record indicates waiver in Illinois

2025App. 3d 742, 749 (1992)), but “substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights” (People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 236 (1996)). ¶ 19 In his original briefs, defendant put forth the general proposition that a trial court commits reversible error when it accepts a waiver of counsel that is not knowing and intelligent.

2025Rather, substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.” Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 132 (1987)).

2021However, strict compliance with Rule 401(a) is not required, and “substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.” Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236 (citing People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 333 (1989)).

2021Rather, “[s]ubstantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.” Id. (quoting Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236 (citing People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 333 (1989), and People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 132 (1987))).

2025Rather, substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.” Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 132 (1987)).

2021Instead, “substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.” Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236 ; see also People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 132 (1987).

2021“Rather, substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.” Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236 . ¶ 25 While a defendant does not need the skill and experience of a lawyer to competently and intelligently choose self-representation, “he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of such representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is -7- No. 1-19-1709 doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”

2019There are numerous decisions, which we refer to later, discussing what substantial compliance means, but the supreme court has held that “substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.” Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236 ; see also Kidd, 178 Ill. 2d at 104-05 ; People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 333 (1989); People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 132 (1987). ¶ 42 Illinois Appellate Courts have described two methods to determine wheth

2025However, “ ‘[s]trict technical’ ” compliance with the rule is not always required; substantial compliance will suffice to effectuate a valid waiver “ ‘if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.’ ” Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 41 (quoting People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 236 (1996)).

2025However, “ ‘[s]trict technical’ ” compliance with the rule is not always required; substantial compliance will suffice to effectuate a valid waiver “ ‘if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.’ ” Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 41 (quoting People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 236 (1996)). ¶ 42 Our courts recognize two categories of substantial compliance with Rule 401: “Substantial compliance occurs when any failure to fully provide admonishments does not prejudice defendant because either: (1)

2026July 1, 1984), “The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following: (1) the nature of the charge; (2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and (3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court.” 27 ¶ 9

2023App. 3d 1151, 1162 , 889 N.E.2d 244, 253 (2008). ¶ 18 “[S]trict, technical compliance with Rule 401(a) is not always required; rather, substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the waiver was otherwise made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and the admonishments -7- the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.” Jiles, 364 Ill.

2025However, “ ‘[s]trict technical’ ” compliance with the rule is not always required; substantial compliance will suffice to effectuate a valid waiver “ ‘if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.’ ” Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 41 (quoting People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 236 (1996)). ¶ 42 Our courts recognize two categories of substantial compliance with Rule 401: “Substantial compliance occurs when any failure to fully provide admonishments does not prejudice defendant because either: (1)

2022Moreover, the rule requiring that a defendant be informed of the nature of the charges against him “does not require the trial court to state to defendant all facts which do or may constitute the offense.” Pike, 2016 IL App (1st) 122626, ¶ 117 (citing People v. Harden, 78 Ill.

2004The making of objections is ordinarily a matter of trial strategy (People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 327 , 677 N.E.2d 875, 891 (1997)), and we do not find defense counsel’s representation fell outside the range of reasonable professional assistance.

2004The making of objections is ordinarily a matter of trial strategy (People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 327 , 677 N.E.2d 875, 891 (1997)), and we do not find defense counsel’s representation fell outside the range of reasonable professional assistance.

2002People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 333 (1989); People v. Smith, 249 Ill.

2002People v. Coleman , 129 Ill. 2d 321, 333 (1989); People v. Smith , 249 Ill.

2026See People v. Winters, 2020 IL App (2d) 180784, ¶¶ 14-17 (rejecting claim that jury waiver was involuntary where defendant accepted bench trial in exchange for sentencing benefit, and reaffirming that such bargaining context does not, standing alone, render a waiver involuntary under the sixth amendment or Illinois Constitution). ¶ 24 As in Winters, the record here shows the defendant was fully admonished and expressly acknowledged that he was giving up his right to a jury trial as part of a negotiated posture that included potential sentencing benefits, as well as amending the charge to exclu

2023The right to waive counsel is fundamental, and because of the gravity of the circumstance, each case “must be evaluated on its own particular set of facts.” Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 54 . 8 ¶ 21 The docket entry dated December 14, 2021, which was the defendant’s first appearance, states: “Defendant present in custody, tendered copy of the Information, and advised as to the nature of the charges and possible penalties.” When reviewing a docket entry, “[w]e must presume the common-law record is correct.” People v. Martinez, 361 Ill.

2023App. 3d 1151, 1162 , 889 N.E.2d 244, 253 (2008). ¶ 18 “[S]trict, technical compliance with Rule 401(a) is not always required; rather, substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the waiver was otherwise made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and the admonishments -7- the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.” Jiles, 364 Ill.

2022Nonetheless, we find no error, as the court was not required to admonish defendant pursuant to Rule 401(a) under the circumstances. ¶ 20 In People v. Young, 341 Ill.

2022Moreover, the rule requiring that a defendant be informed of the nature of the charges against him “does not require the trial court to state to defendant all facts which do or may constitute the offense.” Pike, 2016 IL App (1st) 122626, ¶ 117 (citing People v. Harden, 78 Ill.