spousal privilege in New Jersey

2012Like' its sister privilege, the spousal privilege is intended to protect the sanctity and tranquility of marriage from the negative consequences which are “presumed to attend the compelled condemnation of one spouse by another in a criminal proceeding.” State v. Baluch, 341 N.J.Super. 141, 171 , 775 A.2d 127 (App.Div.) (citing Briley, supra, 53 N.J. at 505 , 251 A.2d 442 ), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 89 , 784 A.2d 721 (2001).

2012Like' its sister privilege, the spousal privilege is intended to protect the sanctity and tranquility of marriage from the negative consequences which are “presumed to attend the compelled condemnation of one spouse by another in a criminal proceeding.” State v. Baluch, 341 N.J.Super. 141, 171 , 775 A.2d 127 (App.Div.) (citing Briley, supra, 53 N.J. at 505 , 251 A.2d 442 ), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 89 , 784 A.2d 721 (2001).

2017Super. 178, 181 (App. Div. 2010), aff'd, 208 N.J. 519 (2012) (Mauti I), we granted defendant's motion for leave to appeal and reversed the Criminal Part's pretrial ruling, which applied the Supreme Court's holding in In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232 , 243–44 (1979), to pierce the spousal privilege provided by N.J.R.E. 501(2) and compel defendant's wife to testify as a witness for the State. 1 This name is fictitious, as are all the names of Joanne's family members who are mentioned in the record of this case.

2012The issue in this appeal is whether, at the State’s behest, the spousal privilege embodied in N.J.R.E. 501(2) can be pierced by application of the factors we set forth in In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232 , 398 A.2d 882 (1979). 1 The trial judge, guided by Kozlov , ordered a wife to testify as a witness in a sexual assault case against her husband.

2001Such privileges block "the path of the normal trial objective of a search for ultimate truth," ibid. (quoting State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 (1969)), and are recognized only where they "serve a more important public interest than the need for full disclosure," id. at 414, 640 A. 2d 817 (quoting Briley, supra, 53 N.J. at 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 ); State v. Shahamet, 228 N.J.Super. 340, 344 , 549 A. 2d 884 (App.Div.1988). *147 The spousal privilege "does not attract generous and sympathetic application." State v. Ospina, 239 N.J.Super. 645, 651 , 571 A. 2d 1373 (App.Div.), certif.

2001Such privileges block "the path of the normal trial objective of a search for ultimate truth," ibid. (quoting State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 (1969)), and are recognized only where they "serve a more important public interest than the need for full disclosure," id. at 414, 640 A. 2d 817 (quoting Briley, supra, 53 N.J. at 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 ); State v. Shahamet, 228 N.J.Super. 340, 344 , 549 A. 2d 884 (App.Div.1988). *147 The spousal privilege "does not attract generous and sympathetic application." State v. Ospina, 239 N.J.Super. 645, 651 , 571 A. 2d 1373 (App.Div.), certif.

2019In applying 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(3)(C) to the facts of this case, "the agency clearly erred by reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made upon a showing of the relevant factors." H.K., 379 N.J.

2019Super. 354, 364 (App. Div. 2006), the Division has not promulgated regulations interpreting the spousal waiver requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(3)(C).5 Ultimately, we are not bound by the Division's interpretation and "we will not uphold an unreasonable interpretation[.]" Zimmerman, 237 N.J. at 476 .

2014In addition, the marital communications privilege continues to protect confidential communications made during the marriage even if the parties divorce, see id. at 533, 33 A.3d 1216 ; N.J.R.E. 509; the spousal privilege ceases to apply once the marriage ends, State v. Mauti, 416 N.J.Super. 178, 193 , 3 A.3d 624 (App.Div.2010), affd, Mauti, supra, 208 N.J. 519 , 33 A.3d 1216 ; State v. Brown, 113 N.J.Super. 348, 353 , 273 A.2d 783 (App.Div.1971). 2 The State conceded at oral argument before the Appellate Division, see Terry, supra, 430 N.J.Super. at 589 , 66 A.3d 177 and in its motion for leave

2014In addition, the marital communications privilege continues to protect confidential communications made during the marriage even if the parties divorce, see id. at 533, 33 A.3d 1216 ; N.J.R.E. 509; the spousal privilege ceases to apply once the marriage ends, State v. Mauti, 416 N.J.Super. 178, 193 , 3 A.3d 624 (App.Div.2010), affd, Mauti, supra, 208 N.J. 519 , 33 A.3d 1216 ; State v. Brown, 113 N.J.Super. 348, 353 , 273 A.2d 783 (App.Div.1971). 2 The State conceded at oral argument before the Appellate Division, see Terry, supra, 430 N.J.Super. at 589 , 66 A.3d 177 and in its motion for leave

