grand jury clause in District of Columbia

1998In the same vein, Judge Ferren, in Wooley, supra, 697 A.2d at 779, wrote citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 , 55 S.Ct. 629, 630-31 , 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935): "The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements" that (1) the accused must be "definitely informed" of the charges so that he or she can adequately prepare a defense, and (2) the crime must be defined with sufficient precision that the accused assuredly will not risk "another prosecution for the same offense." Judge Ferren voiced a third concern for which the grand jury clause

1998In the same vein, Judge Ferren, in Wooley, supra, 697 A.2d at 779, wrote citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 , 55 S.Ct. 629, 630-31 , 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935): “The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements” that (1) the accused must be “definitely informed” of the charges so that he or she can adequately prepare a defense, and (2) the crime must be defined with sufficient precision that the accused assuredly will not risk “another prosecution for the same offense.” Judge Ferren voiced a third concern for which the grand jury clause

1998In the same vein, Judge Ferren, in Wooley, supra, 697 A.2d at 779, wrote citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 , 55 S.Ct. 629, 630-31 , 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935): "The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements" that (1) the accused must be "definitely informed" of the charges so that he or she can adequately prepare a defense, and (2) the crime must be defined with sufficient precision that the accused assuredly will not risk "another prosecution for the same offense." Judge Ferren voiced a third concern for which the grand jury clause

1998In the same vein, Judge Ferren, in Wooley, supra, 697 A.2d at 779, wrote citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 , 55 S.Ct. 629, 630-31 , 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935): "The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements" that (1) the accused must be "definitely informed" of the charges so that he or she can adequately prepare a defense, and (2) the crime must be defined with sufficient precision that the accused assuredly will not risk "another prosecution for the same offense." Judge Ferren voiced a third concern for which the grand jury clause

2003D.C. 35, 44, 416 F.2d 791, 800 (1969) (holding that a witness who testifies voluntarily before the grand jury may not claim the privilege when called to testify at the trial on the indictment that the grand jury returned).

2000In short, a conviction must be based on an offense proved at trial and fully alleged in the indictment.” Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 1005 (D.C.1991) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

1998In the same vein, Judge Ferren, in Wooley, supra, 697 A.2d at 779, wrote citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 , 55 S.Ct. 629, 630-31 , 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935): "The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements" that (1) the accused must be "definitely informed" of the charges so that he or she can adequately prepare a defense, and (2) the crime must be defined with sufficient precision that the accused assuredly will not risk "another prosecution for the same offense." Judge Ferren voiced a third concern for which the grand jury clause

1998In the same vein, Judge Ferren, in Wooley, supra, 697 A.2d at 779, wrote citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 , 55 S.Ct. 629, 630-31 , 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935): "The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements" that (1) the accused must be "definitely informed" of the charges so that he or she can adequately prepare a defense, and (2) the crime must be defined with sufficient precision that the accused assuredly will not risk "another prosecution for the same offense." Judge Ferren voiced a third concern for which the grand jury clause

1995Cf. Skyers v. United States, 619 A.2d 931, 933-34 (D.C.1993) (outlining the factors for admission of prior recorded testimony of an unavailable witness). 9 .

1994The jury could also reasonably infer that Allen’s order was intended to convey to Ford that she should falsify her testimony, if necessary, in order to “tell them nothing.” Although case authority on this issue is sparse, support can be found in Petite v. United States, 262 F.2d 788, 796 (4th Cir.1959), remanded on other grounds, 361 U.S. 529 , 80 S.Ct. 450 , 4 L.Ed.2d 490 (1960), where the court approved a jury instruction in which the trial court told the jury that: A defendant may be guilty without having instructed the witness what to say. [One] may be guilty of subornation of perjury even

1983We conclude under these circumstances that we could not say “with fair assurance that the jury verdict was not substantially swayed by the error.” 436 A.2d at 1285 ; see also Kottea-kos, supra. In Towles , we found plain error when the jury could have considered as substantive evidence an implicating prior inconsistent statement of a witness already convicted of the crime at issue. 428 A.2d at 843 .

1978It has been held, however, that “a bona fide endeavor” to put a witness on the stand, even where “the Government’s effort was ‘last minute’ and ‘lackadaisical,’ ” will “fatally undercut any claim appellant might have had to a missing witness instruction.” Stewart v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 274 , 279, 418 F.2d 1110, 1115 (1969). 5 In the instant case, the last name of the witness was not certain, his address was unknown, and the government exhausted the only lead it had as to his whereabouts.