48 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sevillagreen2 sentences2020See Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d at 24 . ¶ 23 The “degree of punishment is a significant factor to consider in determining whether a statute creates an absolute liability offense” (People v. Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d 113, 122 (1989)), and under the cyberstalking statute, a defendant could be sentenced to one to three years in prison for committing cyberstalking. 2019See Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d at 24 . ¶ 23 The “degree of punishment is a significant factor to consider in determining whether a statute creates an absolute liability offense” (People v. Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d 113, 122 (1989)), and under the cyberstalking statute, a defendant could be sentenced to one to three years in prison for committing cyberstalking. | 3 | 4 |
People v. O'BRIENgreen2 sentences2022See O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d at 94-95. ¶ 40 Applying the reasoning from O’Brien, we conclude that the failure to include a mental state requirement in the section 3-703 offense at issue sufficiently establishes the legislature’s intent to create a less serious offense than in section 4- 104(a)(4). 2022Moreover, if we adopt petitioner’s view and infer a mental state requirement in section 3-703, that construction would render the express mental state requirements the legislature chose to include in other offenses within that article, including one in section 3-703 itself, “ ‘ “meaningless surplusage.” ’ ” O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d at 94 (quoting In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 550). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Fairclothgreen2 sentences2024See People v. Faircloth, 234 Ill. 2024Nere, 2018 IL 122566, ¶ 31, n.4 ; Faircloth, 234 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences2023Absent “a clear legislative purpose to impose absolute liability ***, [a] court will imply a mental state requirement.” People v. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15, 24 (1992). 2020See Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d at 24 . ¶ 23 The “degree of punishment is a significant factor to consider in determining whether a statute creates an absolute liability offense” (People v. Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d 113, 122 (1989)), and under the cyberstalking statute, a defendant could be sentenced to one to three years in prison for committing cyberstalking. | 3 | 3 |
In Re KCgreen2 sentences2022Moreover, if we adopt petitioner’s view and infer a mental state requirement in section 3-703, that construction would render the express mental state requirements the legislature chose to include in other offenses within that article, including one in section 3-703 itself, “ ‘ “meaningless surplusage.” ’ ” O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d at 94 (quoting In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 550). 2022Moreover, if we adopt petitioner’s view and infer a mental state requirement in section 3-703, that construction would render the express mental state requirements the legislature chose to include in other offenses within that article, including one in section 3-703 itself, “ ‘ “meaningless surplusage.” ’ ” O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d at 94 (quoting In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 550). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Molnargreen2 sentences2010This holding comports with that of the supreme court in People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495, 520-21 (2006), which, while holding that the first clause created an absolute liability offense, specifically noted that the second clause had a mental state requirement. 2010This holding comports with that of the supreme court in People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495, 520-21 (2006), which, while holding that the first clause created an absolute liability offense, specifically noted that the second clause had a mental state requirement. | 2 | 2 |
People v. MacKgreen2 sentences1998In our view, appellate counsel’s failure to seek reversal of defendant’s death sentence on the basis of the defective eligibility-stage verdict was patently erroneous.” (Emphasis added.) Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 533 . 1998In our view, appellate counsel's failure to seek reversal of defendant's death sentence on the basis of the defective eligibility-stage verdict was patently erroneous." (Emphasis added.) Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 533, 212 Ill.Dec. 955 , 658 N.E.2d 437 . | 2 | 2 |
Morissette v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021The Court concluded that “[t]here is no dispute that the mental state requirement in [the threat statute] is satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2012 . 2020The Court concluded that “[t]here is no dispute that the mental state requirement in [the threat statute] is satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2012 . | 1 | 7 |
People v. Tollivergreen2 sentences2000In People v. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d 397 (1992), this court modified the holding in Gean with respect to the mental state requirement under section 4 — 104(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code. 2000This court also described the mental state requirement under section 4 — 104(a)(2) as “knowledge plus criminal purpose.” Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d at 403 . | 1 | 3 |
People v. Geangreen2 sentences2000Gean, 143 Ill.2d at 285-86 , 158 Ill.Dec. 5 , 573 N.E.2d 818 . 2000Gean, 143 Ill. 2d at 285-86 . | 1 | 3 |
People v. Guygreen1 sentence2025The appellate court reversed Guy’s attempted first degree murder conviction outright, holding that (1) the attempted first degree murder instruction misstated the law, (2) Guy’s conviction for attempted first degree murder was inconsistent with his conviction for second degree murder, and (3) the jury’s finding that Guy believed in the need for self- defense was a factual determination that precluded a finding of guilt for attempted first degree murder. 2023 IL App (3d) 210423, ¶¶ 61, 65, 67, 85 . ¶3 We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal, which requested that we take the case “on | 1 | 1 |
