content instruction in Connecticut

2025We review the 26 The defendant argues in his supplemental brief: ‘‘Both parties should have been left to argue what reasonable inferences could be drawn from the evidence during summation, without the court’s emphasizing only one view in its instructions.’’ Page 52 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 54 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper defendant’s claim under this standard.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Scott, 270 Conn. 92, 104 , 851 A.2d 291 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 987 , 125 S. Ct. 1861 , 161 L.

2006We review the defendant’s claim under this standard.”), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 987 , 125 S. Ct. 1861 , 161 L.

2025We review the 26 The defendant argues in his supplemental brief: ‘‘Both parties should have been left to argue what reasonable inferences could be drawn from the evidence during summation, without the court’s emphasizing only one view in its instructions.’’ Page 52 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 54 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper defendant’s claim under this standard.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Scott, 270 Conn. 92, 104 , 851 A.2d 291 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 987 , 125 S. Ct. 1861 , 161 L.

2006We review the defendant’s claim under this standard.”), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 987 , 125 S. Ct. 1861 , 161 L.

2017See State v. King , 321 Conn. 135 , 154, 136 A.3d 1210 (2016) (when charging document and state's presentation of evidence were sufficient to put defendant on notice of state's theory that two charges requiring mutually inconsistent mental states related to different acts and different results, defendant could be convicted of both charges even though "the trial court never explicitly informed the jury that it could deliver a guilty verdict on both charges"); cf. State v. Spikes , 111 Conn.App. 543 , 553, 961 A.2d 426 (2008) ("[w]hen the nature of the crime as charged in the information and the

2017See State v. King, 321 Conn. 135 , 154, 136 A.3d 1210 (2016) (when charging document and state’s presentation of evidence were sufficient to put defen- dant on notice of state’s theory that two charges requir- ing mutually inconsistent mental states related to different acts and different results, defendant could be convicted of both charges even though ‘‘the trial court never explicitly informed the jury that it could deliver a guilty verdict on both charges’’); cf. State v. Spikes, 111 Conn. App. 543, 553 , 961 A.2d 426 (2008) (‘‘[w]hen the nature of the crime as charged in the information a

2017See State v. King , 321 Conn. 135 , 154, 136 A.3d 1210 (2016) (when charging document and state's presentation of evidence were sufficient to put defendant on notice of state's theory that two charges requiring mutually inconsistent mental states related to different acts and different results, defendant could be convicted of both charges even though "the trial court never explicitly informed the jury that it could deliver a guilty verdict on both charges"); cf. State v. Spikes , 111 Conn.App. 543 , 553, 961 A.2d 426 (2008) ("[w]hen the nature of the crime as charged in the information and the

2017See State v. King, 321 Conn. 135 , 154, 136 A.3d 1210 (2016) (when charging document and state’s presentation of evidence were sufficient to put defen- dant on notice of state’s theory that two charges requir- ing mutually inconsistent mental states related to different acts and different results, defendant could be convicted of both charges even though ‘‘the trial court never explicitly informed the jury that it could deliver a guilty verdict on both charges’’); cf. State v. Spikes, 111 Conn. App. 543, 553 , 961 A.2d 426 (2008) (‘‘[w]hen the nature of the crime as charged in the information a

2017See State v. King , 321 Conn. 135 , 154, 136 A.3d 1210 (2016) (when charging document and state's presentation of evidence were sufficient to put defendant on notice of state's theory that two charges requiring mutually inconsistent mental states related to different acts and different results, defendant could be convicted of both charges even though "the trial court never explicitly informed the jury that it could deliver a guilty verdict on both charges"); cf. State v. Spikes , 111 Conn.App. 543 , 553, 961 A.2d 426 (2008) ("[w]hen the nature of the crime as charged in the information and the

2017See State v. King , 321 Conn. 135 , 154, 136 A.3d 1210 (2016) (when charging document and state's presentation of evidence were sufficient to put defendant on notice of state's theory that two charges requiring mutually inconsistent mental states related to different acts and different results, defendant could be convicted of both charges even though "the trial court never explicitly informed the jury that it could deliver a guilty verdict on both charges"); cf. State v. Spikes , 111 Conn.App. 543 , 553, 961 A.2d 426 (2008) ("[w]hen the nature of the crime as charged in the information and the

2009It is well established that “[t]he decision whether to give an instruction on flight, as well as the content of such an instruction, if given, should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Figueroa, 257 Conn. 192, 196 , 777 A.2d 587 (2001). “[F]light, when unexplained, tends to prove a consciousness of guilt. . . .

2009It is well established that “[t]he decision whether to give an instruction on flight, as well as the content of such an instruction, if given, should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Figueroa, 257 Conn. 192, 196 , 777 A.2d 587 (2001). “[F]light, when unexplained, tends to prove a consciousness of guilt. . . .

