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21 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Conway v. Town of Wiltongreen2 sentences1999We note that we have, on occasion, “questioned the use of the legislative acquiescence rule as a tool by which to divine legislative intent”; Conway v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 678 , 680 A.2d 242 (1996); in cases in which, following our decision on a particular issue, the legislature has had insufficient time to respond before we are again called upon to consider the same or a sufficiently related issue. 1999We note that we have, on occasion, “questioned the use of the legislative acquiescence rule as a tool by which to divine legislative intent”; Conway v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 678 , 680 A.2d 242 (1996); in cases in which, following our decision on a particular issue, the legislature has had insufficient time to respond before we are again called upon to consider the same or a sufficiently related issue. | 2 | 4 |
Chestnut Point Realty, LLC v. Town of E. Windsorgreen2 sentences2023See Chestnut Point Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, 324 Conn. 528 , 544 n.9, 153 A.3d 636 (2017); see also Mayer v. Historic District Commission, 325 Conn. 765, 778 , 160 A.3d 333 (2017) (under doctrine of legislative acquiescence, court ‘‘may infer that the failure of the legislature to take corrective action within a reasonable period of time following a definitive judicial interpretation of a statute signals legislative agreement with that interpretation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2023See Chestnut Point Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, 324 Conn. 528 , 544 n.9, 153 A.3d 636 (2017); see also Mayer v. Historic District Commission, 325 Conn. 765, 778 , 160 A.3d 333 (2017) (under doctrine of legislative acquiescence, court ‘‘may infer that the failure of the legislature to take corrective action within a reasonable period of time following a definitive judicial interpretation of a statute signals legislative agreement with that interpretation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 2 | 2 |
Mayer v. Historic Dist. Comm'n of Grotongreen2 sentences2023See Chestnut Point Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, 324 Conn. 528 , 544 n.9, 153 A.3d 636 (2017); see also Mayer v. Historic District Commission, 325 Conn. 765, 778 , 160 A.3d 333 (2017) (under doctrine of legislative acquiescence, court ‘‘may infer that the failure of the legislature to take corrective action within a reasonable period of time following a definitive judicial interpretation of a statute signals legislative agreement with that interpretation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2023See Chestnut Point Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, 324 Conn. 528 , 544 n.9, 153 A.3d 636 (2017); see also Mayer v. Historic District Commission, 325 Conn. 765, 778 , 160 A.3d 333 (2017) (under doctrine of legislative acquiescence, court ‘‘may infer that the failure of the legislature to take corrective action within a reasonable period of time following a definitive judicial interpretation of a statute signals legislative agreement with that interpretation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 2 | 2 |
Spiotti v. Town of Wolcottgreen2 sentences2023Once an appropriate interval to permit legislative reconsideration has passed without corrective legislative action, the inference of legislative acquiescence places a significant jurisprudential limitation on our own authority to reconsider the merits of our earlier decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation, 330 Conn. 400 , 417-18, 195 A.3d 664 (2018); accord Spiotti v. Wolcott, 326 Conn. 190 , 201-202, 163 A.3d 46 (2017). a Considerations of Legislative Acquiescence The legislative acquiescence doctrine does not necessarily foreclose reconsidera 2023Once an appropriate interval to permit legislative reconsideration has passed without corrective legislative action, the inference of legislative acquiescence places a significant jurisprudential limitation on our own authority to reconsider the merits of our earlier decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation, 330 Conn. 400 , 417-18, 195 A.3d 664 (2018); accord Spiotti v. Wolcott, 326 Conn. 190 , 201-202, 163 A.3d 46 (2017). a Considerations of Legislative Acquiescence The legislative acquiescence doctrine does not necessarily foreclose reconsidera | 2 | 2 |
State v. Courchesnegreen2 sentences2017We further disagree with the plaintiffs' reliance on the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, under which "we may infer that the failure of the legislature to take corrective action within a reasonable period of time following a definitive judicial interpretation of a statute signals legislative agreement with that interpretation." State v. Courchesne , 296 Conn. 622 , 717, 998 A.2d 1 (2010). 2017We further disagree with the plaintiffs' reliance on the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, under which "we may infer that the failure of the legislature to take corrective action within a reasonable period of time following a definitive judicial interpretation of a statute signals legislative agreement with that interpretation." State v. Courchesne , 296 Conn. 622 , 717, 998 A.2d 1 (2010). | 2 | 2 |