People v. Neregreen2 sentences2024The court noted that the drug-induced homicide statute “already spells out what act a defendant must commit, what harm must occur, and how the harm must occur, and the only mental state requirement is the defendant’s knowing delivery of a controlled substance.” Id. 2024Nere, 2018 IL 122566, ¶ 31, n.4 ; Faircloth, 234 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Woodgreen1 sentence2019It held the statute’s mental state requirement was met if he transmitted a communication “for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” Elonis, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2012 . ¶ 51 Other Illinois courts addressing section 12-9 have likewise concluded “intentionality on the defendant’s part is required.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Goodwin, 2018 IL App (1st) 152045, ¶ 38 ; see also People v. Wood, 2017 IL App (1st) 143135, ¶ 13 ; Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 10 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dyegreen2 sentences2019It held the statute’s mental state requirement was met if he transmitted a communication “for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” Elonis, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2012 . ¶ 51 Other Illinois courts addressing section 12-9 have likewise concluded “intentionality on the defendant’s part is required.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Goodwin, 2018 IL App (1st) 152045, ¶ 38 ; see also People v. Wood, 2017 IL App (1st) 143135, ¶ 13 ; Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 10 . 2019In Dye, we noted section 12-9 must be interpreted “ ‘within the confines of the first amendment’ ” Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 10 (quoting People v. Diomedes, 2014 IL App (2d) 121080, ¶ 30 , 13 N.E.3d 125 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Elonis v. United States
green
2 sentences2021The Court concluded that “[t]here is no dispute that the mental state requirement in [the threat statute] is satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2012 . 2021These statutory provisions are consistent with the Elonis Court’s recognition that the mental state requirement for communicating a true threat is satisfied if “the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” Elonis, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2012 . | 7 | 2017–2021 |
Virginia v. Black
green
2 sentences2021Accordingly, we conclude that the true threat exception under the first amendment does not mandate that the accused specifically intend to threaten the victim and a statutory ban on threats that requires knowing conduct is not unconstitutionally overbroad. ¶ 58 Arguing for a contrary result, defendant places significant reliance on the statement in Black that “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” See 2020Accordingly, we conclude that the true threat exception under the first amendment does not mandate that the accused specifically intend to threaten the victim and a statutory ban on threats that requires knowing conduct is not unconstitutionally overbroad. ¶ 58 Arguing for a contrary result, defendant places significant reliance on the statement in Black that “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” See | 4 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Relerford
green
2 sentences2018In the appellate court’s view, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. ___ , 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), compelled invalidation of both statutes on due process grounds because the relevant provisions lack a mental state requirement. 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 , ¶¶ 21, 26-27, 31-33. 2017In the appellate court's view, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Elonis v. United States , 575 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2001 , 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015), compelled invalidation of both statutes on due process grounds because the relevant provisions lack a mental state requirement. 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 , ¶¶ 21, 26-27, 31-33, 404 Ill.Dec. 505 , 56 N.E.3d 489 . | 4 | 2017–2020 |
People v. Relerford
green
2 sentences2020Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 15 ; Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531, ¶ 27 . ¶ 33 However, our supreme court found that this court erred in vacating the defendant’s convictions based on Elonis. 2019Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 15 ; Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531, ¶ 27 . ¶ 33 However, our supreme court found that this court erred in vacating the defendant’s convictions based on Elonis. | 2 | 2019–2020 |
People v. Dixon
green
2 sentences2018In vacating -4- defendant’s unsentenced convictions on counts II, III, and IV, the appellate court concluded that it had jurisdiction to address the validity of those convictions under this court’s decision in People v. Dixon, 91 Ill. 2d 346 (1982). 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 , ¶¶ 29-30. ¶ 16 The State appeals from the judgment of the appellate court as a matter of right. 2017In vacating defendant's unsentenced convictions on counts II, III, and IV, the appellate court concluded that it had jurisdiction to address the validity of those convictions under this court's decision in People v. Dixon , 91 Ill. 2d 346 , 63 Ill.Dec. 442 , 438 N.E.2d 180 (1982). 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 , ¶¶ 29-30, 404 Ill.Dec. 505 , 56 N.E.3d 489 . ¶ 16 The State appeals from the judgment of the appellate court as a matter of right. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
People v. Avant
green
2 sentences1993(See People v. Avant (1989), 178 Ill. 1990The precise argument advanced by the defendant was made and rejected in People v. Avant (1989), 178 Ill. | 2 | 1990–1993 |
Town of City of Champaign v. Overmeyer's Inc.
