grand jury hearing in Illinois

2018See, e.g., People v. Boston, 2016 IL 118661, ¶ 4 (no discussion of the involvement of law enforcement when discussing the State’s Attorney’s request for a subpoena to investigate a cold case); People v. Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill. 2d 177 (2000) (no discussion of other agency involvement in analysis of whether special prosecutor properly sought to divest the defendants of their reporter’s privilege in a grand jury investigation); People v. Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d 436, 458 (1994) (no discussion of other agency involvement in analysis of grand jury’s power to disclose subpoenaed documents to the State’s Atto

2017See, e.g. , People v. Boston , 2016 IL 118661 , ¶ 4, 401 Ill.Dec. 157 , 49 N.E.3d 859 (no discussion of the involvement of law enforcement when discussing the State's Attorney's request for a subpoena to investigate a cold case); People v. Pawlaczyk , 189 Ill. 2d 177 , 244 Ill.Dec. 13 , 724 N.E.2d 901 (2000) (no discussion of other agency involvement in analysis of whether special prosecutor properly sought to divest the defendants of their reporter's privilege in a grand jury investigation); People v. Wilson , 164 Ill. 2d 436 , 458, 207 Ill.Dec. 417 , 647 N.E.2d 910 (1994) (no discussion of o

1999Lenard, 79 Ill.

1999Lenard , 79 Ill.

2024Id. ¶ 17 Parks, who has a child with defendant, testified that she dated defendant for a year prior to the early morning hours of June 9, 1991, when she and defendant walked to 439 East 111th Place.

2024Id. ¶ 22 Parks told the grand jury that she had been dating defendant on and off for three years when he came to her house in the early morning hours of June 9, 1991, and asked her to take a ride.

2020Id. at 987 .

2001In People v. Smith, 67 Ill.

1992We are not persuaded to the contrary by defendant’s contention that the purpose of the statutory requirement at issue is to ensure that defendants receive admonishments concerning their Miranda rights and that the court recognized in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 16 L.

1992We are not persuaded to the contrary by defendant’s contention that the purpose of the statutory requirement at issue is to ensure that defendants receive admonishments concerning their Miranda rights and that the court recognized in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 16 L.

1992The official heading or title of a statute can provide guidance in interpreting the provision if its meaning is unclear. ( People v. Malone (1979), 71 Ill.App.3d 231, 232 , 27 Ill.Dec. 677 , 389 N.E.2d 908 .) We do not believe section 112-4(b) is unclear, however, with respect to the issue in question.

1992The official heading or title of a statute can provide guidance in interpreting the provision if its meaning is unclear. ( People v. Malone (1979), 71 Ill.App.3d 231, 232 , 27 Ill.Dec. 677 , 389 N.E.2d 908 .) We do not believe section 112-4(b) is unclear, however, with respect to the issue in question.

1989App. 3d 750 , 392 N.E.2d 235 ); and (4) the judge, as an assistant State’s Attorney, appeared before a grand jury hearing investigating the defendants and had assisted in the preparation of a related memorandum.

1985App. 3d 1027 , 390 N.E.2d 1259 .) In Rivera, two witnesses alleged that police officers coerced them into testifying against the accused at a grand jury hearing.

1983(People v. Arnold; People v. Munson (1925), 319 Ill. 596 , 150 N.E. 280 ; People v. Hartenbower (1918), 283 Ill. 591 , 119 N.E. 605 , dismissed (1919), 248 U.S. 550 , 63 L.

1983(People v. Arnold; People v. Munson (1925), 319 Ill. 596 , 150 N.E. 280 ; People v. Hartenbower (1918), 283 Ill. 591 , 119 N.E. 605 , dismissed (1919), 248 U.S. 550 , 63 L.

1983(People v. Arnold; People v. Munson (1925), 319 Ill. 596 , 150 N.E. 280 ; People v. Hartenbower (1918), 283 Ill. 591 , 119 N.E. 605 , dismissed (1919), 248 U.S. 550 , 63 L.

