taking analysis in Alabama

2008"The importance of the chain of custody of a blood sample was demonstrated by this court in Miller v. State, 484 So.2d 1203 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).

2008“The importance of the chain of custody of a blood sample was demonstrated by this court in Miller v. State, 484 So.2d 1203 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).

1998Three years later, Congress passed Pub.L. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153, amending 25 U.S.C. § 70s(b); that new law provided for de novo review in the Court of Claims “of the merits” of the taking claim, “without regard to the defenses of res judicata and collateral estop-pel.” 448 U.S. at 389 , 100 S.Ct. 2716 .

1998Three years later, Congress passed Pub.L. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153, amending 25 U.S.C. § 70s(b); that new law provided for de novo review in the Court of Claims “of the merits” of the taking claim, “without regard to the defenses of res judicata and collateral estop-pel.” 448 U.S. at 389 , 100 S.Ct. 2716 .

2012Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985) (“A ... reason the taking claim is not yet ripe is that respondent did not seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.

2012Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985) (“A ... reason the taking claim is not yet ripe is that respondent did not seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.

2009If ‘ “the substance analyzed has passed through several hands the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had it and tvhat was done with it between the taking and the analysis.” Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527 , 90 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1955) (emphasis added).’ Suttle, 565 So.2d at 1199 .” Green, 597 So.2d at 1332 .

2000In Schmerber v. State, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the taking and analysis of a defendant's blood, while he is in custody and over his objection, does not violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable search and seizures, provided that certain factors are considered.

2000In Schmerber v. State, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the taking and analysis of a defendant's blood, while he is in custody and over his objection, does not violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable search and seizures, provided that certain factors are considered.

1993Starrs, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases § 1.18(2)(c) (3d ed. 1986). “[WJhere the substance analyzed has passed through several hands the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to tvho had it and what was done ivith it between the taking and the analysis.” Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527 , 90 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1955) (emphasis added [in Suttle J).’” See also Powell v. State, 515 So.2d 140 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).

1992Instead, it applies a "leads to conjecture" test, a test found in a 1955 Virginia case, Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527 , 90 S.E.2d 257 (1955) ("If `the substance analyzed has passed through several hands the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had it and what was done with it between the taking and the analysis '"). [5] The Williams case, cited by the majority, but not followed, says that "[t]he evidence need not negate the most remote possibility of substitution, alteration, or tampering with the evidence, but rather must prove to a reasonable probability that the item is

1992Instead, it applies a "leads to conjecture" test, a test found in a 1955 Virginia case, Rodgers v. Commonwealth , 197 Va. 527 , 90 S.E.2d 257 (1955) ("If 'the substance analyzed has passed through several hands the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had it and what was done with it between the taking and the analysis ' "). 5 The Williams case, cited by the majority, but not followed, says that "[t]he evidence need not negate the most remote possibility of substitution, alteration, or tampering with the evidence, but rather must prove to a reasonable probability that the item is

1990In Moorman v. State , 574 So.2d 953 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), also released this date, a conviction for vehicular homicide involving the chain of custody of a blood sample was affirmed "[d]espite the facts that two 'links' in the chain of custody did not testify and were only generally identified as a unit secretary and a person from the laboratory" who "picked up the sample." 574 So.2d at 956 .

1990In Moorman v. State , 574 So.2d 953 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), also released this date, a conviction for vehicular homicide involving the chain of custody of a blood sample was affirmed "[d]espite the facts that two 'links' in the chain of custody did not testify and were only generally identified as a unit secretary and a person from the laboratory" who "picked up the sample." 574 So.2d at 956 .

1981Baldwin v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 380 So.2d 388 (1980); Hobbie v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 685 (1978); Moseley v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 357 So.2d 390 (1978); Mays v State , Ala.Cr.App., 335 So.2d 246 (1976); Bray v. State , 47 Ala. App. 308 , 253 So.2d 531 , cert. denied, 287 Ala. 728 , 253 So.2d 533 § 13A-8-44 suggests the possibility that under the now statutory law of Alabama, as distinguished from the formerly applied common law in Alabama, it is not as important that an indictment name the owner of the property involved. § 13A-8-44 provides: "No person may submit in defense against a p

1981Baldwin v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 380 So.2d 388 (1980); Hobbie v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 685 (1978); Moseley v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 357 So.2d 390 (1978); Mays v State , Ala.Cr.App., 335 So.2d 246 (1976); Bray v. State , 47 Ala. App. 308 , 253 So.2d 531 , cert. denied, 287 Ala. 728 , 253 So.2d 533 § 13A-8-44 suggests the possibility that under the now statutory law of Alabama, as distinguished from the formerly applied common law in Alabama, it is not as important that an indictment name the owner of the property involved. § 13A-8-44 provides: "No person may submit in defense against a p

1981Baldwin v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 380 So.2d 388 (1980); Hobbie v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 685 (1978); Moseley v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 357 So.2d 390 (1978); Mays v State , Ala.Cr.App., 335 So.2d 246 (1976); Bray v. State , 47 Ala. App. 308 , 253 So.2d 531 , cert. denied, 287 Ala. 728 , 253 So.2d 533 § 13A-8-44 suggests the possibility that under the now statutory law of Alabama, as distinguished from the formerly applied common law in Alabama, it is not as important that an indictment name the owner of the property involved. § 13A-8-44 provides: "No person may submit in defense against a p