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commissiongreen2 sentences1999See Conway v. Town of Wilton , 238 Conn. 653 , 678 (1996); Aaron v. Securities Exchange Commission , 446 U.S. 680 , 694 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 1945 , 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1990); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission , 395 U.S. 367 , 381-82 n. 11, 89 S.Ct. 1794 , 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1960). 1999See Conway v. Town of Wilton , 238 Conn. 653 , 678 (1996); Aaron v. Securities Exchange Commission , 446 U.S. 680 , 694 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 1945 , 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1990); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission , 395 U.S. 367 , 381-82 n. 11, 89 S.Ct. 1794 , 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1960). | 2 | 2 |
Hall v. Gilbert & Bennett Manufacturing Co.green2 sentences1998See Hall v. Gilbert Bennett Manufacturing Co., 241 Conn. 282 , 297 , 695 A.2d 1051 (1997) (stating "[t]ime and again, we have characterized the failure of the legislature to take corrective action as manifesting the legislature's acquiescence in our construction of a statute. . . ."). 1998See Hall v. Gilbert Bennett Manufacturing Co., 241 Conn. 282 , 297 , 695 A.2d 1051 (1997) (stating "[t]ime and again, we have characterized the failure of the legislature to take corrective action as manifesting the legislature's acquiescence in our construction of a statute. . . ."). | 2 | 2 |
Stuart v. Stuartgreen2 sentences2017Cf. Stuart v. Stuart , 297 Conn. 26 , 47, 996 A.2d 259 (2010) (discussing particular applicability of doctrine of legislative acquiescence when "legislature affirmatively amended the statute subsequent to a judicial or administrative interpretation, but chose not to amend the specific provision of the statute at issue" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). 2017Cf. Stuart v. Stuart , 297 Conn. 26 , 47, 996 A.2d 259 (2010) (discussing particular applicability of doctrine of legislative acquiescence when "legislature affirmatively amended the statute subsequent to a judicial or administrative interpretation, but chose not to amend the specific provision of the statute at issue" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). | 1 | 5 |
Berkley v. Gavingreen2 sentences2010The legislative acquiescence doctrine is especially persuasive when, as in the present case, the “legislature affirmatively amended the statute subsequent to a judicial or administrative interpretation, but chose not to amend the specific provision of the statute at issue.” Berkley v. Gavin, 253 Conn. 761, 780 , 756 A.2d 248 (2000). 13 In light of this legislative history, as well as the strong suggestion within the text of § 5-270 (g) (2) that the enumerated dirties require discretion and autonomy, I would conclude that the trial court properly determined that the board correctly had conclude 2010The legislative acquiescence doctrine is especially persuasive when, as in the present case, the “legislature affirmatively amended the statute subsequent to a judicial or administrative interpretation, but chose not to amend the specific provision of the statute at issue.” Berkley v. Gavin, 253 Conn. 761, 780 , 756 A.2d 248 (2000). 13 In light of this legislative history, as well as the strong suggestion within the text of § 5-270 (g) (2) that the enumerated dirties require discretion and autonomy, I would conclude that the trial court properly determined that the board correctly had conclude | 1 | 3 |
Aaron v. Securities & Exchange Commissiongreen2 sentences1999See Conway v. Town of Wilton , 238 Conn. 653 , 678 (1996); Aaron v. Securities Exchange Commission , 446 U.S. 680 , 694 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 1945 , 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1990); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission , 395 U.S. 367 , 381-82 n. 11, 89 S.Ct. 1794 , 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1960). 1999See Conway v. Town of Wilton , 238 Conn. 653 , 678 (1996); Aaron v. Securities Exchange Commission , 446 U.S. 680 , 694 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 1945 , 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1990); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission , 395 U.S. 367 , 381-82 n. 11, 89 S.Ct. 1794 , 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1960). | 1 | 2 |
Butts v. Bysiewiczgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298 Conn. 665, 686 , 5 A.3d 932 (2010). 2026See, e.g., Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298 Conn. 665, 686 , 5 A.3d 932 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Doegreen2 sentences2017See General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 51-215a (a); see also State v. Fernando A. , 294 Conn. 1 , 20 n.15, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) (en banc) ("the fact that [ State v. Doe , 46 Conn.Supp. 598 , 765 A.2d 518 (2000) ], is a Superior Court decision not binding statewide does not detract from its status at that time as the only published authority construing [General Statutes] § 46b-38c"); accord State v. Courchesne , supra, at 717-18 , 998 A.2d 1 (unnecessary to apply presumption of legislative acquiescence because legislative history demonstrated General Assembly's approval of two published Superior 2017See General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 51-215a (a); see also State v. Fernando A. , 294 Conn. 1 , 20 n.15, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) (en banc) ("the fact that [ State v. Doe , 46 Conn.Supp. 598 , 765 A.2d 518 (2000) ], is a Superior Court decision not binding statewide does not detract from its status at that time as the only published authority construing [General Statutes] § 46b-38c"); accord State v. Courchesne , supra, at 717-18 , 998 A.2d 1 (unnecessary to apply presumption of legislative acquiescence because legislative history demonstrated General Assembly's approval of two published Superior | 1 | 1 |
