grand jury hearing in California

2022(See Johnson v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County (1975) 15 Cal.3d 248, 255 (Johnson); People v. Becerra (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1070 .) However, defendant concedes that the People in this case provided the grand jury with a defense letter that, in defendant’s own words, contained a “detailed description of exculpatory material . . . and a collection of many exculpatory documents along with a description of how each document tended to negate the charges.” The record confirms that the prosecutor informed the grand jury of this letter; made the identified documents available for the gran

2011(It didn’t help, as the Johnson court pointed out, that the prosecution did not call the deputy district attorney with whom the accused had claimed to have made the previous deal (see Johnson, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 252 ).) However, at a subsequent grand jury hearing, the prosecutor never informed the grand jury about the accused’s testimony at the preliminary hearing (i.e., that the accused had a deal with the district attorney to be an informant), and furthermore “created the false impression” that the accused “would refuse to testify if called” by having the arresting officer testify that t

2018Thus, in Backus , supra , 23 Cal.3d 360 , 152 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 590 P.2d 837 , the defendants sought to dismiss the indictment on the ground that extensive inadmissible evidence was presented to the grand jury in violation of their right to due process. ( Id. at pp. 391-392, 152 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 590 P.2d 837 .) The court noted it had previously assumed, but had found it unnecessary to decide, that "grand jury indictment procedures must comport with the demands of the due process clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 392, 152 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 590 P.2d 837 .)

2018Thus, in Backus , supra , 23 Cal.3d 360 , 152 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 590 P.2d 837 , the defendants sought to dismiss the indictment on the ground that extensive inadmissible evidence was presented to the grand jury in violation of their right to due process. ( Id. at pp. 391-392, 152 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 590 P.2d 837 .) The court noted it had previously assumed, but had found it unnecessary to decide, that "grand jury indictment procedures must comport with the demands of the due process clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 392, 152 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 590 P.2d 837 .)

2015(Id. at pp. 1225-1229.) “California’s system of criminal pleading under [Penal Code] section 952 relies in part upon the transcript of the grand jury hearing or preliminary examination which must be furnished to the defendant to inform him of particular circumstances of his offense not shown by the accusatory 15 pleading. [Citations.]” (People v. Jordan (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 362, 369 .) Thus, the defendant “learn[s] the details of the charges filed against him” from the transcript of the proceedings.

1988“Since the constitutional application of section 952 relies in part upon notice afforded by the transcript, it follows a demurrer under section 1004 for failure of the indictment to substantially conform to section 952 contemplates testing the adequacy of the notice to defendant by allegations in the language of the statute when viewed in light of the transcript. ” (People v. Jordan (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 362, 369-370 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 570 ]; see also People v. Tolbert (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 685, 690, fn. 2 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 313 ].) In light of these principles of California pleading, we cannot percei

2005We rely on federal cases in this context because (1) before Smith was decided, both the federal and the California free exercise clauses were analyzed under the compelling state interest test (see Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 138-141 , 253 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 763 P.2d 852 ), and (2) we have found no California cases involving free exercise clause claims in a grand jury context.

2005We rely on federal cases in this context because (1) before Smith was decided, both the federal and the California free exercise clauses were analyzed under the compelling state interest test (see Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 138-141 , 253 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 763 P.2d 852 ), and (2) we have found no California cases involving free exercise clause claims in a grand jury context.

1978(Chambers v. Municipal Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 809, 812-813 ....) The statute being valid, the writ must issue.” The court stated at page 228: “However, assuming arguendo that the procedure followed by respondent court satisfies the minimum requirements of due process, it is not our province to invalidate legislation on the ground that an alternative procedure would conserve judicial resources.” The Attorney General contends that “[t]he trial court did not err in denying petitioner’s 995 motion as there is no evidence in this record that petitioner was unable to stand trial at the time of t

1975(Chambers v. Municipal Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 809, 812-813 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 120 ].) The statute being valid, the writ must issue.

2022(See People v. McAlister (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 918, 926 [Where a defense letter “in fact came to the 10 In full, the prosecutor stated: “The last thing we’re going to do by way of giving you over evidence is something that we call Johnson. . . . [¶] The grand jury is not required to hear evidence for the target, but it shall weigh all the evidence submitted to it, and when it has reason to believe that other evidence within its reach will explain away the charge, it shall order the evidence to be produced and, for that purpose, may require the deputy district attorney to issue process for the w

2019(See In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 662 [“the separation of powers doctrine is violated only when the actions of a branch of government defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another branch.”]; see Loving v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 748, 757 [“one branch of the Government may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of another”].) In addition, we do not find that petitioner’s due process rights were violated since it was not shown that he reasonably might have been deprived of a properly constituted, independent, and impartial grand jury.