1981Baldwin v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 380 So.2d 388 (1980); Hobbie v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 685 (1978); Moseley v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 357 So.2d 390 (1978); Mays v State , Ala.Cr.App., 335 So.2d 246 (1976); Bray v. State , 47 Ala. App. 308 , 253 So.2d 531 , cert. denied, 287 Ala. 728 , 253 So.2d 533 § 13A-8-44 suggests the possibility that under the now statutory law of Alabama, as distinguished from the formerly applied common law in Alabama, it is not as important that an indictment name the owner of the property involved. § 13A-8-44 provides: "No person may submit in defense against a p

1981Baldwin v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 380 So.2d 388 (1980); Hobbie v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 685 (1978); Moseley v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 357 So.2d 390 (1978); Mays v State , Ala.Cr.App., 335 So.2d 246 (1976); Bray v. State , 47 Ala. App. 308 , 253 So.2d 531 , cert. denied, 287 Ala. 728 , 253 So.2d 533 § 13A-8-44 suggests the possibility that under the now statutory law of Alabama, as distinguished from the formerly applied common law in Alabama, it is not as important that an indictment name the owner of the property involved. § 13A-8-44 provides: "No person may submit in defense against a p

1981Baldwin v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 380 So.2d 388 (1980); Hobbie v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 685 (1978); Moseley v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 357 So.2d 390 (1978); Mays v State , Ala.Cr.App., 335 So.2d 246 (1976); Bray v. State , 47 Ala. App. 308 , 253 So.2d 531 , cert. denied, 287 Ala. 728 , 253 So.2d 533 § 13A-8-44 suggests the possibility that under the now statutory law of Alabama, as distinguished from the formerly applied common law in Alabama, it is not as important that an indictment name the owner of the property involved. § 13A-8-44 provides: "No person may submit in defense against a p

1981Baldwin v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 380 So.2d 388 (1980); Hobbie v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 685 (1978); Moseley v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 357 So.2d 390 (1978); Mays v State , Ala.Cr.App., 335 So.2d 246 (1976); Bray v. State , 47 Ala. App. 308 , 253 So.2d 531 , cert. denied, 287 Ala. 728 , 253 So.2d 533 § 13A-8-44 suggests the possibility that under the now statutory law of Alabama, as distinguished from the formerly applied common law in Alabama, it is not as important that an indictment name the owner of the property involved. § 13A-8-44 provides: "No person may submit in defense against a p

1981Baldwin v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 380 So.2d 388 (1980); Hobbie v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 685 (1978); Moseley v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 357 So.2d 390 (1978); Mays v State , Ala.Cr.App., 335 So.2d 246 (1976); Bray v. State , 47 Ala. App. 308 , 253 So.2d 531 , cert. denied, 287 Ala. 728 , 253 So.2d 533 § 13A-8-44 suggests the possibility that under the now statutory law of Alabama, as distinguished from the formerly applied common law in Alabama, it is not as important that an indictment name the owner of the property involved. § 13A-8-44 provides: "No person may submit in defense against a p

1916Co., 1 Ala. App. 399 , 55 South. 929 . (4) The evidence shows that this cotton was taken in the absence of the plaintiff and delivered to the defendant without her knowledge, and the mere silence of the plaintiff after knowledge of the conversion was brought to her did not amount to a ratification of the taking or a waiver of the tort. — McCarty v. Roswald & Co., 105 Ala. 511 , 17 South. 120 .

1916Co. , 1 Ala. App. 399 , 55 So. 929 . (4) The evidence shows that this cotton was taken in the absence of the plaintiff and delivered to the defendant without her knowledge, and the mere silence of the plaintiff after knowledge of the conversion was brought to her did not amount to a ratification of the taking or a waiver of the tort. — McCarty v. Roswald Co. , 105 Ala. 511 , 17 So. 120 .

1916Co., 1 Ala. App. 399 , 55 South. 929 . (4) The evidence shows that this cotton was taken in the absence of the plaintiff and delivered to the defendant without her knowledge, and the mere silence of the plaintiff after knowledge of the conversion was brought to her did not amount to a ratification of the taking or a waiver of the tort. — McCarty v. Roswald & Co., 105 Ala. 511 , 17 South. 120 .

1916Co. , 1 Ala. App. 399 , 55 So. 929 . (4) The evidence shows that this cotton was taken in the absence of the plaintiff and delivered to the defendant without her knowledge, and the mere silence of the plaintiff after knowledge of the conversion was brought to her did not amount to a ratification of the taking or a waiver of the tort. — McCarty v. Roswald Co. , 105 Ala. 511 , 17 So. 120 .

1885Taking issue upon it, he stakes the fate of his case on its truth or falsity; and if the jury find the averments of the plea to be proved, the defendant is entitled to a verdict, whether the plea be good or not. —Mudge v. Treat, 57 Ala. 1 ; Betancourt v. Eberlin, 71 Ala. 461 .

1885Taking issue upon it, he stakes the fate of his case on its truth or falsity; and if the jury find the averments of the plea to be proved, the defendant is entitled to a verdict, whether the plea be good or not. —Mudge v. Treat, 57 Ala. 1 ; Betancourt v. Eberlin, 71 Ala. 461 .