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18 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ashermangreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., People v. Wells, 101 App. Div. 3d 1250, 1252–53, 955 N.Y.S.2d 684 (2012), appeal denied, 20 N.Y.3d 1066 , 985 N.E.2d 927 , 962 N.Y.S.2d 617 (2013); see also State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 728 , 732–33, 478 A.2d 227 (1984) (concluding that extreme emotional disturbance defense instruction was warranted on basis of testimony of witnesses regarding defendant’s bizarre behavior and appearance after murder, as well as brutal nature of murder itself), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S. Ct. 1749 , 84 L. 2025See, e.g., People v. Wells, 101 App. Div. 3d 1250, 1252–53, 955 N.Y.S.2d 684 (2012), appeal denied, 20 N.Y.3d 1066 , 985 N.E.2d 927 , 962 N.Y.S.2d 617 (2013); see also State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 728 , 732–33, 478 A.2d 227 (1984) (concluding that extreme emotional disturbance defense instruction was warranted on basis of testimony of witnesses regarding defendant’s bizarre behavior and appearance after murder, as well as brutal nature of murder itself), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S. Ct. 1749 , 84 L. | 2 | 2 |
James v. Cohengreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., People v. Wells, 101 App. Div. 3d 1250, 1252–53, 955 N.Y.S.2d 684 (2012), appeal denied, 20 N.Y.3d 1066 , 985 N.E.2d 927 , 962 N.Y.S.2d 617 (2013); see also State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 728 , 732–33, 478 A.2d 227 (1984) (concluding that extreme emotional disturbance defense instruction was warranted on basis of testimony of witnesses regarding defendant’s bizarre behavior and appearance after murder, as well as brutal nature of murder itself), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S. Ct. 1749 , 84 L. 2017See, e.g., State v. Asherman , 193 Conn. 695 , 729-31, 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S.Ct. 1749 , 84 L.Ed.2d 814 (1985). | 2 | 2 |
Basham v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., People v. Wells, 101 App. Div. 3d 1250, 1252–53, 955 N.Y.S.2d 684 (2012), appeal denied, 20 N.Y.3d 1066 , 985 N.E.2d 927 , 962 N.Y.S.2d 617 (2013); see also State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 728 , 732–33, 478 A.2d 227 (1984) (concluding that extreme emotional disturbance defense instruction was warranted on basis of testimony of witnesses regarding defendant’s bizarre behavior and appearance after murder, as well as brutal nature of murder itself), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S. Ct. 1749 , 84 L. 2017See, e.g., State v. Asherman , 193 Conn. 695 , 729-31, 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S.Ct. 1749 , 84 L.Ed.2d 814 (1985). | 2 | 2 |
Asherman v. Connecticutgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., People v. Wells, 101 App. Div. 3d 1250, 1252–53, 955 N.Y.S.2d 684 (2012), appeal denied, 20 N.Y.3d 1066 , 985 N.E.2d 927 , 962 N.Y.S.2d 617 (2013); see also State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 728 , 732–33, 478 A.2d 227 (1984) (concluding that extreme emotional disturbance defense instruction was warranted on basis of testimony of witnesses regarding defendant’s bizarre behavior and appearance after murder, as well as brutal nature of murder itself), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S. Ct. 1749 , 84 L. 2017See, e.g., State v. Asherman , 193 Conn. 695 , 729-31, 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 , 105 S.Ct. 1749 , 84 L.Ed.2d 814 (1985). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Pattersongreen2 sentences2025Appx. 58 (2d Cir. 2005); State v. Patterson, 229 Conn. 328, 333, 341 , 641 A.2d 123 (1994) (evidence that defendant had intentionally concealed weapon prior to shooting and had fled city and hid weapon after shooting defeated claim that ‘‘he had killed the victim in a fit of rage or passion, or under the influence of a similarly extreme emotion’’). 2025Appx. 58 (2d Cir. 2005); State v. Patterson, 229 Conn. 328, 333, 341 , 641 A.2d 123 (1994) (evidence that defendant had intentionally concealed weapon prior to shooting and had fled city and hid weapon after shooting defeated claim that ‘‘he had killed the victim in a fit of rage or passion, or under the influence of a similarly extreme emotion’’). | 1 | 1 |
Shiwlochan v. Portuondogreen1 sentence2025All of these actions demonstrate ‘‘consciousness of guilt, [which] is entirely inconsistent with an extreme emotional disturbance defense . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jusino, 163 Conn. App. 618 , 634, 137 A.3d 65 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 906 , 136 A.3d 643 (2016); see also Shiwlochan v. Portuondo, 345 F. Supp. 2d 242, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (petitioner’s efforts to hide murder weapon and to evade police were ‘‘products of a conscious decision 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17 0 Conn. 46 ,0 19 State v. Henderson and undermine[d] the [petitioner’s] claim that he was ac | 1 | 1 |
