eligibility requirement in Pennsylvania

2025At that time, eligibility for that office was set forth in Article 2, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, which provided, with a limited exception, that Representatives “shall have been citizens and inhabitants of the State for four years, and inhabitants of their respective districts one year next before their election . . . and shall reside in their respective districts during their terms of office.” (Emphasis added.) The eligibility requirement under this former constitutional provision relied upon the concepts of “inhabitance” and “residence,” and the Pennsylvania Constitut

2025At that time, eligibility for that office was set forth in Article 2, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, which provided, with a limited exception, that Representatives “shall have been citizens and inhabitants of the State for four years, and inhabitants of their respective districts one year next before their election . . . and shall reside in their respective districts during their terms of office.” (Emphasis added.) The eligibility requirement under this former constitutional provision relied upon the concepts of “inhabitance” and “residence,” and the Pennsylvania Constitut

2025At that time, eligibility for that office was set forth in Article 2, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, which provided, with a limited exception, that Representatives “shall have been citizens and inhabitants of the State for four years, and inhabitants of their respective districts one year next before their election . . . and shall reside in their respective districts during their terms of office.” (Emphasis added.) The eligibility requirement under this former constitutional provision relied upon the concepts of “inhabitance” and “residence,” and the Pennsylvania Constitut

2025At that time, eligibility for that office was set forth in Article 2, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, which provided, with a limited exception, that Representatives “shall have been citizens and inhabitants of the State for four years, and inhabitants of their respective districts one year next before their election . . . and shall reside in their respective districts during their terms of office.” (Emphasis added.) The eligibility requirement under this former constitutional provision relied upon the concepts of “inhabitance” and “residence,” and the Pennsylvania Constitut

2020Additionally, the Supreme Court stated: [W]e find that this Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Turner, which involved a PCRA petitioner and not a defendant presenting ineffectiveness claims in post-sentence motions, has no bearing on our decision.9 9 As noted, this Court in [Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754 (Pa. 2013)] held that the PCRA’s eligibility requirement that the petitioner be “serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole” did not deny the petitioner due process where she was no longer in custody and had previous opportunities to present ineffectiveness claims.

2020The PCRA court denied the Commonwealth’s motion and found the eligibility requirement under Section 9543(a)(1)(i) unconstitutional as applied to the petitioner because it deprived her of “her due process right to a remedy arising from the alleged denial of the effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 759 .

2026Rather, the Court simply held that a court of common pleas may not administratively “dictate income levels above which an individual [who applies for representation] shall not be permitted to show that he or she does not have the financial resources with which to hire private counsel.” Id. at 1151 .

2025“The evidence should have been given full consideration,” Claimant reasons, “as it directly addresses the eligibility requirement under the law.” Id.

2023Pickens v. Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Board, 890 A.2d 1117 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); and Luther P. Miller.

2023MH Davis, 789 A.2d at 401-04 .

2023See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (b)(4), (c)(1)(i)(A-B); Osorio-Martinez, supra. See also Zaleppa, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the order declining to find Children eligible for SIJS, albeit on other grounds.

2023See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (b)(4), (c)(1)(i)(A-B); Osorio-Martinez, supra. See also Zaleppa, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the order declining to find Children eligible for SIJS, albeit on other grounds.

2023See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (b)(4), (c)(1)(i)(A-B); Osorio-Martinez, supra. See also Zaleppa, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the order declining to find Children eligible for SIJS, albeit on other grounds.

2023See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (b)(4), (c)(1)(i)(A-B); Osorio-Martinez, supra. See also Zaleppa, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the order declining to find Children eligible for SIJS, albeit on other grounds.

2020Delgros, 183 A.3d at 363 .

2013In her first issue, Claimant argues that she meets the eligibility test of Section 402(h) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 802(h), as recently clarified by this Court in Risse v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 35 A.3d 79 (Pa.Cmwlth.2012).

