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18 California opinions name it 3 courts 1880–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Application of Millergreen2 sentences1958(Matter of Miller, 162 Cal. 687, 698 [ 124 P. 427 ].)” The facts in the case at bar do not establish an improper discrimination under the principles stated in the cited ease. 1958(Matter of Miller, 162 Cal. 687, 698 [ 124 P. 427 ].)” The facts in the case at bar do not establish an improper discrimination under the principles stated in the cited ease. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Johnsongreen2 sentences2018"The overwhelming concern ... with the relation of the rule in question to the reliability of the truth-determining process at trial is but a corollary to the ultimate test of the integrity of the judicial process: its capacity to ensure the acquittal of the innocent." ( Id. at pp. 415-416, 90 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 475 P.2d 841 .) The Court applied Leary retroactively because it held defendants, like Johnson, who asserted the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination against charges of failing to pay the federal marijuana tax are innocent as a matter of law. ( Johnson , at pp. 415-416, 90 Cal 2018"The overwhelming concern ... with the relation of the rule in question to the reliability of the truth-determining process at trial is but a corollary to the ultimate test of the integrity of the judicial process: its capacity to ensure the acquittal of the innocent." ( Id. at pp. 415-416, 90 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 475 P.2d 841 .) The Court applied Leary retroactively because it held defendants, like Johnson, who asserted the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination against charges of failing to pay the federal marijuana tax are innocent as a matter of law. ( Johnson , at pp. 415-416, 90 Cal | 1 | 1 |
Gibson v. Chouteaugreen2 sentences2005(Willett, supra, 1 Cal.2d at p. 463 .) The proponent invoked, and the Supreme Court applied, the doctrine of relation, “ ‘by which an act done at one time is considered, by a fiction of law, to have been done at some antecedent period.’ ” (Peyton v. Desmond (8th Cir. 1904) 129 F. 1, 11 , quoting Gibson v. Chouteau (1871) 80 U.S. 92, 100-101 [ 20 L.Ed. 534 ].) The Willett court explained that the “doctrine is of both equitable and legal cognizance. [Citation.] It was promulgated for the purpose of promoting justice or preventing injustice and is applicable where several proceedings are essentia 2005(Willett, supra, 1 Cal.2d at p. 463 .) The proponent invoked, and the Supreme Court applied, the doctrine of relation, “ ‘by which an act done at one time is considered, by a fiction of law, to have been done at some antecedent period.’ ” (Peyton v. Desmond (8th Cir. 1904) 129 F. 1, 11 , quoting Gibson v. Chouteau (1871) 80 U.S. 92, 100-101 [ 20 L.Ed. 534 ].) The Willett court explained that the “doctrine is of both equitable and legal cognizance. [Citation.] It was promulgated for the purpose of promoting justice or preventing injustice and is applicable where several proceedings are essentia | 1 | 1 |
Kotteakos v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1988In the formulation of a standard of prejudice, "Necessarily the character of the proceeding, what is at stake upon its outcome, and the relation of the error asserted to casting the balance for decision on the case as a whole, are material factors...." ( Kotteakos v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 750, 762 [ 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 ].) As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, "the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. 1988In the formulation of a standard of prejudice, "Necessarily the character of the proceeding, what is at stake upon its outcome, and the relation of the error asserted to casting the balance for decision on the case as a whole, are material factors...." ( Kotteakos v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 750, 762 [ 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 ].) As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, "the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Burnickgreen2 sentences1984Further, if the rule relates to characteristics of the judicial system which are essential to minimizing convictions of the innocent, it will apply retroactively regardless of the reliance of prosecutors on former law, and regardless of the burden which retroactivity will place upon the judicial system. ” (Italics added.) We explained that “The overwhelming concern of recent retroactivity decisions with the relation of the rule in question to the reliability of the truth-determining process at trial is but a corollary to the ultimate test of the integrity of the judicial process: its capacity 1984Further, if the rule relates to characteristics of the judicial system which are essential to minimizing convictions of the innocent, it will apply retroactively regardless of the reliance of prosecutors on former law, and regardless of the burden which retroactivity will place upon the judicial system. ” (Italics added.) We explained that “The overwhelming concern of recent retroactivity decisions with the relation of the rule in question to the reliability of the truth-determining process at trial is but a corollary to the ultimate test of the integrity of the judicial process: its capacity | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1984(Accord, People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 644-645 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 566 P.2d 228 ] (holding that the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity in narcotics addicts commitment proceedings are fully retroactive under Burnick and Ivan V.).) In People v. Gainer (1977) supra, 19 Cal.3d 835 , we held it error to give the so-called “Allen instruction” to potentially deadlocked juries, primarily because it impaired the defendant’s right to the independent judgment of each juror and a truly unanimous verdict, and exerted undue pressure on the dissenting jurors to vote 1984(Accord, People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 644-645 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 566 P.2d 228 ] (holding that the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity in narcotics addicts commitment proceedings are fully retroactive under Burnick and Ivan V.).) In People v. Gainer (1977) supra, 19 Cal.3d 835 , we held it error to give the so-called “Allen instruction” to potentially deadlocked juries, primarily because it impaired the defendant’s right to the independent judgment of each juror and a truly unanimous verdict, and exerted undue pressure on the dissenting jurors to vote | 1 | 1 |
Gillum v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1958Equally applicable to the situation at bar is the observation of the court in Gillum v. Johnson, 7 Cal.2d 744, 759 [ 62 P.2d 1037 , 63 P.2d 8 .10, 108 A.L.R. 595 ], that “it was deemed necessary to draw the line somewhere in order that the plan be not too cumbersome and unwieldy.” In Mono Power Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.App. 675, 679, 680 [ 166 P. 387 ], the court said: “It must be clearly shown that the legislation attacked makes an improper discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, *333 all of whom 1958Equally applicable to the situation at bar is the observation of the court in Gillum v. Johnson, 7 Cal.2d 744, 759 [ 62 P.2d 1037 , 63 P.2d 8 .10, 108 A.L.R. 595 ], that “it was deemed necessary to draw the line somewhere in order that the plan be not too cumbersome and unwieldy.” In Mono Power Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.App. 675, 679, 680 [ 166 P. 387 ], the court said: “It must be clearly shown that the legislation attacked makes an improper discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, *333 all of whom | 1 | 1 |
Mono Power Co. v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1958Equally applicable to the situation at bar is the observation of the court in Gillum v. Johnson, 7 Cal.2d 744, 759 [ 62 P.2d 1037 , 63 P.2d 8 .10, 108 A.L.R. 595 ], that “it was deemed necessary to draw the line somewhere in order that the plan be not too cumbersome and unwieldy.” In Mono Power Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.App. 675, 679, 680 [ 166 P. 387 ], the court said: “It must be clearly shown that the legislation attacked makes an improper discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, *333 all of whom 1958Equally applicable to the situation at bar is the observation of the court in Gillum v. Johnson, 7 Cal.2d 744, 759 [ 62 P.2d 1037 , 63 P.2d 8 .10, 108 A.L.R. 595 ], that “it was deemed necessary to draw the line somewhere in order that the plan be not too cumbersome and unwieldy.” In Mono Power Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.App. 675, 679, 680 [ 166 P. 387 ], the court said: “It must be clearly shown that the legislation attacked makes an improper discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, *333 all of whom | 1 | 1 |
Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co.green2 sentences1939(Wells v. Mantes, 99 Cal. 583 [ 34 P. 324 ]; DeNecochea v. Curtis, supra; 26 Cal.Jur. sec. 260, p. 72.) The opinions in the cases last cited imply that one cannot claim the benefit of the "doctrine of relation" unless the code provisions have been strictly complied with, and this, I believe, is the correct view. (1 Wiel on Water Rights, 3d ed., sec. 375; Taylor v. Abbott, 103 Cal. 421 [ 37 P. 408 ]; Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 211 [ 110 P. 927 ].) Suppose that several claimants filed notice for given amounts of water to be diverted by means of a dam and each then 1939(Wells v. Mantes, 99 Cal. 583 [ 34 P. 324 ]; DeNecochea v. Curtis, supra; 26 Cal.Jur. sec. 260, p. 72.) The opinions in the cases last cited imply that one cannot claim the benefit of the "doctrine of relation" unless the code provisions have been strictly complied with, and this, I believe, is the correct view. (1 Wiel on Water Rights, 3d ed., sec. 375; Taylor v. Abbott, 103 Cal. 421 [ 37 P. 408 ]; Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 211 [ 110 P. 927 ].) Suppose that several claimants filed notice for given amounts of water to be diverted by means of a dam and each then | 1 | 1 |
Hawkins v. Flintgreen2 sentences1927But, as is said in the case of Hawkins v. Harlan, 68 Cal. 236, 237 [ 9 Pac. 108, 109 ], and equally applicable to the facts of the instant case: “This (referring to a position taken by counsel similar to the position of appellant here) is by operation of the doctrine of relation, which is a fiction of the law adopted solely for the purposes of justice, and will not be given effect when, as in the present case, it would work manifest injustice. 1927But, as is said in the case of Hawkins v. Harlan, 68 Cal. 236, 237 [ 9 Pac. 108, 109 ], and equally applicable to the facts of the instant case: “This (referring to a position taken by counsel similar to the position of appellant here) is by operation of the doctrine of relation, which is a fiction of the law adopted solely for the purposes of justice, and will not be given effect when, as in the present case, it would work manifest injustice. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Peyton v. Desmond
green
1 sentence2005(Willett, supra, 1 Cal.2d at p. 463 .) The proponent invoked, and the Supreme Court applied, the doctrine of relation, “ ‘by which an act done at one time is considered, by a fiction of law, to have been done at some antecedent period.’ ” (Peyton v. Desmond (8th Cir. 1904) 129 F. 1, 11 , quoting Gibson v. Chouteau (1871) 80 U.S. 92, 100-101 [ 20 L.Ed. 534 ].) The Willett court explained that the “doctrine is of both equitable and legal cognizance. [Citation.] It was promulgated for the purpose of promoting justice or preventing injustice and is applicable where several proceedings are essentia | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Willett v. Jordan
green
2 sentences2005The adoption of Ordinance 412 retroactive to the effective date of Ordinance 381 was proper The City’s retroactive enactment of Ordinance 412 was proper under the “doctrine of relation” (also referred to as the doctrine of relation back)—a doctrine explained and applied in Willett v. Jordan (1934) 1 Cal.2d 461 [ 35 P.2d 1025 (Willett). 2005The adoption of Ordinance 412 retroactive to the effective date of Ordinance 381 was proper The City’s retroactive enactment of Ordinance 412 was proper under the “doctrine of relation” (also referred to as the doctrine of relation back)—a doctrine explained and applied in Willett v. Jordan (1934) 1 Cal.2d 461 [ 35 P.2d 1025 (Willett). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Gainer
green
2 sentences1984(Accord, People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 644-645 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 566 P.2d 228 ] (holding that the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity in narcotics addicts commitment proceedings are fully retroactive under Burnick and Ivan V.).) In People v. Gainer (1977) supra, 19 Cal.3d 835 , we held it error to give the so-called “Allen instruction” to potentially deadlocked juries, primarily because it impaired the defendant’s right to the independent judgment of each juror and a truly unanimous verdict, and exerted undue pressure on the dissenting jurors to vote 1984(Accord, People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 644-645 [ 139 Cal. Rptr. 594 , 566 P.2d 228 ] (holding that the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity in narcotics addicts commitment proceedings are fully retroactive under Burnick and Ivan V. ).) In People v. Gainer (1977) supra, 19 Cal.3d 835 , we held it error to give the so-called " Allen instruction" to potentially deadlocked juries, primarily because it impaired the defendant's right to the independent judgment of each juror and a truly unanimous verdict, and exerted undue pressure on the dissenting jurors to v | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Pryor v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences1984(Accord, People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 644-645 [ 139 Cal. Rptr. 594 , 566 P.2d 228 ] (holding that the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity in narcotics addicts commitment proceedings are fully retroactive under Burnick and Ivan V. ).) In People v. Gainer (1977) supra, 19 Cal.3d 835 , we held it error to give the so-called " Allen instruction" to potentially deadlocked juries, primarily because it impaired the defendant's right to the independent judgment of each juror and a truly unanimous verdict, and exerted undue pressure on the dissenting jurors to v 1984(Accord, People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 644-645 [ 139 Cal. Rptr. 594 , 566 P.2d 228 ] (holding that the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity in narcotics addicts commitment proceedings are fully retroactive under Burnick and Ivan V. ).) In People v. Gainer (1977) supra, 19 Cal.3d 835 , we held it error to give the so-called " Allen instruction" to potentially deadlocked juries, primarily because it impaired the defendant's right to the independent judgment of each juror and a truly unanimous verdict, and exerted undue pressure on the dissenting jurors to v | 1 | 1984–1984 |
United States v. Clarke
green
1 sentence1962However, United States v. Clarke, 69 F.2d 748 , appears to us to be in point and to indicate a fair way of interpreting the statute in accordance with its expressed legislative intent. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Connolly v. Pre-Mixed Concrete Co.
green
2 sentences1958As an additional safeguard, the lower court, at the request of appellants, gave a separate cautionary and explanatory instruction, not in issue, wherein the jury was properly and thoroughly charged on the relation of the doctrine to negligence, proximate cause and contributory negligence and admonished that the last clear chance provides no exception to the basic principle that liability must be founded on both negligence and proximate cause; that it does not set aside the law of contributory negligence and that it will defeat the defense of contributory negligence only when, after plaintiff’s 1958As an additional safeguard, the lower court, at the request of appellants, gave a separate cautionary and explanatory instruction, not in issue, wherein the jury was properly and thoroughly charged on the relation of the doctrine to negligence, proximate cause and contributory negligence and admonished that the last clear chance provides no exception to the basic principle that liability must be founded on both negligence and proximate cause; that it does not set aside the law of contributory negligence and that it will defeat the defense of contributory negligence only when, after plaintiff’s | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Tubbs v. Delillo
green
2 sentences1942In Tubbs v. Delillo, 19 Cal. App. 612 [ 127 Pac. 514 ], the court said: “But, as stated in the Mars case, the position of the interveners is the same as though they had brought a new action, and the 'situation must be viewed in the light of the facts existing at the time the complaint in intervention was filed. “. . . a complaint in intervention sets up a new cause of action, and admittedly also in favor of a third party, and the doctrine of relation does not apply. 1942In Tubbs v. Delillo, 19 Cal. App. 612 [ 127 Pac. 514 ], the court said: “But, as stated in the Mars case, the position of the interveners is the same as though they had brought a new action, and the 'situation must be viewed in the light of the facts existing at the time the complaint in intervention was filed. “. . . a complaint in intervention sets up a new cause of action, and admittedly also in favor of a third party, and the doctrine of relation does not apply. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Sanford v. Bergin
neutral
1 sentence1942To determine, therefore, whether the action has been brought prematurely, or whether the statute of limitations has run against it, we must look to the date of the filing of the complaint in intervention and not of the filing of the original complaint.” In Sanford v. Bergin, 156 Cal. 43 [ 103 Pac. 333 ], the action was for partition. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Carrero v. Morales-Díaz
green
2 sentences1939(Wells v. Mantes, 99 Cal. 583 [ 34 Pac. 324 ]; DeNecochea v. Curtis, supra; 26 Cal. Jur. sec. 260, p. 72.) The opinions in the cases last cited imply that one cannot claim the benefit of the “doctrine of relation” unless the code provisions have been strictly complied with, and this, I believe, is the correct view. (1 Wiel on Water Rights, 3d ed., sec. 375; Taylor v. Abbott, 103 Cal. 421 [ 37 Pac. 408 ] ; Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 211 [ 110 Pac. 927 ].) Suppose that several claimants filed notice for given amounts of water to be diverted by means of a dam and ea 1939(Wells v. Mantes, 99 Cal. 583 [ 34 P. 324 ]; DeNecochea v. Curtis, supra; 26 Cal.Jur. sec. 260, p. 72.) The opinions in the cases last cited imply that one cannot claim the benefit of the "doctrine of relation" unless the code provisions have been strictly complied with, and this, I believe, is the correct view. (1 Wiel on Water Rights, 3d ed., sec. 375; Taylor v. Abbott, 103 Cal. 421 [ 37 P. 408 ]; Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 211 [ 110 P. 927 ].) Suppose that several claimants filed notice for given amounts of water to be diverted by means of a dam and each then | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Osgood v. El Dorado Water & Deep Gravel Mining Co.
green
2 sentences1939Co., 56 Cal. 571 ), but nevertheless it must contain the essential data specified in the statute and must conform substantially to its terms. 1939Co., 56 Cal. 571 ), but nevertheless it must contain the essential data specified in the statute and must conform substantially to its terms. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Wells v. Mantes
green
2 sentences1939(Wells v. Mantes, 99 Cal. 583 [ 34 Pac. 324 ]; DeNecochea v. Curtis, supra; 26 Cal. Jur. sec. 260, p. 72.) The opinions in the cases last cited imply that one cannot claim the benefit of the “doctrine of relation” unless the code provisions have been strictly complied with, and this, I believe, is the correct view. (1 Wiel on Water Rights, 3d ed., sec. 375; Taylor v. Abbott, 103 Cal. 421 [ 37 Pac. 408 ] ; Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 211 [ 110 Pac. 927 ].) Suppose that several claimants filed notice for given amounts of water to be diverted by means of a dam and ea 1939(Wells v. Mantes, 99 Cal. 583 [ 34 P. 324 ]; DeNecochea v. Curtis, supra; 26 Cal.Jur. sec. 260, p. 72.) The opinions in the cases last cited imply that one cannot claim the benefit of the "doctrine of relation" unless the code provisions have been strictly complied with, and this, I believe, is the correct view. (1 Wiel on Water Rights, 3d ed., sec. 375; Taylor v. Abbott, 103 Cal. 421 [ 37 P. 408 ]; Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 211 [ 110 P. 927 ].) Suppose that several claimants filed notice for given amounts of water to be diverted by means of a dam and each then | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Taylor v. Abbott
neutral
2 sentences1939(Wells v. Mantes, 99 Cal. 583 [ 34 P. 324 ]; DeNecochea v. Curtis, supra; 26 Cal.Jur. sec. 260, p. 72.) The opinions in the cases last cited imply that one cannot claim the benefit of the "doctrine of relation" unless the code provisions have been strictly complied with, and this, I believe, is the correct view. (1 Wiel on Water Rights, 3d ed., sec. 375; Taylor v. Abbott, 103 Cal. 421 [ 37 P. 408 ]; Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 211 [ 110 P. 927 ].) Suppose that several claimants filed notice for given amounts of water to be diverted by means of a dam and each then 1939(Wells v. Mantes, 99 Cal. 583 [ 34 P. 324 ]; DeNecochea v. Curtis, supra; 26 Cal.Jur. sec. 260, p. 72.) The opinions in the cases last cited imply that one cannot claim the benefit of the "doctrine of relation" unless the code provisions have been strictly complied with, and this, I believe, is the correct view. (1 Wiel on Water Rights, 3d ed., sec. 375; Taylor v. Abbott, 103 Cal. 421 [ 37 P. 408 ]; Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 211 [ 110 P. 927 ].) Suppose that several claimants filed notice for given amounts of water to be diverted by means of a dam and each then | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Perry v. Paschal
green
2 sentences1927The difference, however, between appellant’s position and the conclusion arrived at by this court is: That the appellant assumes, contrary to its declaration in the petition regarding the doctrine of relation, that the Zumwalts became identified or connected with the title to the property by virtue of the agreement of option, whereas our position is, as indicated in the former opinion, that the option agreement did not have any such effect; that said option merely involved a unilateral agreement which does not become a contract inter partes in the. sense of an absolute contract to convey on th 1927The difference, however, between appellant’s position and the conclusion arrived at by this court is: That the appellant assumes, contrary to its declaration in the petition regarding the doctrine of relation, that the Zumwalts became identified or connected with the title to the property by virtue of the agreement of option, whereas our position is, as indicated in the former opinion, that the option agreement did not have any such effect; that said option merely involved a unilateral agreement which does not become a contract inter partes in the. sense of an absolute contract to convey on th | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Barnes v. Rea
green
2 sentences1927The difference, however, between appellant’s position and the conclusion arrived at by this court is: That the appellant assumes, contrary to its declaration in the petition regarding the doctrine of relation, that the Zumwalts became identified or connected with the title to the property by virtue of the agreement of option, whereas our position is, as indicated in the former opinion, that the option agreement did not have any such effect; that said option merely involved a unilateral agreement which does not become a contract inter partes in the. sense of an absolute contract to convey on th 1927The difference, however, between appellant’s position and the conclusion arrived at by this court is: That the appellant assumes, contrary to its declaration in the petition regarding the doctrine of relation, that the Zumwalts became identified or connected with the title to the property by virtue of the agreement of option, whereas our position is, as indicated in the former opinion, that the option agreement did not have any such effect; that said option merely involved a unilateral agreement which does not become a contract inter partes in the. sense of an absolute contract to convey on th | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Lux v. Haggin
green
2 sentences1924Before this time expired respondent filed the present action, and he cannot now bolster up' an insufficient claim of adverse use by the doctrine of relation.” We do not deem it necessary to discuss the riparian rights of the appellant, Northern California Power Company, Cons., further than to refer to the cases of Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 [ 4 Pac. 919 , 10 Pac. 674 ], Gallatin v. Corning Irr. 1924Before this time expired respondent filed the present action, and he cannot now bolster up' an insufficient claim of adverse use by the doctrine of relation.” We do not deem it necessary to discuss the riparian rights of the appellant, Northern California Power Company, Cons., further than to refer to the cases of Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 [ 4 Pac. 919 , 10 Pac. 674 ], Gallatin v. Corning Irr. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Gallatin v. Corning Irrigation Co.
green
1 sentence1924Co., 163 Cal. 405 [Ann. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Hibberd v. Smith
green
1 sentence1920(Hibberd v. Smith, 67 Cal. 547, 561 , [ 56 Am. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
People v. Ortiz
neutral
1 sentence1911Proc., sec. 700.)’ When such a deed is executed, by the doctrine of relation, it is deemed and taken as though executed as at the date when the lien of which it is the sequence originated, (Foorman v. Wallace, 75 Cal. 552 , [ 17 Pac. 860 ], and “the effect of the sale is itself ... to invest in the purchaser the title of the mortgagor at the date of the mortgage.” (Sichler v. Look, 93 Cal. 600 -610, [ 29 Pac. 220 ].) Section 831 of the Civil Code provides that “an owner of *19 land bounded by a road or street is presumed to own to the center of the way, but the contrary may be shown,” and sect | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Foorman v. Wallace
green
1 sentence1911Proc., sec. 700.)’ When such a deed is executed, by the doctrine of relation, it is deemed and taken as though executed as at the date when the lien of which it is the sequence originated, (Foorman v. Wallace, 75 Cal. 552 , [ 17 Pac. 860 ], and “the effect of the sale is itself ... to invest in the purchaser the title of the mortgagor at the date of the mortgage.” (Sichler v. Look, 93 Cal. 600 -610, [ 29 Pac. 220 ].) Section 831 of the Civil Code provides that “an owner of *19 land bounded by a road or street is presumed to own to the center of the way, but the contrary may be shown,” and sect | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Sichler v. Look
green
2 sentences1911Proc., sec. 700.)’ When such a deed is executed, by the doctrine of relation, it is deemed and taken as though executed as at the date when the lien of which it is the sequence originated, (Foorman v. Wallace, 75 Cal. 552 , [ 17 Pac. 860 ], and “the effect of the sale is itself ... to invest in the purchaser the title of the mortgagor at the date of the mortgage.” (Sichler v. Look, 93 Cal. 600 -610, [ 29 Pac. 220 ].) Section 831 of the Civil Code provides that “an owner of *19 land bounded by a road or street is presumed to own to the center of the way, but the contrary may be shown,” and sect 1911Proc., sec. 700.)’ When such a deed is executed, by the doctrine of relation, it is deemed and taken as though executed as at the date when the lien of which it is the sequence originated, (Foorman v. Wallace, 75 Cal. 552 , [ 17 Pac. 860 ], and “the effect of the sale is itself ... to invest in the purchaser the title of the mortgagor at the date of the mortgage.” (Sichler v. Look, 93 Cal. 600 -610, [ 29 Pac. 220 ].) Section 831 of the Civil Code provides that “an owner of *19 land bounded by a road or street is presumed to own to the center of the way, but the contrary may be shown,” and sect | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Wadsworth v. Wadsworth green | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Hemenway v. Abbott green | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Case v. De Goes neutral | 1 | 1885–1885 |
| Jackson ex dem. Griswold v. Bard neutral | 1 | 1885–1885 |
| Megerle v. Ashe green | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.