2018In opposing the defendant's request that we exercise supervisory authority to reach his state constitutional claim, the Appellate Court framed the issue in justiciability terms: "Because we have determined in the present case that Miranda warnings were not required because the defendant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation, any further discussion about the content of such warnings would be untethered to any actual controversy and, thus, premature." State v. Castillo , supra, 165 Conn. App. at 730 , 140 A.3d 301 .

2018In opposing the defendant's request that we exercise supervisory authority to reach his state constitutional claim, the Appellate Court framed the issue in justiciability terms: "Because we have determined in the present case that Miranda warnings were not required because the defendant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation, any further discussion about the content of such warnings would be untethered to any actual controversy and, thus, premature." State v. Castillo , supra, 165 Conn. App. at 730 , 140 A.3d 301 .

2017Under the well established principle that "[w]hat's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander"; State v. Fernandez , 5 Conn.App. 40 , 52, 496 A.2d 533 (1985) ; 11 this bolsters our conclusion that, when the defendant has been charged with two offenses requiring mutually exclusive states of mind, the manner in which the state has presented the evidence is sufficient to put all parties on notice as to whether the offenses relate to the same act and result.

2017Under the well established principle that "[w]hat's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander"; State v. Fernandez , 5 Conn.App. 40 , 52, 496 A.2d 533 (1985) ; 11 this bolsters our conclusion that, when the defendant has been charged with two offenses requiring mutually exclusive states of mind, the manner in which the state has presented the evidence is sufficient to put all parties on notice as to whether the offenses relate to the same act and result.

2009To prevail on her claim, the defendant must establish both that the court abused its discretion and that she suffered harm as a result. 5 See State v. Hinds, 86 Conn. App. 557, 568 , 861 A.2d 1219 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 915 , 871 A.2d 372 (2005).

2009To prevail on her claim, the defendant must establish both that the court abused its discretion and that she suffered harm as a result. 5 See State v. Hinds, 86 Conn. App. 557, 568 , 861 A.2d 1219 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 915 , 871 A.2d 372 (2005).

2009To prevail on her claim, the defendant must establish both that the court abused its discretion and that she suffered harm as a result. [5] See State v. Hinds, 86 Conn.App. 557, 568 , 861 A.2d 1219 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 915 , 871 A.2d 372 (2005).

2009To prevail on her claim, the defendant must establish both that the court abused its discretion and that she suffered harm as a result. 5 See State v. Hinds, 86 Conn. App. 557, 568 , 861 A.2d 1219 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 915 , 871 A.2d 372 (2005).

2009To prevail on her claim, the defendant must establish both that the court abused its discretion and that she suffered harm as a result. [5] See State v. Hinds, 86 Conn.App. 557, 568 , 861 A.2d 1219 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 915 , 871 A.2d 372 (2005).

2009To prevail on her claim, the defendant must establish both that the court abused its discretion and that she suffered harm as a result. 5 See State v. Hinds, 86 Conn. App. 557, 568 , 861 A.2d 1219 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 915 , 871 A.2d 372 (2005).

2008Id.

2003Accordingly, [i]n reviewing a constitutional challenge to the trial court’s instruction, we must consider the jury charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the instruction misled the jury.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478, 490 , 820 A.2d 1024 (2003). “[T]he decision whether to give an instruction on [consciousness of guilt], as well as the content of such an instruction, if given, should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jackson, 75 Conn. App. 57

2003Accordingly, [i]n reviewing a constitutional challenge to the trial court’s instruction, we must consider the jury charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the instruction misled the jury.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478, 490 , 820 A.2d 1024 (2003). “[T]he decision whether to give an instruction on [consciousness of guilt], as well as the content of such an instruction, if given, should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jackson, 75 Conn. App. 57

2003Accordingly, [i]n reviewing a constitutional challenge to the trial court’s instruction, we must consider the jury charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the instruction misled the jury.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478, 490 , 820 A.2d 1024 (2003). “[T]he decision whether to give an instruction on [consciousness of guilt], as well as the content of such an instruction, if given, should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jackson, 75 Conn. App. 57

2003Accordingly, [i]n reviewing a constitutional challenge to the trial court’s instruction, we must consider the jury charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the instruction misled the jury.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478, 490 , 820 A.2d 1024 (2003). “[T]he decision whether to give an instruction on [consciousness of guilt], as well as the content of such an instruction, if given, should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jackson, 75 Conn. App. 57

2000Thus, in Connecticut, a claim that a lawyer violated a rule of professional responsibility is not alone a sufficient basis to establish legal liability, but the content of a rule may be evidence of a particular standard of care in a properly framed malpractice action. [cf. also, Biller Assoc. v. Peterken, 58 Conn. App. 8 (2000) where the Appellate Court considered the requirements of Rule 1.15(b) as evidence of the applicable standard of care. ] To the extent that the factual allegations of the third count are mere repetitions of the allegations of the prior two counts only cast as breaches of

1992The practice followed by the plaintiff of attaching a copy of the complaint to the notice was found by our Supreme Court to satisfy the content requirement of Connecticut General Statutes Section 31-293 , Winslow v. Lewis Shepard, Inc. 216 Conn. 533 , 540 (1990).