representation defense in California

2025(See, e.g., People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541 [noting that defendant’s complaint in court about counsel were insufficient to require a Marsden hearing when he never indicated he wanted new representation]; People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399 [finding that the trial court is under no obligation to independently raise a Marsden inquiry when a defendant has not made some indication that he or she wants new counsel].) Here, while Williams may have been expressing displeasure with counsel’s failure to visit him, he did not make any indication in his written motion to dismiss that he was r

2025(See, e.g., People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541 [noting that defendant’s complaint in court about counsel were insufficient to require a Marsden hearing when he never indicated he wanted new representation]; People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399 [finding that the trial court is under no obligation to independently raise a Marsden inquiry when a defendant has not made some indication that he or she wants new counsel].) Here, while Williams may have been expressing displeasure with counsel’s failure to visit him, he did not make any indication in his written motion to dismiss that he was r

2025(See, e.g., People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541 [noting that defendant’s complaint in court about counsel were insufficient to require a Marsden hearing when he never indicated he wanted new representation]; People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399 [finding that the trial court is under no obligation to independently raise a Marsden inquiry when a defendant has not made some indication that he or she wants new counsel].) Here, while Williams may have been expressing displeasure with counsel’s failure to visit him, he did not make any indication in his written motion to dismiss that he was r

2025(See, e.g., People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541 [noting that defendant’s complaint in court about counsel were insufficient to require a Marsden hearing when he never indicated he wanted new representation]; People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399 [finding that the trial court is under no obligation to independently raise a Marsden inquiry when a defendant has not made some indication that he or she wants new counsel].) Here, while Williams may have been expressing displeasure with counsel’s failure to visit him, he did not make any indication in his written motion to dismiss that he was r

2024If its bid is the lowest, and it is a responsible bidder, but the contract is awarded to a higher bidder, the elements of a promissory estoppel cause of action appear to be established.” (Kajima/Ray Wilson, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 315 ; see also id. at pp. 311-312 [discussing Swinerton and Universal By-Products].) A public entity’s discretion to reject all bids and the public nature of the contract merely bear on the measure of damages available under a promissory estoppel theory.

2023Under the circumstances, the disclosure was sufficient to permit withdrawal.” (Aceves, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 593 , fn. omitted.) The appellate court rejected a contention it was impermissible for the trial court to accept the representation of defense counsel that a conflict had existed.

2015(People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 125 .) The court did not reversibly err by not conducting a Marsden hearing because it was aware of the allegations made by Taylor and satisfied as to the representation provided by defense counsel.

2015This holding stems from the requirement that a debtor seeking the shelter provided by federal bankruptcy laws disclose all legal or equitable property interests to a bankruptcy court. . . . [¶] The omission of a cause of action or claim "from . . . mandatory bankruptcy filings is tantamount to a representation that no such claim existed." ' " (Gottlieb v. Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 137 (Gottlieb).) 7 This rule "has been applied by California courts." (Hamilton, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1610 .) Thus, " ' "courts that have considered the effect of a debtor's failure to disclose a poten

2014(Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 1239-1240.) Similarly, the Tumlinsons' and Johnston's reliance on Guido v. Koopman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 837 (Guido) for the proposition that as an attorney DeGeorge could not have reasonably relied on "legal matters" is unavailing.

2014(Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 1239-1240.) Similarly, the Tumlinsons' and Johnston's reliance on Guido v. Koopman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 837 (Guido) for the proposition that as an attorney DeGeorge could not have reasonably relied on "legal matters" is unavailing.

