23 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rogers v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Rogers v. State, 105 S.W.3d 630, 637 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). 2008Rogers v. State, 105 S.W.3d 630, 637 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). | 5 | 5 |
Hart v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 63 (Tex. Crim. 2010Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). | 3 | 3 |
Elonis v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025Id. at 737 , 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (stating that the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct is the communication’s threatening nature and that therefore the mental state requirement must “apply to the fact that the communication contains a threat”). | 1 | 1 |
Harvey v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See id. at 373–74. | 1 | 1 |
Bridwell v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Bridwell, 804 S.W.2d at 904 ; see also TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449 , 96 S.Ct. 2126 . | 1 | 1 |
Whiting v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See, Whiting v. State, 797 S.W.2d at 48 . | 1 | 1 |
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.green2 sentences2016See Bridwell, 804 S.W.2d at 904 ; see also TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449 , 96 S.Ct. 2126 . 2016See Bridwell, 804 S.W.2d at 904 ; see also TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449 , 96 S.Ct. 2126 . | 1 | 1 |
Sakil v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Appellant contends that an extraneous offense instruction and a mental state instruction in the jury charge were “so egregious and created such harm that [he] did not have a fair and impartial trial.” Sakil v. State, 287 S.W.3d 23, 26 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Lugo-Lugo v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Lugo-Lugo v. State, 650 S.W.2d 72, 88 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Mann v. Stategreen1 sentence2006App. 1995). 23: See Tyra , 897 S.W.2d at 797 (holding that driving an automobile constitutes the use of it and that driving in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury constitutes using it as a deadly weapon); see also Mann v. State , 58 S.W.3d 132, 133 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Tyra v. Stategreen2 sentences2006App. 1979). 21: See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b) (Vernon 2003) (stating the mental state requirement for murder). 22: Tyra v. State , 897 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex. Crim. 2006App. 1995). 23: See Tyra , 897 S.W.2d at 797 (holding that driving an automobile constitutes the use of it and that driving in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury constitutes using it as a deadly weapon); see also Mann v. State , 58 S.W.3d 132, 133 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.green2 sentences1998United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2874 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854, 870 (1978)(“[F]ar more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing *608 with an intent requirement”); Pollard, 687 S.W.2d at 374. 1998United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2874 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854, 870 (1978)(“[F]ar more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing *608 with an intent requirement”); Pollard, 687 S.W.2d at 374. | 1 | 1 |
Wornick Co. v. Casasgreen1 sentence1997Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct that “goes beyond all possible bounds of decency” and that is “regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Stategreen2 sentences1997To support his argument that this court should label section 551.144 as a circumstance oriented offense or a result oriented offense, Tovar relies on State v. Williams, 780 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, no pet.) and Martinez v. State, 879 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). 1997See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lindley v. Lindley
green
2 sentences2015Thus, to support a claim for insane delusion, there must be evidence "not only of a mental error affecting the terms of the will, but that the persistence of this mental error was caused by defective cerebration." Id. 2007Thus, to support 9 a claim for insane delusion, there must be evidence “not only of a mental error affecting the terms of the will, but that the persistence of this mental error was caused by defective cerebration.” Id. | 2 | 2007–2015 |
Prather v. McClelland
green
2 sentences1956The mental error must have been actually operative in the production of the instrument. 175 A.L.R. 956 ; Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574 , 13 S.W. 543 ; Bagwell v. Shanks, Tex.Civ.App., 260 S.W. 222 ; Denson v. Beazley, 34 Tex. 191 . 1956The mental error must have been actually operative in the production of the instrument. 175 A.L.R. 956 ; Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574 , 13 S.W. 543 ; Bagwell v. Shanks, Tex.Civ.App., 260 S.W. 222 ; Denson v. Beazley, 34 Tex. 191 . | 2 | 1956–1980 |
Long v. State
green
1 sentence2013Citing Long, Judge Price reasoned that, although there was no statutory language expressly dispensing with the mental- state requirement, “it is precisely the absence of a culpable mental state as to the victim’s age, when the legislature has prescribed mental elements as to other portions of the offense, that makes the legislative intent clear.” Id. (citing Long, 931 S.W.2d at 291 ). 6 The felony-murder statute provides that a person commits the offense of murder if he “commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission o | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Johnson v. State
green
1 sentence2013Citing Long, Judge Price reasoned that, although there was no statutory language expressly dispensing with the mental- state requirement, “it is precisely the absence of a culpable mental state as to the victim’s age, when the legislature has prescribed mental elements as to other portions of the offense, that makes the legislative intent clear.” Id. (citing Long, 931 S.W.2d at 291 ). 6 The felony-murder statute provides that a person commits the offense of murder if he “commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission o | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Tovar v. State
green
1 sentence1998II.COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING The court of appeals found that (1) the Act places a burden upon governmental officials to conduct open meetings, (2) the action of conducting a closed meeting is not inherently innocent and thus not a circumstance oriented crime; (3) Tovar v. State, 949 S.W.2d 370 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), is not dispositive authority for the proposition that section 551.144 is a result oriented offense; (4) the plain language of section 551.144 indicates that it is a nature-of-the-conduct offense; (5) the Act does not provide a good faith exception or a mistake of law defense; and (6) | 1 | 1998–1998 |
McQueen v. State
green
1 sentence1997Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Williams
green
1 sentence1997To support his argument that this court should label section 551.144 as a circumstance oriented offense or a result oriented offense, Tovar relies on State v. Williams, 780 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, no pet.) and Martinez v. State, 879 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Hawk v. Union Electric Co.
green
1 sentence1980Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574 , 13 S.W. 543 (1890); Gulf Oil Corporation v. Walker, 288 *798 S.W.2d 173 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1956, no writ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Fraser v. Jennison
green
2 sentences1956“A man may believe himself to be the supreme ruler of the universe and nevertheless make a perfectly sensible disposition of his property, and the courts will sustain it when it appears that his mania did not dictate its provisions.” This is the language of Judge Cooley in Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206 , 3 N.W. 882, 900 . 1956“A man may believe himself to be the supreme ruler of the universe and nevertheless make a perfectly sensible disposition of his property, and the courts will sustain it when it appears that his mania did not dictate its provisions.” This is the language of Judge Cooley in Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206 , 3 N.W. 882, 900 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Denson v. Beazley
neutral
1 sentence1956The mental error must have been actually operative in the production of the instrument. 175 A.L.R. 956 ; Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574 , 13 S.W. 543 ; Bagwell v. Shanks, Tex.Civ.App., 260 S.W. 222 ; Denson v. Beazley, 34 Tex. 191 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Bagwell v. Shanks
neutral
1 sentence1956The mental error must have been actually operative in the production of the instrument. 175 A.L.R. 956 ; Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574 , 13 S.W. 543 ; Bagwell v. Shanks, Tex.Civ.App., 260 S.W. 222 ; Denson v. Beazley, 34 Tex. 191 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.