State v. FERNANDO A.green2 sentences2017See General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 51-215a (a); see also State v. Fernando A. , 294 Conn. 1 , 20 n.15, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) (en banc) ("the fact that [ State v. Doe , 46 Conn.Supp. 598 , 765 A.2d 518 (2000) ], is a Superior Court decision not binding statewide does not detract from its status at that time as the only published authority construing [General Statutes] § 46b-38c"); accord State v. Courchesne , supra, at 717-18 , 998 A.2d 1 (unnecessary to apply presumption of legislative acquiescence because legislative history demonstrated General Assembly's approval of two published Superior 2017See General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 51-215a (a); see also State v. Fernando A. , 294 Conn. 1 , 20 n.15, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) (en banc) ("the fact that [ State v. Doe , 46 Conn.Supp. 598 , 765 A.2d 518 (2000) ], is a Superior Court decision not binding statewide does not detract from its status at that time as the only published authority construing [General Statutes] § 46b-38c"); accord State v. Courchesne , supra, at 717-18 , 998 A.2d 1 (unnecessary to apply presumption of legislative acquiescence because legislative history demonstrated General Assembly's approval of two published Superior | 1 | 1 |
Wiseman v. Armstronggreen2 sentences2010See Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 825-26 , 850 A.2d 114 (2004) (fact that legislature amended statute three times after attorney general’s opinion but did not change relevant provision indicative of legislative acquiescence); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, supra, 176 Conn. 198 (“inference of legislative concurrence with the agency’s interpretation [is] to be drawn from legislative silence concerning that interpretation, especially where the legislature makes unrelated amendments in the same statute”). 2010See Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 825-26 , 850 A.2d 114 (2004) (fact that legislature amended statute three times after attorney general’s opinion but did not change relevant provision indicative of legislative acquiescence); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, supra, 176 Conn. 198 (“inference of legislative concurrence with the agency’s interpretation [is] to be drawn from legislative silence concerning that interpretation, especially where the legislature makes unrelated amendments in the same statute”). | 1 | 1 |
Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review of Franklingreen2 sentences1996Although we have looked to legislative inaction following a decision as a signal of acquiescence in the holding of the court; see, e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 203 Conn. 425, 439 , 525 A.2d 91 (1987); we have more recently questioned the use of the legislative acquiescence rule as a tool by which to divine legislative intent. 1996Although we have looked to legislative inaction following a decision as a signal of acquiescence in the holding of the court; see, e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 203 Conn. 425, 439 , 525 A.2d 91 (1987); we have more recently questioned the use of the legislative acquiescence rule as a tool by which to divine legislative intent. | 1 | 1 |
Town of Greenwich v. Department of Public Utility Controlgreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Streitweiser v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 219 Conn. 371, 379 , 593 A.2d 498 (1991); Greenwich v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 121 , 127-28 n.6, 592 A.2d 372 (1991). 1996See, e.g., Streitweiser v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 219 Conn. 371, 379 , 593 A.2d 498 (1991); Greenwich v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 121 , 127-28 n.6, 592 A.2d 372 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Streitweiser v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co.green2 sentences1996See, e.g., Streitweiser v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 219 Conn. 371, 379 , 593 A.2d 498 (1991); Greenwich v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 121 , 127-28 n.6, 592 A.2d 372 (1991). 1996See, e.g., Streitweiser v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 219 Conn. 371, 379 , 593 A.2d 498 (1991); Greenwich v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 121 , 127-28 n.6, 592 A.2d 372 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Graham v. Comm'r of Transp.
