taking analysis in Illinois

2017The opinion also states that when reviewing an award of compensatory damages for nonfatal injuries, a court may consider, among other things, “the permanency of the plaintiff’s condition, the possibility of future deterioration, the extent of the plaintiff’s medical expenses, and the restrictions imposed on the plaintiff by the injuries.” Richardson, 175 Ill. 2d at 114 . ¶ 68 Defendants contends that the jury’s award of $50,000 in compensatory damages for future surgery was excessive because Baumrucker testified she did not want surgery and her physician, Dr. Chmell, said he would not perform

2017The opinion also states that when reviewing an award of compensatory damages for nonfatal injuries, a court may consider, among other things, “the permanency of the plaintiff’s condition, the - 13 - possibility of future deterioration, the extent of the plaintiff’s medical expenses, and the restrictions imposed on the plaintiff by the injuries.” Richardson, 175 Ill. 2d at 114 . ¶ 68 Defendants contends that the jury’s award of $50,000 in compensatory damages for future surgery was excessive because Baumrucker testified she did not want surgery and her physician, Dr. Chmell, said he would not p

2011Morton Grove Park *542 District v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 78 Ill.2d 353 , 35 Ill.Dec. 767 , 399 N.E.2d 1295 (1980). ¶ 38 In Morton Grove Park District, the supreme court considered whether the county treasurer's retention of interest earned on a condemnation award, deposited by the park district with the county treasurer pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act, violated the taking clause of the federal and state constitutions.

2011Morton Grove Park *542 District v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 78 Ill.2d 353 , 35 Ill.Dec. 767 , 399 N.E.2d 1295 (1980). ¶ 38 In Morton Grove Park District, the supreme court considered whether the county treasurer's retention of interest earned on a condemnation award, deposited by the park district with the county treasurer pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act, violated the taking clause of the federal and state constitutions.

2008Dohany, 281 U.S. at 365 , 74 L.

2008Dohany, 281 U.S. at 365 , 74 L.

2003In Bevan v. Brandon Township, 438 Mich. 1202 , 475 N.W.2d 37 (1991), the Supreme Court of Michigan also found guidance in Keystone and Penn in determining that the plaintiffs’ property should be viewed as a whole rather than as two separate lots for purposes of the taking analysis.

2003The Bevan court noted that “[s]ince for purposes of a taking analysis it is necessary to compare the value ‘taken’ with the value that remains, ‘one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property “whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.” [Citation.]’ ” Bevan, 438 Mich, at 393 , 475 N.W.2d at 42 , quoting Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497 , 94 L.

2003The Bevan court noted that “[s]ince for purposes of a taking analysis it is necessary to compare the value ‘taken’ with the value that remains, ‘one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property “whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.” [Citation.]’ ” Bevan, 438 Mich, at 393 , 475 N.W.2d at 42 , quoting Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497 , 94 L.

2003The Bevan court noted that “[s]ince for purposes of a taking analysis it is necessary to compare the value ‘taken’ with the value that remains, ‘one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property “whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.” [Citation.]’ ” Bevan, 438 Mich, at 393 , 475 N.W.2d at 42 , quoting Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497 , 94 L.

2026Perfecting an Appeal ¶ 25 Defendant’s second claim of ineffective assistance is based on his allegation that plea counsel disregarded his request to file and perfect his appeal. “[A] guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable issues.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torres, 228 Ill. 2d at 401 .

2025Taking defendant’s allegation as true and liberally construing it in his favor, as we must at this stage, defendant’s allegation sufficiently demonstrates defendant informed defense counsel he wanted a bench trial and defense counsel usurped defendant’s right to waive a jury trial by failing to honor defendant’s wishes. -8- ¶ 27 The State relies on People v. Powell, 281 Ill.

2022“Our supreme court has described the circuit court’s role during the first stage of review as acting strictly in an administrative capacity by screening out those petitions which are without legal substance or are obviously without merit. [Citation.]” Romero, 2015 IL App (1st) 140205 , ¶ 26.

