spousal privilege in Texas

2005Actual transfer is defined as "the manual transfer of property from the transferor to the transferee or to the transferee's agents or to someone identified in law with the transferee ." Heberling v. State , 834 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tex. Crim.

2005Actual transfer is defined as "the manual transfer of property from the transferor to the transferee or to the transferee's agents or to someone identified in law with the transferee ." Heberling v. State , 834 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tex. Crim.

1995Jones v. State, 859 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd); Gibbons v. State, 794 S.W.2d 887, 893 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1990, no pet.).

1994Gibbons v. State, 794 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1990, no pet.); Fuentes v. State, 775 S.W.2d 64, 65-66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.).

2025See Freeman v. State, 230 S.W.3d 392, 402 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, pet. denied).

2021The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that marrying the witness can constitute wrongdoing, if done so that the witness can invoke a spousal privilege against testifying.25 And the First Circuit has held that fleeing the jurisdiction can constitute the requisite wrongdoing if a witness dies of natural causes before the defendant is apprehended.26 New Mexico’s Supreme Court has concluded that the rationale supporting the doctrine suggests that the interest in disclosing relevant information at trial is paramount and that “any significant interference with that interest beyond the exercise

2021The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that marrying the witness can constitute wrongdoing, if done so that the witness can invoke a spousal privilege against testifying.25 And the First Circuit has held that fleeing the jurisdiction can constitute the requisite wrongdoing if a witness dies of natural causes before the defendant is apprehended.26 New Mexico’s Supreme Court has concluded that the rationale supporting the doctrine suggests that the interest in disclosing relevant information at trial is paramount and that “any significant interference with that interest beyond the exercise

2021The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that marrying the witness can constitute wrongdoing, if done so that the witness can invoke a spousal privilege against testifying.25 And the First Circuit has held that fleeing the jurisdiction can constitute the requisite wrongdoing if a witness dies of natural causes before the defendant is apprehended.26 New Mexico’s Supreme Court has concluded that the rationale supporting the doctrine suggests that the interest in disclosing relevant information at trial is paramount and that “any significant interference with that interest beyond the exercise

2021See id.; Capps v. State, 244 S.W.3d 520, 529 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that jailhouse calls between spouses were not privileged when defendant was aware that calls might be monitored).

2021The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that marrying the witness can constitute wrongdoing, if done so that the witness can invoke a spousal privilege against testifying.25 And the First Circuit has held that fleeing the jurisdiction can constitute the requisite wrongdoing if a witness dies of natural causes before the defendant is apprehended.26 New Mexico’s Supreme Court has concluded that the rationale supporting the doctrine suggests that the interest in disclosing relevant information at trial is paramount and that “any significant interference with that interest beyond the exercise

2021The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that marrying the witness can constitute wrongdoing, if done so that the witness can invoke a spousal privilege against testifying.25 And the First Circuit has held that fleeing the jurisdiction can constitute the requisite wrongdoing if a witness dies of natural causes before the defendant is apprehended.26 New Mexico’s Supreme Court has concluded that the rationale supporting the doctrine suggests that the interest in disclosing relevant information at trial is paramount and that “any significant interference with that interest beyond the exercise

2021The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that marrying the witness can constitute wrongdoing, if done so that the witness can invoke a spousal privilege against testifying.25 And the First Circuit has held that fleeing the jurisdiction can constitute the requisite wrongdoing if a witness dies of natural causes before the defendant is apprehended.26 New Mexico’s Supreme Court has concluded that the rationale supporting the doctrine suggests that the interest in disclosing relevant information at trial is paramount and that “any significant interference with that interest beyond the exercise

2018See Colburn, 966 S.W.2d at 514 (citing TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 104(a); see also McVickers v. State, 874 33 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)).

