spousal privilege in California

2022The court observed, however, that “the Supreme Court in Pendleton did not set a precise standard for when a spousal waiver is deemed unconscionable.” (Facter, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 982 .) In an accompanying footnote, the court noted that “[f]ormer section 1615 (pertaining to unenforceable premarital agreements) applies to premarital agreements as a whole and does not specifically reference spousal support waivers.

2022The court observed, however, that “the Supreme Court in Pendleton did not set a precise standard for when a spousal waiver is deemed unconscionable.” (Facter, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 982 .) In an accompanying footnote, the court noted that “[f]ormer section 1615 (pertaining to unenforceable premarital agreements) applies to premarital agreements as a whole and does not specifically reference spousal support waivers.

2025(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 420 [because the defendant’s statement to his wife constituted a direct and violent threat, “any expectation of confidentiality would have been unreasonable”]; People v. Carter (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 748 , 752–753 [same]; see generally United States v. White (9th Cir. 1992) 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 [protecting threats against a spouse is inconsistent with the purpose of the marital communications privilege, which 58 is to foster marital harmony].) Therefore, the message was not barred by the spousal privilege.

2025Judgments are assigned, sold, and transferred among judgment creditors, collection agencies, and “creditors’ 2 For example, the Enforcement of Judgments Law authorizes the judgment creditor in a judgment debtor examination to conduct “the widest scope for inquiry concerning property and business affairs of the [judgment] debtor.” (Young v. Keele (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1093 ; accord, Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Assn. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 575, 581 .) In addition, certain evidentiary privileges, such as the spousal privilege not to testify, do not apply post-judgment.

2021At times, defendant would apologize to the court for interrupting, but would then continue to argue that Marcy could not testify against him, and would continue telling Marcy not to take the stand. 6 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 11 During a hearing regarding the admission of certain evidence, defendant stated, “Man, what the hell this got to do with the fuckin’ charges now, man?

2021(People v. Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 517-518 [“[t]he crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors generally understand and faithfully follow instructions”].) We conclude the same logic applies to cases involving the spousal privilege.

2020The act constituted wrongdoing if the defendant agreed to marry the witness, and did marry her, with an intent to enable her to claim the spousal privilege. ( Szerlong, supra, at pp. 863- 865.) Commonwealth v. Edwards (2005) 444 Mass. 526 (Edwards), also relied upon by Szerlong, held that wrongdoing may include a defendant’s collusion with a witness when the defendant intends to ensure that the witness will not be heard at trial.

2020(Id. at p. 540; Szerlong, supra, 457 Mass. at p. 863 .) The offer of proof indicated the defendant in telephone calls from jail conspired with the witness and others to procure the witness’s unavailability. ( Edwards, supra, 444 Mass. at pp. 530-531.) The state supreme court, remanding the matter for an evidentiary hearing, held that colluding with a witness could qualify as wrongdoing.

2020(Id. at pp. 798-799.) The appellate court held that the primary rights at issue were not the same and, therefore, the trial court erred by concluding the petition was barred by issue preclusion. 17 “The primary right at issue in the former proceeding was [the respondent’s] own right . . . to receive a share of the decedent’s estate as an omitted spouse.” (Estate of Dito, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 801 .) The issues in that proceeding included the validity of the decedent’s marriage to the respondent and the validity of a spousal waiver contained in a prenuptial agreement.

2020In Commonwealth v. Szerlong (2010) 457 Mass. 858 (Szerlong), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a defendant’s agreement to marry the victim to enable her to claim the spousal privilege and not have to testify against the defendant was wrongdoing that forfeited the right to challenge admitting the victim’s out-of-court statements.

2020The act constituted wrongdoing if the defendant agreed to marry the witness, and did marry her, with an intent to enable her to claim the spousal privilege. ( Szerlong, supra, at pp. 863- 865.) Commonwealth v. Edwards (2005) 444 Mass. 526 (Edwards), also relied upon by Szerlong, held that wrongdoing may include a defendant’s collusion with a witness when the defendant intends to ensure that the witness will not be heard at trial.

2016Said spousal support shall be non-modifiable.‟” ( Thornton, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 251, 253 .) The Glasser court did not quote the entire spousal clause, it merely characterized it this way: “The pertinent language of the support provision is: „Spousal support shall be non-modifiable for any reason whatsoever.‟” (Glasser, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 151 .) 19 Here is the clause from Cesnalis: “„4.

2016Said spousal support shall be non-modifiable.‟” ( Thornton, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 251, 253 .) The Glasser court did not quote the entire spousal clause, it merely characterized it this way: “The pertinent language of the support provision is: „Spousal support shall be non-modifiable for any reason whatsoever.‟” (Glasser, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 151 .) 19 Here is the clause from Cesnalis: “„4.

2016Said spousal support shall be non-modifiable.‟” ( Thornton, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 251, 253 .) The Glasser court did not quote the entire spousal clause, it merely characterized it this way: “The pertinent language of the support provision is: „Spousal support shall be non-modifiable for any reason whatsoever.‟” (Glasser, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 151 .) 19 Here is the clause from Cesnalis: “„4.

2013(See Macaluso v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1042 .) We think the better approach here, on the unique facts before us where it is not clear if the superior court will be issuing further orders regarding the very discovery at issue, is to treat the appeal like a petition for writ of mandate. 5 Section 708.130, subdivision (b) renders the spousal privilege inapplicable to an examination proceeding under this article.

2009(Estate of Shinkle, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006 .) Similarly, Estate of Odian (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 152 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 ], on which Elizabeth relies, did not involve the spousal exception under section 21351, subdivision (a) for spousal transfers.