1983(People v. Arnold; People v. Munson (1925), 319 Ill. 596 , 150 N.E. 280 ; People v. Hartenbower (1918), 283 Ill. 591 , 119 N.E. 605 , dismissed (1919), 248 U.S. 550 , 63 L.

1983(People v. Arnold; People v. Munson (1925), 319 Ill. 596 , 150 N.E. 280 ; People v. Hartenbower (1918), 283 Ill. 591 , 119 N.E. 605 , dismissed (1919), 248 U.S. 550 , 63 L.

1983(People v. Arnold; People v. Munson (1925), 319 Ill. 596 , 150 N.E. 280 ; People v. Hartenbower (1918), 283 Ill. 591 , 119 N.E. 605 , dismissed (1919), 248 U.S. 550 , 63 L.

1982In United States v. Insana (2d Cir. 1970), 423 F.2d 1165 , cert, denied (1970), 400 U.S. 841 , 27 L.

1982In United States v. Insana (2d Cir. 1970), 423 F.2d 1165 , cert, denied (1970), 400 U.S. 841 , 27 L.

1979App. 3d 1057 , 371 N.E.2d 949 .) We also believe that the court properly sustained objections to questions concerning the officers’ refusal to answer questions during an internal departmental investigation and at a grand jury hearing.

1978In our opinion in Godsey we relied heavily on the reasoning of two Federal appeals courts’ decisions (United States v. Rubin (5th Cir. 1977), 559 F.2d 975 ; United States v. Tomaiolo (2d Cir. 1957), 249 F.2d 683 ).

1978In our opinion in Godsey we relied heavily on the reasoning of two Federal appeals courts’ decisions (United States v. Rubin (5th Cir. 1977), 559 F.2d 975 ; United States v. Tomaiolo (2d Cir. 1957), 249 F.2d 683 ).

1977This was an attack on the credibility of Parra, and it is well settled that the determination of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is for the trier of fact and, when that evidence is merely conflicting, the reviewing court will not substitute its judgment (People v. Bolger (1934), 359 Ill. 58 , 194 N.E. 225 ) unless the record discloses the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt (People v. Novotny (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 401 , 244 N.E.2d 182 ).

1977This was an attack on the credibility of Parra, and it is well settled that the determination of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is for the trier of fact and, when that evidence is merely conflicting, the reviewing court will not substitute its judgment (People v. Bolger (1934), 359 Ill. 58 , 194 N.E. 225 ) unless the record discloses the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt (People v. Novotny (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 401 , 244 N.E.2d 182 ).

1977This was an attack on the credibility of Parra, and it is well settled that the determination of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is for the trier of fact and, when that evidence is merely conflicting, the reviewing court will not substitute its judgment (People v. Bolger (1934), 359 Ill. 58 , 194 N.E. 225 ) unless the record discloses the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt (People v. Novotny (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 401 , 244 N.E.2d 182 ).

1977This was an attack on the credibility of Parra, and it is well settled that the determination of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is for the trier of fact and, when that evidence is merely conflicting, the reviewing court will not substitute its judgment (People v. Bolger (1934), 359 Ill. 58 , 194 N.E. 225 ) unless the record discloses the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt (People v. Novotny (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 401 , 244 N.E.2d 182 ).

1975As was said by our supreme court in People v. Page, 38 Ill.2d 611 , 615-16: “In fact, the only conceivable manner in which defendant here could have been prejudiced by his waiver of indictment is to assume that a grand jury hearing the evidence against a defendant who has made an unchallenged, incriminatory statement [which the defendant in this case had made also] regarding an armed robbery might not indict him.

1975As was said by our supreme court in People v. Page, 38 Ill.2d 611 , 615-16: “In fact, the only conceivable manner in which defendant here could have been prejudiced by his waiver of indictment is to assume that a grand jury hearing the evidence against a defendant who has made an unchallenged, incriminatory statement [which the defendant in this case had made also] regarding an armed robbery might not indict him.

1940(People v. Buzan, 351 Ill. 610 ; People v. Blume, 345 id. 524.) Also represented, as a second basis for the motion, was the discovery of a statement made by Tro jar subsequent to the grand jury hearing, that the defendant had accompanied him and Brookman when they obtained the money.