spousal privilege in Maryland

2020That said, in a footnote, the Court of Special Appeals stated: “We note that the spousal privilege, codified in [CJ] § 9-106, does not seem to include any exceptions concerning an improper motive or purpose in marrying.” Id. at 211 n.7, 676 A.2d at 1001 n.7.

2019Because we reversed Mr. Hagez's conviction on other grounds, we did not reach the issue of "whether the statutory testimonial privilege is available to a witness who has married solely to assert the spousal privilege or to obstruct justice." Id. at 211 , 676 A.2d 992 .

1992There followed Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 564-566 , 380 A.2d 611 (1977) (recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357-358 , 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (abrogated defense of interspousal immunity for outrageous conduct); Pope v. State, 284 Md. at 333-352, 396 A.2d 1054 (jettisoned misprision of felony as a chargeable offense in Maryland); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35-47 , 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (recognized tort of wrongful discharge from employment); Moxley v. Acker, 294 Md. 47, 49-53 , 447 A.2d 857 (1982) (deleted force as a

1992There followed Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 564-566 , 380 A.2d 611 (1977) (recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357-358 , 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (abrogated defense of interspousal immunity for outrageous conduct); Pope v. State, 284 Md. at 333-352, 396 A.2d 1054 (jettisoned misprision of felony as a chargeable offense in Maryland); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35-47 , 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (recognized tort of wrongful discharge from employment); Moxley v. Acker, 294 Md. 47, 49-53 , 447 A.2d 857 (1982) (deleted force as a

2020The Court of Special Appeals explained that it would “follow the out-of-state courts that have declined to create a judicial exception to the spousal privilege and hold that a spouse may invoke the privilege even in the context of a sham marriage.” Id. at 687 , 213 A.3d at 658 .

2020The Court of Special Appeals explained that it would “follow the out-of-state courts that have declined to create a judicial exception to the spousal privilege and hold that a spouse may invoke the privilege even in the context of a sham marriage.” Id. at 687 , 213 A.3d at 658 .

2019In State v. Peters , 213 Ga.App. 352 , 444 S.E.2d 609 , 610 (1994), Georgia's intermediate appellate court concluded that the spousal privilege "may be invoked regardless of the underlying motives for a valid, existing marriage." There, the State charged Linda Peters with murdering her husband.

2019In State v. Peters , 213 Ga.App. 352 , 444 S.E.2d 609 , 610 (1994), Georgia's intermediate appellate court concluded that the spousal privilege "may be invoked regardless of the underlying motives for a valid, existing marriage." There, the State charged Linda Peters with murdering her husband.

2019See Walsh, supra , at 1305; State v. Chrismore , 223 Iowa 957 , 274 N.W. 3 , 4 (1937) (adopting view that Iowa statute precludes spouse's testimony even if defendant marries witness "for the sole purpose of suppressing her testimony"); Norman v. State , 127 Tenn. 340 , 155 S.W. 135 , 135-37 (1913) (upholding the common law spousal privilege when "it is clear that the marriage, so far as [defendant] was concerned, was entered into for the express purpose of shielding himself against prosecution"); State v. McGinty , 14 Wash.2d 71 , 126 P.2d 1086 , 1090 (1942) (recognizing application of the pri

2019See Walsh, supra , at 1305; State v. Chrismore , 223 Iowa 957 , 274 N.W. 3 , 4 (1937) (adopting view that Iowa statute precludes spouse's testimony even if defendant marries witness "for the sole purpose of suppressing her testimony"); Norman v. State , 127 Tenn. 340 , 155 S.W. 135 , 135-37 (1913) (upholding the common law spousal privilege when "it is clear that the marriage, so far as [defendant] was concerned, was entered into for the express purpose of shielding himself against prosecution"); State v. McGinty , 14 Wash.2d 71 , 126 P.2d 1086 , 1090 (1942) (recognizing application of the pri

2019Unlike the various states which simply require a valid marriage to invoke the spousal privilege, the Lutwak Court defined marriage as *701 the specific intent to "establish a life together and assume certain duties and obligations." Id.

2019One of the earliest interpretations of the spousal privilege is found in Turpin v. State , 55 Md. 462 (1881).

2019See Walsh, supra , at 1305; State v. Chrismore , 223 Iowa 957 , 274 N.W. 3 , 4 (1937) (adopting view that Iowa statute precludes spouse's testimony even if defendant marries witness "for the sole purpose of suppressing her testimony"); Norman v. State , 127 Tenn. 340 , 155 S.W. 135 , 135-37 (1913) (upholding the common law spousal privilege when "it is clear that the marriage, so far as [defendant] was concerned, was entered into for the express purpose of shielding himself against prosecution"); State v. McGinty , 14 Wash.2d 71 , 126 P.2d 1086 , 1090 (1942) (recognizing application of the pri

2019In Osborne v. State , 623 P.2d 784 , 787 (Alaska 1981), "the defendant married his wife, an important witness for the prosecution, just a week before trial." Mr. Osborne argued that "there was no proof that his marriage was a sham, and that absent such proof" his wife was entitled to invoke the spousal privilege not to testify against him.