1984Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(e). [2] The term "deliberate" is defined as a "presumed or real awareness of the implications or consequences of one's actions . . . or by fully conscious often willful intent." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 596 (1966). [3] Other jurisdictions that require factfinders to determine whether alcoholic claimants had the ability to abstain from drinking which resulted in their misconduct include Jacobs v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1035 , 102 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1972); Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Jo

1984Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(e). [2] The term "deliberate" is defined as a "presumed or real awareness of the implications or consequences of one's actions . . . or by fully conscious often willful intent." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 596 (1966). [3] Other jurisdictions that require factfinders to determine whether alcoholic claimants had the ability to abstain from drinking which resulted in their misconduct include Jacobs v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1035 , 102 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1972); Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Jo

1984Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(e). [2] The term "deliberate" is defined as a "presumed or real awareness of the implications or consequences of one's actions . . . or by fully conscious often willful intent." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 596 (1966). [3] Other jurisdictions that require factfinders to determine whether alcoholic claimants had the ability to abstain from drinking which resulted in their misconduct include Jacobs v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1035 , 102 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1972); Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Jo

1984Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(e). [2] The term "deliberate" is defined as a "presumed or real awareness of the implications or consequences of one's actions . . . or by fully conscious often willful intent." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 596 (1966). [3] Other jurisdictions that require factfinders to determine whether alcoholic claimants had the ability to abstain from drinking which resulted in their misconduct include Jacobs v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1035 , 102 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1972); Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Jo

1980In Urso v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 39 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 184 , 394 A.2d 1322 (1978), this Court affirmed the award of benefits on the ground that the receipt of support indicated dependency.

1980In Urso v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 39 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 184 , 394 A.2d 1322 (1978), this Court affirmed the award of benefits on the ground that the receipt of support indicated dependency.

1978Lascaris v. Shirley, supra; Doe v. Flowers, 364 F.Supp. 953 (D.C.W.Va.1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 922 , 94 S.Ct. 1921 (1974); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F.Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F.Supp. 165 (D.C.N.M.1972); Doe v. Swank, 332 F.Supp. 61 (D.C.Ill.1971), aff’d sub nom., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 537 , 30 L.Ed.2d 539 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F.Supp. 85 (N.D.Cal.1971), aff’d sub nom., Carlson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 , 92 S.Ct. 446 , 30 L.Ed.2d 364 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F.Supp. 759 (D.Or.1971), aff’d, 404 U.S. 803 , 92 S.Ct. 91 , 30 L.Ed.2d 39 (1971); Doe v. Shap

1978Lascaris v. Shirley, supra; Doe v. Flowers, 364 F.Supp. 953 (D.C.W.Va.1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 922 , 94 S.Ct. 1921 (1974); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F.Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F.Supp. 165 (D.C.N.M.1972); Doe v. Swank, 332 F.Supp. 61 (D.C.Ill.1971), aff’d sub nom., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 537 , 30 L.Ed.2d 539 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F.Supp. 85 (N.D.Cal.1971), aff’d sub nom., Carlson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 , 92 S.Ct. 446 , 30 L.Ed.2d 364 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F.Supp. 759 (D.Or.1971), aff’d, 404 U.S. 803 , 92 S.Ct. 91 , 30 L.Ed.2d 39 (1971); Doe v. Shap

1978Lascaris v. Shirley, supra; Doe v. Flowers, 364 F.Supp. 953 (D.C.W.Va.1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 922 , 94 S.Ct. 1921 (1974); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F.Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F.Supp. 165 (D.C.N.M.1972); Doe v. Swank, 332 F.Supp. 61 (D.C.Ill.1971), aff’d sub nom., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 537 , 30 L.Ed.2d 539 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F.Supp. 85 (N.D.Cal.1971), aff’d sub nom., Carlson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 , 92 S.Ct. 446 , 30 L.Ed.2d 364 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F.Supp. 759 (D.Or.1971), aff’d, 404 U.S. 803 , 92 S.Ct. 91 , 30 L.Ed.2d 39 (1971); Doe v. Shap

1978Lascaris v. Shirley, supra; Doe v. Flowers, 364 F.Supp. 953 (D.C.W.Va.1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 922 , 94 S.Ct. 1921 (1974); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F.Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F.Supp. 165 (D.C.N.M.1972); Doe v. Swank, 332 F.Supp. 61 (D.C.Ill.1971), aff’d sub nom., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 537 , 30 L.Ed.2d 539 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F.Supp. 85 (N.D.Cal.1971), aff’d sub nom., Carlson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 , 92 S.Ct. 446 , 30 L.Ed.2d 364 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F.Supp. 759 (D.Or.1971), aff’d, 404 U.S. 803 , 92 S.Ct. 91 , 30 L.Ed.2d 39 (1971); Doe v. Shap