State v. Haynesgreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., State v. Haynes, 352 Conn. 236, 243 , 336 A.3d 1139 (2025) (defendant stabbed girlfriend to death for threat- ening to remove his dreadlocks); State v. Person, supra, 236 Conn. 353–56 (defendant stabbed ex-girlfriend to death after she broke off short-lived engagement); State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114 , 117–19, 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (defendant killed victim for parking in his space); State v. Casey, 201 Conn. 174 , 176–78, 513 A.2d 1183 (1986) (defendant killed neighbor for washing car and getting soapy water into defendant’s newly seeded lawn). | 1 | 1 |
Shiwlochan v. Portuondogreen1 sentence2025All of these actions demonstrate ‘‘consciousness of guilt, [which] is entirely inconsistent with an extreme emotional disturbance defense . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jusino, 163 Conn. App. 618 , 634, 137 A.3d 65 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 906 , 136 A.3d 643 (2016); see also Shiwlochan v. Portuondo, 345 F. Supp. 2d 242, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (petitioner’s efforts to hide murder weapon and to evade police were ‘‘products of a conscious decision 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17 0 Conn. 46 ,0 19 State v. Henderson and undermine[d] the [petitioner’s] claim that he was ac | 1 | 1 |
Narumanchi v. DeStefanogreen2 sentences2017"It is well established that a petitioner in a habeas proceeding cannot rely on mere conjecture or speculation to satisfy either the performance or prejudice prong but must instead offer demonstrable evidence in support of his claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Commissioner of Correction , 142 Conn. App. 53 , 59, 64 A.3d 334 (2013) ; see also Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 285 Conn. 585 , 599, 940 A.2d 789 (2008) (petitioner's burden not met by speculation but by demonstrable realities); Narumanchi v. DeStefano , 89 Conn. App. 807 , 815, 875 A.2d 71 (2005) ("[s]pecu 2017"It is well established that a petitioner in a habeas proceeding cannot rely on mere conjecture or speculation to satisfy either the performance or prejudice prong but must instead offer demonstrable evidence in support of his claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Commissioner of Correction , 142 Conn. App. 53 , 59, 64 A.3d 334 (2013) ; see also Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 285 Conn. 585 , 599, 940 A.2d 789 (2008) (petitioner's burden not met by speculation but by demonstrable realities); Narumanchi v. DeStefano , 89 Conn. App. 807 , 815, 875 A.2d 71 (2005) ("[s]pecu | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen2 sentences2017"It is well established that a petitioner in a habeas proceeding cannot rely on mere conjecture or speculation to satisfy either the performance or prejudice prong but must instead offer demonstrable evidence in support of his claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Commissioner of Correction , 142 Conn. App. 53 , 59, 64 A.3d 334 (2013) ; see also Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 285 Conn. 585 , 599, 940 A.2d 789 (2008) (petitioner's burden not met by speculation but by demonstrable realities); Narumanchi v. DeStefano , 89 Conn. App. 807 , 815, 875 A.2d 71 (2005) ("[s]pecu 2017"It is well established that a petitioner in a habeas proceeding cannot rely on mere conjecture or speculation to satisfy either the performance or prejudice prong but must instead offer demonstrable evidence in support of his claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Commissioner of Correction , 142 Conn. App. 53 , 59, 64 A.3d 334 (2013) ; see also Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 285 Conn. 585 , 599, 940 A.2d 789 (2008) (petitioner's burden not met by speculation but by demonstrable realities); Narumanchi v. DeStefano , 89 Conn. App. 807 , 815, 875 A.2d 71 (2005) ("[s]pecu | 1 | 1 |
Oliver Petrovich v. Arthur Leonardo, Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facilitygreen1 sentence2017See Petrovich v. Leonardo , 229 F.3d 384 , 386-87 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The decision to assert an affirmative defense [such as extreme emotional disturbance] is akin to other, fundamental trial decisions, such as the decision to plead to a lesser charge or to assert a plea of insanity. ... | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Milardogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Witherspoon v. Salmgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Elliott
green
2 sentences2018The present case is therefore distinguishable from State v. Elliott , supra, 177 Conn. at 4 , 411 A.2d 3 , in which the court incorrectly charged the jury on the " 'heat of passion' " defense, rather than the extreme emotional disturbance defense. 2018The present case is therefore distinguishable from State v. Elliott , supra, 177 Conn. at 4 , 411 A.2d 3 , in which the court incorrectly charged the jury on the " 'heat of passion' " defense, rather than the extreme emotional disturbance defense. | 5 | 1993–2025 |
State v. Person
green