2019(See In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 662 [“the separation of powers doctrine is violated only when the actions of a branch of government defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another branch.”]; see Loving v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 748, 757 [“one branch of the Government may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of another”].) In addition, we do not find that petitioner’s due process rights were violated since it was not shown that he reasonably might have been deprived of a properly constituted, independent, and impartial grand jury.

2014(People v. Brown (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 916, 932 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 589 ] (Brown); People v. Dupree (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 60, 65 [ 319 P.2d 39 ]; In re Lemon (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 82, 91-92 [ 59 P.2d 213 ] (Lemon).) 3.

2014(People v. Brown (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 916, 932 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 589 ] (Brown); People v. Dupree (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 60, 65 [ 319 P.2d 39 ]; In re Lemon (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 82, 91-92 [ 59 P.2d 213 ] (Lemon).) 3.

2014(People v. Brown (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 916, 932 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 589 ] (Brown); People v. Dupree (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 60, 65 [ 319 P.2d 39 ]; In re Lemon (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 82, 91-92 [ 59 P.2d 213 ] (Lemon).) 3.

2014(People v. Brown (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 916, 932 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 589 ] (Brown); People v. Dupree (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 60, 65 [ 319 P.2d 39 ]; In re Lemon (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 82, 91-92 [ 59 P.2d 213 ] (Lemon).) 3.

2014(People v. Brown (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 916, 932 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 589 ] (Brown); People v. Dupree (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 60, 65 [ 319 P.2d 39 ]; In re Lemon (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 82, 91-92 [ 59 P.2d 213 ] (Lemon).) 3.

2014(People v. Brown (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 916, 932 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 589 ] (Brown); People v. Dupree (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 60, 65 [ 319 P.2d 39 ]; In re Lemon (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 82, 91-92 [ 59 P.2d 213 ] (Lemon).) 3.

2008(See People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1259, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 850 P.2d 1 ["Their versions of the events and identification of the shooter or shooters varied greatly"].) Robert Thompson, for example, told police in the first few hours after the murder that the passenger in the rear seat had fired all the shots and that this man had a medium-to-dark complexion and was wearing a brown short-sleeved shirt and baggy jeans. [8] Thompson gave the same account to the grand jury and to defense counsel a few months before the pen alty retrial.

2008(See People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1259, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 850 P.2d 1 ["Their versions of the events and identification of the shooter or shooters varied greatly"].) Robert Thompson, for example, told police in the first few hours after the murder that the passenger in the rear seat had fired all the shots and that this man had a medium-to-dark complexion and was wearing a brown short-sleeved shirt and baggy jeans. [8] Thompson gave the same account to the grand jury and to defense counsel a few months before the pen alty retrial.

1997The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that involuntary or coerced statements could not be used for any purpose at a subsequent trial, as use of involuntary statements amounted to a due process denial. ( Id. at pp. 459-460 [99 S.Ct. at pp. 1297-1298].) "Testimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony. [In this grand jury proceeding,] ... the witness is told to talk or face the government's coercive sanctions, notably, a conviction for contempt." ( Id. at p. 459 [ 99 S.Ct. at p. 1297 ].) Testimony provided in a grand jury hearing wi

1997The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that involuntary or coerced statements could not be used for any purpose at a subsequent trial, as use of involuntary statements amounted to a due process denial. ( Id. at pp. 459-460 [99 S.Ct. at pp. 1297-1298].) "Testimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony. [In this grand jury proceeding,] ... the witness is told to talk or face the government's coercive sanctions, notably, a conviction for contempt." ( Id. at p. 459 [ 99 S.Ct. at p. 1297 ].) Testimony provided in a grand jury hearing wi

1992This is [a] more demanding requirement than reasonable suspicion . . . .” (Id., 545 P.2d at p. 867 , italics added; see also State v. Shaw (1984) 68 Or.App. 693 [ 684 P.2d 7, 9-10 ].) The majority’s final citation is to State v. Nordquist (N.D. 1981) 309 N.W.2d 109 , in which the court held that it is not fatal to an indictment that some of the evidence before the grand jury was legally inadmissible.

1992This is [a] more demanding requirement than reasonable suspicion . . . .” (Id., 545 P.2d at p. 867 , italics added; see also State v. Shaw (1984) 68 Or.App. 693 [ 684 P.2d 7, 9-10 ].) The majority’s final citation is to State v. Nordquist (N.D. 1981) 309 N.W.2d 109 , in which the court held that it is not fatal to an indictment that some of the evidence before the grand jury was legally inadmissible.