19 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Loziergreen2 sentences2015However, for strict liability to be the mental standard, the statute must plainly indicate a purpose to impose it.” State v. Lozier, 101 Ohio St.3d 161 , 2004-Ohio-732 , ¶ 21. 2009When the section neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is sufficient culpability to commit the offense.” {¶ 35} Under R.C. 2901.21(B), “for strict liability to be the mental standard, the statute must plainly indicate a purpose to impose it.” State v. Lozier, 101 Ohio St.3d 161 , 2004-Ohio-732 , 803 N.E.2d 770, ¶21 . | 2 | 7 |
State v. Colongreen2 sentences2009Appellant argues that the deficiency in the indictment so permeated the trial as to cause structural error, citing State v. Colon , 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917 , (" Colon I "). {¶ 16} In Colon I , the court held that because R.C. 2911.02 (A)(2), which defines the crime of robbery, does not specify a particular degree of culpability, nor does the statute plainly indicate that strict liability is the mental standard, pursuant to R.C. 2901.21 (B), the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted recklessly. 2009Appellant argues that the deficiency in the indictment so permeated the trial as to cause structural error, citing State v. Colon , 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917 , (" Colon I "). {¶ 16} In Colon I , the court held that because R.C. 2911.02 (A)(2), which defines the crime of robbery, does not specify a particular degree of culpability, nor does the statute plainly indicate that strict liability is the mental standard, pursuant to R.C. 2901.21 (B), the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted recklessly. | 1 | 6 |
State v. Rowangreen2 sentences2023State v. Moody, 104 Ohio St.3d 244 , 2004-Ohio-6395 , ¶ 5-18 (analyzing R.C. 2919.24 Contributing to unruliness or delinquency of a child and concluding, “for strict liability to be the mental standard, the statute must plainly indicate a purpose to impose it.”). 2022State v. Moody, 104 Ohio St.3d 244, 246 (2004) ("[F]or strict liability to be the mental standard, the statute must plainly indicate a purpose to impose it."). | 1 | 3 |
Grant v. Ohio Department of Liquor Controlgreen2 sentences1996See Grant v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 76 , 619 N.E.2d 1165 , and Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co. (July 22, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 63207, unreported, 1993 WL 276950 . 1996See Grant v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 76 , 619 N.E.2d 1165 , and Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co. (July 22, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 63207, unreported, 1993 WL 276950 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Osborne v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2009As a result, [pursuant to R.C. 2901.21(B),] the state was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant recklessly inflicted, attempted to inflict, or threatened to inflict physical harm.” Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, ¶ 14 . {¶ 21} Relative to this assignment of error, appellant in this case was indicted in Count III of the indictment on illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), which provides: {¶ 22} “(A) No person shall do any of the following: {¶ 23} 2009As a result, [pursuant to R.C. 2901.21(B),] the state was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant recklessly inflicted, attempted to inflict, or threatened to inflict physical harm.” Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, ¶ 14 . {¶ 21} Relative to this assignment of error, appellant in this case was indicted in Count III of the indictment on illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), which provides: {¶ 22} “(A) No person shall do any of the following: {¶ 23} | 2 | 2007–2009 |
Village of Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.
green
1 sentence2017Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. , 77 Ohio St.3d 102 , 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Colon
green
2 sentences2010Thus, the court concluded that the state was required to prove recklessness and that the indictment was defective for failure to charge recklessness, a point that the state conceded. 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008- Ohio- 1624, 885 N.E.2d 917, at ¶ 14-15 . {¶ 42} We went on to hold that “[w]hen an indictment fails to charge a mens rea element of a crime and the defendant fails to raise that defect in the trial court, the defendant has not waived the defect in the indictment,” id. at syllabus, and that instead, a structural error analysis is appropriate, id. at ¶ 23. {¶ 43} Upon reconsideration in Col 2010Thus, the court concluded that the state was required to prove recklessness and that the indictment was defective for failure to charge recklessness, a point that the state conceded. 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008- Ohio- 1624, 885 N.E.2d 917, at ¶ 14-15 . {¶ 42} We went on to hold that “[w]hen an indictment fails to charge a mens rea element of a crime and the defendant fails to raise that defect in the trial court, the defendant has not waived the defect in the indictment,” id. at syllabus, and that instead, a structural error analysis is appropriate, id. at ¶ 23. {¶ 43} Upon reconsideration in Col | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. O'Brien
green
2 sentences2009Appellee’s knowledge of the appropriate mental state standard is evidenced by his continuing efforts, before and during trial, to dismiss the indictment on the basis that such element was not included, in the indictment.” Id. 2009The court found that O’Brien “was neither misled nor prejudiced by the amendment to the originally defective indictment.” Id. {¶ 16} In conclusion, O’Brien held, “An indictment which does not contain all the essential elements of an offense, may be amended to include the omitted element, if the name or identity of the crime is not changed, and the accused has not been misled or prejudiced by the omission of such element from the indictment.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 17} In contrast to the state, Hamilton relies upon State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2 | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Young
green
2 sentences2009As a result, [pursuant to R.C. 2901.21(B),] the state was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant recklessly inflicted, attempted to inflict, or threatened to inflict physical harm.” Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, ¶ 14 . {¶ 21} Relative to this assignment of error, appellant in this case was indicted in Count III of the indictment on illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), which provides: {¶ 22} “(A) No person shall do any of the following: {¶ 23} 2009As a result, [pursuant to R.C. 2901.21(B),] the state was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant recklessly inflicted, attempted to inflict, or threatened to inflict physical harm.” Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, ¶ 14 . {¶ 21} Relative to this assignment of error, appellant in this case was indicted in Count III of the indictment on illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), which provides: {¶ 22} “(A) No person shall do any of the following: {¶ 23} | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Moody
neutral
1 sentence2009“Thus, in construing R.C. 2901.21(B), [the Supreme Court of Ohio has] repeatedly held that in order to impose strict criminal liability, the statute must clearly show such legislative intent.” State v. Moody, 104 Ohio St.3d 244 , 2004-Ohio-6395 , 819 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 6 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Maxwell
green
1 sentence2004However, for strict liability to be the mental standard, the statute must plainly indicate a purpose to impose it. {¶ 22} In State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254 , 2002-Ohio-2121 , 767 N.E.2d 242 , the majority decided that the language of R.C. 2907.321(A)(6) plainly indicated a purpose to impose strict liability. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Maxwell
green
1 sentence2004However, for strict liability to be the mental standard, the statute must plainly indicate a purpose to impose it. {¶ 22} In State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254 , 2002-Ohio-2121 , 767 N.E.2d 242 , the majority decided that the language of R.C. 2907.321(A)(6) plainly indicated a purpose to impose strict liability. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.