2019In Osborne v. State , 623 P.2d 784 , 787 (Alaska 1981), "the defendant married his wife, an important witness for the prosecution, just a week before trial." Mr. Osborne argued that "there was no proof that his marriage was a sham, and that absent such proof" his wife was entitled to invoke the spousal privilege not to testify against him.

2019The Court of Appeals acknowledged the unclear origin of the spousal privilege in Brown v. State , a case concerning the related "confidential communications privilege" now codified at CJP § 9-105. 8 *659 359 Md. 180 , 189-90, 753 A.2d 84 (2000).

2019The Court of Appeals acknowledged the unclear origin of the spousal privilege in Brown v. State , a case concerning the related "confidential communications privilege" now codified at CJP § 9-105. 8 *659 359 Md. 180 , 189-90, 753 A.2d 84 (2000).

2019State v. Witchey , 388 N.W.2d 893 , 894 n.2 (S.D. 1986).

2019App. 1903) ("When the marriage ceremony is performed, no matter what the motive was or may be, the witness thenceforward becomes the lawful wife of defendant, and is prohibited under [the Texas] statute from testifying against her husband, except where the offense is by the husband against her person."); United States v. White , 4 Utah 499 , 11 P. 570 , 571 (1886) ("when the marriage ceremony was performed, no matter what the motive was, the witness became beyond all question the lawful wife of the defendant, and in this case she could not testify against his objection"); State v. Anderson , 2

2019App. 1903) ("When the marriage ceremony is performed, no matter what the motive was or may be, the witness thenceforward becomes the lawful wife of defendant, and is prohibited under [the Texas] statute from testifying against her husband, except where the offense is by the husband against her person."); United States v. White , 4 Utah 499 , 11 P. 570 , 571 (1886) ("when the marriage ceremony was performed, no matter what the motive was, the witness became beyond all question the lawful wife of the defendant, and in this case she could not testify against his objection"); State v. Anderson , 2

2019See Walsh, supra , at 1305; State v. Chrismore , 223 Iowa 957 , 274 N.W. 3 , 4 (1937) (adopting view that Iowa statute precludes spouse's testimony even if defendant marries witness "for the sole purpose of suppressing her testimony"); Norman v. State , 127 Tenn. 340 , 155 S.W. 135 , 135-37 (1913) (upholding the common law spousal privilege when "it is clear that the marriage, so far as [defendant] was concerned, was entered into for the express purpose of shielding himself against prosecution"); State v. McGinty , 14 Wash.2d 71 , 126 P.2d 1086 , 1090 (1942) (recognizing application of the pri

2019See Walsh, supra , at 1305; State v. Chrismore , 223 Iowa 957 , 274 N.W. 3 , 4 (1937) (adopting view that Iowa statute precludes spouse's testimony even if defendant marries witness "for the sole purpose of suppressing her testimony"); Norman v. State , 127 Tenn. 340 , 155 S.W. 135 , 135-37 (1913) (upholding the common law spousal privilege when "it is clear that the marriage, so far as [defendant] was concerned, was entered into for the express purpose of shielding himself against prosecution"); State v. McGinty , 14 Wash.2d 71 , 126 P.2d 1086 , 1090 (1942) (recognizing application of the pri

2019App. 1903) ("When the marriage ceremony is performed, no matter what the motive was or may be, the witness thenceforward becomes the lawful wife of defendant, and is prohibited under [the Texas] statute from testifying against her husband, except where the offense is by the husband against her person."); United States v. White , 4 Utah 499 , 11 P. 570 , 571 (1886) ("when the marriage ceremony was performed, no matter what the motive was, the witness became beyond all question the lawful wife of the defendant, and in this case she could not testify against his objection"); State v. Anderson , 2

2019App. 1903) ("When the marriage ceremony is performed, no matter what the motive was or may be, the witness thenceforward becomes the lawful wife of defendant, and is prohibited under [the Texas] statute from testifying against her husband, except where the offense is by the husband against her person."); United States v. White , 4 Utah 499 , 11 P. 570 , 571 (1886) ("when the marriage ceremony was performed, no matter what the motive was, the witness became beyond all question the lawful wife of the defendant, and in this case she could not testify against his objection"); State v. Anderson , 2

2019App. 1903) ("When the marriage ceremony is performed, no matter what the motive was or may be, the witness thenceforward becomes the lawful wife of defendant, and is prohibited under [the Texas] statute from testifying against her husband, except where the offense is by the husband against her person."); United States v. White , 4 Utah 499 , 11 P. 570 , 571 (1886) ("when the marriage ceremony was performed, no matter what the motive was, the witness became beyond all question the lawful wife of the defendant, and in this case she could not testify against his objection"); State v. Anderson , 2