2018See Barnes v. State, No. 04-13-00346-CR, 2014 WL 6979529 , at *7 (Tex.App.--San Antonio Dec. 10, 2014, pet. ref’d) (citing Aguilar v. State, 715 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (the right to have the issue of the existence of a common-law marriage submitted to the jury “may be waived if such an instruction is not requested”)); see also Hightower v. State, 629 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (finding that appellant’s failure to complain that the issue of a common- law marriage was not submitted to the jury, or to request that it be submitted, waived the error he now seeks to present o

2018See Colburn, 966 S.W.2d at 514 (citing TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 104(a); see also McVickers v. State, 874 33 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)).

2018See Barnes v. State, No. 04-13-00346-CR, 2014 WL 6979529 , at *7 (Tex.App.--San Antonio Dec. 10, 2014, pet. ref’d) (citing Aguilar v. State, 715 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (the right to have the issue of the existence of a common-law marriage submitted to the jury “may be waived if such an instruction is not requested”)); see also Hightower v. State, 629 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (finding that appellant’s failure to complain that the issue of a common- law marriage was not submitted to the jury, or to request that it be submitted, waived the error he now seeks to present o

2017See Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. Crim.

2015Weaver v. State, 855 S.W.2d 116, 119-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993).

2013While we are mindful of Appellant’s admonition that “[t]he courts cannot be made vehicles of fraud,” Dixie Gas & Fuel Co. v. Jacobs, 47 S.W.2d 457, 462 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1932, writ dism’d w.o.j.), Sarah’s purported testimony that Robert did not testify as to the existence of cracks in the ladder at his deposition does not contradict Robert’s trial testimony.

2012Servs., Inc., 22 S.W.3d 331, 337 (Tex. 1999). permitted Cynthia to claim the spousal privilege to refuse to disclose communications with her husband, Rod, about an incident at issue in the underlying litigation.

2010Specifically, Andelman read a portion of the medical forensic examination records to the jury.21 By his eighth issue, Garcia contends that, under Crawford, ―the introduction of the children‘s videotaped statements is a clear violation of the law and is error.‖ In Crawford, the declarant of an out-of-court statement, who was the defendant‘s wife, did not testify at the defendant‘s trial after asserting the spousal privilege.22 The trial court allowed the State to play the defendant‘s wife‘s tape-recorded statement to 19 Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 793 (―If the trial court's decision was within the

2010Act of May 24, 1973 , 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 399, 1973 Tex. Gen.

2007The exception to the spousal privilege did not apply because the wife “was not the injured party in the case being tried.” Young v. State, 603 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tex. Crim.App.1980).

2007On rehearing, Judge Clinton wrote for the court: “[I]t is a case for an offense allegedly committed by [the defendant] against Gould.... ‘[T]he wife was not the injured party in the case being tried.’ ” Young, 603 S.W.2d at 853 .

2006EVID. 513(a) ("Except as permitted in Rule 504(b)(2) [regarding the spousal privilege], the claim of a privilege . . . is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel, and no inference may be drawn therefrom."); McKaine v. State, 170 S.W.3d 285, 293 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.) ("A witness's assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment rights and refusal to testify is not evidence and the jury is not allowed to draw any inferences from such actions.") (citing Rule 513 and Torres v. State, 137 S.W.3d 191 , 198 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)). [12] In fact, Fernan

2006Evid. 513(a) ("Except as permitted in Rule 504(b)(2) [regarding the spousal privilege], the claim of a privilege ... is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel, and no inference may be drawn therefrom.”); McKaine v. State, 170 S.W.3d 285, 293 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.) (“A witness’s assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment rights and refusal to testify is not evidence and the jury is not allowed to draw any inferences from such actions.”) (citing Rule 513 and Torres v. State, 137 S.W.3d 191 , 198 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)). .

1996Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 281 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 , 111 S.Ct. 2914 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991).

1996Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 281 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 , 111 S.Ct. 2914 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991).

1995Jones v. State, 859 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd); Gibbons v. State, 794 S.W.2d 887, 893 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1990, no pet.).

1994Gibbons v. State, 794 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1990, no pet.); Fuentes v. State, 775 S.W.2d 64, 65-66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.).

1994Gibbons v. State, 794 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1990, no pet.); Fuentes v. State, 775 S.W.2d 64, 65-66 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.).