eligibility hearing in Illinois

2011Id. ¶ 86 The defendant in Emerson complained that the judge’s statements conveyed to the jury that the court, and the attorneys, believed the defendant would be found eligible for the death penalty and that an aggravation-mitigation hearing would be necessary, but the supreme court found no error in the judge’s comments.

2011Id. ¶ 86 The defendant in Emerson complained that the judge's statements conveyed to the jury that the court, and the attorneys, believed the defendant would be found eligible for the death penalty and that an aggravation-mitigation hearing would be necessary, but the Supreme Court found no error in the judge's comments.

2006Class X Eligibility The defendant contends that his Class X sentence is unconstitutional in that it violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L.

2006Class X Eligibility The defendant contends that his Class X sentence is unconstitutional in that it violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L.

2002He contends that counsel’s ignorance is demonstrated by a series of alleged omissions: (1) counsel failed to object to the absence of the mental states in the issues instruction for the felony-murder count at the eligibility hearing, or tender a correct instruction; (2) counsel failed to object to the prosecutors’s argument omitting the mental states; (3) counsel failed to present defendant’s testimony that the shot was an accident at the eligibility stage when it would have been relevant to eligibility; (4) counsel essentially conceded the defendant’s eligibility for a death sentence rather t

2002He contends that counsel’s ignorance is demonstrated by a series of alleged omissions: (1) counsel failed to object to the absence of the mental states in the issues instruction for the felony-murder count at the eligibility hearing, or tender a correct instruction; (2) counsel failed to object to the prosecutors’s argument omitting the mental states; (3) counsel failed to present defendant’s testimony that the shot was an accident at the eligibility stage when it would have been relevant to eligibility; (4) counsel essentially conceded the defendant’s eligibility for a death sentence rather t

2001The court in Williams, 317 Ill.

2001The court in Williams , 317 Ill.

2000Cal. 2000) (recognizing same); United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318 , 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing same); United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2000) (indicating that Apprendi established a new constitutional rule and applying the decision retroactively pursuant to Griffith). 6 Notably, the Illinois death penalty statute expressly provides that the eligibility factors for such a punishment must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.

2000Cal. 2000) (recognizing same); United States v. Rogers , 228 F.3d 1318 , 1325-26 (11 th Cir. 2000) (recognizing same); United States v. Nordby , 225 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9 th Cir. 2000) (indicating that Apprendi established a new constitutional rule and applying the decision retroactively pursuant to Griffith ). 6: Notably, the Illinois death penalty statute expressly provides that the eligibility factors for such a punishment must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.

2025However, she further notes, after Cinkus was decided, the legislature, similar to the situation here, amended section 3.1-10-5(b), which currently provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person is not eligible to take the oath of office for a municipal office if that person is, at the time required for taking the oath of office, in arrears in the payment of a tax or other - 10 - 2025 IL App (2d) 250017 indebtedness due to the municipality.” (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West 2022).

2019Although not mentioned by the majority, the record on appeal contains a document titled “Cook County Pension Fund Medical Choice Plus Plan,” 3 containing an “Eligibility” section that states, “You are eligible to enroll in the Plan if you are an ‘Annuitant’ as defined in Section 9-239 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/9-239) and provided that you were last employed with Cook County or the Forest Preserve District.” According to the plain reading of this rule, Levin does not qualify for health care benefits since her last employer was neither Cook County nor the Forest Preserve District.

2019Although not mentioned by the majority, the record on appeal contains a document titled “Cook County Pension Fund Medical Choice Plus Plan,” 3 containing an “Eligibility” section that states, “You are eligible to enroll in the Plan if you are an ‘Annuitant’ as defined in Section 9-239 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/9-239) and provided that you were last employed with Cook County or the Forest Preserve District.” According to the plain reading of this rule, Levin does not qualify for health care benefits since her last employer was neither Cook County nor the Forest Preserve District.

2002In support of his position, the defendant argues that this case is similar to People v. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d 1 , 191 Ill.Dec. 10 , 623 N.E.2d 255 (1993), where this court found that the defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's misapprehension of the law and was therefore entitled to a new death eligibility and sentencing hearing.

2002In support of his position, the defendant argues that this case is similar to People v. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d 1 , 191 Ill.Dec. 10 , 623 N.E.2d 255 (1993), where this court found that the defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's misapprehension of the law and was therefore entitled to a new death eligibility and sentencing hearing.

1995To establish eligibility under that factor the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant was at least 18 years old at the time he committed the murder for which he is being sentenced; (2) the defendant was convicted of another murder in addition to the one for which he is being sentenced; and (3) the defendant, in committing each of the murders, acted with the requisite intent or knowledge. (720 ILCS 5/9—1(b)(3) (West 1992); People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 1, 32-36 .) Each of these three elements was undeniably proved at the defendant’s eligibility hearing in this c

1995The purpose of the eligibility factors enumerated in section 9—1(b) is to "narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and *** reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” (Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862, 877 , 77 L.

1995The purpose of the eligibility factors enumerated in section 9—1(b) is to "narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and *** reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” (Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862, 877 , 77 L.