representation requirement in Pennsylvania

2025To have any meaning, the rule also requires appointed counsel to provide meaningful representation.” Perez, 799 A.2d at 852 (citations omitted). [W]hen appointed counsel fails to amend an inarticulately drafted pro se [PCRA] petition, or fails otherwise to participate meaningfully, this court will conclude that the proceedings were, for all practical purposes, [uncounseled] and in violation of the representation requirement . . . . [A PCRA] petition is effectively [uncounseled] under a variety of circumstances whenever omissions of record demonstrate that counsel’s inaction deprived the petiti

2017Id. [W]hen appointed counsel fails to amend an inarticulately drafted pro se [post-conviction] petition, or fails otherwise to participate meaningfully, this [C]ourt will conclude that the proceedings were, for all practical purposes, uncounseled and in violation of the representation requirement. -5- J-S45013-17 Id. at 852 (emphasis added). “[T]o provide meaningful representation, appointed counsel must at least address the timeliness of a PCRA petition and determine whether the petition fits any exception to the PCRA’s timeliness provision, where the subject petition is untimely on its face.

2019This court has stated “when appointed counsel fails to amend an inarticulately drafted pro se [post-conviction] petition, or fails otherwise to participate meaningfully, this court will conclude that the proceedings were, for all practical purposes, uncounseled and in violation of the representation requirement.” Commonwealth v. Hampton, 718 A.2d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ollie, 450 A.2d 1026 (Pa.Super. 1982), and Sangricco, 415 A.2d at 133 ).

2015Cf. Commonwealth v. Hampton, 718 A.2d 1250, 1253 (Pa. Super. 1998) (finding proceedings effectively -6- J-S53011-15 uncounseled and in violation of the representation requirement “when appointed counsel fails to amend an inarticulately drafted pro se [PCRA] petition, or fails otherwise to participate meaningfully[.]”).

2019This court has stated “when appointed counsel fails to amend an inarticulately drafted pro se [post-conviction] petition, or fails otherwise to participate meaningfully, this court will conclude that the proceedings were, for all practical purposes, uncounseled and in violation of the representation requirement.” Commonwealth v. Hampton, 718 A.2d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ollie, 450 A.2d 1026 (Pa.Super. 1982), and Sangricco, 415 A.2d at 133 ).

2017In addressing the petitioner’s right to counsel under the precursor to the PCRA, we admonished that “[w]hen appointed counsel fails to amend an inarticulately drafted pro se [post conviction] petition, or fails otherwise to participate meaningfully, this court will conclude that the proceedings were, for all practical purposes, uncounseled and in violation of the representation requirement....” [Commonwealth v. Ollie, 304 Pa.Super. 505 , 450 A.2d 1026, 1028 (Pa.Super. 1982)]; [(quoting Commonwealth v. Sangricco, 490 Pa. 126 , 415 A.2d 65 (1980))] (internal quotation marks omitted).

2019This court has stated “when appointed counsel fails to amend an inarticulately drafted pro se [post-conviction] petition, or fails otherwise to participate meaningfully, this court will conclude that the proceedings were, for all practical purposes, uncounseled and in violation of the representation requirement.” Commonwealth v. Hampton, 718 A.2d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ollie, 450 A.2d 1026 (Pa.Super. 1982), and Sangricco, 415 A.2d at 133 ).

2019This Court has stated: “[W]hen appointed counsel fails to amend an inarticulately drafted pro se [post-conviction] petition, or fails otherwise to participate meaningfully, this [C]ourt will conclude that the proceedings were, for all practical purposes, uncounseled and in violation of the representation requirement. . . .” [Commonwealth v.] Ollie, 450 A.2d [1026,] 1028 [(Pa. Super. 1982)] [(]quoting Commonwealth v. Sangricco, 490 Pa. 126 , 415 A.2d 65 (1980)[)] (internal quotation marks omitted).

1981Finally, and of primary importance to this case, we have held that the representation requirement “is not limited to the mere naming of an attorney to represent an accused, but *310 also envisions that counsel so appointed shall have the opportunity and in fact discharge the responsibilities required by his representation.” Commonwealth v. Fiero, 462 Pa. 409, 413 , 341 A.2d 448, 450 (1975). 4 Under the circumstances of this case, an amended petition should have been filed and was necessary for adequate representation.

1981Finally, and of primary importance to this case, we have held that the representation requirement “is not limited to the mere naming of an attorney to represent an accused, but *310 also envisions that counsel so appointed shall have the opportunity and in fact discharge the responsibilities required by his representation.” Commonwealth v. Fiero, 462 Pa. 409, 413 , 341 A.2d 448, 450 (1975). 4 Under the circumstances of this case, an amended petition should have been filed and was necessary for adequate representation.

2015See also Commonwealth v. Kutnyk, 781 A.2d 1259, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2001) (the petitioner was “entitled to counsel to represent him despite any apparent untimeliness of the petition or the apparent non-cognizability of the claims presented”). _______________________ (Footnote Continued) forwarded to the defendant’s attorney and the attorney for the Commonwealth within 10 days of receipt.”). -8- J-S26004-15 It is evident that Williams would like to appeal the dismissal of his PCRA petition but we cannot discern from his pro se notice of appeal exactly which one of the February 4, 2014, orders he t

2011We disagree. *35 As explained above, the CBA at issue in Kozura expressly provided that the grievance “may be referred to arbitration by the Employee ” and gave the union “representative status [at the arbitration] solely at the employee’s behest.” Kozura, 568 Pa. at 72, 74 , 791 A.2d at 1174, 1175 (emphasis added).

2011We disagree. *35 As explained above, the CBA at issue in Kozura expressly provided that the grievance “may be referred to arbitration by the Employee ” and gave the union “representative status [at the arbitration] solely at the employee’s behest.” Kozura, 568 Pa. at 72, 74 , 791 A.2d at 1174, 1175 (emphasis added).