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29 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rainoldigreen2 sentences2022See ORS 161.105(1) (a culpable mental state is not required if “[a]n offense defined by a statute outside the Oregon Criminal Code clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement for the offense or for any material element thereof”); see also State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486, 491 , 268 P3d 568 (2011) (describ- ing analysis for crimes outside the Criminal Code as a “sequence” where it is first determined whether the legislature intended to dispose of the mental state requirement and then determined, in the same manner as for statutes within the Crimina 2022See ORS 161.105(1) (a culpable mental state is not required if “[a]n offense defined by a statute outside the Oregon Criminal Code clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement for the offense or for any material element thereof”); see also State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486, 491 , 268 P3d 568 (2011) (describ- ing analysis for crimes outside the Criminal Code as a “sequence” where it is first determined whether the legislature intended to dispose of the mental state requirement and then determined, in the same manner as for statutes within the Crimina | 2 | 3 |
State v. Prophetgreen2 sentences2025In Prophet, 318 Or App at 350 (2022), we noted that Owen had established that “all elements other than venue, statute of limitations, and the like, ‘necessarily require[ ] a culpable mental state’ under ORS 161.095(2), regardless of whether the statute provides an explicit mental state.” As relevant here, we concluded in State v. Waterman, 319 Or App 695, 702 , 511 P3d 78 (2022) that the value element of criminal mischief is material, and therefore requires a mental state instruction. 2025In Prophet, 318 Or App at 350 (2022), we noted that Owen had established that “all elements other than venue, statute of limitations, and the like, ‘necessarily require[ ] a culpable mental state’ under ORS 161.095(2), regardless of whether the statute provides an explicit mental state.” As relevant here, we concluded in State v. Waterman, 319 Or App 695, 702 , 511 P3d 78 (2022) that the value element of criminal mischief is material, and therefore requires a mental state instruction. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Sellgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Sell, 328 Or App 82, 97 , 536 P3d 1019 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 63 (2024) (considering the jury’s other findings in deciding that the failure to instruct on the mental state requirement for resisting arrest was harmless). 2025See, e.g., State v. Sell, 328 Or App 82, 97 , 536 P3d 1019 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 63 (2024) (considering the jury’s other findings in deciding that the failure to instruct on the mental state requirement for resisting arrest was harmless). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Owengreen2 sentences2026See State v. Owen, 369 Or 288, 290 , 505 P3d 953 (2022) (establishing that failure to instruct the jury on the applicable mental state was error). 2026See State v. Owen, 369 Or 288, 290 , 505 P3d 953 (2022) (establishing that failure to instruct the jury on the applicable mental state was error). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Perkinsgreen2 sentences2025State v. Gray, 261 Or App 121, 131 , 322 P3d 1094 (2014) (failure to give a mental state instruction as to forc- ible compulsion was not harmless where, “even if the jury believed [the victim’s] version of events * * *, a reasonable juror might have doubted whether defendant knew that he had subjected [the victim] to forcible compulsion, particu- larly given [the victim’s] testimony that she had, on previous occasions, allowed defendant to pull her hair and put his hands on her neck”); State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630 , 529 P3d 999 (2023) (holding that “the failure to submit a required el 2025State v. Gray, 261 Or App 121, 131 , 322 P3d 1094 (2014) (failure to give a mental state instruction as to forc- ible compulsion was not harmless where, “even if the jury believed [the victim’s] version of events * * *, a reasonable juror might have doubted whether defendant knew that he had subjected [the victim] to forcible compulsion, particu- larly given [the victim’s] testimony that she had, on previous occasions, allowed defendant to pull her hair and put his hands on her neck”); State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630 , 529 P3d 999 (2023) (holding that “the failure to submit a required el | 1 | 3 |