2019See Walsh, supra , at 1305; State v. Chrismore , 223 Iowa 957 , 274 N.W. 3 , 4 (1937) (adopting view that Iowa statute precludes spouse's testimony even if defendant marries witness "for the sole purpose of suppressing her testimony"); Norman v. State , 127 Tenn. 340 , 155 S.W. 135 , 135-37 (1913) (upholding the common law spousal privilege when "it is clear that the marriage, so far as [defendant] was concerned, was entered into for the express purpose of shielding himself against prosecution"); State v. McGinty , 14 Wash.2d 71 , 126 P.2d 1086 , 1090 (1942) (recognizing application of the pri

2019See Walsh, supra , at 1305; State v. Chrismore , 223 Iowa 957 , 274 N.W. 3 , 4 (1937) (adopting view that Iowa statute precludes spouse's testimony even if defendant marries witness "for the sole purpose of suppressing her testimony"); Norman v. State , 127 Tenn. 340 , 155 S.W. 135 , 135-37 (1913) (upholding the common law spousal privilege when "it is clear that the marriage, so far as [defendant] was concerned, was entered into for the express purpose of shielding himself against prosecution"); State v. McGinty , 14 Wash.2d 71 , 126 P.2d 1086 , 1090 (1942) (recognizing application of the pri

2019See Walsh, supra , at 1305; State v. Chrismore , 223 Iowa 957 , 274 N.W. 3 , 4 (1937) (adopting view that Iowa statute precludes spouse's testimony even if defendant marries witness "for the sole purpose of suppressing her testimony"); Norman v. State , 127 Tenn. 340 , 155 S.W. 135 , 135-37 (1913) (upholding the common law spousal privilege when "it is clear that the marriage, so far as [defendant] was concerned, was entered into for the express purpose of shielding himself against prosecution"); State v. McGinty , 14 Wash.2d 71 , 126 P.2d 1086 , 1090 (1942) (recognizing application of the pri

2019See Walsh, supra , at 1305; State v. Chrismore , 223 Iowa 957 , 274 N.W. 3 , 4 (1937) (adopting view that Iowa statute precludes spouse's testimony even if defendant marries witness "for the sole purpose of suppressing her testimony"); Norman v. State , 127 Tenn. 340 , 155 S.W. 135 , 135-37 (1913) (upholding the common law spousal privilege when "it is clear that the marriage, so far as [defendant] was concerned, was entered into for the express purpose of shielding himself against prosecution"); State v. McGinty , 14 Wash.2d 71 , 126 P.2d 1086 , 1090 (1942) (recognizing application of the pri

2012Id. at 510, 668 A.2d 990 .

2005The officer that recorded the statement testified that he arrived “ ‘within two minutes after he was called,’ ” and that Robin was “ ‘very upset, crying, screaming, almost to the point where she was hysterical.’” Id. at 700 , 661 A.2d 175 .

2005The officer that recorded the statement testified that he arrived “ ‘within two minutes after he was called,’ ” and that Robin was “ ‘very upset, crying, screaming, almost to the point where she was hysterical.’” Id. at 700 , 661 A.2d 175 .

2004“Communications between husband and wife occurring during the marriage are deemed confidential if expressly made so, or if the subject is such that the communicating spouse would probably desire that the matter be kept secret, either because its disclosure would be embarrassing or for some other reason.” Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 542 , 380 A.2d 49 (1977) (citation omitted).

2004“Communications between husband and wife occurring during the marriage are deemed confidential if expressly made so, or if the subject is such that the communicating spouse would probably desire that the matter be kept secret, either because its disclosure would be embarrassing or for some other reason.” Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 542 , 380 A.2d 49 (1977) (citation omitted).

2004The *712 appellate court agreed: “In our view, the questions were deliberately asked [by the prosecutor] and the answers fully expected, the effect of which ivas to destroy the spousal privilege and was prejudicial to the [defendant].” Id. (emphasis supplied).

2004As Judge Moylan explained for this Court in Ashford , the spousal privilege embodied in C.J. § 9-105 is available in both civil and criminal trials, and “may be asserted by the spouse who uttered the confidential communication.” Ashford, 147 Md.App. at 59 , 807 A.2d 732 ; see also Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook (3rd ed.1999), § 903, at 374-378; Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence (2001), § 505:2, at 152-155.

2004As Judge Moylan explained for this Court in Ashford , the spousal privilege embodied in C.J. § 9-105 is available in both civil and criminal trials, and “may be asserted by the spouse who uttered the confidential communication.” Ashford, 147 Md.App. at 59 , 807 A.2d 732 ; see also Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook (3rd ed.1999), § 903, at 374-378; Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence (2001), § 505:2, at 152-155.

2003Second, the failure of defendant’s counsel to assert the spousal privilege constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under this state’s two-prong test set forth in People v. Garcia [, 398 Mich. 250 , 247 N.W.2d 547 (Mich.1976) ].

2003Second, the failure of defendant’s counsel to assert the spousal privilege constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under this state’s two-prong test set forth in People v. Garcia [, 398 Mich. 250 , 247 N.W.2d 547 (Mich.1976) ].