spousal privilege in Pennsylvania

2022Section 2901 states as follows, Unless the [trial] court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent or parents' rights have been terminated, the investigation required by [S]ection 2535 (relating to investigation) has been completed, the report of the intermediary has been filed pursuant to [S]ection 2533 (relating to report of intermediary) and all other legal ____________________________________________ 11In R.B.F., supra, our Supreme Court relied upon Section 2901 to afford unmarried, same-sex partners (who were not permitted to ma

2022Our courts have recognized a second exception under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2901, which gives the trial court discretion to grant an adoption in limited circumstances where the party cannot meet the statutory requirements but has demonstrated cause for the noncompliance.6 Id. at 1121 (citing R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1201-02 ) (holding that same-sex couples may pursue Section 2901, where prior to the legalization7 of same-sex marriage, they could not satisfy the spousal exception under Section 2903).

2022See In re Adoption of J.D.S., 763 A.2d 867, 871 (Pa. Super. 2000) (holding that the spousal provision “applies only to ‘stepparent’ situations and has no application to those whose relationship is not a legally recognized marriage.”); see also R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1199-1200 .

2016See R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1202 (“There is no language in the Adoption Act precluding two unmarried same-sex partners (or unmarried heterosexual partners) from adopting a child who had no legal parents.”). (continuedJ) [J-59-2016] - 18 termination or relinquishment of an existing parent’s rights prior to an adoption is to facilitate a “new parent-child relationship” between the child and the adoptive parent, B.E., 377 A.2d at 156 (“Termination of parental rights permits the child and the adoptive parent or parents to establish a new parent-child relationship through adoption”), and to protect “th

2022Nonetheless, when the marital status for purposes of the spousal exception to the relinquishment requirement is not satisfied, our Supreme Court has held that Section 2901 of the Adoption Act permits a trial court, in its discretion, to permit the non-compliance upon a showing of cause as to why the requirement has not been met for purposes of invoking the exception.11 M.R.D. 145 A.3d at 1121 .

2022See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2903, 2901; M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1123 .

2016Fidelity, 924 A.2d at 1271 .

2015Co. of New York v. United Settlement Servs., Inc., 924 A.2d 1270, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that spousal privilege was not separable in case alleging that husband and wife engaged in fraud, because the spousal privilege does not extend to communications that perpetrate a fraud, and the court would have to determine whether fraud was committed to determine whether the privilege applied). - 11 - J-A24027-15 The two privileges cited by LeBoon are as follows: Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, in a civil matter neither husband nor wife shall be competent or permitted to testify

2015We recently explained: We recognize that “Communications between spouses are presumed to be confidential, and the party opposing application of the rule disqualifying such testimony bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.” Commonwealth v. McBurrows, 779 A.2d 509, 514 (Pa.Super.2001) (internal citation omitted).

2011Likewise, in Commonwealth v. McBurrows, 779 A.2d 509 (Pa.Super.2001) (en banc), appeal denied, 572 Pa. 732 , 815 A.2d 632 (2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 829 , 124 S.Ct. 60 , 157 L.Ed.2d 55 (2003), this Court was called upon to decide whether wife’s observance of her husband's act of disposing of a murder weapon was a "confidential communication” for purposes of the spousal privilege.

2014She first asserts that the receipt was subject to the spousal privilege outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5914, which states, neither husband nor wife shall be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made by one to the other, unless this privilege -6- J-A26005-14 In rendering its ruling herein, the trial court relied upon Commonwealth v. Dubin, 581 A.2d 944, 947 (Pa.Super. 1990).

1993The disclosure of the information to a superior is not equivalent to testifying against a spouse and, therefore, the spousal privilege does not apply. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5914, 5923, 5924; Commonwealth v. Dubin, 399 Pa.Superior Ct. 100, 581 A.2d 944 (1990), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 527 Pa. 592 , 588 A.2d 912 (1991) (prohibition against using a spouse’s confidential communications at trial does not apply to actions of police in obtaining information). .

