representation doctrine in Illinois

1921Thus to shackle estates without the power of relief unless every person having a contingent and possible interest could be brought before the court would be to sacrifice the rights and interest of the present generation to those of posterity and of citizens to aliens.” In the present case twenty-five of the descendants of the devisees mentioned in the will as contingent remainder-men in case of the death of Park Longworth without descendants surviving him were in being who were not made parties to the bill, and in this respect the case differs from that of Hale v. Hale, supra. The doctrine of

1894For a further discussion of the doctrine of representation, and its application to cases of this character, see Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227 .

2023People v. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 19 .

2023People v. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 19 .

1980(Glickauf v. Moss; Cales v. Dressler (1924), 315 Ill. 142 , 146 N.E. 162 ; Hale v. Hale (1893), 146 Ill. 227, 256-61 ; Fox Lake Hills Property Owners Association v. Fox Lake Hills, Inc. (1970), 120 Ill.

1960Ed. 219 .” In Mortimore v. Bashore, supra, the court also says that where a party, though not before the court in person, is so far represented by others that his interest receives actual and efficient protection, he will be bound by representation, and says: “The doctrine of representation applies, however, only where persons are before the court who have the same interests as those of persons not in being or not before the court and who will be equally certain to bring forward the merits of such interests and give them effective protection.” In Cales v. Dressier, 315 Ill. 142 , the court say

2024However, Rule 651(c) does not suggest “the certificate is intended to be a comprehensive recounting of all of postconviction counsel’s efforts.” People v. Jones, 2011 IL App (1st) 092529, ¶ 24 .

2023Jones, 2011 IL App (1st) 092529, ¶ 23 .

2021“The so-called ‘doctrine of representation’ requires that those who are brought into the suit ‘have the same interest as have those not brought in, and are equally certain to bring forward the entire merits of the controversy as would the absent persons.’ ” State Farm, 394 Ill.

2021“The so-called ‘doctrine of representation’ requires that those who are brought into the suit ‘have the same interest as have those not brought in, and are equally certain to bring forward the entire merits of the controversy as would the absent persons.’ ” State Farm, 394 Ill.

2007Crum & Forster and Diamond State do not contend that it is “practically impossible” to join all claimants; rather, they contend that the doctrine articulated in Oglesby has “evolved to the extent that a showing of the practical impossibility of joining all parties is no longer required for the doctrine to be applied.” Crum & Forster and Diamond State rely on Yorulmazoglu v. Lake Forest Hospital, 359 Ill.

2007Crum & Forster and Diamond State do not contend that it is “practically impossible” to join all claimants; rather, they contend that the doctrine articulated in Oglesby has “evolved to the extent that a showing of the -15- Nos. 1-06-1310, 1-06-1386, 1-06-1478 (Consolidated) practical impossibility of joining all parties is no longer required for the doctrine to be applied.” Crum & Forster and Diamond State rely on Yorulmazoglu v. Lake Forest Hospital, 359 Ill.

2006Holzer, 295 Ill.

2006Holzer, 295 Ill.

1998Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Soffer , 213 Ill.

1998Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Soffer, 213 Ill.

1987We disagree with Zalk Josephs’ contention that the “doctrine of representation” is not applicable here under Tri-Mor Bowl, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp. (1977), 51 Ill.

1982Meyer v. Kerner (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 33, 38 , 219 N.E.2d 617 ), an exception to this ordinarily inflexible rule has been developed in the “doctrine of representation.” (Tri-Mor Bowl, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp. (1977), 51 Ill.

1977App. 2d 455 , 167 N.E.2d 442 (1st Dist. 1960).) This so-called “doctrine of representation” applies where persons are before the court who have the same interests, and will be equally certain to bring them forward and protect them, as those of persons not before the court.

1977App. 2d 455 , 167 N.E.2d 442 .) This so-called “doctrine of representation” applies where persons are before the court who have the same interests, and will be equally certain to bring them forward and protect them, as those of persons not before the court.

1971Accordingly, we find (1) that the trial court acted within its discretion in obtaining an interpreter for the defendant at the commencement of trial; (People v. Shok (1957), 12 Ill.2d 93 , 145 N.E.2d 86 ; People v. Soldat (1965), 32 Ill.2d 478 , 207 N.E.2d 449 ; (2) the representation by defense counsel was not of such low quality as to reduce the trial to a farce, (People v. Washington (1968), 41 Ill.2d 16 , 241 N.E.2d 425 ); and (3) the record does not support defendant’s claim he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

1971Accordingly, we find (1) that the trial court acted within its discretion in obtaining an interpreter for the defendant at the commencement of trial; (People v. Shok (1957), 12 Ill.2d 93 , 145 N.E.2d 86 ; People v. Soldat (1965), 32 Ill.2d 478 , 207 N.E.2d 449 ; (2) the representation by defense counsel was not of such low quality as to reduce the trial to a farce, (People v. Washington (1968), 41 Ill.2d 16 , 241 N.E.2d 425 ); and (3) the record does not support defendant’s claim he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

2023People v. Quezada, 2022 IL App (2d) 210076, ¶ 14 .

2020Id. ¶ 69 2.

2020In Bethlehem, the plaintiff made the representation that the test chamber could be built (it could but the testing the government required needed two chambers and Bethlehem only had one) and the government, given the fact it had “very little competence concerning the state of the art or knowledge of what equipment might be available to simulate the necessary environment” (Bethlehem Corp., 462 F.2d at 1401 ), could reasonably rely upon the plaintiff’s representations without impliedly warranting their veracity.

2012Mendoza, 402 Ill.

2007Caparos, 364 Ill.

1993(In re Marriage of Vucic (1991), 216 Ill.

1993(Doyle, 144 Ill. 2d at 466-67 .) On the other hand, such a fee may be reasonable where the attorney has expended a great deal of effort on behalf of the client.