eligibility requirement in Ohio

2025By contrast, in reviewing a juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody on weight-of-the-evidence grounds, “the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 10 . {¶25} When ruling on a motion for permanent custody filed by a children’s services agen

2024It makes no difference that exclusion of R.C. 2953.33 relief is found in the previous Revised Code section. {¶ 24} In challenging the trial court's denial of his application for sealing, appellant also relies upon R.C. 1.11, which provides in part that "[r]emedial laws and all proceedings under them shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining justice." Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to liberally construe R.C. 2953.33 to achieve its purpose of transitioning qualified offenders "into meaningful and productive roles."

2020Id.

2018Id. {¶ 10} The statute circumscribes ILC eligibility in various ways.

2013Id. {¶ 14} Prior to Branch’s plea, her attorney confirmed with the trial court that it was denying her motion without a hearing, even though the court obtained an ILC eligibility report and then denied Branch’s motion based on an eligibility requirement.

2009Co. (1972), 465 F.2d 1320, 1325-1326 . {¶ 35} In accordance with the foregoing, we find that the trial court correctly found that appellant did not satisfy the eligibility requirement for intervention found in R.C. 2951.041(B)(7). {¶ 36} Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error is denied. {¶ 37} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

2007Id., citing, in part, Sections 3 and 7 , Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution. {¶ 17} "* * * {¶ 18} "The provisions of Chapter 123, as enacted by ordinance, also provide for promotional examinations and set forth the qualifications necessary to take such examinations. {¶ 19} "* * * {¶ 20} "Section 123.08 (a) sets the initial eligibility requirement to take a promotional examination: `an applicant must have at least one year of service in the rank immediately below the rank for which he is an applicant.' Subdivisions (b) through (d) of that section provide for competitive examinations[.]" {¶

1993Moreover, any contractual ambiguities should be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured, and strictly “against the insurer who drafted the contract language.” Id., 42 Ohio App.3d at 214 , 537 N.E.2d at 675 (citing Suburban Community Hosp. v. Lindquist [1982], 69 Ohio St.2d 302 , 23 O.O.3d 286 , 432 N.E.2d 173 ).

1993Moreover, any contractual ambiguities should be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured, and strictly “against the insurer who drafted the contract language.” Id., 42 Ohio App.3d at 214 , 537 N.E.2d at 675 (citing Suburban Community Hosp. v. Lindquist [1982], 69 Ohio St.2d 302 , 23 O.O.3d 286 , 432 N.E.2d 173 ).

1993Moreover, any contractual ambiguities should be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured, and strictly “against the insurer who drafted the contract language.” Id., 42 Ohio App.3d at 214 , 537 N.E.2d at 675 (citing Suburban Community Hosp. v. Lindquist [1982], 69 Ohio St.2d 302 , 23 O.O.3d 286 , 432 N.E.2d 173 ).

1993Moreover, any contractual ambiguities should be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured, and strictly “against the insurer who drafted the contract language.” Id., 42 Ohio App.3d at 214 , 537 N.E.2d at 675 (citing Suburban Community Hosp. v. Lindquist [1982], 69 Ohio St.2d 302 , 23 O.O.3d 286 , 432 N.E.2d 173 ).