19 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Community Health Care Services, Inc.green2 sentences2017Stevens v. Hickman Comm. Health Care Servs., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tenn. 2013) (allowing substantial compliance with the HIPAA form requirement under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E)). “[U]nless strict compliance with a notice content requirement „is essential to avoid prejudicing an opposing litigant,‟ substantial compliance with a content requirement will suffice.” Thurmond, 433 S.W.3d at 520 (quoting Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 555 ). 2017Stevens v. Hickman Comm. Health Care Servs., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tenn. 2013) (allowing substantial compliance with the HIPAA form requirement under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E)). “[U]nless strict compliance with a notice content requirement „is essential to avoid prejudicing an opposing litigant,‟ substantial compliance with a content requirement will suffice.” Thurmond, 433 S.W.3d at 520 (quoting Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 555 ). | 4 | 7 |
Richard Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLCgreen2 sentences2017Stevens v. Hickman Comm. Health Care Servs., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tenn. 2013) (allowing substantial compliance with the HIPAA form requirement under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E)). “[U]nless strict compliance with a notice content requirement „is essential to avoid prejudicing an opposing litigant,‟ substantial compliance with a content requirement will suffice.” Thurmond, 433 S.W.3d at 520 (quoting Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 555 ). 2016After reviewing other medical malpractice cases in which defendants argued strict compliance with notice provisions or particular forms was required, the Court wrote that “unless strict compliance with a notice content requirement „is essential to avoid prejudicing an opposing litigant,‟ substantial compliance with a content requirement will suffice.” Id. at 520 (quoting Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 555). | 2 | 6 |
State v. Haynesgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Haynes, 720 S.W.2d 76 (Tenn. 1986). 2016Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) states that after a trial court instructs the jury, “the parties shall be given an opportunity to object . . . to the content of an instruction that was given or the failure to give a requested instruction.” Although the failure to object does not does not prevent a party from assigning error relative to instructional error in a motion for new trial, our supreme court has stated that “alleged omissions in the jury charge must be called to the trial judge‟s attention or be regarded as waived.” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 509 (Tenn. 2004); see St | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lynngreen2 sentences2012“Rule 30(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that failure to make objection to the content of an instruction ‘shall not prejudice the right of a party to assign the basis of the objection as error in support of a motion for a new trial.’” State v. Lynn, 924 S.W.2d 892, 898-99 (Tenn. 1996). -11- The trial court instructed the jury regarding criminal responsibility as follows: The defendant is criminally responsible as a party to the offense or offenses . . . if the offenses were committed by the defendant’s own conduct, by the conduct of another for which the defendant is c 2000State v. Lynn, 924 S.W.2d 892, 898-899 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Graham, No. 02C01-9507-CR-00189, 1999 WL 225853 , at *12 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Jackson, April 20, 1999). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2016Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) states that after a trial court instructs the jury, “the parties shall be given an opportunity to object . . . to the content of an instruction that was given or the failure to give a requested instruction.” Although the failure to object does not does not prevent a party from assigning error relative to instructional error in a motion for new trial, our supreme court has stated that “alleged omissions in the jury charge must be called to the trial judge‟s attention or be regarded as waived.” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 509 (Tenn. 2004); see St | 1 | 1 |
Berry ex rel. Berry v. Conovergreen1 sentence2015See Berry, 673 S.W.2d at 545 ; see also Forbes, 918 S.W.2d at 452 ; Burton, 394 S.W.2d at 876-77 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Forbesgreen1 sentence2015See Berry, 673 S.W.2d at 545 ; see also Forbes, 918 S.W.2d at 452 ; Burton, 394 S.W.2d at 876-77 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Curtis Myers v. Amisub (SFH), Inc., d/b/a St. Francis Hospital
green
2 sentences2016The Supreme Court began its analysis by examining Myers and Stevens and summarized the pertinent principles articulated in both cases: (1) providing potential defendants pre-suit notice of health care liability claims is the “essence” and “fundamental” purpose of the pre-suit notice requirement, Myers, 382 S.W.3d at 309 ; and (2) unless strict compliance with a notice content requirement “is essential to avoid prejudicing an opposing litigant,” substantial compliance with a content requirement will suffice, Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 555 . 2014Myers and Stevens thus instruct that: (1) providing potential defendants pre-suit notice of health care liability claims is the “essence” and “fundamental” purpose of the pre-suit notice requirement, Myers, 382 S.W.3d at 309 ; and (2) unless strict compliance with a notice content requirement “is essential to avoid prejudicing an opposing litigant,” substantial compliance with a content requirement will suffice, Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 555 . | 3 | 2014–2016 |
Burton v. State
green
1 sentence2015See Berry, 673 S.W.2d at 545 ; see also Forbes, 918 S.W.2d at 452 ; Burton, 394 S.W.2d at 876-77 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Miller v. Alman Construction Co.
