences to being the subject of such a protective order.” Burt v. Francis, 528 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2016, no pet.) (collecting cases).

2023Code Ann. § 153.004 (f) (mandating that a trial court must consider the issuance of protective order under Chapter 85, Title 4 of the Family Code in determining child custody); Martin, 545 S.W.3d at 167; see also In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam).