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18 California opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1990As stated in People v. Van Hoek, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at page 817 : "Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supported by specific testimony given at trial is the fundamental due process rule, steeped in antiquity, that the prosecution must prove a specific act and the twelve jurors must agree on one specific act." (Accord, People v. Creighton (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 314, 320 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 249 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 468 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 215 , 573 P.2d 433 ]).) The majority purport to address this concern 1990As stated in People v. Van Hoek, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at page 817 : "Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supported by specific testimony given at trial is the fundamental due process rule, steeped in antiquity, that the prosecution must prove a specific act and the twelve jurors must agree on one specific act." (Accord, People v. Creighton (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 314, 320 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 249 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 468 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 215 , 573 P.2d 433 ]).) The majority purport to address this concern | 3 | 3 |
Bellizzi v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1988The court in People v. Mejia, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d at page 579 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 192 ], held that if “state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” In discussing the principles involved in its decision, the court quoted from Bellizzi v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 33, 36 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 52 , 524 P.2d 148 ]: ‘“The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity [original italics] to present material evidence which might prove his in 1988The court in People v. Mejia, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d at page 579 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 192 ], held that if “state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” In discussing the principles involved in its decision, the court quoted from Bellizzi v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 33, 36 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 52 , 524 P.2d 148 ]: ‘“The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity [original italics] to present material evidence which might prove his in | 2 | 4 |
People v. Mejiagreen2 sentences1988The court in People v. Mejia, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d at page 579 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 192 ], held that if “state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” In discussing the principles involved in its decision, the court quoted from Bellizzi v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 33, 36 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 52 , 524 P.2d 148 ]: ‘“The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity [original italics] to present material evidence which might prove his in 1988The court in People v. Mejia, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d at page 579 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 192 ], held that if “state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” In discussing the principles involved in its decision, the court quoted from Bellizzi v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 33, 36 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 52 , 524 P.2d 148 ]: ‘“The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity [original italics] to present material evidence which might prove his in | 2 | 3 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermillgreen2 sentences2015(Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 546 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 494 ].) “The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.” (Ibid.) Here, defense counsel actually presented to the court defendant’s request for immediate release despite the two-step process of section 1026.2. 2015(Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 546 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 494 ].) “The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.” (Ibid.) Here, defense counsel actually presented to the court defendant’s request for immediate release despite the two-step process of section 1026.2. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Creightongreen2 sentences1990As stated in People v. Van Hoek, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at page 817 : "Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supported by specific testimony given at trial is the fundamental due process rule, steeped in antiquity, that the prosecution must prove a specific act and the twelve jurors must agree on one specific act." (Accord, People v. Creighton (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 314, 320 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 249 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 468 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 215 , 573 P.2d 433 ]).) The majority purport to address this concern 1990As stated in People v. Van Hoek, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at page 817 : "Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supported by specific testimony given at trial is the fundamental due process rule, steeped in antiquity, that the prosecution must prove a specific act and the twelve jurors must agree on one specific act." (Accord, People v. Creighton (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 314, 320 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 249 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 468 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 215 , 573 P.2d 433 ]).) The majority purport to address this concern | 1 | 3 |
Bell v. Bursongreen2 sentences2005See Bell v. Burson [(1971)] 402 U.S. [535,] 540 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 90 , 91 S.Ct., 1586, 1590 ].” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, supra, 470 U.S. at pp. 545-546.) “The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement. 2005See Bell v. Burson [(1971)] 402 U.S. [535,] 540 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 90 , 91 S.Ct., 1586, 1590 ].” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, supra, 470 U.S. at pp. 545-546.) “The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Haytongreen2 sentences1988Therefore, the issues raised by appellant are not cognizable on an appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea.” (People v. Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 419 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 426 ], italics added.) Hayton concerned the appealability of a trial court error in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss based on an asserted deprivation of his right to a speedy trial and to due process. 1988Therefore, the issues raised by appellant are not cognizable on an appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea.” (People v. Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 419 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 426 ], italics added.) Hayton concerned the appealability of a trial court error in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss based on an asserted deprivation of his right to a speedy trial and to due process. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1983(Id., at p. 577.) The appellate court affirmed, holding that in dropping the charges against the illegal alien witnesses and making them available for deportation without notifying the defendant, the state had made material witnesses unavailable to the defendant, stating: “If . . . state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. . . . ‘The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity to present material evidence which might prove his 1983(Id., at p. 577.) The appellate court affirmed, holding that in dropping the charges against the illegal alien witnesses and making them available for deportation without notifying the defendant, the state had made material witnesses unavailable to the defendant, stating: “If . . . state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. . . . ‘The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity to present material evidence which might prove his | 1 | 1 |
People v. Golidaygreen2 sentences1983(Id., at p. 577.) The appellate court affirmed, holding that in dropping the charges against the illegal alien witnesses and making them available for deportation without notifying the defendant, the state had made material witnesses unavailable to the defendant, stating: “If . . . state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. . . . ‘The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity to present material evidence which might prove his 1983(Id., at p. 577.) The appellate court affirmed, holding that in dropping the charges against the illegal alien witnesses and making them available for deportation without notifying the defendant, the state had made material witnesses unavailable to the defendant, stating: “If . . . state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. . . . ‘The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity to present material evidence which might prove his | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences1983(Id., at p. 577.) The appellate court affirmed, holding that in dropping the charges against the illegal alien witnesses and making them available for deportation without notifying the defendant, the state had made material witnesses unavailable to the defendant, stating: “If . . . state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. . . . ‘The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity to present material evidence which might prove his 1983(Id., at p. 577.) The appellate court affirmed, holding that in dropping the charges against the illegal alien witnesses and making them available for deportation without notifying the defendant, the state had made material witnesses unavailable to the defendant, stating: “If . . . state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. . . . ‘The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity to present material evidence which might prove his | 1 | 1 |
People v. Perezgreen2 sentences1983(Id., at p. 577.) The appellate court affirmed, holding that in dropping the charges against the illegal alien witnesses and making them available for deportation without notifying the defendant, the state had made material witnesses unavailable to the defendant, stating: “If . . . state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. . . . ‘The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity to present material evidence which might prove his 1983(Id., at p. 577.) The appellate court affirmed, holding that in dropping the charges against the illegal alien witnesses and making them available for deportation without notifying the defendant, the state had made material witnesses unavailable to the defendant, stating: “If . . . state action has made a material witness unavailable, dismissal is mandated by due process and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. . . . ‘The fundamental due process principle ... is that the prosecution may not deprive an accused of the opportunity to present material evidence which might prove his | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernalgreen2 sentences1983(Id., at pp. 580-581.) Real party in interest contends that the test of materiality enunciated in Mejia has been changed by the recent Supreme Court of the United States case of United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 873 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1193, 1206-1207 , 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3449 ]. 1983(Id., at pp. 580-581.) Real party in interest contends that the test of materiality enunciated in Mejia has been changed by the recent Supreme Court of the United States case of United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 873 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 1193, 1206-1207 , 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3449 ]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Van Hoek
green
2 sentences1993The Fifth District found the failure to allege and prove specific acts of molestation constituted a deprivation of due process because the defendant was not afforded an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 818 .) The Fifth District also found that it was impossible for the jury to unanimously agree upon any specific acts to support a conviction under section 288 when testimony of the victim is generic and consequently unspecific as to time or place. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 816 .) “Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supporte 1993The Fifth District found the failure to allege and prove specific acts of molestation constituted a deprivation of due process because the defendant was not afforded an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 818 .) The Fifth District also found that it was impossible for the jury to unanimously agree upon any specific acts to support a conviction under section 288 when testimony of the victim is generic and consequently unspecific as to time or place. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 816 .) “Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supporte | 6 | 1988–1993 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences1993The Fifth District found the failure to allege and prove specific acts of molestation constituted a deprivation of due process because the defendant was not afforded an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 818 .) The Fifth District also found that it was impossible for the jury to unanimously agree upon any specific acts to support a conviction under section 288 when testimony of the victim is generic and consequently unspecific as to time or place. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 816 .) “Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supporte 1993The Fifth District found the failure to allege and prove specific acts of molestation constituted a deprivation of due process because the defendant was not afforded an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 818 .) The Fifth District also found that it was impossible for the jury to unanimously agree upon any specific acts to support a conviction under section 288 when testimony of the victim is generic and consequently unspecific as to time or place. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 816 .) “Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supporte | 4 | 1988–1993 |
People v. Castro
green
2 sentences1993The Fifth District found the failure to allege and prove specific acts of molestation constituted a deprivation of due process because the defendant was not afforded an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 818 .) The Fifth District also found that it was impossible for the jury to unanimously agree upon any specific acts to support a conviction under section 288 when testimony of the victim is generic and consequently unspecific as to time or place. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 816 .) “Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supporte 1993The Fifth District found the failure to allege and prove specific acts of molestation constituted a deprivation of due process because the defendant was not afforded an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 818 .) The Fifth District also found that it was impossible for the jury to unanimously agree upon any specific acts to support a conviction under section 288 when testimony of the victim is generic and consequently unspecific as to time or place. ( 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 816 .) “Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supporte | 4 | 1988–1993 |
Southern California Underground Contractors, Inc. v. City of San Diego
green
2 sentences2014(See, e.g., Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 533, 543 , citing Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 .) In Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, this court explained that due process " ' "is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstance." [Citation.]' [Citation.] Rather, it ' "is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." ' " (Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 543 .) As we explain, we cannot say under the present cir 2014(See, e.g., Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 533, 543 , citing Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 .) In Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, this court explained that due process " ' "is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstance." [Citation.]' [Citation.] Rather, it ' "is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." ' " (Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 543 .) As we explain, we cannot say under the present cir | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
1 sentence2014(See, e.g., Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 533, 543 , citing Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 .) In Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, this court explained that due process " ' "is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstance." [Citation.]' [Citation.] Rather, it ' "is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." ' " (Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 543 .) As we explain, we cannot say under the present cir | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Applebaum v. Board of Directors of Barton Memorial Hospital
green
1 sentence2013(Applebaum v. Board of Directors (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 648, 656-657 .) However, “[t]he distinction between fair procedure and due process rights appears to be one of origin and not of the extent of protection afforded an individual; the essence of both rights is fairness. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Coleman v. DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL ADMININISTRATION
green
2 sentences2000The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” { Loudermill, supra, 470 U.S. at pp. 542-546 [105 S.Ct. at pp. 1493-1495], citations and fns. omitted.) 8 While Shelly and Loudermill involved employees who had been discharged, our Supreme Court faced a different set of circumstances in Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 346 , 805 P.2d 300 ]. 2000The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” { Loudermill, supra, 470 U.S. at pp. 542-546 [105 S.Ct. at pp. 1493-1495], citations and fns. omitted.) 8 While Shelly and Loudermill involved employees who had been discharged, our Supreme Court faced a different set of circumstances in Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 346 , 805 P.2d 300 ]. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Jones
green
1 sentence1992(Id. at p. 816.) “Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supported by specific testimony given at trial is the fundamental due process rule, steeped in antiquity, that the prosecution must prove a specific act and the twelve jurors must agree on one specific act.” (Id. at p. 817 relying on People v. Williams (1901) 133 Cal. 165 [ 65 P. 323 ] and People v. Castro (1901) 133 Cal. 11 [ 65 P. 13 ].) While the Legislature responded to Van Hoek by creating a new crime, the Supreme Court abrogated its holding in People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d 294, 320-321 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Moreno
green
1 sentence1990(People v. Castro, 133 Cal. 11 [ 65 P. 13 ], and People v. Williams, 133 Cal. 165 [ 65 P. 323 ].) “Implicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supported by specific testimony given at trial is the fundamental due process rule, steeped in antiquity, that the prosecution must prove a specific act and the twelve jurors must agree on one specific act.” (Van Hoek, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 817 ; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 789 .) The holdings in both Castro and Williams were that the prosecution may not rely on testimony that acts of unlawful sex | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Atkins
green
2 sentences1989Relying upon these cases, the Fifth District in Van Hoek and again in People v. Atkins, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 15 , observed that “[ijmplicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supported by specific testimony given at trial is the fundamental due process rule, steeped in antiquity, that the prosecution must prove a specific act and the twelve jurors must agree on one specific act.” (Van Hoek, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 817 ; Atkins, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 22 .) Appellant concedes that “[i]n the ordinary situation, where testimony shows more than one specif 1989Relying upon these cases, the Fifth District in Van Hoek and again in People v. Atkins, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 15 , observed that “[ijmplicit in the cases requiring specificity of charges and the charges being supported by specific testimony given at trial is the fundamental due process rule, steeped in antiquity, that the prosecution must prove a specific act and the twelve jurors must agree on one specific act.” (Van Hoek, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 817 ; Atkins, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 22 .) Appellant concedes that “[i]n the ordinary situation, where testimony shows more than one specif | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Kiihoa
green
2 sentences1976Even if the prosecution’s motives are ‘praiseworthy,’ they cannot prevail when they ‘inevitably result, intentionally or unintentionally, in depriving the defendant of a fair trial.’ [citing People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal.2d 748 ( 3 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 349 P.2d 673 )].” Generally speaking the People may select and choose which witnesses they wish to use to prove their case against a defendant. 1976Even if the prosecution’s motives are ‘praiseworthy,’ they cannot prevail when they ‘inevitably result, intentionally or unintentionally, in depriving the defendant of a fair trial.’ [citing People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal.2d 748 ( 3 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 349 P.2d 673 )].” Generally speaking the People may select and choose which witnesses they wish to use to prove their case against a defendant. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.