green
1 sentence2006Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Gentry v. Betty Lou Bakeries
green
1 sentence2005The Advisory Commission Comments for Rule 51.02 state that “ . . . errors in the charge should be available as grounds for relief on motion for new trial or on appeal, subject to the rules regarding harmless error.” As we stated above, Mr. Bailey’s motion for new trial asserted that the disputed jury instruction amounted to reversible error. -6- KCDC argues that the jury instruction constitutes “invited error,” and cites Gentry v. Betty Lou Bakeries, 100 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. 1936), for the proposition that such an error precludes the property owner from being entitled to relief. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Dukes v. Montgomery County Nursing Home
green
1 sentence1995After citing certain passages from Ma-chules concerning the content of the doctrine, the Court of Criminal Appeals asserted that “the doctrine of equitable tolling has been recognized in Tennessee when the litigant has acted in good faith and the opponent is not prejudiced by the tolling.” However, the two Tennessee cases cited by the Court to support this assertion —Green v. Prince, 53 Tenn.App. 541 , 385 S.W.2d 127 (1964), and Dukes v. Montgomery Co. Nursing Home, 639 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn.1982)—do not involve “equitable tolling” in the Machules sense. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Green v. Prince
green
2 sentences1995After citing certain passages from Ma-chules concerning the content of the doctrine, the Court of Criminal Appeals asserted that “the doctrine of equitable tolling has been recognized in Tennessee when the litigant has acted in good faith and the opponent is not prejudiced by the tolling.” However, the two Tennessee cases cited by the Court to support this assertion —Green v. Prince, 53 Tenn.App. 541 , 385 S.W.2d 127 (1964), and Dukes v. Montgomery Co. Nursing Home, 639 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn.1982)—do not involve “equitable tolling” in the Machules sense. 1995After citing certain passages from Ma-chules concerning the content of the doctrine, the Court of Criminal Appeals asserted that “the doctrine of equitable tolling has been recognized in Tennessee when the litigant has acted in good faith and the opponent is not prejudiced by the tolling.” However, the two Tennessee cases cited by the Court to support this assertion —Green v. Prince, 53 Tenn.App. 541 , 385 S.W.2d 127 (1964), and Dukes v. Montgomery Co. Nursing Home, 639 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn.1982)—do not involve “equitable tolling” in the Machules sense. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Rule v. Empire Gas Corp.
green
2 sentences1985In Rule v. Empire Gas Corp., 563 S.W.2d 551 (Tenn. 1978) our Supreme Court reviewed the law pertaining to a special request for jury instructions as affected by Tenn.R.Civ.P., Rule 51 .02, which provides: “After the judge has instructed the jury, the parties shall be given opportunity to object, out of hearing of the jury, to the content of an instruction given or to failure to give a requested instruction, but failure to make objection shall not prejudice the right of a party to assign the basis of the objection as error in support of a motion for a new trial. 1985Id. at 553 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.