extreme emotional disturbance instruction in Kentucky

2010An extreme emotional disturbance instruction must be supported by “some definite, non-speculative evidence.” Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792, 807 (Ky.2003) (quoting Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Ky. 1998)).

2010An extreme emotional disturbance instruction must be supported by "some definite, non-speculative evidence ." Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792, 807 (Ky. 2003) (quoting Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Ky. 1998)) .

2022While Jacobs testified that Nelson was “very upset and mad” when she first came into 5 Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky. 2010). 6 Driver v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 877, 888 (Ky. 2012). 6 the trailer, mere “hurt” or “anger” is insufficient to warrant an extreme emotional disturbance instruction.

2022An extreme emotional disturbance instruction “‘must be supported by some definite, non-speculative evidence.’5 The evidence must show . . . an identifiable triggering event6 which caused the defendant to ‘suffer a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome [the defendant’s] judgment[.]’” Id. 607 S.W.3d at 644 (quoting Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky. 2010)).

2020In this case, no definitive or non-speculative proof was offered that Williams “suffered a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from an impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes.” McClellan, 715 S.W.2d at 468-69 .

2018We have previously defined extreme emotional disturbance as "a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes." McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986).

2020We have previously explained, Specifically, the evidence must show that some triggering event caused the defendant to suffer “a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s judgment, 7 and to cause one to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes.” Id. (quoting Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Ky. 2006)).

2010Specifically, the evidence must show that some triggering event caused the defendant to suffer “a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes.” Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Ky.2006) (alteration in original, quoting McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky.1986)); see also KRS 507.020(l)(a), 507.030(l)(b).

2010An extreme emotional disturbance instruction must be supported by “some definite, non-speculative evidence.” Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792, 807 (Ky.2003) (quoting Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Ky. 1998)).

2010An extreme emotional disturbance instruction must be supported by "some definite, non-speculative evidence ." Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792, 807 (Ky. 2003) (quoting Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Ky. 1998)) .

2022The party seeking an extreme emotional disturbance instruction bears the burden to show an occurrence so dramatic that it renders the mind temporarily uncontrollable and provokes an “explosion of violence.” Id. at 7 (quoting Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 883 (Ky. 2015)). 5 While “[t]rial courts have a duty to instruct the jury on the whole law . . . that duty does not extend to placing speculative theories before the jury merely because the testimony includes some basis for speculation.” Daniel, 607 S.W.3d at 644 (citing Lackey v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 348, 355 (Ky. 2015)).

2022The party seeking an extreme emotional disturbance instruction bears the burden to show an occurrence so dramatic that it renders the mind temporarily uncontrollable and provokes an “explosion of violence.” Id. at 7 (quoting Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 883 (Ky. 2015)). 5 While “[t]rial courts have a duty to instruct the jury on the whole law . . . that duty does not extend to placing speculative theories before the jury merely because the testimony includes some basis for speculation.” Daniel, 607 S.W.3d at 644 (citing Lackey v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 348, 355 (Ky. 2015)).

2022An extreme emotional disturbance instruction “‘must be supported by some definite, non-speculative evidence.’5 The evidence must show . . . an identifiable triggering event6 which caused the defendant to ‘suffer a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome [the defendant’s] judgment[.]’” Id. 607 S.W.3d at 644 (quoting Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky. 2010)).

2022The party seeking an extreme emotional disturbance instruction bears the burden to show an occurrence so dramatic that it renders the mind temporarily uncontrollable and provokes an “explosion of violence.” Id. at 7 (quoting Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 883 (Ky. 2015)). 5 While “[t]rial courts have a duty to instruct the jury on the whole law . . . that duty does not extend to placing speculative theories before the jury merely because the testimony includes some basis for speculation.” Daniel, 607 S.W.3d at 644 (citing Lackey v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 348, 355 (Ky. 2015)).

2022This triggering event need not have emanated from the victim, and it may arise from “the ‘cumulative impact of a series of related events.’” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792, 807 (Ky. 2003); Fields v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Ky. 2001)).

2022Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 84-85 (Ky. 1998).

2022While Jacobs testified that Nelson was “very upset and mad” when she first came into 5 Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky. 2010). 6 Driver v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 877, 888 (Ky. 2012). 6 the trailer, mere “hurt” or “anger” is insufficient to warrant an extreme emotional disturbance instruction.

2022This triggering event need not have emanated from the victim, and it may arise from “the ‘cumulative impact of a series of related events.’” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792, 807 (Ky. 2003); Fields v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Ky. 2001)).

2022The party seeking an extreme emotional disturbance instruction bears the burden to show an occurrence so dramatic that it renders the mind temporarily uncontrollable and provokes an “explosion of violence.” Id. at 7 (quoting Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 883 (Ky. 2015)). 5 While “[t]rial courts have a duty to instruct the jury on the whole law . . . that duty does not extend to placing speculative theories before the jury merely because the testimony includes some basis for speculation.” Daniel, 607 S.W.3d at 644 (citing Lackey v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 348, 355 (Ky. 2015)).

2022Nelson claims the trial court improperly denied his request for an extreme emotional disturbance instruction, arguing that the evidence was sufficient to warrant such an instruction and that its denial violated “his right to due process of law[.]” “Under proper facts, [extreme emotional disturbance] reduces murder, a capital offense under Kentucky Revised Statutes 507.020, to first degree manslaughter, a Class B felony under KRS 507.030(1)(b).” Hargroves, 615 S.W.3d at 6.

1994This Court has said, "In those cases considered by this court involving the necessity of an extreme emotional disturbance instruction, we have uniformly required some definitive, nonspeculative evidence." Henley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 621 S.W.2d 906, 909 (1981).

1994This Court has said, “In those cases considered by this court involving the necessity of an extreme emotional disturbance instruction, we have uniformly required some definitive, nonspe-eulative evidence.” Henley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 621 S.W.2d 906, 909 (1981).