mental requirement in Colorado

2021Whether a statute implies a mental state requirement turns on "the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language" and "the legislative intent represented by the statutory scheme ." People v. Manzo , 144 P.3d 551, 554 ( Colo. 2006 ) ; see also § 18-1-503 (2) , C.R.S. ( 2020 ) ( " [A] culpable mental state may ... be required for the commission of [an] offense ... if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such a culpable mental state." ) . ¶77 At the time of the accident, the Wildlife Code defined "take" as "to acquire possession of wildlife; but such term shall not include the accid

2021Whether a statute implies a mental state requirement turns on “the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language” and “the legislative intent represented by the statutory scheme.” People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551, 554 (Colo. 2006); see also § 18-1-503(2), C.R.S. (2020) (“[A] culpable mental state may . . . be See § 33-6-109(3), C.R.S. (2020); § 33-6-104(1), C.R.S. (2018). “[W]e must interpret [a] statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context . . . .” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 , 11 n.8 (2004). 9 required for the commission of [an] offen

2023Still, our supreme court concluded that the mental state requirement did not apply to the result element because the statute’s “phraseology . . . demonstrate[d] the legislature’s intent to hold the arsonist responsible for the fire’s result, regardless of the arsonist’s awareness of the fire’s danger to other persons or property.” Id. at 1286; see also People v. Benzor, 100 P.3d 542, 544 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that, because “knowingly” appeared only in the conduct clause of the statute but not in the circumstance clause, the legislature intended that the “mental state ‘knowingly’ apply onl

2023Cf. Metcalf, 926 P.2d at 138 (noting that the division’s plain language reading of a statute furthered the statute’s purpose of protecting children from those who intend to deprive the lawful custodian of custody of the child).

2023Still, our supreme court concluded that the mental state requirement did not apply to the result element because the statute’s “phraseology . . . demonstrate[d] the legislature’s intent to hold the arsonist responsible for the fire’s result, regardless of the arsonist’s awareness of the fire’s danger to other persons or property.” Id. at 1286; see also People v. Benzor, 100 P.3d 542, 544 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that, because “knowingly” appeared only in the conduct clause of the statute but not in the circumstance clause, the legislature intended that the “mental state ‘knowingly’ apply onl

2016Local Liquor Licensing Auth., 111 P.3d 568, 570 (Colo. App. 2005), does not satisfy the mental state requirement of “knowingly” in section 12-47-801(4)(a)(I). ¶ 39 The supreme court’s decision in Build It & They Will Drink compels this conclusion even though the court was addressing licensee liability under the Dram Shop Act rather than social host liability.

2005Consider, for example, the driver in Weiderspon v. People, 118 Colo. 529, 534 , 198 P.2d 301, 303 (1948), who merely "heard a `swish' as his truck and the car of the prosecuting witness met and passed." Under today's decision, this driver has good reason not to stop, for ignorance (even willful ignorance) operates in his favor.

2005Consider, for example, the driver in Weiderspon v. People, 118 Colo. 529, 534 , 198 P.2d 301, 303 (1948), who merely "heard a `swish' as his truck and the car of the prosecuting witness met and passed." Under today's decision, this driver has good reason not to stop, for ignorance (even willful ignorance) operates in his favor.

2003See Johnson v. People, supra, 172 Colo. at 77 , 470 P.2d at 40 (if defendant raises a mental defense, he or she still has the right to remain silent during an exam; however "the State is placed at a great disadvantage when it must prepare against a plea of insanity, and if its psychiatrists are met with a wall of silence, they would have no way of forming an opinion as to the defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the act") (quoting State v. Huson; 73 Wash.2d 660 , 440 P.2d 192, 197 (1968)).

2003See Johnson v. People, supra, 172 Colo. at 77 , 470 P.2d at 40 (if defendant raises a mental defense, he or she still has the right to remain silent during an exam; however "the State is placed at a great disadvantage when it must prepare against a plea of insanity, and if its psychiatrists are met with a wall of silence, they would have no way of forming an opinion as to the defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the act") (quoting State v. Huson, 73 Wash.2d 660 , 440 P.2d 192, 197 (1968)).

2003See Johnson v. People, supra, 172 Colo. at 77 , 470 P.2d at 40 (if defendant raises a mental defense, he or she still has the right to remain silent during an exam; however "the State is placed at a great disadvantage when it must prepare against a plea of insanity, and if its psychiatrists are met with a wall of silence, they would have no way of forming an opinion as to the defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the act") (quoting State v. Huson, 73 Wash.2d 660 , 440 P.2d 192, 197 (1968)).

2003See Johnson v. People, supra, 172 Colo. at 77 , 470 P.2d at 40 (if defendant raises a mental defense, he or she still has the right to remain silent during an exam; however "the State is placed at a great disadvantage when it must prepare against a plea of insanity, and if its psychiatrists are met with a wall of silence, they would have no way of forming an opinion as to the defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the act") (quoting State v. Huson, 73 Wash.2d 660 , 440 P.2d 192, 197 (1968)).

2003See Johnson v. People, supra, 172 Colo. at 77 , 470 P.2d at 40 (if defendant raises a mental defense, he or she still has the right to remain silent during an exam; however "the State is placed at a great disadvantage when it must prepare against a plea of insanity, and if its psychiatrists are met with a wall of silence, they would have no way of forming an opinion as to the defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the act") (quoting State v. Huson, 73 Wash.2d 660 , 440 P.2d 192, 197 (1968)).