1978Lascaris v. Shirley, supra; Doe v. Flowers, 364 F.Supp. 953 (D.C.W.Va.1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 922 , 94 S.Ct. 1921 (1974); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F.Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F.Supp. 165 (D.C.N.M.1972); Doe v. Swank, 332 F.Supp. 61 (D.C.Ill.1971), aff’d sub nom., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 537 , 30 L.Ed.2d 539 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F.Supp. 85 (N.D.Cal.1971), aff’d sub nom., Carlson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 , 92 S.Ct. 446 , 30 L.Ed.2d 364 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F.Supp. 759 (D.Or.1971), aff’d, 404 U.S. 803 , 92 S.Ct. 91 , 30 L.Ed.2d 39 (1971); Doe v. Shap

1978Lascaris v. Shirley, supra; Doe v. Flowers, 364 F.Supp. 953 (D.C.W.Va.1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 922 , 94 S.Ct. 1921 (1974); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F.Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F.Supp. 165 (D.C.N.M.1972); Doe v. Swank, 332 F.Supp. 61 (D.C.Ill.1971), aff’d sub nom., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 537 , 30 L.Ed.2d 539 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F.Supp. 85 (N.D.Cal.1971), aff’d sub nom., Carlson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 , 92 S.Ct. 446 , 30 L.Ed.2d 364 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F.Supp. 759 (D.Or.1971), aff’d, 404 U.S. 803 , 92 S.Ct. 91 , 30 L.Ed.2d 39 (1971); Doe v. Shap

1978Lascaris v. Shirley, supra; Doe v. Flowers, 364 F.Supp. 953 (D.C.W.Va.1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 922 , 94 S.Ct. 1921 (1974); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F.Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F.Supp. 165 (D.C.N.M.1972); Doe v. Swank, 332 F.Supp. 61 (D.C.Ill.1971), aff’d sub nom., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 537 , 30 L.Ed.2d 539 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F.Supp. 85 (N.D.Cal.1971), aff’d sub nom., Carlson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 , 92 S.Ct. 446 , 30 L.Ed.2d 364 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F.Supp. 759 (D.Or.1971), aff’d, 404 U.S. 803 , 92 S.Ct. 91 , 30 L.Ed.2d 39 (1971); Doe v. Shap

1978Lascaris v. Shirley, supra; Doe v. Flowers, 364 F.Supp. 953 (D.C.W.Va.1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 922 , 94 S.Ct. 1921 (1974); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F.Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F.Supp. 165 (D.C.N.M.1972); Doe v. Swank, 332 F.Supp. 61 (D.C.Ill.1971), aff’d sub nom., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 537 , 30 L.Ed.2d 539 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F.Supp. 85 (N.D.Cal.1971), aff’d sub nom., Carlson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 , 92 S.Ct. 446 , 30 L.Ed.2d 364 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F.Supp. 759 (D.Or.1971), aff’d, 404 U.S. 803 , 92 S.Ct. 91 , 30 L.Ed.2d 39 (1971); Doe v. Shap

1978Lascaris v. Shirley, supra; Doe v. Flowers, 364 F.Supp. 953 (D.C.W.Va.1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 922 , 94 S.Ct. 1921 (1974); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F.Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F.Supp. 165 (D.C.N.M.1972); Doe v. Swank, 332 F.Supp. 61 (D.C.Ill.1971), aff’d sub nom., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 537 , 30 L.Ed.2d 539 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F.Supp. 85 (N.D.Cal.1971), aff’d sub nom., Carlson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 , 92 S.Ct. 446 , 30 L.Ed.2d 364 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F.Supp. 759 (D.Or.1971), aff’d, 404 U.S. 803 , 92 S.Ct. 91 , 30 L.Ed.2d 39 (1971); Doe v. Shap