14 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Belangergreen2 sentences2016See State v. Ruiz, 2003-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 6-9 , 133 N.M. 717 , 68 P.3d 957 (recognizing that a prosecutor’s questioning can be considered intentional when he walked a key witness right into the testimony that had been suppressed by a motion in limine); see also State v. Saavedra, 1985-NMSC-077 , ¶ 9, 103 N.M. 282 , 705 P.2d 1133 (concluding that an improper prosecutorial motive was established when the prosecutor asked an identical question of the same witness at a grand jury hearing and received identical inadmissible answers each time), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-0 2016See State v. Ruiz, 2003-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 6-9 , 133 N.M. 717 , 68 P.3d 957 (recognizing that a prosecutor’s questioning can be considered intentional when he walked a key witness right into the testimony that had been suppressed by a motion in limine); see also State v. Saavedra, 1985-NMSC-077 , ¶ 9, 103 N.M. 282 , 705 P.2d 1133 (concluding that an improper prosecutorial motive was established when the prosecutor asked an identical question of the same witness at a grand jury hearing and received identical inadmissible answers each time), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-0 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ruizgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Ruiz, 2003-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 6-9 , 133 N.M. 717 , 68 P.3d 957 (recognizing that a prosecutor’s questioning can be considered intentional when he walked a key witness right into the testimony that had been suppressed by a motion in limine); see also State v. Saavedra, 1985-NMSC-077 , ¶ 9, 103 N.M. 282 , 705 P.2d 1133 (concluding that an improper prosecutorial motive was established when the prosecutor asked an identical question of the same witness at a grand jury hearing and received identical inadmissible answers each time), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-0 2016See State v. Ruiz, 2003-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 6-9 , 133 N.M. 717 , 68 P.3d 957 (recognizing that a prosecutor’s questioning can be considered intentional when he walked a key witness right into the testimony that had been suppressed by a motion in limine); see also State v. Saavedra, 1985-NMSC-077 , ¶ 9, 103 N.M. 282 , 705 P.2d 1133 (concluding that an improper prosecutorial motive was established when the prosecutor asked an identical question of the same witness at a grand jury hearing and received identical inadmissible answers each time), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-0 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Saavedragreen2 sentences2016See State v. Ruiz, 2003-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 6-9 , 133 N.M. 717 , 68 P.3d 957 (recognizing that a prosecutor’s questioning can be considered intentional when he walked a key witness right into the testimony that had been suppressed by a motion in limine); see also State v. Saavedra, 1985-NMSC-077 , ¶ 9, 103 N.M. 282 , 705 P.2d 1133 (concluding that an improper prosecutorial motive was established when the prosecutor asked an identical question of the same witness at a grand jury hearing and received identical inadmissible answers each time), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-0 2016See State v. Ruiz, 2003-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 6-9 , 133 N.M. 717 , 68 P.3d 957 (recognizing that a prosecutor’s questioning can be considered intentional when he walked a key witness right into the testimony that had been suppressed by a motion in limine); see also State v. Saavedra, 1985-NMSC-077 , ¶ 9, 103 N.M. 282 , 705 P.2d 1133 (concluding that an improper prosecutorial motive was established when the prosecutor asked an identical question of the same witness at a grand jury hearing and received identical inadmissible answers each time), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-0 | 1 | 1 |
State v. AUGUSTIN M.green2 sentences2011See State v. Augustin M., 2003-NMCA-065, ¶¶ 16, 19 , 133 N.M. 636 , 68 P.3d 182 (recognizing that the prosecution is required to instruct the grand jury regarding the elements of the offense, but not possible defenses that a defendant may raise). {16} Consequently, we hold that the State properly excluded the “without consent” language from the grand jury instruction defining “unlawfulness” because Victim’s consent or lack thereof is legally irrelevant to the unlawfulness element of both CSP II and CSP IV. 2011See State v. Augustin M., 2003-NMCA-065, ¶¶ 16, 19 , 133 N.M. 636 , 68 P.3d 182 (recognizing that the prosecution is required to instruct the grand jury regarding the elements of the offense, but not possible defenses that a defendant may raise). {16} Consequently, we hold that the State properly excluded the “without consent” language from the grand jury instruction defining “unlawfulness” because Victim’s consent or lack thereof is legally irrelevant to the unlawfulness element of both CSP II and CSP IV. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Heinsengreen2 sentences2009See State v. Heinsen, 9 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 25 , 138 N.M. 441 , 121 P.3d 1040 (“New Mexico has long 10 recognized that the State has wide discretion to dismiss a criminal case in magistrate 11 court by filing a nolle prosequi and reinstating charges in district court.”). “[T]he 12 District Attorney’s decision to pursue felony charges in district court after filing a 13 nolle prosequi on the initial misdemeanor charges does not suggest a likelihood of 14 vindictiveness.” Brule, 1999-NMSC-026, ¶ 11 . 15 {23} The mere fact that the prosecutor sought the felony child abuse indictment 16 shortly after 2009See State v. Heinsen, 9 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 25 , 138 N.M. 441 , 121 P.3d 1040 (“New Mexico has long 10 recognized that the State has wide discretion to dismiss a criminal case in magistrate 11 court by filing a nolle prosequi and reinstating charges in district court.”). “[T]he 12 District Attorney’s decision to pursue felony charges in district court after filing a 13 nolle prosequi on the initial misdemeanor charges does not suggest a likelihood of 14 vindictiveness.” Brule, 1999-NMSC-026, ¶ 11 . 15 {23} The mere fact that the prosecutor sought the felony child abuse indictment 16 shortly after | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brulegreen1 sentence2009See State v. Heinsen, 9 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 25 , 138 N.M. 441 , 121 P.3d 1040 (“New Mexico has long 10 recognized that the State has wide discretion to dismiss a criminal case in magistrate 11 court by filing a nolle prosequi and reinstating charges in district court.”). “[T]he 12 District Attorney’s decision to pursue felony charges in district court after filing a 13 nolle prosequi on the initial misdemeanor charges does not suggest a likelihood of 14 vindictiveness.” Brule, 1999-NMSC-026, ¶ 11 . 15 {23} The mere fact that the prosecutor sought the felony child abuse indictment 16 shortly after | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Earlesgreen2 sentences2008Because of the absence of case law in New Mexico on this subject, we have looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. {36} In United States v. Earles, 983 F.Supp. 1236 , 1241—43 (N.D.Iowa 1997), a key prosecution witness testified at a grand jury hearing, and then, after failing a polygraph examination, testified differently at a second grand jury hearing. 2008Because of the absence of case law in New Mexico on this subject, we have looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. {36} In United States v. Earles, 983 F.Supp. 1236, 1241-43 (N.D.Iowa 1997), a key prosecution witness testified at a grand jury hearing, and then, after failing a polygraph examination, testified differently at a second grand jury hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Cassell v. Texasgreen2 sentences1998See Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 704-05 , 634 P.2d 1244, 1256-57 (1981) (stating that the evidence to show probable cause is less than that required at trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Martinez, 97 N.M. 585, 588 , 642 P.2d 188, 191 (Ct.App.1982) (stating that grand jury determines probable cause to accuse); see also Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302 , 70 S.Ct. 629 , 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[The grand jury’s power] is only to accuse, not to convict. 1998See Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 704-05 , 634 P.2d 1244, 1256-57 (1981) (stating that the evidence to show probable cause is less than that required at trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Martinez, 97 N.M. 585, 588 , 642 P.2d 188, 191 (Ct.App.1982) (stating that grand jury determines probable cause to accuse); see also Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302 , 70 S.Ct. 629 , 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[The grand jury’s power] is only to accuse, not to convict. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martinezgreen2 sentences1998See Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 704-05 , 634 P.2d 1244, 1256-57 (1981) (stating that the evidence to show probable cause is less than that required at trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Martinez, 97 N.M. 585, 588 , 642 P.2d 188, 191 (Ct.App.1982) (stating that grand jury determines probable cause to accuse); see also Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302 , 70 S.Ct. 629 , 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[The grand jury’s power] is only to accuse, not to convict. 1998See Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 704-05 , 634 P.2d 1244, 1256-57 (1981) (stating that the evidence to show probable cause is less than that required at trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Martinez, 97 N.M. 585, 588 , 642 P.2d 188, 191 (Ct.App.1982) (stating that grand jury determines probable cause to accuse); see also Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302 , 70 S.Ct. 629 , 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[The grand jury’s power] is only to accuse, not to convict. | 1 | 1 |
Buzbee v. Donnellygreen2 sentences1998See Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 704-05 , 634 P.2d 1244, 1256-57 (1981) (stating that the evidence to show probable cause is less than that required at trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Martinez, 97 N.M. 585, 588 , 642 P.2d 188, 191 (Ct.App.1982) (stating that grand jury determines probable cause to accuse); see also Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302 , 70 S.Ct. 629 , 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[The grand jury’s power] is only to accuse, not to convict. 1998See Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 704-05 , 634 P.2d 1244, 1256-57 (1981) (stating that the evidence to show probable cause is less than that required at trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Martinez, 97 N.M. 585, 588 , 642 P.2d 188, 191 (Ct.App.1982) (stating that grand jury determines probable cause to accuse); see also Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302 , 70 S.Ct. 629 , 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[The grand jury’s power] is only to accuse, not to convict. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Radovickgreen2 sentences1997See People v. Radovick, 275 Ill.App.3d 809 , 212 Ill.Dec. 82, 88 , 656 N.E.2d 235, 241 (1995) (finding no abuse of discretion by trial court for excluding grand jury testimony because the State is developing its case and “would have had Httle motive to ehaHenge [a witness’s] version of events at this time”). 1997See People v. Radovick, 275 Ill.App.3d 809 , 212 Ill.Dec. 82, 88 , 656 N.E.2d 235, 241 (1995) (finding no abuse of discretion by trial court for excluding grand jury testimony because the State is developing its case and “would have had Httle motive to ehaHenge [a witness’s] version of events at this time”). | 1 | 1 |
Scoggins v. Stategreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); 1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ferogreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); 1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boeglingreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); 1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gilbertgreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); 1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lucerogreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); 1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); | 1 | 1 |
State v. Watleygreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); 1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Vialpando
green
2 sentences2016See State v. Ruiz, 2003-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 6-9 , 133 N.M. 717 , 68 P.3d 957 (recognizing that a prosecutor’s questioning can be considered intentional when he walked a key witness right into the testimony that had been suppressed by a motion in limine); see also State v. Saavedra, 1985-NMSC-077 , ¶ 9, 103 N.M. 282 , 705 P.2d 1133 (concluding that an improper prosecutorial motive was established when the prosecutor asked an identical question of the same witness at a grand jury hearing and received identical inadmissible answers each time), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-0 2016See State v. Ruiz, 2003-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 6-9 , 133 N.M. 717 , 68 P.3d 957 (recognizing that a prosecutor’s questioning can be considered intentional when he walked a key witness right into the testimony that had been suppressed by a motion in limine); see also State v. Saavedra, 1985-NMSC-077 , ¶ 9, 103 N.M. 282 , 705 P.2d 1133 (concluding that an improper prosecutorial motive was established when the prosecutor asked an identical question of the same witness at a grand jury hearing and received identical inadmissible answers each time), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-0 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Baca
green
1 sentence2015Under these circumstances, we cannot say that 9 the district court abused its discretion in disallowing the prior testimony during 10 Defendant’s second trial. 11 {10} While we recognize that the Supreme Court in Baca supported its holding by 12 illustrating the differences between a grand jury hearing, at issue there, and a trial such 13 as that at issue here, 1997-NMSC-045, ¶ 27 , we do not view this distinction to 14 preclude our holding today. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Hill
green
2 sentences2005Hill, 88 N.M. at 219 , 539 P.2d at 239 . “[H]is methods in procuring [a] conviction must accord with the fair and impartial administration of justice, and he should see that the accused receives a fair trial.... ” Chambers, 86 N.M. at 386 , 524 P.2d at 1002 (quoting 2 Thornton on Attorneys at Law, § 712 (1914)). {37} At one time, the ethical code for attorneys included an aspirational goal of avoiding an appearance of impropriety. 2005Hill, 88 N.M. at 219 , 539 P.2d at 239 . “[H]is methods in procuring [a] conviction must accord with the fair and impartial administration of justice, and he should see that the accused receives a fair trial.... ” Chambers, 86 N.M. at 386 , 524 P.2d at 1002 (quoting 2 Thornton on Attorneys at Law, § 712 (1914)). {37} At one time, the ethical code for attorneys included an aspirational goal of avoiding an appearance of impropriety. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Chambers
green
2 sentences2005Hill, 88 N.M. at 219 , 539 P.2d at 239 . “[H]is methods in procuring [a] conviction must accord with the fair and impartial administration of justice, and he should see that the accused receives a fair trial.... ” Chambers, 86 N.M. at 386 , 524 P.2d at 1002 (quoting 2 Thornton on Attorneys at Law, § 712 (1914)). {37} At one time, the ethical code for attorneys included an aspirational goal of avoiding an appearance of impropriety. 2005Hill, 88 N.M. at 219 , 539 P.2d at 239 . “[H]is methods in procuring [a] conviction must accord with the fair and impartial administration of justice, and he should see that the accused receives a fair trial.... ” Chambers, 86 N.M. at 386 , 524 P.2d at 1002 (quoting 2 Thornton on Attorneys at Law, § 712 (1914)). {37} At one time, the ethical code for attorneys included an aspirational goal of avoiding an appearance of impropriety. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Morris J. Miller, United States of America v. Arnold L. Ross
green
1 sentence1997Defendant primarily relies on United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.1990) and United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231 (2nd Cir.1992), to support her position that O’Leary’s grand jury testimony should have been admitted under the former-testimony exception. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Salerno
green
1 sentence1997Defendant primarily relies on United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir.1990) and United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231 (2nd Cir.1992), to support her position that O’Leary’s grand jury testimony should have been admitted under the former-testimony exception. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Russell v. Texas
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); 1994See, e.g., Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 123-24 , 802 P.2d 631, 632-33 (1990) (applying the Chouinard test where the State lost various evidence of a methamphetamine lab); State v. Fero, 107 N.M. 369, 370-71 , 758 P.2d 783, 784-85 (1988) (applying the three-part test where evidence was removed from the crime scene by the police and later lost a few days before trial); State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 254 , 731 P.2d 943, 950 (1987) (the three-part test applied where the defendant claimed that the State withheld an original tape containing exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of evidence); | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Apodaca v. Viramontes
green
2 sentences1990In Apodaca v. Viramontes, 53 N.M. 514 , 212 P.2d 425 (1949), the state claimed that a witness who had testified before the grand jury could not claim the privilege against self-incrimination when called to give identical testimony at trial. 1990In Apodaca v. Viramontes, 53 N.M. 514 , 212 P.2d 425 (1949), the state claimed that a witness who had testified before the grand jury could not claim the privilege against self-incrimination when called to give identical testimony at trial. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. Odell Broward and Gary L. Forbes
green
2 sentences1983United States v. Broward, 594 F.2d 345 (2d. 1983United States v. Broward, 594 F.2d 345 (2d. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Rogers v. State
green
2 sentences1982Rogers v. State, 94 N.M. 218 , 608 P.2d 530 (Ct.App.1980), held that the target must have been given notice thirty-six hours in advance of the grand jury hearing, unless the prosecutor shows that he was unable, with reasonable diligence, to give such notice. 1982Rogers v. State, 94 N.M. 218 , 608 P.2d 530 (Ct.App.1980), held that the target must have been given notice thirty-six hours in advance of the grand jury hearing, unless the prosecutor shows that he was unable, with reasonable diligence, to give such notice. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Herrera
green
2 sentences1981The motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing. (a) The Effect of Maldonado v. State, 93 N.M. 670 , 604 P.2d 363 (1979) State v. Herrera, 93 N.M. 442 , 601 P.2d 75 (Ct.App.1979), held that defendant is denied due process when the prosecutor knowingly withholds exculpatory evidence from the grand jury. 1981The motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing. (a) The Effect of Maldonado v. State, 93 N.M. 670 , 604 P.2d 363 (1979) State v. Herrera, 93 N.M. 442 , 601 P.2d 75 (Ct.App.1979), held that defendant is denied due process when the prosecutor knowingly withholds exculpatory evidence from the grand jury. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Maldonado v. State
green
2 sentences1981The motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing. (a) The Effect of Maldonado v. State, 93 N.M. 670 , 604 P.2d 363 (1979) State v. Herrera, 93 N.M. 442 , 601 P.2d 75 (Ct.App.1979), held that defendant is denied due process when the prosecutor knowingly withholds exculpatory evidence from the grand jury. 1981The motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing. (a) The Effect of Maldonado v. State, 93 N.M. 670 , 604 P.2d 363 (1979) State v. Herrera, 93 N.M. 442 , 601 P.2d 75 (Ct.App.1979), held that defendant is denied due process when the prosecutor knowingly withholds exculpatory evidence from the grand jury. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| United States v. Goldman green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Coblentz v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Viers v. State
green
2 sentences1975Mr. Wilson’s presence and participation in the grand jury hearing was unlawful, in violation of § 41-5-4, supra. Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558 , 166 A. 45 , 88 A.L.R. 886 (1933); Viers v. State, 10 Okl.Cr. 28 , 134 P. 80 (1913); United States v. Goldman, 28 F.2d 424 (D.C.Conn.1928). . [I]t is highly improper for counsel employed to prosecute a case to be permitted to go into the grand jury room where the defendant cannot be heard and has no one to represent him. 1975Mr. Wilson’s presence and participation in the grand jury hearing was unlawful, in violation of § 41-5-4, supra. Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558 , 166 A. 45 , 88 A.L.R. 886 (1933); Viers v. State, 10 Okl.Cr. 28 , 134 P. 80 (1913); United States v. Goldman, 28 F.2d 424 (D.C.Conn.1928). . [I]t is highly improper for counsel employed to prosecute a case to be permitted to go into the grand jury room where the defendant cannot be heard and has no one to represent him. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.