green
2 sentences2023Once an appropriate interval to permit legislative reconsideration has passed without corrective legislative action, the inference of legislative acquiescence places a significant jurisprudential limitation on our own authority to reconsider the merits of our earlier decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation, 330 Conn. 400 , 417-18, 195 A.3d 664 (2018); accord Spiotti v. Wolcott, 326 Conn. 190 , 201-202, 163 A.3d 46 (2017). a Considerations of Legislative Acquiescence The legislative acquiescence doctrine does not necessarily foreclose reconsidera 2023Once an appropriate interval to permit legislative reconsideration has passed without corrective legislative action, the inference of legislative acquiescence places a significant jurisprudential limitation on our own authority to reconsider the merits of our earlier decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation, 330 Conn. 400 , 417-18, 195 A.3d 664 (2018); accord Spiotti v. Wolcott, 326 Conn. 190 , 201-202, 163 A.3d 46 (2017). a Considerations of Legislative Acquiescence The legislative acquiescence doctrine does not necessarily foreclose reconsidera | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Salamon
green
2 sentences2023In other words, [l]egislative concurrence is particularly strong [when] the legislature makes unrelated amendments in the same statute.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Stuart, 297 Conn. 26, 47 , 996 A.2d 259 (2010); see, e.g., State v. Ashby, supra, 336 Conn. 492-93; Spiotti v. Wolcott, supra, 326 Conn. 202 ; State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 , 525-26, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008). 2023In other words, [l]egislative concurrence is particularly strong [when] the legislature makes unrelated amendments in the same statute.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Stuart, 297 Conn. 26, 47 , 996 A.2d 259 (2010); see, e.g., State v. Ashby, supra, 336 Conn. 492-93; Spiotti v. Wolcott, supra, 326 Conn. 202 ; State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 , 525-26, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Ray
green
2 sentences2018As we observed in State v. Ray , supra, 290 Conn. at 614 , 966 A.2d 148 , "[i]f we were writing on a blank slate, we might find persuasive" the defendant's interpretation of § 21a-278 (b), given the language of the statute and the fact that it "finds some support in the chronology of the statutes and the [statute's] legislative history ...." The doctrine of legislative acquiescence has, however, even more strength now than when we considered the identical issue in Ray . 2018As we observed in State v. Ray , supra, 290 Conn. at 614 , 966 A.2d 148 , "[i]f we were writing on a blank slate, we might find persuasive" the defendant's interpretation of § 21a-278 (b), given the language of the statute and the fact that it "finds some support in the chronology of the statutes and the [statute's] legislative history ...." The doctrine of legislative acquiescence has, however, even more strength now than when we considered the identical issue in Ray . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lozada v. Warden, State Prison
green
1 sentence2017Should the legislature determine that existing "restrictive measures"; Lozada v. Warden , supra, 223 Conn. at 845 n.11, 613 A.2d 818 ; already in place to address frivolous habeas petitions, such as summary dismissal without a trial under § 52-470 (b) or Anders briefs 17 filed by habeas counsel, are insufficient to stem the tide of third habeas petitions challenging the first two layers of habeas representation, the legislature remains free to amend the relevant statutes as necessary. 18 Cf. **569 In re Jonathan M. , supra, 255 Conn. at 240 -41 , 764 A.2d 739 (concluding that **570 habeas *124 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In re Jonathan M.
green
2 sentences2017Should the legislature determine that existing "restrictive measures"; Lozada v. Warden , supra, 223 Conn. at 845 n.11, 613 A.2d 818 ; already in place to address frivolous habeas petitions, such as summary dismissal without a trial under § 52-470 (b) or Anders briefs 17 filed by habeas counsel, are insufficient to stem the tide of third habeas petitions challenging the first two layers of habeas representation, the legislature remains free to amend the relevant statutes as necessary. 18 Cf. **569 In re Jonathan M. , supra, 255 Conn. at 240 -41 , 764 A.2d 739 (concluding that **570 habeas *124 2017Should the legislature determine that existing "restrictive measures"; Lozada v. Warden , supra, 223 Conn. at 845 n.11, 613 A.2d 818 ; already in place to address frivolous habeas petitions, such as summary dismissal without a trial under § 52-470 (b) or Anders briefs 17 filed by habeas counsel, are insufficient to stem the tide of third habeas petitions challenging the first two layers of habeas representation, the legislature remains free to amend the relevant statutes as necessary. 18 Cf. **569 In re Jonathan M. , supra, 255 Conn. at 240 -41 , 764 A.2d 739 (concluding that **570 habeas *124 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Moulton
green
2 sentences2014State v. Moul- ton, 310 Conn. 337 , 361 n.22, 78 A.3d 55 (2013) (acknowl- edging that ‘‘under the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, legislative cognizance of the courts’ prior interpretation of [a statute is] presumed, and the failure of the legislature to enact corrective legislation consti- tute[s] evidence of its agreement with that interpreta- tion’’). 2014State v. Moul- ton, 310 Conn. 337 , 361 n.22, 78 A.3d 55 (2013) (acknowl- edging that ‘‘under the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, legislative cognizance of the courts’ prior interpretation of [a statute is] presumed, and the failure of the legislature to enact corrective legislation consti- tute[s] evidence of its agreement with that interpreta- tion’’). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority.