2021Ayres, 2017 IL 120071 , ¶ 26.

2020Jones, 211 Ill. 2d at 144 . ¶ 64 C.

2015Also, the taking requirement of the federal statute has also been interpreted to require " 'simply the acquisition *** of possession, dominion or control of the [vehicle] for some period of time.' " (Emphasis added.) DeLaCorte, 113 F.3d at 156 (quoting United States v. Moore, 73 F. 3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1228 (1996).

2015Also, the taking requirement of the federal statute has also been interpreted to require " 'simply the acquisition *** of possession, dominion or control of the [vehicle] for some period of time.' " (Emphasis added.) DeLaCorte, 113 F.3d at 156 (quoting United States v. Moore, 73 F. 3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1228 (1996).

2013We further explained that “what constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause is not necessarily controlled by the form of the judge’s action” or “what the judge calls it.” Id. at 388-89 (citing Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 571 , and Jorn, 400 U.S. at 478 n.7). ¶ 30 Applying these principles to the facts before us, we looked beyond the form to the substance of what occurred in the circuit court and held that “[w]hile the judge denominated his action an ‘acquittal,’ it bore none of those characteristics except the label.” Deems, 81 Ill. 2d at 389 .

2013In rejecting the defendant’s argument, we determined that under the facts presented -9- “defendant has not yet been subjected to jeopardy, much less double jeopardy.” Id. at 387-88. ¶ 28 Taking instruction from the decisions of the Supreme Court, we held that the “rules that specify when jeopardy attaches and that prohibit a retrial of an acquitted defendant *** should not be applied mechanically when the interests they protect are not endangered and when their mechanical application would frustrate society’s interest in enforcing its criminal laws.” Deems, 81 Ill. 2d at 388 . ¶ 29 Although th

2013We further explained that “what constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause is not necessarily controlled by the form of the judge’s action” or “what the judge calls it.” Id. at 388-89 (citing Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 571 , and Jorn, 400 U.S. at 478 n.7). ¶ 30 Applying these principles to the facts before us, we looked beyond the form to the substance of what occurred in the circuit court and held that “[w]hile the judge denominated his action an ‘acquittal,’ it bore none of those characteristics except the label.” Deems, 81 Ill. 2d at 389 .

2013We further explained that “what constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause is not necessarily controlled by the form of the judge’s action” or “what the judge calls it.” Id. at 388-89 (citing Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 571 , and Jorn, 400 U.S. at 478 n.7). ¶ 30 Applying these principles to the facts before us, we looked beyond the form to the substance of what occurred in the circuit court and held that “[w]hile the judge denominated his action an ‘acquittal,’ it bore none of those characteristics except the label.” Deems, 81 Ill. 2d at 389 .

2013In rejecting the defendant’s argument, we determined that under the facts presented -9- “defendant has not yet been subjected to jeopardy, much less double jeopardy.” Id. at 387-88. ¶ 28 Taking instruction from the decisions of the Supreme Court, we held that the “rules that specify when jeopardy attaches and that prohibit a retrial of an acquitted defendant *** should not be applied mechanically when the interests they protect are not endangered and when their mechanical application would frustrate society’s interest in enforcing its criminal laws.” Deems, 81 Ill. 2d at 388 . ¶ 29 Although th

2013In rejecting the defendant’s argument, we determined that under the facts presented -9- “defendant has not yet been subjected to jeopardy, much less double jeopardy.” Id. at 387-88. ¶ 28 Taking instruction from the decisions of the Supreme Court, we held that the “rules that specify when jeopardy attaches and that prohibit a retrial of an acquitted defendant *** should not be applied mechanically when the interests they protect are not endangered and when their mechanical application would frustrate society’s interest in enforcing its criminal laws.” Deems, 81 Ill. 2d at 388 . ¶ 29 Although th

2012Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452 .

2011App. 3d 626, 636 (2010); cf. People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138 (1995) (the case upon which the State relies, where the court affirmed a second- stage dismissal where defense counsel, in a deposition, explained his strategic reasons for declining to pursue a motion to suppress).