2006This holding stems from the requirement that a debtor seeking the shelter provided by federal bankruptcy laws disclose all legal or equitable property interests to a bankruptcy court. ... [1] The omission of a cause of action or claim ‘from . . . mandatory bankruptcy filings is tantamount to a representation that no such claim existed.’ ” {Autos, Inc. v. Gowin, supra, 330 B.R. at p. 795 , citations omitted; accord, In re Superior Crewboats, Inc. (5th Cir. 2004) 374 F.3d 330, 335 ; Youngblood Group v. Lufkin Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n (E.D.Tex. 1996) 932 F.Supp. 859, 867-869 .) Here, the same pa

2006This holding stems from the requirement that a debtor seeking the shelter provided by federal bankruptcy laws disclose all legal or equitable property interests to a bankruptcy court. ... [1] The omission of a cause of action or claim ‘from . . . mandatory bankruptcy filings is tantamount to a representation that no such claim existed.’ ” {Autos, Inc. v. Gowin, supra, 330 B.R. at p. 795 , citations omitted; accord, In re Superior Crewboats, Inc. (5th Cir. 2004) 374 F.3d 330, 335 ; Youngblood Group v. Lufkin Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n (E.D.Tex. 1996) 932 F.Supp. 859, 867-869 .) Here, the same pa

1999Ass'n, Inc. v. Carey Canada (S.D.Fla.1990) 749 F.Supp. 255, 261 . ( 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058 , 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 228 .) This exception arises when counsel, upon discovery and absent consent, immediately withdraws from an unseen concurrent adverse representation which occurred by "mere happenstance." Under those circumstances, the proper disqualification standard is the former representation rule. ( Ibid. ) Nevertheless, the court in Florida Ins.

1999Ass'n, Inc. v. Carey Canada (S.D.Fla.1990) 749 F.Supp. 255, 261 . ( 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058 , 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 228 .) This exception arises when counsel, upon discovery and absent consent, immediately withdraws from an unseen concurrent adverse representation which occurred by "mere happenstance." Under those circumstances, the proper disqualification standard is the former representation rule. ( Ibid. ) Nevertheless, the court in Florida Ins.

1996Consequently, your request for a new trial, based on that ground, is denied.” Discussion In two recent cases, our Supreme Court addressed the issue of the relationship between trial counsel’s license to practice law and the defendant’s state constitutional right to counsel. 4 The first is In re Johnson (1992) 1 Cal.4th 689 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 170 , 822 P.2d 1317 ].

1996Consequently, your request for a new trial, based on that ground, is denied.” Discussion In two recent cases, our Supreme Court addressed the issue of the relationship between trial counsel’s license to practice law and the defendant’s state constitutional right to counsel. 4 The first is In re Johnson (1992) 1 Cal.4th 689 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 170 , 822 P.2d 1317 ].

1992Truck argues that this withdrawal rendered FFIC a former client and that, as such, the less severe former representation standard (see Global Van Lines v. Superior Court (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 483 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 609 ]), rather than the standard governing concurrent representation, should have been applied.

1992Truck argues that this withdrawal rendered FFIC a former client and that, as such, the less severe former representation standard (see Global Van Lines v. Superior Court (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 483 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 609 ]), rather than the standard governing concurrent representation, should have been applied.

1990(Mortimore v. Bashore, supra, 148 N.E. at p. 319; Feen v. Ray, supra, 487 N.E.2d at pp. 622-623; Tri-Mor Bowl, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., supra, 366 N.E.2d at p. 944 .) Here, the Illinois proceedings on their face fail to show that St.

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o

1990(Mortimore v. Bashore, supra, 148 N.E. at p. 319; Feen v. Ray, supra, 487 N.E.2d at pp. 622-623; Tri-Mor Bowl, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., supra, 366 N.E.2d at p. 944 .) Here, the Illinois proceedings on their face fail to show that St.

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o

1990The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons . . . not before the court, and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” (Mortimore v. Bashore (1925) 317 I11. 535 [ 148 N.E. 316 , 319]; see Borrowman v. Howland (1983) 119 Ill.App. 3d 493 [ 457 N.E.2d 103, 107 ]; Estate of Rosta (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 786 [ 444 N.E.2d 704, 707-708 ]; Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Illinois E.P.A. (1982) 111 Ill.App.3d 414 [ 444 N.E.2d 211, 219 ], vacated on o