taking claim in New Jersey

2018The judge concluded the $100 fee charged by Paulsboro was reasonable and "clearly [related to] advanc[ing] a substantial public *1060 interest[,] ... public health and .... insuring that rental premises remain safe." As such, charging the fees did not constitute a taking in violation of the CRA and, further, that because the fee charged were for "registration and inspection" they did not violate Timber Glen 's holding that prohibited using fees as "a revenue-generating tax." The judge supplemented her reasons in the order she entered on July 28, 2016, in which she stated: Under Bernardsville Q

2018The judge concluded the $100 fee charged by Paulsboro was reasonable and "clearly [related to] advanc[ing] a substantial public *1060 interest[,] ... public health and .... insuring that rental premises remain safe." As such, charging the fees did not constitute a taking in violation of the CRA and, further, that because the fee charged were for "registration and inspection" they did not violate Timber Glen 's holding that prohibited using fees as "a revenue-generating tax." The judge supplemented her reasons in the order she entered on July 28, 2016, in which she stated: Under Bernardsville Q

1968It should be observed that, in the case of Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 , 77 S.Ct. 408 , 1 L.ed. 2 d 448 (1957), involving a test based on a sample of blood taken, at the request of a police officer, by a physician from the accused while the latter was unconscious, it was held that the absence of conscious consent, without more, did not necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional right. *355 Defendant contends that the consent requirement is statutory, and he cites in support of his position the cases of State v. Blair, 45 N.J. 43 (1965) and State v. Swiderski, supra .

1968It should be observed that, in the case of Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 , 77 S.Ct. 408 , 1 L.ed. 2 d 448 (1957), involving a test based on a sample of blood taken, at the request of a police officer, by a physician from the accused while the latter was unconscious, it was held that the absence of conscious consent, without more, did not necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional right. *355 Defendant contends that the consent requirement is statutory, and he cites in support of his position the cases of State v. Blair, 45 N.J. 43 (1965) and State v. Swiderski, supra .

2021As the Law Division judge concluded, the State met that burden and established that the Alcotest operator "ensure[d] that the procedures leading to the actual taking of the test [were] strictly followed." Ugrovics, 410 N.J.

2013In re N.J.A.C. 5: 96, supra, 416 N.J.Super. at 493 , 6 A.3d 445 .

2013In re N.J.A.C. 5: 96, supra, 416 N.J.Super. at 493 , 6 A.3d 445 .

2009Texas Eastern Transmission, supra, 48 N.J. at 273 , 225 A. 2d 130 .

2009Texas Eastern Transmission, supra, 48 N.J. at 273 , 225 A. 2d 130 .

2007Although the commonality requirement may be satisfied by a single shared experience, the predominance inquiry is far more demanding. [(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] The trial judge found that “[tjhere are 40 Wal-Mart stores and nine Sam’s Club stores in New Jersey” and that, “[i]n the WalMart stores, there are 90 different hourly employee classifications whüe, in the Sam’s Club stores, there are 100 different hourly employee classifications.” Taking issue with the obviously erroneous statistical and anecdotal proofs advanced by plaintiffs, she explained that those proofs do

2007Although the commonality requirement may be satisfied by a single shared experience, the predominance inquiry is far more demanding. [(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] The trial judge found that “[tjhere are 40 Wal-Mart stores and nine Sam’s Club stores in New Jersey” and that, “[i]n the WalMart stores, there are 90 different hourly employee classifications whüe, in the Sam’s Club stores, there are 100 different hourly employee classifications.” Taking issue with the obviously erroneous statistical and anecdotal proofs advanced by plaintiffs, she explained that those proofs do

1994As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Keystone, supra, 480 U.S. 470, 494 , 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1246 , 94 L.Ed. 2d 472, 494 , there is "an important distinction between a claim that the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking and a claim that the particular impact of government action on a specific piece of property requires the payment of just compensation." Quoting from its decision in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 , 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2370 , 69 L.Ed. 2d 1, 28 (1981) (which quoted Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 , 100 S.Ct.

1994As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Keystone, supra, 480 U.S. 470, 494 , 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1246 , 94 L.Ed. 2d 472, 494 , there is "an important distinction between a claim that the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking and a claim that the particular impact of government action on a specific piece of property requires the payment of just compensation." Quoting from its decision in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 , 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2370 , 69 L.Ed. 2d 1, 28 (1981) (which quoted Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 , 100 S.Ct.

1989See Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at 263 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. at 2143 n. 9, 65 L.Ed.2d at 113 n. 9; Barsky v. Wilmington, supra, 578 F.Supp. at 173 ; Kingston E.

1982The taking clause was not involved. (4) Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 , 48 S.Ct. 447 , 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928).

1982The taking clause was not involved. (4) Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 , 48 S.Ct. 447 , 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928).

1982In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 , 66 S.Ct. 1062 , 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1945), Justice Douglas found that significant interference with the use and enjoyment of a farm caused by low flying military planes constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

1982In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 , 66 S.Ct. 1062 , 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1945), Justice Douglas found that significant interference with the use and enjoyment of a farm caused by low flying military planes constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

1980Taking issue with plaintiffs’ contention that the tax statute was facially unconstitutional under Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 , 95 S.Ct. 1191 , 43 L.Ed.2d 530 (1975), the State requested an opportunity to develop and introduce *489 evidence that a “transportation emergency” justified the disparate treatment of non-residents.

1980Taking issue with plaintiffs’ contention that the tax statute was facially unconstitutional under Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 , 95 S.Ct. 1191 , 43 L.Ed.2d 530 (1975), the State requested an opportunity to develop and introduce *489 evidence that a “transportation emergency” justified the disparate treatment of non-residents.

1978NOTES [1] Several million dollars have been obtained for the Erie-Lackawanna terminal project. [2] The original complaint was not verified in accordance with R. 1:6-6 and R. 4:67-2(a) because plaintiff did not swear that the allegations were true based upon personal knowledge, see Patrolman's Benerolent Ass'n v. Montclair, 70 N.J. 130 , 133-134, n. 1 (1976); Lippman v. Hydro-Space Technology, Inc., 77 N.J.

1968It should be observed that, in the case of Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 , 77 S.Ct. 408 , 1 L.ed. 2 d 448 (1957), involving a test based on a sample of blood taken, at the request of a police officer, by a physician from the accused while the latter was unconscious, it was held that the absence of conscious consent, without more, did not necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional right. *355 Defendant contends that the consent requirement is statutory, and he cites in support of his position the cases of State v. Blair, 45 N.J. 43 (1965) and State v. Swiderski, supra .

1968It should be observed that, in the case of Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 , 77 S.Ct. 408 , 1 L.ed. 2 d 448 (1957), involving a test based on a sample of blood taken, at the request of a police officer, by a physician from the accused while the latter was unconscious, it was held that the absence of conscious consent, without more, did not necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional right. *355 Defendant contends that the consent requirement is statutory, and he cites in support of his position the cases of State v. Blair, 45 N.J. 43 (1965) and State v. Swiderski, supra .