green
2 sentences2010See Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 825-26 , 850 A.2d 114 (2004) (fact that legislature amended statute three times after attorney general's opinion but did not change relevant provision indicative of legislative acquiescence); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, supra, 176 Conn. at 198 , 405 A.2d 638 ("inference of legislative concurrence with the agency's interpretation [is] to be drawn from legislative silence concerning that interpretation, especially where the legislature makes unrelated amendments in the same statute"). [14] Although the majority ack 2010See Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 825-26 , 850 A.2d 114 (2004) (fact that legislature amended statute three times after attorney general's opinion but did not change relevant provision indicative of legislative acquiescence); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, supra, 176 Conn. at 198 , 405 A.2d 638 ("inference of legislative concurrence with the agency's interpretation [is] to be drawn from legislative silence concerning that interpretation, especially where the legislature makes unrelated amendments in the same statute"). [14] Although the majority ack | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Discuillo v. Stone & Webster
green
2 sentences2008In other words, "[l]egislative concurrence is particularly strong [when] the legislature makes unrelated amendments in the same statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570, 594 , 698 A.2d 873 (1997) ( Berdon, J., dissenting). 2008In other words, "[l]egislative concurrence is particularly strong [when] the legislature makes unrelated amendments in the same statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570, 594 , 698 A.2d 873 (1997) ( Berdon, J., dissenting). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2008"Time and again, we have characterized the failure of the legislature to take corrective action as manifesting the legislature's acquiescence in our construction of a statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 254 Conn. at 252 , 756 A.2d 1264 ; accord Mahon v. B.V. 2008"Time and again, we have characterized the failure of the legislature to take corrective action as manifesting the legislature's acquiescence in our construction of a statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 254 Conn. at 252 , 756 A.2d 1264 ; accord Mahon v. B.V. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2008This court should honor the "significant jurisprudential limitation" imposed on us by the legislative acquiescence doctrine; (internal quotation marks omitted) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 259 Conn. at 874 , 792 A.2d 774 ; and recognize that "legislatures and not courts are responsible for defining criminal activity." State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 675 , 888 A.2d 985 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 578 , 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006). 2008This court should honor the "significant jurisprudential limitation" imposed on us by the legislative acquiescence doctrine; (internal quotation marks omitted) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 259 Conn. at 874 , 792 A.2d 774 ; and recognize that "legislatures and not courts are responsible for defining criminal activity." State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 675 , 888 A.2d 985 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 578 , 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Skakel
green
2 sentences2008This court should honor the "significant jurisprudential limitation" imposed on us by the legislative acquiescence doctrine; (internal quotation marks omitted) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 259 Conn. at 874 , 792 A.2d 774 ; and recognize that "legislatures and not courts are responsible for defining criminal activity." State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 675 , 888 A.2d 985 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 578 , 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006). 2008This court should honor the "significant jurisprudential limitation" imposed on us by the legislative acquiescence doctrine; (internal quotation marks omitted) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 259 Conn. at 874 , 792 A.2d 774 ; and recognize that "legislatures and not courts are responsible for defining criminal activity." State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 675 , 888 A.2d 985 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 578 , 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
DeSena v. City of Waterbury
green
2 sentences2007To be sure, “we have, on occasion, questioned the use of the legislative acquiescence rule as a tool by which to divine legislative intent ... in cases in which, following our decision on a particular issue, the legislature has had insufficient time to respond before we are again called [on] to consider the same or a sufficiently related issue.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Desena v. Waterbury, 249 Conn. 63 , 83 n.22, 731 A.2d 733 (1999). 2007To be sure, “we have, on occasion, questioned the use of the legislative acquiescence rule as a tool by which to divine legislative intent ... in cases in which, following our decision on a particular issue, the legislature has had insufficient time to respond before we are again called [on] to consider the same or a sufficiently related issue.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Desena v. Waterbury, 249 Conn. 63 , 83 n.22, 731 A.2d 733 (1999). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.