2014In addition, the marital communications privilege continues to protect confidential communications made during the marriage even if the parties divorce, see id. at 533, 33 A.3d 1216 ; N.J.R.E. 509; the spousal privilege ceases to apply once the marriage ends, State v. Mauti, 416 N.J.Super. 178, 193 , 3 A.3d 624 (App.Div.2010), affd, Mauti, supra, 208 N.J. 519 , 33 A.3d 1216 ; State v. Brown, 113 N.J.Super. 348, 353 , 273 A.2d 783 (App.Div.1971). 2 The State conceded at oral argument before the Appellate Division, see Terry, supra, 430 N.J.Super. at 589 , 66 A.3d 177 and in its motion for leave

2014In addition, the marital communications privilege continues to protect confidential communications made during the marriage even if the parties divorce, see id. at 533, 33 A.3d 1216 ; N.J.R.E. 509; the spousal privilege ceases to apply once the marriage ends, State v. Mauti, 416 N.J.Super. 178, 193 , 3 A.3d 624 (App.Div.2010), affd, Mauti, supra, 208 N.J. 519 , 33 A.3d 1216 ; State v. Brown, 113 N.J.Super. 348, 353 , 273 A.2d 783 (App.Div.1971). 2 The State conceded at oral argument before the Appellate Division, see Terry, supra, 430 N.J.Super. at 589 , 66 A.3d 177 and in its motion for leave

2010State v. Lado, 275 N.J.Super. 140 , 151 n. 6, 645 A. 2d 1197 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 271 , 649 A. 2d 1290 (1994).

2010State v. Lado, 275 N.J.Super. 140 , 151 n. 6, 645 A. 2d 1197 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 271 , 649 A. 2d 1290 (1994).

2010State v. Lado, 275 N.J.Super. 140 , 151 n. 6, 645 A. 2d 1197 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 271 , 649 A. 2d 1290 (1994).

2001Such privileges block "the path of the normal trial objective of a search for ultimate truth," ibid. (quoting State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 (1969)), and are recognized only where they "serve a more important public interest than the need for full disclosure," id. at 414, 640 A. 2d 817 (quoting Briley, supra, 53 N.J. at 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 ); State v. Shahamet, 228 N.J.Super. 340, 344 , 549 A. 2d 884 (App.Div.1988). *147 The spousal privilege "does not attract generous and sympathetic application." State v. Ospina, 239 N.J.Super. 645, 651 , 571 A. 2d 1373 (App.Div.), certif.

2001Such privileges block "the path of the normal trial objective of a search for ultimate truth," ibid. (quoting State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 (1969)), and are recognized only where they "serve a more important public interest than the need for full disclosure," id. at 414, 640 A. 2d 817 (quoting Briley, supra, 53 N.J. at 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 ); State v. Shahamet, 228 N.J.Super. 340, 344 , 549 A. 2d 884 (App.Div.1988). *147 The spousal privilege "does not attract generous and sympathetic application." State v. Ospina, 239 N.J.Super. 645, 651 , 571 A. 2d 1373 (App.Div.), certif.

2001Such privileges block "the path of the normal trial objective of a search for ultimate truth," ibid. (quoting State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 (1969)), and are recognized only where they "serve a more important public interest than the need for full disclosure," id. at 414, 640 A. 2d 817 (quoting Briley, supra, 53 N.J. at 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 ); State v. Shahamet, 228 N.J.Super. 340, 344 , 549 A. 2d 884 (App.Div.1988). *147 The spousal privilege "does not attract generous and sympathetic application." State v. Ospina, 239 N.J.Super. 645, 651 , 571 A. 2d 1373 (App.Div.), certif.

2001Such privileges block "the path of the normal trial objective of a search for ultimate truth," ibid. (quoting State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 (1969)), and are recognized only where they "serve a more important public interest than the need for full disclosure," id. at 414, 640 A. 2d 817 (quoting Briley, supra, 53 N.J. at 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 ); State v. Shahamet, 228 N.J.Super. 340, 344 , 549 A. 2d 884 (App.Div.1988). *147 The spousal privilege "does not attract generous and sympathetic application." State v. Ospina, 239 N.J.Super. 645, 651 , 571 A. 2d 1373 (App.Div.), certif.

