12 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Israelgreen2 sentences2011Thus, “[t]o meet the grand jury requirement of article I, section 10, an indictment must be specific enough to ensure that the grand jury had before it all the facts necessary to find probable cause.” State v. Israel, 78 Hawai'i 66, 72-73 , 890 P.2d 303, 309-10 (1995). 2011Thus, “[t]o meet the grand jury requirement of article I, section 10, an indictment must be specific enough to ensure that the grand jury had before it all the facts necessary to find probable cause.” State v. Israel, 78 Hawai'i 66, 72-73 , 890 P.2d 303, 309-10 (1995). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Apaogreen2 sentences2008See Israel , 78 Hawai`i at 73, 890 P.2d at 310 ("[J]ust as the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense *149 charged, the State is also required to sufficiently allege them. . . ." (Quoting State v. Tuua, 3 Haw.App. 287, 293 , 649 P.2d 1180, 1184-85 (1982).)); State v. Stan's Contr., Inc., 111 Hawai`i 17, 32, 137 P.3d 331, 346 (2006) ("An indictment must enable a grand jury to determine that probable cause exists that the accused committed a violation of the charged offense . . . as to the elements of the offense. . . ."); Apao, 59 Haw. at 635 & n 2008See Israel , 78 Hawai`i at 73, 890 P.2d at 310 ("[J]ust as the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense *149 charged, the State is also required to sufficiently allege them. . . ." (Quoting State v. Tuua, 3 Haw.App. 287, 293 , 649 P.2d 1180, 1184-85 (1982).)); State v. Stan's Contr., Inc., 111 Hawai`i 17, 32, 137 P.3d 331, 346 (2006) ("An indictment must enable a grand jury to determine that probable cause exists that the accused committed a violation of the charged offense . . . as to the elements of the offense. . . ."); Apao, 59 Haw. at 635 & n | 1 | 3 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2008See State v. Israel, 78 Hawai`i 66, 73, 890 P.2d 303, 310 (1995) (explaining that "the requirement that an accusation must sufficiently allege all of the essential elements of the offense charged derived" from the grand jury clause and the due process clause). [13] In contrast to the federal indictment rule, see Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215 , this court has held that not all facts that increase the maximum penalty for a crime must be pled in the charging instrument. 2008See State v. Israel, 78 Hawai`i 66, 73, 890 P.2d 303, 310 (1995) (explaining that "the requirement that an accusation must sufficiently allege all of the essential elements of the offense charged derived" from the grand jury clause and the due process clause). [13] In contrast to the federal indictment rule, see Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215 , this court has held that not all facts that increase the maximum penalty for a crime must be pled in the charging instrument. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cottongreen2 sentences2008See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 , 122 S.Ct. 1781 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (explaining that, "[i]n federal prosecutions," other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum "must be charged in the indictment" (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215 ))); Williams v. Haviland, 467 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir.2006) ("By explicitly referring to federal prosecutions and distinguishing state prosecutions, Cotton makes clear that Apprendi did not rev 2008See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 , 122 S.Ct. 1781 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (explaining that, "[i]n federal prosecutions," other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum "must be charged in the indictment" (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215 ))); Williams v. Haviland, 467 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir.2006) ("By explicitly referring to federal prosecutions and distinguishing state prosecutions, Cotton makes clear that Apprendi did not rev | 1 | 1 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2008V.)); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (declining to address the question whether a defendant in a state prosecution could challenge, under the federal constitution, the absence of aggravating factors in his indictment and noting that "the `due process of law' that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States to provide to persons accused of crime . . . has not . . . been construed to include" the fifth amendment's grand jury clause); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 597 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ); Alexand 2008V.)); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (declining to address the question whether a defendant in a state prosecution could challenge, under the federal constitution, the absence of aggravating factors in his indictment and noting that "the `due process of law' that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States to provide to persons accused of crime . . . has not . . . been construed to include" the fifth amendment's grand jury clause); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 597 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ); Alexand | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Havilandgreen2 sentences2008Although the indictment rule in Jones is grounded in the fifth amendment’s grand jury clause, see Haviland, 467 F.3d at 533 , which has not been applied to state prosecutions, see Alexander, 405 U.S. at 633 , 92 S.Ct. 1221 , article I, section 10 of the Hawaii Constitution was patterned after its federal counterpart, see 1 Constitutional Convention of Hawaii 164, 243, 420 (1960) (explaining that article I, section 9, which was ultimately codified as section 8 (the predecessor to article I, section 10), “incorporates the first three clauses of the 5th Amendment of the Federal Constitution”). 2008Although the indictment rule in Jones is grounded in the fifth amendment's grand jury clause, see Haviland, 467 F.3d at 533 , which has not been applied to state prosecutions, see Alexander, 405 U.S. at 633 , 92 S.Ct. 1221 , article I, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution was patterned after its federal counterpart, see 1 Constitutional Convention of Hawaii 164, 243, 420 (1960) (explaining that article I, section 9, which was ultimately codified as section 8 (the predecessor to article I, section 10), "incorporates the first three clauses of the 5th Amendment of the Federal Constitution"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tafoyagreen2 sentences2008See State v. Tafoya, 91 Hawai i 261, 270, 982 P.2d 890, 899 (1999). 2008See State v. Tafoya, 91 Hawai`i 261, 270, 982 P.2d 890, 899 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2008V.)); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (declining to address the question whether a defendant in a state prosecution could challenge, under the federal constitution, the absence of aggravating factors in his indictment and noting that "the `due process of law' that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States to provide to persons accused of crime . . . has not . . . been construed to include" the fifth amendment's grand jury clause); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 597 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ); Alexand 2008V.)); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (declining to address the question whether a defendant in a state prosecution could challenge, under the federal constitution, the absence of aggravating factors in his indictment and noting that "the `due process of law' that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States to provide to persons accused of crime . . . has not . . . been construed to include" the fifth amendment's grand jury clause); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 597 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ); Alexand | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jendruschgreen2 sentences2008A charge defective in this regard amounts to a failure to state an offense, and a conviction based upon it cannot be sustained, for that would constitute a denial of due process. '" (Quoting State v. Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 281 , 567 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1977).) (Emphasis added.)). [14] The Apao proposition was implicitly grounded in article I, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution, insofar as we relied on a federal decision interpreting the fifth amendment's grand jury clause. 2008A charge defective in this regard amounts to a failure to state an offense, and a conviction based upon it cannot be sustained, for that would constitute a denial of due process. '" (Quoting State v. Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 281 , 567 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1977).) (Emphasis added.)). [14] The Apao proposition was implicitly grounded in article I, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution, insofar as we relied on a federal decision interpreting the fifth amendment's grand jury clause. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Louis Martin Radetsky, A/K/A L. M. Radetskygreen2 sentences2008Apao, 59 Haw. at 635 & n. 5, 586 P.2d 250 , 257 & n. 5 (quoting United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 562 (10th Cir.1976), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994 , 1004 & n. 11 (10th Cir.1990)). . 2008Apao, 59 Haw. at 635 & n. 5, 586 P.2d 250 , 257 & n. 5 (quoting United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 562 (10th Cir.1976), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994 , 1004 & n. 11 (10th Cir. 1990)). [15] Given the Cunningham analysis, extrinsic enhancers effectively become, for constitutional purposes, attendant circumstances of the "aggravated" offense. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stan's Contracting, Inc.green2 sentences2008See Israel, 78 Hawai'i at 73 , 890 P.2d at 310 (“[J]ust as the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense charged, the State is also required to sufficiently allege them.... ” (Quoting State v. Tuua, 3 Haw.App. 287, 293 , 649 P.2d 1180, 1184-85 (1982).)); State v. Stan’s Contr., Inc., 111 Hawai'i 17, 32 , 137 P.3d 331, 346 (2006) (“An indictment must enable a grand jury to determine that probable cause exists that the accused committed a violation of the charged offense ... as to the elements of the offense .... ”); Apao, 59 Haw. at 635 & n. 5, 586 2008See Israel , 78 Hawai`i at 73, 890 P.2d at 310 ("[J]ust as the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense *149 charged, the State is also required to sufficiently allege them. . . ." (Quoting State v. Tuua, 3 Haw.App. 287, 293 , 649 P.2d 1180, 1184-85 (1982).)); State v. Stan's Contr., Inc., 111 Hawai`i 17, 32, 137 P.3d 331, 346 (2006) ("An indictment must enable a grand jury to determine that probable cause exists that the accused committed a violation of the charged offense . . . as to the elements of the offense. . . ."); Apao, 59 Haw. at 635 & n | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tuuagreen2 sentences2008See Israel , 78 Hawai`i at 73, 890 P.2d at 310 ("[J]ust as the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense *149 charged, the State is also required to sufficiently allege them. . . ." (Quoting State v. Tuua, 3 Haw.App. 287, 293 , 649 P.2d 1180, 1184-85 (1982).)); State v. Stan's Contr., Inc., 111 Hawai`i 17, 32, 137 P.3d 331, 346 (2006) ("An indictment must enable a grand jury to determine that probable cause exists that the accused committed a violation of the charged offense . . . as to the elements of the offense. . . ."); Apao, 59 Haw. at 635 & n 2008See Israel , 78 Hawai`i at 73, 890 P.2d at 310 ("[J]ust as the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense *149 charged, the State is also required to sufficiently allege them. . . ." (Quoting State v. Tuua, 3 Haw.App. 287, 293 , 649 P.2d 1180, 1184-85 (1982).)); State v. Stan's Contr., Inc., 111 Hawai`i 17, 32, 137 P.3d 331, 346 (2006) ("An indictment must enable a grand jury to determine that probable cause exists that the accused committed a violation of the charged offense . . . as to the elements of the offense. . . ."); Apao, 59 Haw. at 635 & n | 1 | 1 |
CITY AND CTY. OF HONOLULU v. Toyamagreen2 sentences2000See also City & County v. Toyama, 61 Haw. 156 , 158 n. 1, 598 P.2d 168 , 169 n. 1 (1979). 2000See also City & County v. Toyama, 61 Haw. 156 , 158 n. 1, 598 P.2d 168 , 169 n. 1 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kanegreen2 sentences1995State v. Kane, 3 Haw.App. 450, 457 , 652 P.2d 642, 647 (1982). 1995State v. Kane, 3 Haw.App. 450, 457 , 652 P.2d 642, 647 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lawlergreen2 sentences1982Probable cause has been defined as “[c]redible evidence which excites in the mind of the grand jury an honest and reasonable belief that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.” State v. Lawler, 221 Wis. 423 , 267 N.W. 65, 568, 574 (1936). 1982Probable cause has been defined as “[c]redible evidence which excites in the mind of the grand jury an honest and reasonable belief that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.” State v. Lawler, 221 Wis. 423 , 267 N.W. 65, 568, 574 (1936). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cominsgreen1 sentence1978The determination as to exact cause of death was reached by the Medical Examiner, who was not called to testify at the grand jury hearing. 5 We recognize that this approach is plainly at variance with the views expressed in both Jones v. Taylor, 547 F.2d 808 , 809 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1977), and Commonwealth v. Comins,-Mass.-, 356 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977), which took the position that an indictment returned solely on the basis of hearsay is not necessarily invalid. 6 See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 988, 1037 (1938). | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. Georgiagreen1 sentence1977The grand jury requirement is “a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused. . . .” Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sapienza v. Hayashi
green
2 sentences2018In Sapienza v. Hayashi , for instance, a trial court judge issued an order disqualifying the entire City and County of Honolulu Prosecutor's Office from participating in a grand jury inquiry because the City Prosecutor was a political appointee of the Mayor who was accused of wrongdoing in the underlying matter. 57 Haw. at 291 -92 , 554 P.2d at 1133 -34 . 2018In Sapienza v. Hayashi , for instance, a trial court judge issued an order disqualifying the entire City and County of Honolulu Prosecutor's Office from participating in a grand jury inquiry because the City Prosecutor was a political appointee of the Mayor who was accused of wrongdoing in the underlying matter. 57 Haw. at 291 -92 , 554 P.2d at 1133 -34 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Kachanian
green
2 sentences2009With respect to the second restraint, the grand jury, in addition to the drug-related offenses, indicted Hicks for Count III resisting arrest, charging in salient part: On or about the 30th day of October 2001, . . . [Hicks] intentionally prevented [Officer Natividad], a peace officer acting under color of his official authority, from effecting an arrest by using or threatening to use physical force against [Officer Natividad] or another, thereby committing the offense of Resisting Arrest, in violation of [Hawaii Revised Statutes] Section 710-1026(1) (a) [.] Thus, the circuit court's findings 2009With respect to the second restraint, the grand jury, in addition to the drug-related offenses, indicted Hicks for Count III resisting arrest, charging in salient part: On or about the 30th day of October 2001, . . . [Hicks] intentionally prevented [Officer Natividad], a peace officer acting under color of his official authority, from effecting an arrest by using or threatening to use physical force against [Officer Natividad] or another, thereby committing the offense of Resisting Arrest, in violation of [Hawaii Revised Statutes] Section 710-1026(1) (a) [.] Thus, the circuit court's findings | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Maugaotega
green
2 sentences2008Because the petit jury must find certain extrinsic elemental facts as a prerequisite to convicting a defendant of the enhanced (i.e., “aggravated”) version of an offense, see Maugaotega II, 115 Hawai'i at 447 , 168 P.3d at 577 , it necessarily follows that, during the grand jury proceeding, the jury should likewise be required to find probable cause with respect to such elemental facts. 2008Because the petit jury must find certain extrinsic elemental facts as a prerequisite to convicting a defendant of the enhanced ( i.e., "aggravated") version of an offense, see Maugaotega II, 115 Hawai`i at 447, 168 P.3d at 577 , it necessarily follows that, during the grand jury proceeding, the jury should likewise be required to find probable cause with respect to such elemental facts. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Harris v. United States
red
2 sentences2008See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 , 122 S.Ct. 1781 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (explaining that, "[i]n federal prosecutions," other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum "must be charged in the indictment" (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215 ))); Williams v. Haviland, 467 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir.2006) ("By explicitly referring to federal prosecutions and distinguishing state prosecutions, Cotton makes clear that Apprendi did not rev 2008See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 , 122 S.Ct. 1781 , 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (explaining that, "[i]n federal prosecutions," other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum "must be charged in the indictment" (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215 ))); Williams v. Haviland, 467 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir.2006) ("By explicitly referring to federal prosecutions and distinguishing state prosecutions, Cotton makes clear that Apprendi did not rev | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2008V.)); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (declining to address the question whether a defendant in a state prosecution could challenge, under the federal constitution, the absence of aggravating factors in his indictment and noting that "the `due process of law' that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States to provide to persons accused of crime . . . has not . . . been construed to include" the fifth amendment's grand jury clause); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 597 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ); Alexand 2008V.)); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (declining to address the question whether a defendant in a state prosecution could challenge, under the federal constitution, the absence of aggravating factors in his indictment and noting that "the `due process of law' that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States to provide to persons accused of crime . . . has not . . . been construed to include" the fifth amendment's grand jury clause); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 597 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ); Alexand | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Sammy G. Daily and Frederik A. Figge
green