green
2 sentences1979App. 2d 523 , 152 N.E.2d 752 .) The inherent implication of the legislature’s deletion of the specific mental state requirement is that neither intent nor any other criminal mental state is needed to impose liability under the present section 4 — 105(e).” ( 70 Ill. 1979App. 2d 523 , 152 N.E.2d 752 .) The inherent implication of the legislature’s deletion of the specific mental state requirement is that neither intent nor any other criminal mental state is needed to impose liability under the present section 4 — 105(e). | 2 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Frieberg
green
1 sentence2026In this case, the additional qualifier to the requirement of “specific intent” is “for the purpose of causing financial loss to another or bringing some financial gain to oneself,” further refining the mental state requirement. 720 ILCS 5/17-0.5 (West 2020). ¶ 24 We are not swayed by the State’s reliance on the additional statutory language that intent to defraud “includes an intent to cause another to assume, create, transfer, alter, or terminate any right, obligation, or power with reference to any person or property.” Id. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Milka
green
1 sentence2024Milka, 336 Ill. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Goodwin
green
1 sentence2019It held the statute’s mental state requirement was met if he transmitted a communication “for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” Elonis, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2012 . ¶ 51 Other Illinois courts addressing section 12-9 have likewise concluded “intentionality on the defendant’s part is required.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Goodwin, 2018 IL App (1st) 152045, ¶ 38 ; see also People v. Wood, 2017 IL App (1st) 143135, ¶ 13 ; Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 10 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Diomedes
green
2 sentences2019In Dye, we noted section 12-9 must be interpreted “ ‘within the confines of the first amendment’ ” Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 10 (quoting People v. Diomedes, 2014 IL App (2d) 121080, ¶ 30 , 13 N.E.3d 125 ). 2019In Dye, we noted section 12-9 must be interpreted “ ‘within the confines of the first amendment’ ” Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 10 (quoting People v. Diomedes, 2014 IL App (2d) 121080, ¶ 30 , 13 N.E.3d 125 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. DePalma
green
1 sentence1998The second district in People v. DePalma, 256 Ill. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Ramey
green
2 sentences1995(See People v. Pugh (1993), 157 Ill.2d 1, 17 , 191 Ill.Dec. 10 , 623 N.E.2d 255 ; People v. Ramey (1992), 151 Ill.2d 498, 545 , 177 Ill.Dec. 449 , 603 N.E.2d 519 .) Moreover, this court has specifically held that an attorney's apparent misunderstanding of this mental state requirement fell outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. ( Pugh, 157 Ill.2d at 19 , 191 Ill.Dec. 10 , 623 N.E.2d 255 .) Notwithstanding the absence of case law involving the precise defect at issue here, we believe that a competent attorney would have recognized the fundamental importance of 1995(See People v. Pugh (1993), 157 Ill. 2d 1, 17 ; People v. Ramey (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 498, 545 .) Moreover, this court has specifically held that an attorney’s apparent misunderstanding of this mental state requirement fell outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Pugh
green
2 sentences1995(See People v. Pugh (1993), 157 Ill.2d 1, 17 , 191 Ill.Dec. 10 , 623 N.E.2d 255 ; People v. Ramey (1992), 151 Ill.2d 498, 545 , 177 Ill.Dec. 449 , 603 N.E.2d 519 .) Moreover, this court has specifically held that an attorney's apparent misunderstanding of this mental state requirement fell outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. ( Pugh, 157 Ill.2d at 19 , 191 Ill.Dec. 10 , 623 N.E.2d 255 .) Notwithstanding the absence of case law involving the precise defect at issue here, we believe that a competent attorney would have recognized the fundamental importance of 1995(See People v. Pugh (1993), 157 Ill. 2d 1, 17 ; People v. Ramey (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 498, 545 .) Moreover, this court has specifically held that an attorney’s apparent misunderstanding of this mental state requirement fell outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Burton
green
1 sentence1994App. 3d 116, 122 , 558 N.E.2d 1369, 1374 , this court ruled that a mental state instruction is not required when instructing the jury on the elements of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and we have consistently reaffirmed this ruling. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Land green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Summers
green
1 sentence1994(Summers, 202 Ill. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Crane green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Leonard green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Grant green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Camille Corporation, an Illinois Corporation v. William Phares green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Adams green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| The PEOPLE v. Stagg green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Valley Steel Products Co. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Malone green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Leach green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Delay neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| People v. Barksdale green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| The People v. Faulisi green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| The People v. Coolidge green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.