sixth point error in Texas

2015Page 6 679 S.W.2d 721 , *; 1984 Tex. App. LEXIS 6484 , ** Therefore, the jury's finding, that appellee would constitute a "double recovery." Appellant's seventh point need an additional $71,820 in order to be fairly and rea- of error is overruled. sonably compensated for damages sustained by appel- The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. lant's breach, was supported by the evidence and did not Page 1 132 S.W.3d 471 , *; 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9952 , ** Continental Holdings, Ltd., Appellant v. Jim Leahy, Individually; Brown, Parker & Leahy, L.L.P.; and Thompson & Knight, L.L.P., Appellees No

2015Page 6 679 S.W.2d 721 , *; 1984 Tex. App. LEXIS 6484 , ** Therefore, the jury's finding, that appellee would constitute a "double recovery." Appellant's seventh point need an additional $71,820 in order to be fairly and rea- of error is overruled. sonably compensated for damages sustained by appel- The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. lant's breach, was supported by the evidence and did not Page 1 132 S.W.3d 471 , *; 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9952 , ** Continental Holdings, Ltd., Appellant v. Jim Leahy, Individually; Brown, Parker & Leahy, L.L.P.; and Thompson & Knight, L.L.P., Appellees No

2015Page 6 679 S.W.2d 721 , *; 1984 Tex. App. LEXIS 6484 , ** Therefore, the jury's finding, that appellee would constitute a "double recovery." Appellant's seventh point need an additional $71,820 in order to be fairly and rea- of error is overruled. sonably compensated for damages sustained by appel- The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. lant's breach, was supported by the evidence and did not Page 1 132 S.W.3d 471 , *; 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9952 , ** Continental Holdings, Ltd., Appellant v. Jim Leahy, Individually; Brown, Parker & Leahy, L.L.P.; and Thompson & Knight, L.L.P., Appellees No

2015Page 6 679 S.W.2d 721 , *; 1984 Tex. App. LEXIS 6484 , ** Therefore, the jury's finding, that appellee would constitute a "double recovery." Appellant's seventh point need an additional $71,820 in order to be fairly and rea- of error is overruled. sonably compensated for damages sustained by appel- The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. lant's breach, was supported by the evidence and did not Page 1 132 S.W.3d 471 , *; 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9952 , ** Continental Holdings, Ltd., Appellant v. Jim Leahy, Individually; Brown, Parker & Leahy, L.L.P.; and Thompson & Knight, L.L.P., Appellees No

2012We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 . 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 2 .

2012We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 . 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 2 .

2004McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 514 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997).

2004McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 514 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997).

1994Therefore, the sixth point of error is now moot. [2] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). [3] The State, appellant and the trial court comment that the group of persons called for service in this case were divided into smaller groups of eight.

1994Therefore, the sixth point of error is now moot. [2] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). [3] The State, appellant and the trial court comment that the group of persons called for service in this case were divided into smaller groups of eight.

1994Jones, 846 S.W.2d at 924 .

1993Citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) and King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.1987), vacated in part, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc), appellant contends the denial to so instruct violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

1993Citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) and King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.1987), vacated in part, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc), appellant contends the denial to so instruct violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

1993Citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) and King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.1987), vacated in part, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc), appellant contends the denial to so instruct violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

1993Citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) and King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.1987), vacated in part, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc), appellant contends the denial to so instruct violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

1993Citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) and King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.1987), vacated in part, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc), appellant contends the denial to so instruct violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

1993Citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) and King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.1987), vacated in part, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc), appellant contends the denial to so instruct violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

1987In re L.F., 617 S.W.2d at 340 ; see In re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d at 661 .

1987In re L.F., 617 S.W.2d at 340 ; see In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d at 661 .

1987While a right to recover prejudgment interest must be supported by a specific pleading for that relief, Vidor Wal *265 green Pharmacy v. Fisher, 728 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.1987), appellant failed to bring this matter to the attention of the trial court by a proper objection; therefore, we hold any error was waived.

1986Rose relies on Tex.R.Evid. 608 and the case of Commonwealth Lloyd’s Insurance Co. v. Thomas, 678 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ).

1974We said in Cusack v. Cusack, supra, 491 S.W.2d at pp. 719-720 that: “The question as to whether the marriage has become insupportable because of discord or conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the marriage relationship and prevents any reasonable reconciliation is peculiarly one of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.” We also said in Cusack v. Cusack, supra, that the sufficiency and weight of the evidence necessary to meet the requirements of insupportability must be left to the sound discretion of the court or jury trying the case.

1974We said in Cusack v. Cusack, supra, 491 S.W.2d at pp. 719-720 that: “The question as to whether the marriage has become insupportable because of discord or conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the marriage relationship and prevents any reasonable reconciliation is peculiarly one of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.” We also said in Cusack v. Cusack, supra, that the sufficiency and weight of the evidence necessary to meet the requirements of insupportability must be left to the sound discretion of the court or jury trying the case.

1967Evans Co., 11 Tex.Civ.App. 138 , 32 S.W. 795, 796 , cited by appellants, merely holds: “ * * * That the grantee in an alleged fraudulent conveyance can be made a party to the suit in which the land has been attached, for the purpose of testing the validity of his claim, is now the settled practice in this state.” We can see no merit to the sixth point of error and it is accordingly overruled.

1967Evans Co., 11 Tex.Civ.App. 138 , 32 S.W. 795, 796 , cited by appellants, merely holds: “ * * * That the grantee in an alleged fraudulent conveyance can be made a party to the suit in which the land has been attached, for the purpose of testing the validity of his claim, is now the settled practice in this state.” We can see no merit to the sixth point of error and it is accordingly overruled.

1964Appellant’s position is that since “she was appointed in a fiduciary capacity, both in the will of August 10, 1960, and by the Probate Court, and in offering said will for probate and resisting the contest filed thereon, she was fulfilling a requirement and duty imposed upon her by law and, therefor, said costs should not be taxed against her in any capacity or in any event, said costs should be taxed against her only in her fiduciary capacity and, therefore, paid by the estate * * * ”, citing McCannon v. McCannon, 2 S.W.2d 942 at page 951 (Tex.Civ.App., 1927; dism.).