2007The trial court noted that the spousal privilege codified in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5924 1 does not protect communications between spouses as to business or property matters, Commonwealth v. Darush, 279 Pa.Super. 140 , 420 A.2d 1071 (1980), rev’d on other grounds, 501 Pa. 15 , 459 A.2d 727 (1983), and also does not encompass private communications made in furtherance of fraud.

2007The trial court noted that the spousal privilege codified in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5924 1 does not protect communications between spouses as to business or property matters, Commonwealth v. Darush, 279 Pa.Super. 140 , 420 A.2d 1071 (1980), rev’d on other grounds, 501 Pa. 15 , 459 A.2d 727 (1983), and also does not encompass private communications made in furtherance of fraud.

2026The PCRA court responds to this claim with the following: In order for [Appellant] to obtain the spousal privilege to object to his wife’s testimony, the communication had to be a confidential one between husband and wife. [See Commonwealth] v. May, 656 A.2d 1335, 1342 (Pa. 1995).

2024Commonwealth v. Wilson, 672 A.2d 293, 301 (Pa. 1996).

2016See R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1202 (“There is no language in the Adoption Act precluding two unmarried same-sex partners (or unmarried heterosexual partners) from adopting a child who had no legal parents.”). (continuedJ) [J-59-2016] - 18 termination or relinquishment of an existing parent’s rights prior to an adoption is to facilitate a “new parent-child relationship” between the child and the adoptive parent, B.E., 377 A.2d at 156 (“Termination of parental rights permits the child and the adoptive parent or parents to establish a new parent-child relationship through adoption”), and to protect “th

2015Further, our Statutory Construction Act provides that “[w]hen the words of the statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); see Commonwealth v. Valle-Velez, 995 A.2d 1264, 1270 (Pa.Super.2010) (declining “to look beyond the express statutory language at the policy issues surrounding the spousal privilege statute” found in related Section 5913).

2015See Commonwealth v. Mattison, 82 A.3d 386, 394 (Pa. 2013) (“The spousal confidential communications privilege has its roots in common law and ‘is based upon considerations of public policy, as in the case of husband and wife to preserve the peace, harmony and confidence’ in their relations.”).

2010We decline to do so. ¶ 13 Under the commonly accepted tenets of statutory construction, we must apply statutory language as written, and avoid disregarding the language of a statute “under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); Clanton, 151 A.2d at 92 (commenting that “the language of [the spousal privilege] cannot be ignored in pursuit of its spirit even though a broad or liberal construction would obviously protect society in criminal cases.”).

2010We decline to do so. ¶ 13 Under the commonly accepted tenets of statutory construction, we must apply statutory language as written, and avoid disregarding the language of a statute “under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); Clanton, 151 A.2d at 92 (commenting that “the language of [the spousal privilege] cannot be ignored in pursuit of its spirit even though a broad or liberal construction would obviously protect society in criminal cases.”).

2002Judge Kelly noted his agreement with the majority’s analysis, but expressed his “distaste for the spousal privilege as it applies to situations involving the sexual abuse of a child.” 722 A.2d at 717-18 (Kelly, J., concurring).

2002Judge Kelly noted his agreement with the majority's analysis, but expressed his "distaste for the spousal privilege as it applies to situations involving the sexual abuse of a child." 722 A.2d at 717-18 (Kelly, J., concurring).

2002Justice Papadakos opined that the statutes, while badly drafted, revealed a legislative intent “to destroy the spousal privilege where a child in the home suffers violence.” Hancharik, 633 A.2d at 1081 (Papadakos, J., concurring).

2002Justice Papadakos opined that the statutes, while badly drafted, revealed a legislative intent "to destroy the spousal privilege where a child in the home suffers violence." Hancharik, 633 A.2d at 1081 (Papadakos, J., concurring).