State v. Hortongreen2 sentences2026See also Horton, 327 Or App at 260 - 61 (“[D]efendant never raised any issue regarding a mental- state requirement for the value element of criminal mis- chief. * * * We therefore proceed with plain-error review.”). 2026In Horton, the trial court gave no mental-state instruction for the value element of criminal mischief, and the defendant “never raised any issue regarding a mental- state requirement” for that element. 327 Or App at 260 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Stowellgreen2 sentences2022See e.g., State v. Stowell, 304 Or App 1, 9 , 466 P3d 1009 (2020) (citing Jones, 223 Or App at 620 ) (reasoning that 6 The Supreme Court ultimately reversed our decision in Rainoldi, but it did so on the ground that the legislature had clearly intended to dispense with a mental state requirement for ORS 166.270, an offense outside the Criminal Code. 2022See e.g., State v. Stowell, 304 Or App 1, 9 , 466 P3d 1009 (2020) (citing Jones, 223 Or App at 620 ) (reasoning that 6 The Supreme Court ultimately reversed our decision in Rainoldi, but it did so on the ground that the legislature had clearly intended to dispense with a mental state requirement for ORS 166.270, an offense outside the Criminal Code. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2022See e.g., State v. Stowell, 304 Or App 1, 9 , 466 P3d 1009 (2020) (citing Jones, 223 Or App at 620 ) (reasoning that 6 The Supreme Court ultimately reversed our decision in Rainoldi, but it did so on the ground that the legislature had clearly intended to dispense with a mental state requirement for ORS 166.270, an offense outside the Criminal Code. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cunninghamgreen1 sentence2015“In ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. King, 307 Or 332, 339 , 768 P2d 391 (1989); see also State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63 , 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lawrencegreen1 sentence2015“In ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. King, 307 Or 332, 339 , 768 P2d 391 (1989); see also State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63 , 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Peevy v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015“In ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. King, 307 Or 332, 339 , 768 P2d 391 (1989); see also State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63 , 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Heintzgreen2 sentences1978In State v. Heintz, 26 Or App 935, 939-40 , 554 P2d 556 (1976), Judge Tanzer stated in a specially concurring opinion: "The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, borrowed from criminal procedure, is inappropriate in a mental hearing where the issue is the degree of probability of future possibilities rather than the existence of a past fact. 1978In State v. Heintz, 26 Or App 935, 939-40 , 554 P2d 556 (1976), Judge Tanzer stated in a specially concurring opinion: "The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, borrowed from criminal procedure, is inappropriate in a mental hearing where the issue is the degree of probability of future possibilities rather than the existence of a past fact. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Mikkelsen v. Hill
green
2 sentences2026(Emphasis added.) Thus, he contends, the evidence that he presented to the trial panel demonstrates that his conduct was merely negligent and that this court should not conclude that he knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tri- bunal as required to find that he violated RPC 3.4(c).10 We reject that argument because a finding of con- tempt of court has the mental state requirement of willful- ness, and, as the trial panel observed, respondent “freely and voluntarily” admitted, in his Petition to Admit Contempt of Court, that he committed contempt of court by “willfully resist[ 2026(Emphasis added.) Thus, he contends, the evidence that he presented to the trial panel demonstrates that his conduct was merely negligent and that this court should not conclude that he knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tri- bunal as required to find that he violated RPC 3.4(c).10 We reject that argument because a finding of con- tempt of court has the mental state requirement of willful- ness, and, as the trial panel observed, respondent “freely and voluntarily” admitted, in his Petition to Admit Contempt of Court, that he committed contempt of court by “willfully resist[ | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Efimoff
green
2 sentences2026Such an approach might be particularly defensible in a case such as this one, Cite as 346 Or App 402 (2026) 409 where the trial court affirmatively decided that no mental state attached to the element at issue, arguably making it irrelevant which mental state the defendant argued for. 2026It is not unreasonable to suggest that, as long as a defendant raised the issue of a mental state requirement for a partic- ular element, the state had an opportunity to respond, and the trial court decided the issue, the claim of error should be Cite as 346 Or App 402 (2026) 409 deemed preserved for appeal, even if the defendant’s argu- ments have shifted on appeal as to which specific mental state is required. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Waterman