2009(Estate of Shinkle, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006 .) Similarly, Estate of Odian (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 152 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 ], on which Elizabeth relies, did not involve the spousal exception under section 21351, subdivision (a) for spousal transfers.

2009(Estate of Shinkle, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006 .) Similarly, Estate of Odian (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 152 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 ], on which Elizabeth relies, did not involve the spousal exception under section 21351, subdivision (a) for spousal transfers.

1992News, supra, at p. 2180.) Also, the report explains that the definition of “person” in 18 United States Code section 2510 (6) “is intended to be comprehensive.” (Id. at p. 2179.) 10 The spousal exception set forth in Simpson was narrowed somewhat in Anonymous v. Anonymous, supra, 558 F.2d 677 .

1992News, supra, at p. 2180.) Also, the report explains that the definition of “person” in 18 United States Code section 2510 (6) “is intended to be comprehensive.” (Id. at p. 2179.) 10 The spousal exception set forth in Simpson was narrowed somewhat in Anonymous v. Anonymous, supra, 558 F.2d 677 .

1991The trial court denied the Hovey motion; defendant does not challenge that ruling on appeal. [19] People v. Velasquez, supra, 26 Cal.3d 425 , was vacated by the United States Supreme court and subsequently reinstated in its entirety in People v. Velasquez (1980) 28 Cal.3d 461 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 507 , 622 P.2d 952 ]. [20] Evidence Code section 972, subdivision (f) makes the spousal privilege inapplicable in "A proceeding resulting from a criminal act which occurred prior to legal marriage of the spouses to each other regarding knowledge acquired prior to that marriage if prior to the legal marria

1991The trial court denied the Hovey motion; defendant does not challenge that ruling on appeal. [19] People v. Velasquez, supra, 26 Cal.3d 425 , was vacated by the United States Supreme court and subsequently reinstated in its entirety in People v. Velasquez (1980) 28 Cal.3d 461 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 507 , 622 P.2d 952 ]. [20] Evidence Code section 972, subdivision (f) makes the spousal privilege inapplicable in "A proceeding resulting from a criminal act which occurred prior to legal marriage of the spouses to each other regarding knowledge acquired prior to that marriage if prior to the legal marria

1991The trial court denied the Hovey motion; defendant does not challenge that ruling on appeal. [19] People v. Velasquez, supra, 26 Cal.3d 425 , was vacated by the United States Supreme court and subsequently reinstated in its entirety in People v. Velasquez (1980) 28 Cal.3d 461 [ 171 Cal. Rptr. 507 , 622 P.2d 952 ]. [20] Evidence Code section 972, subdivision (f) makes the spousal privilege inapplicable in "A proceeding resulting from a criminal act which occurred prior to legal marriage of the spouses to each other regarding knowledge acquired prior to that marriage if prior to the legal marria

1989In 1984, in response to the decision of the California Supreme Court in O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 320 , 662 P.2d 427 ], and the state Legislature’s amendment of the Unruh Act in Civil Code section 51.2, the Homeowners Association decided to change the occupancy restrictions at Creekside by raising the minimum age from 45 years to 55 years, and by changing the spousal exception to include a “cohabitant” or “a person who resides with and provides primary physical or economic support to” a 55-year-old resident, so long as said “cohabitant” is over

1989In 1984, in response to the decision of the California Supreme Court in O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 320 , 662 P.2d 427 ], and the state Legislature’s amendment of the Unruh Act in Civil Code section 51.2, the Homeowners Association decided to change the occupancy restrictions at Creekside by raising the minimum age from 45 years to 55 years, and by changing the spousal exception to include a “cohabitant” or “a person who resides with and provides primary physical or economic support to” a 55-year-old resident, so long as said “cohabitant” is over

1988(Wilkes, supra, 44 Cal.2d at p. 688 .) The court noted that “[c]ontrary to the effect of the trial court’s instructions, [defendant] had no power to produce his wife as a witness if she did not consent to testify.” (Ibid., italics added.) Neither Coleman, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1159 , nor Wilkes, supra, 44 Cal.2d 679 , required the defendant to subpoena the witness and to perform the ritual of having her claim the privilege. 2 The prosecutor’s speculation about the motives underlying Ford’s failure to call his codefendants necessarily implied that Ford could have compelled their testimony, and the j

1988Code, § 1322; both repealed effective Jan. 1, 1967.) Accordingly, it was improper to comment on the defendant's spouse's failure to testify, for the defendant could not compel his spouse to testify either for or against him." (Italics added.) In a similar case involving the former spousal privilege, the court emphasized that the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's comment was compounded by the trial court's instruction effectively informing the jury that it should disbelieve the defendant since he did not call his wife to corroborate his testimony. ( Wilkes, supra, 44 Cal.2d at p. 688.) The

1980In People v. Ford, supra, 60 Cal.2d 772 , the court reviewed the propriety of a Penal Code section 1322 exception in which the trial court “overruled the [claim of privilege] on the ground that defendant was charged with ‘a crime committed . . . against the person ... of his wife [kidnaping]. ...” (Italics added.) {Id., at p. 785.) The court upheld the trial court’s decision on the ground that the “charge (which is amply supported by the evidence) rendered admissible Mrs. Ford’s testimony . ...” It further said that “[bjecause of this prima facie violation of the ‘simple kidnaping’ statute . .

1967It is also contended that the entire statement given to Kerr was inadmissible because secured in violation of the rules announced in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ], A contention is also made that the testimony given by defendant’s wife falls within the spousal privilege, and should have been excluded.

1967It is also contended that the entire statement given to Kerr was inadmissible because secured in violation of the rules announced in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ], A contention is also made that the testimony given by defendant’s wife falls within the spousal privilege, and should have been excluded.