Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gibbons v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2025Whether an instruction is coercive “will necessarily depend on the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given.” Gibbons v. People, 2014 CO 67, ¶ 30 . ¶ 28 “[A]ddressing the fluid dynamics associated with possible deadlock is a quintessential [trial] court responsibility”; thus, trial courts have broad discretion in this area. 2020See People v. Schwartz, 678 P.2d 1000, 1012 (Colo. 1984). 7 ¶ 17 Whether an instruction is coercive “will necessarily depend on the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given.” Gibbons v. People, 2014 CO 67, ¶ 30 . | 1 | 4 |
People v. Schwartzgreen2 sentences2025“A court cannot sanction a verdict ‘which is reached by some members of the 18 jury sacrificing their conscientious opinions merely for the sake of reaching an agreement.’” Id. (quoting Lowe v. People, 488 P.2d 559, 561 (Colo. 1971)). “[T]he coercive effect of a supplemental jury instruction . . . will necessarily depend on the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given.” Gibbons, ¶ 30. ¶ 41 If a jury signals that it is at an impasse, the trial court can mitigate some coercive risk by giving the jury a modified-Allen instruction. 2020See People v. Schwartz, 678 P.2d 1000, 1012 (Colo. 1984). 7 ¶ 17 Whether an instruction is coercive “will necessarily depend on the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given.” Gibbons v. People, 2014 CO 67, ¶ 30 . | 1 | 2 |
Lowe v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2025“A court cannot sanction a verdict ‘which is reached by some members of the 18 jury sacrificing their conscientious opinions merely for the sake of reaching an agreement.’” Id. (quoting Lowe v. People, 488 P.2d 559, 561 (Colo. 1971)). “[T]he coercive effect of a supplemental jury instruction . . . will necessarily depend on the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given.” Gibbons, ¶ 30. ¶ 41 If a jury signals that it is at an impasse, the trial court can mitigate some coercive risk by giving the jury a modified-Allen instruction. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Riosgreen1 sentence2018See People v. Rios, 2014 COA 90, ¶ 23 (there was no reason for the court to instruct the jury on information that was never introduced into evidence); see also Barnhisel v. People, 141 Colo. 243, 246 , 347 P.2d 915, 917 (1959) 17 (“[A]n instruction . . . is erroneous if it implies or assumes the existence of evidence not in the record.”). ¶ 42 Further, the directions for CJI-Civ. 41:4 limit the content of the instruction to “those allegations . . . which if established would constitute a legal basis for determining that the child is dependent and neglected.” Several of the allegations in the p | 1 | 1 |
Barnhisel v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2018See People v. Rios, 2014 COA 90, ¶ 23 (there was no reason for the court to instruct the jury on information that was never introduced into evidence); see also Barnhisel v. People, 141 Colo. 243, 246 , 347 P.2d 915, 917 (1959) 17 (“[A]n instruction . . . is erroneous if it implies or assumes the existence of evidence not in the record.”). ¶ 42 Further, the directions for CJI-Civ. 41:4 limit the content of the instruction to “those allegations . . . which if established would constitute a legal basis for determining that the child is dependent and neglected.” Several of the allegations in the p 2018See People v. Rios, 2014 COA 90, ¶ 23 (there was no reason for the court to instruct the jury on information that was never introduced into evidence); see also Barnhisel v. People, 141 Colo. 243, 246 , 347 P.2d 915, 917 (1959) 17 (“[A]n instruction . . . is erroneous if it implies or assumes the existence of evidence not in the record.”). ¶ 42 Further, the directions for CJI-Civ. 41:4 limit the content of the instruction to “those allegations . . . which if established would constitute a legal basis for determining that the child is dependent and neglected.” Several of the allegations in the p | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2014Id. 1 30 We did so because evaluating the coercive effect of a supplemental jury instruction-such as a time-fuse instruction or a mistrial advisement-will necessarily depend on the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given. 2014See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
v. Black
green
1 sentence2025People v. Black, 2020 COA 136, ¶ 18 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re JS
green
1 sentence2019The majority also concludes that the supreme court’s decision in Farrar v. People, 208 P.3d 802 (Colo. 2009), did not announce a heightened standard for ordering a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Leonardo v. People
green
1 sentence2019In such cases, the trial court should “give appropriate additional instructions in response to the jurors’ request unless: (i) the jury may be adequately informed by directing their attention to some portion of the original instructions . . . .” Id. (quoting III ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 15-4.3(a) (2d ed. 1980)). ¶ 38 Here, the jury did not express confusion about the content of instruction number ten, defining assault in the third degree. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.