green
2 sentences2025In Prophet, 318 Or App at 350 (2022), we noted that Owen had established that “all elements other than venue, statute of limitations, and the like, ‘necessarily require[ ] a culpable mental state’ under ORS 161.095(2), regardless of whether the statute provides an explicit mental state.” As relevant here, we concluded in State v. Waterman, 319 Or App 695, 702 , 511 P3d 78 (2022) that the value element of criminal mischief is material, and therefore requires a mental state instruction. 2025In Prophet, 318 Or App at 350 (2022), we noted that Owen had established that “all elements other than venue, statute of limitations, and the like, ‘necessarily require[ ] a culpable mental state’ under ORS 161.095(2), regardless of whether the statute provides an explicit mental state.” As relevant here, we concluded in State v. Waterman, 319 Or App 695, 702 , 511 P3d 78 (2022) that the value element of criminal mischief is material, and therefore requires a mental state instruction. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Fletcher
green
2 sentences2023The state concedes that, under State v. Fletcher, 263 Or App 630 , 330 P3d 659 (2014), and State v. Owen, 369 Or 288 , 505 P3d 953 (2022), the trial court erred, but argues that the error was harmless. 2023The state concedes that, under State v. Fletcher, 263 Or App 630 , 330 P3d 659 (2014), and State v. Owen, 369 Or 288 , 505 P3d 953 (2022), the trial court erred, but argues that the error was harmless. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Morgan
neutral
2 sentences2017In fact, the court explained in a footnote, ORS 164.405(l)(b) does not include a mental state requirement for the person who aids the defendant; that person need not know, the court opined, that the defendant is engaging in something “nefarious [and] criminal.” Id. at 801 n 3 (brackets in original). 2017In fact, the court explained in a footnote, ORS 164.405(1)(b) does not include a mental state requirement for the person who aids the defendant; that person need not know, the court opined, that the defen- dant is engaging in something “nefarious [and] criminal.” Id. at 801 n 3 (brackets in original). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Ortiz
green
2 sentences2026“Determining that an error is not harmless is nec- essary for reversal, regardless of whether the error was pre- served or unpreserved.” State v. Ortiz, 372 Or 658, 671 , 554 P3d 796 (2024). 2026“Determining that an error is not harmless is nec- essary for reversal, regardless of whether the error was pre- served or unpreserved.” State v. Ortiz, 372 Or 658, 671 , 554 P3d 796 (2024). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Monaco
green
1 sentence2026If that were, in that the state is not required to prove.” 375 Or at 20-21 n 3. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Gray
green
2 sentences2025State v. Gray, 261 Or App 121, 131 , 322 P3d 1094 (2014) (failure to give a mental state instruction as to forc- ible compulsion was not harmless where, “even if the jury believed [the victim’s] version of events * * *, a reasonable juror might have doubted whether defendant knew that he had subjected [the victim] to forcible compulsion, particu- larly given [the victim’s] testimony that she had, on previous occasions, allowed defendant to pull her hair and put his hands on her neck”); State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630 , 529 P3d 999 (2023) (holding that “the failure to submit a required el 2025State v. Gray, 261 Or App 121, 131 , 322 P3d 1094 (2014) (failure to give a mental state instruction as to forc- ible compulsion was not harmless where, “even if the jury believed [the victim’s] version of events * * *, a reasonable juror might have doubted whether defendant knew that he had subjected [the victim] to forcible compulsion, particu- larly given [the victim’s] testimony that she had, on previous occasions, allowed defendant to pull her hair and put his hands on her neck”); State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630 , 529 P3d 999 (2023) (holding that “the failure to submit a required el | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Simonov
green
1 sentence2022Determining whether an element is a circumstance, con- duct, or result element “ultimately is a matter of legislative intent.” Id. at 546 . 3 Although not at issue here, the same analysis applies to statutes outside the Criminal Code that impose criminal liability unless the legislature clearly indi- cates an intent to dispose of the mental state requirement. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Colby
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 247-48 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. King
green
2 sentences2015“In ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. King, 307 Or 332, 339 , 768 P2d 391 (1989); see also State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63 , 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). 2015“In ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. King, 307 Or 332, 339 , 768 P2d 391 (1989); see also State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63 , 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Dupree