2 sentences2025Accordingly, we must determine whether the prose- cutors’ comments misstated the requirements of the extreme emotional disturbance defense and whether any misstatement constituted prosecutorial impropri- ety that deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. ‘‘Section 53a-54a (a), in defining the crime of murder, excepts, as an affirmative defense, a homi- cide committed by a defendant who acts ‘under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the rea- sonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a 2025Accordingly, we must determine whether the prose- cutors’ comments misstated the requirements of the extreme emotional disturbance defense and whether any misstatement constituted prosecutorial impropri- ety that deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. ‘‘Section 53a-54a (a), in defining the crime of murder, excepts, as an affirmative defense, a homi- cide committed by a defendant who acts ‘under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the rea- sonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a | 3 | 2013–2025 |
State v. Raguseo
green
2 sentences1999Whether the constitutional (federal and state) rights of the defendant, Gary Potts, were violated when the jury was instructed on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance that it must assess the “reasonableness” of his action “from the viewpoint of a reasonable man, placed in the defendant’s situation, under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be?” See State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 140 , 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“trial court’s injection of the term ‘reasonable’ into the language of the extreme emotional disturbance defense created an over 1999Whether the constitutional (federal and state) rights of the defendant, Gary Potts, were violated when the jury was instructed on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance that it must assess the “reasonableness” of his action “from the viewpoint of a reasonable man, placed in the defendant’s situation, under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be?” See State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 140 , 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“trial court’s injection of the term ‘reasonable’ into the language of the extreme emotional disturbance defense created an over | 2 | 1999–2025 |
People v. Patterson
green
2 sentences1984“The purpose of the extreme emotional disturbance defense is to permit the defendant to show that his actions were caused by a mental infirmity not arising to the level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed them.” State v. Elliott, supra, 6 , quoting People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 302 , 347 N.E.2d 898 (1976). 1984“The purpose of the extreme emotional disturbance defense is to permit the defendant to show that his actions were caused by a mental infirmity not arising to the level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed them.” State v. Elliott, supra, 6 , quoting People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 302 , 347 N.E.2d 898 (1976). | 2 | 1979–1984 |
Breton v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2026Ed. 2d 485 (2001); Brenton v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 325 Conn. 640 , 698–99, 159 A.3d 1112 (2017) (Our Supreme Court noted that defense attorneys have “an ethical obligation to comply with an informed defendant’s refusal to allow presentation of a mental disease or defect defense or mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case. . . . [That precept] extends to a client’s instruc- tion to his attorney not to present an extreme emotional disturbance defense.” (Citations omitted.)). 2026Ed. 2d 485 (2001); Brenton v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 325 Conn. 640 , 698–99, 159 A.3d 1112 (2017) (Our Supreme Court noted that defense attorneys have “an ethical obligation to comply with an informed defendant’s refusal to allow presentation of a mental disease or defect defense or mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case. . . . [That precept] extends to a client’s instruc- tion to his attorney not to present an extreme emotional disturbance defense.” (Citations omitted.)). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Casey
green
2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Haynes, 352 Conn. 236, 243 , 336 A.3d 1139 (2025) (defendant stabbed girlfriend to death for threat- ening to remove his dreadlocks); State v. Person, supra, 236 Conn. 353–56 (defendant stabbed ex-girlfriend to death after she broke off short-lived engagement); State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114 , 117–19, 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (defendant killed victim for parking in his space); State v. Casey, 201 Conn. 174 , 176–78, 513 A.2d 1183 (1986) (defendant killed neighbor for washing car and getting soapy water into defendant’s newly seeded lawn). 2025See, e.g., State v. Haynes, 352 Conn. 236, 243 , 336 A.3d 1139 (2025) (defendant stabbed girlfriend to death for threat- ening to remove his dreadlocks); State v. Person, supra, 236 Conn. 353–56 (defendant stabbed ex-girlfriend to death after she broke off short-lived engagement); State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114 , 117–19, 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (defendant killed victim for parking in his space); State v. Casey, 201 Conn. 174 , 176–78, 513 A.2d 1183 (1986) (defendant killed neighbor for washing car and getting soapy water into defendant’s newly seeded lawn). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Belle
green
2 sentences2025Indeed, in State v. Person, supra, 236 Conn. 342 , this court overruled State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257 , 576 Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. 46 State v. Henderson The parties’ arguments center on the subjective ele- ment of the extreme emotional disturbance defense.6 The subjective element of the defense requires the fact finder to determine whether the defendant was under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance when he committed the offense. 2025Id., 351 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Aviles
green
2 sentences2025Accordingly, any misstatement of the law regarding the 14 See, e.g., State v. Aviles, 277 Conn. 281 , 284–85, 307–309, 891 A.2d 935 (defendant raised extreme emotional disturbance as defense to murder of victim during drug sale dispute), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 840 , 127 S. Ct. 108 , 166 L. 2025Accordingly, any misstatement of the law regarding the 14 See, e.g., State v. Aviles, 277 Conn. 281 , 284–85, 307–309, 891 A.2d 935 (defendant raised extreme emotional disturbance as defense to murder of victim during drug sale dispute), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 840 , 127 S. Ct. 108 , 166 L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lopez v. Commissioner of Correction
neutral
2 sentences2017"It is well established that a petitioner in a habeas proceeding cannot rely on mere conjecture or speculation to satisfy either the performance or prejudice prong but must instead offer demonstrable evidence in support of his claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Commissioner of Correction , 142 Conn. App. 53 , 59, 64 A.3d 334 (2013) ; see also Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 285 Conn. 585 , 599, 940 A.2d 789 (2008) (petitioner's burden not met by speculation but by demonstrable realities); Narumanchi v. DeStefano , 89 Conn. App. 807 , 815, 875 A.2d 71 (2005) ("[s]pecu 2017"It is well established that a petitioner in a habeas proceeding cannot rely on mere conjecture or speculation to satisfy either the performance or prejudice prong but must instead offer demonstrable evidence in support of his claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Commissioner of Correction , 142 Conn. App. 53 , 59, 64 A.3d 334 (2013) ; see also Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 285 Conn. 585 , 599, 940 A.2d 789 (2008) (petitioner's burden not met by speculation but by demonstrable realities); Narumanchi v. DeStefano , 89 Conn. App. 807 , 815, 875 A.2d 71 (2005) ("[s]pecu | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Sanders v. Commissioner of Correction
green
1 sentence2017The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, as described in State v. Elliott , 177 Conn. 1 , 411 A.2d 3 (1979), allows the defendant to mitigate the charge of murder to manslaughter if he can prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence: "(a) the emotional disturbance is not a mental disease or defect that rises to the level of insanity as defined by the Penal Code; (b) the defendant was exposed to an extremely unusual and overwhelming state, that is, not mere annoyance or unhappiness; and (c) the defendant had an extreme emotional reaction to it, as a result of which there was | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Deluca v. Lord
green
1 sentence2013Though the petitioner relies on DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.3d 578 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 824 , 117 S. Ct. 83 , 136 L. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Lord v. DeLuca
green
1 sentence2013Though the petitioner relies on DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.3d 578 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 824 , 117 S. Ct. 83 , 136 L. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Yang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
green
2 sentences2013Though the petitioner indicated that she had been abducted, threatened, beaten and raped by the man she eventually killed, her counsel declined to pursue an extreme emotional disturbance defense “because of [the petitioner’s] aversion to psychiatrists.” Id., 586 . 2013The District Court found it likely that counsel did not understand the extreme emotional disturbance defense and thought it referred to a form of mental illness; the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ultimately held that counsel’s premature rejection of the defense was unreasonable, inter alia, because in light of the facts of the case and the prosecution’s evidence, “a defense based on [extreme emotional disturbance] offered virtually the only realistic chance of avoiding a conviction for second degree murder.” Id., 588 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Florida Department of Revenue v. General Development Corp.
green
1 sentence2013Though the petitioner relies on DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.3d 578 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 824 , 117 S. Ct. 83 , 136 L. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Blades
green
2 sentences2002“A defendant’s articulated or implied theory of defense may make the victim’s state of mind material to the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 253-54 , 627 A.2d 877 (1993). 14 In State v. Blades, 225 Conn. 609, 635 , 626 A.2d 273 (1993), “[w]e [were] persuaded that the assertion of the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance defense put the victim’s state of mind into issue.” Accordingly, evidence of the victim’s state of mind was deemed admissible. 2002“A defendant’s articulated or implied theory of defense may make the victim’s state of mind material to the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 253-54 , 627 A.2d 877 (1993). 14 In State v. Blades, 225 Conn. 609, 635 , 626 A.2d 273 (1993), “[w]e [were] persuaded that the assertion of the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance defense put the victim’s state of mind into issue.” Accordingly, evidence of the victim’s state of mind was deemed admissible. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Crafts
green
2 sentences2002“A defendant’s articulated or implied theory of defense may make the victim’s state of mind material to the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 253-54 , 627 A.2d 877 (1993). 14 In State v. Blades, 225 Conn. 609, 635 , 626 A.2d 273 (1993), “[w]e [were] persuaded that the assertion of the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance defense put the victim’s state of mind into issue.” Accordingly, evidence of the victim’s state of mind was deemed admissible. 2002“A defendant’s articulated or implied theory of defense may make the victim’s state of mind material to the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 253-54 , 627 A.2d 877 (1993). 14 In State v. Blades, 225 Conn. 609, 635 , 626 A.2d 273 (1993), “[w]e [were] persuaded that the assertion of the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance defense put the victim’s state of mind into issue.” Accordingly, evidence of the victim’s state of mind was deemed admissible. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Connecticut National Bank v. Wolcott Development Co.
green
1 sentence1998Johnson v. Commissioner , 34 Conn. App. 153 , 164 , 640 A.2d 1007 , cert. denied, 229 Conn. 919 , 644 A.2d 914 (1994) The petitioner also argues that trial counsel limited his summation on the extreme emotional disturbance defense to the common law "heat of passion" defense. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction
green
1 sentence1998Johnson v. Commissioner , 34 Conn. App. 153 , 164 , 640 A.2d 1007 , cert. denied, 229 Conn. 919 , 644 A.2d 914 (1994) The petitioner also argues that trial counsel limited his summation on the extreme emotional disturbance defense to the common law "heat of passion" defense. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences1998Johnson v. Commissioner , 34 Conn. App. 153 , 164 , 640 A.2d 1007 , cert. denied, 229 Conn. 919 , 644 A.2d 914 (1994) The petitioner also argues that trial counsel limited his summation on the extreme emotional disturbance defense to the common law "heat of passion" defense. 1998Johnson v. Commissioner , 34 Conn. App. 153 , 164 , 640 A.2d 1007 , cert. denied, 229 Conn. 919 , 644 A.2d 914 (1994) The petitioner also argues that trial counsel limited his summation on the extreme emotional disturbance defense to the common law "heat of passion" defense. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Steiger green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. D'ANTUONO green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Bryan green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Patterson v. New York green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Fair v. Warden green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Whistnant green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.