2001Consistent with our obligation to construe and apply the spousal privilege "`in sensible accommodation to the aim of a just result,'" Szemple, supra, 135 N.J. at 414 , 640 A. 2d 817 (quoting Briley, supra, 53 N.J. at 506 , 251 A. 2d 442 ), and mindful of our inability to unilaterally narrow the *148 privilege by judicial fiat, see Ospina, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 650-51 , 571 A. 2d 1373 (considering the merits of the federal "joint participants" exception to the spousal privilege and noting that a privilege which "protect[s] the harmony of marital bonds forged in shared criminality" may have l

2001It is not of constitutional dimension, id. at 653, 571 A. 2d 1373 , United States v. Hicks, 420 F.Supp. 533, 536, 538 (N.D.Tex.1976), and is only intended to promote the public interest in preserving marital harmony by preventing the discord, repugnance, and humiliation presumed to attend the compelled condemnation of one spouse by another in a criminal proceeding, Briley, supra, 53 N.J. at 505 , 251 A. 2d 442 ; Ospina, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 649-50 , 571 A. 2d 1373 .

2001It emphasizes the assaultive character of the offense by defining sexual penetration to encompass a wide range of sexual contacts, going well beyond traditional "carnal knowledge."2 Consistent with the assaultive character, as opposed to the traditional sexual character, of the offense, the statute also renders the crime gender-neutral: both males and females can be actors or victims. [ Id. at 440-441, 609 A. 2d 1266 .] In footnote 2, following the Court's reference to "carnal knowledge", the Court said the following: (t)his reform replaced the concept of carnal abuse, which was limited to vag

2001It emphasizes the assaultive character of the offense by defining sexual penetration to encompass a wide range of sexual contacts, going well beyond traditional "carnal knowledge."2 Consistent with the assaultive character, as opposed to the traditional sexual character, of the offense, the statute also renders the crime gender-neutral: both males and females can be actors or victims. [ Id. at 440-441, 609 A. 2d 1266 .] In footnote 2, following the Court's reference to "carnal knowledge", the Court said the following: (t)his reform replaced the concept of carnal abuse, which was limited to vag

1991State v. Dyal, supra, 97 N.J. at 237 , 478 A.2d 390 ; State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 , 251 A.2d 442 (1969) (discussing the spousal privilege)., Nor do we find persuasive Ms. Schreiber’s reliance on State v. Elwell, 132 N.H. 599 , 567 A.2d 1002 (1989), a case interpreting New Hampshire’s patient-physician privilege.

1991State v. Dyal, supra, 97 N.J. at 237 , 478 A.2d 390 ; State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 , 251 A.2d 442 (1969) (discussing the spousal privilege)., Nor do we find persuasive Ms. Schreiber’s reliance on State v. Elwell, 132 N.H. 599 , 567 A.2d 1002 (1989), a case interpreting New Hampshire’s patient-physician privilege.

1991State v. Dyal, supra, 97 N.J. at 237 , 478 A.2d 390 ; State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 , 251 A.2d 442 (1969) (discussing the spousal privilege)., Nor do we find persuasive Ms. Schreiber’s reliance on State v. Elwell, 132 N.H. 599 , 567 A.2d 1002 (1989), a case interpreting New Hampshire’s patient-physician privilege.

1991State v. Dyal, supra, 97 N.J. at 237 , 478 A.2d 390 ; State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 , 251 A.2d 442 (1969) (discussing the spousal privilege)., Nor do we find persuasive Ms. Schreiber’s reliance on State v. Elwell, 132 N.H. 599 , 567 A.2d 1002 (1989), a case interpreting New Hampshire’s patient-physician privilege.

1990Cf. State v. Walker, 80 N.J. 187 , 403 A. 2d 1 (1979).

1990Cf. State v. Walker, 80 N.J. 187 , 403 A. 2d 1 (1979).

1989Our careful review of the record persuades us to conclude the evidence of defendant's attempts to marry Sanders "was clearly admissible as illuminating defendant's consciousness of his own guilt." State v. Lassiter, supra, 197 N.J.

1986We, thus, have no occasion to address that question. [2] In State v. Karlein, 197 N.J.

1983As support for its position, the Supreme Court of Washington relied on the spousal immunity analogy, the problem of shifting family assets away from the support of other children in the household, and the difficulty of distinguishing between serious parental misconduct warranting recovery and less extreme torts that should be immunized. 37 Wash, at 243, 79 P. at 788-89 .