green
2 sentences2014State v. Wolfer, 241 Or 15, 17 , 403 P2d 715 (1965); State v. Dupree, 164 Or App 413, 418-19 , 992 P2d 472 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 361 (2000). 2014State v. Wolfer, 241 Or 15, 17 , 403 P2d 715 (1965); State v. Dupree, 164 Or App 413, 418-19 , 992 P2d 472 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 361 (2000). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Wolfer
green
2 sentences2014State v. Wolfer, 241 Or 15, 17 , 403 P2d 715 (1965); State v. Dupree, 164 Or App 413, 418-19 , 992 P2d 472 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 361 (2000). 2014State v. Wolfer, 241 Or 15, 17 , 403 P2d 715 (1965); State v. Dupree, 164 Or App 413, 418-19 , 992 P2d 472 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 361 (2000). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Herring v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014In addition, we addressed and rejected a similar argument in Herring v. American Medical Response Northwest, 255 Or App 315, 323-26 , 297 P3d 9 , rev den, 353 Or 867 (2013). 11 There, we concluded that nothing in the text, context, or legislative history of ORS 124.100(2)(b), the treble damages provision, supported defendant’s argument that that provision includes a heightened mental state requirement. 2014In addition, we addressed and rejected a similar argument in Herring v. American Medical Response Northwest, 255 Or App 315, 323-26 , 297 P3d 9 , rev den, 353 Or 867 (2013). 11 There, we concluded that nothing in the text, context, or legislative history of ORS 124.100(2)(b), the treble damages provision, supported defendant’s argument that that provision includes a heightened mental state requirement. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Claussen
green
1 sentence2013Finally, the Bar asserts that RPC 8.4(a)(4) does not include a mental state requirement, relying on this court’s statement in Claussen, 322 Or at 482 , that the rule “focuses on the effect a lawyer’s conduct has on the administration of justice, rather than on the lawyer’s state of mind when the conduct is undertaken.” III. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Baty
green
2 sentences2012Under ORS 136.465, a defendant generally may be convicted of attempt to commit a completed crime: “In all cases, the defendant may be found guilty of any crime the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which the defendant is charged in the accusatory instrument or of an attempt to commit such crime.” (Emphasis added.) And, that is generally true even if the mental state requirement of the completed crime is different from the mental state requirement for attempt. 2 See State v. Baty, 243 Or App 77, 86 , 259 P3d 98 (2011) (concluding that when charged with driving under the i 2012Under ORS 136.465, a defendant generally may be convicted of attempt to commit a completed crime: “In all cases, the defendant may be found guilty of any crime the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which the defendant is charged in the accusatory instrument or of an attempt to commit such crime.” (Emphasis added.) And, that is generally true even if the mental state requirement of the completed crime is different from the mental state requirement for attempt. 2 See State v. Baty, 243 Or App 77, 86 , 259 P3d 98 (2011) (concluding that when charged with driving under the i | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences1990The majority admits that this case is distinguishable from Buttrey : "ORS 813.010 does not contain affirmative defenses, nor does it provide any other clear textual indication of legislative intent concerning a mental state requirement." 309 Or. at 368 , 788 P.2d at 977 . 1990The majority admits that this case is distinguishable from Buttrey : "ORS 813.010 does not contain affirmative defenses, nor does it provide any other clear textual indication of legislative intent concerning a mental state requirement." 309 Or. at 368 , 788 P.2d at 977 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Shepard v. Bowe
green
2 sentences1984Beginning with Shepard v. Bowe, 250 Or 288 , 442 P2d 238 (1968), it has consistently held that a psychiatrist conducting an examination for the prosecution may not question a defendant concerning the events surrounding the commission of the alleged crime, even if the defendant’s state of mind at that time is crucial to the mental defense. 1984Beginning with Shepard v. Bowe, 250 Or 288 , 442 P2d 238 (1968), it has consistently held that a psychiatrist conducting an examination for the prosecution may not question a defendant concerning the events surrounding the commission of the alleged crime, even if the defendant’s state of mind at that time is crucial to the mental defense. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.