2 sentences2008Apao, 59 Haw. at 635 & n. 5, 586 P.2d 250 , 257 & n. 5 (quoting United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 562 (10th Cir.1976), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994 , 1004 & n. 11 (10th Cir.1990)). . 2008Apao, 59 Haw. at 635 & n. 5, 586 P.2d 250 , 257 & n. 5 (quoting United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 562 (10th Cir.1976), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994 , 1004 & n. 11 (10th Cir. 1990)). [15] Given the Cunningham analysis, extrinsic enhancers effectively become, for constitutional purposes, attendant circumstances of the "aggravated" offense. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Scotland
green
1 sentence1980In State v. Scotland, supra, 58 Haw. at 478 , the court said: We know of no rule of law that mandates the prosecutor to give to the grand jury an instruction to disregard improper testimony in a case such as the one before us. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Bell
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Bell, 60 Haw. 241 , 589 P.2d 517 (1978), the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated: We further reject Hisaw’s attempt to construe § 6-703(d) of the Charter of the City and County of Honolulu (as revised) as a valid requirement that the prosecutor must instruct the grand jury regarding possible defenses. 1980In State v. Bell, 60 Haw. 241 , 589 P.2d 517 (1978), the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated: We further reject Hisaw’s attempt to construe § 6-703(d) of the Charter of the City and County of Honolulu (as revised) as a valid requirement that the prosecutor must instruct the grand jury regarding possible defenses. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Joao
green
2 sentences1978The appellant further argues that officer Ornellas’ testimony at the grand jury hearing biased the grand jury against the appellant, and the court’s ruling in State v. Joao, 53 Haw. 226 , 491 P.2d 1089 (1972), requires that the indictment be dismissed. 1978The appellant further argues that officer Ornellas’ testimony at the grand jury hearing biased the grand jury against the appellant, and the court’s ruling in State v. Joao, 53 Haw. 226 , 491 P.2d 1089 (1972), requires that the indictment be dismissed. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Clifton Ray Jones v. John Taylor and State of North Carolina
green
1 sentence1978The determination as to exact cause of death was reached by the Medical Examiner, who was not called to testify at the grand jury hearing. 5 We recognize that this approach is plainly at variance with the views expressed in both Jones v. Taylor, 547 F.2d 808 , 809 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1977), and Commonwealth v. Comins,-Mass.-, 356 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977), which took the position that an indictment returned solely on the basis of hearsay is not necessarily invalid. 6 See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 988, 1037 (1938). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Baker v. Marshall
green
1 sentence1978The determination as to exact cause of death was reached by the Medical Examiner, who was not called to testify at the grand jury hearing. 5 We recognize that this approach is plainly at variance with the views expressed in both Jones v. Taylor, 547 F.2d 808 , 809 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1977), and Commonwealth v. Comins,-Mass.-, 356 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977), which took the position that an indictment returned solely on the basis of hearsay is not necessarily invalid. 6 See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 988, 1037 (1938). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Layton
green
2 sentences1978The grand jury transcript, a copy of which is a part of the record in this case, reveals that Detective Trepte testified, inter alia, to the following matters: (1) When he arrived at the Waikiki Gateway Hotel on the morning of November 26, 1974, he found the body of a partially nude, young woman in the restroom of the hotel launderette, and the woman “was pronounced dead, at the scene”; and (2) “An autopsy was performed on the woman and the cause of death comes back as ‘asphyxia, due to strangulation.’ ” *5 Based upon the testimony of Trepte and of other witnesses, the grand jury indicted appe 1978The grand jury transcript, a copy of which is a part of the record in this case, reveals that Detective Trepte testified, inter alia, to the following matters: (1) When he arrived at the Waikiki Gateway Hotel on the morning of November 26, 1974, he found the body of a partially nude, young woman in the restroom of the hotel launderette, and the woman “was pronounced dead, at the scene”; and (2) “An autopsy was performed on the woman and the cause of death comes back as ‘asphyxia, due to strangulation.’ ” *5 Based upon the testimony of Trepte and of other witnesses, the grand jury indicted appe | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.