derivative claim in Maryland

18 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2025 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
Berry & Gould v. Berrygreen md · 2000 · cited in 2 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 2 sentences 2023Count III – Unjust Enrichment A cause of action for unjust enrichment consists of three elements: “(1) [a] benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) [a]n appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) [t]he acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.” Berry & Gould, P.A. v. Berry, 360 Md. 142, 151 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 295 (2007 2023Count III – Unjust Enrichment A cause of action for unjust enrichment consists of three elements: “(1) [a] benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) [a]n appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) [t]he acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.” Berry & Gould, P.A. v. Berry, 360 Md. 142, 151 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 295 (2007	2	2
Hill v. Cross Country Settlement, LLCgreen md · 2007 · cited in 2 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 2 sentences 2023Count III – Unjust Enrichment A cause of action for unjust enrichment consists of three elements: “(1) [a] benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) [a]n appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) [t]he acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.” Berry & Gould, P.A. v. Berry, 360 Md. 142, 151 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 295 (2007 2023Count III – Unjust Enrichment A cause of action for unjust enrichment consists of three elements: “(1) [a] benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) [a]n appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) [t]he acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.” Berry & Gould, P.A. v. Berry, 360 Md. 142, 151 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 295 (2007	2	2
Shenker v. Laureate Education, Inc.green md · 2009 · cited in 4 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2010–2022 2 sentences 2022Id. at 343 . 2022Id. at 343 .	1	4
Feldman v. Cutaiagreen del · 2008 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016See Feldman v. Cutaia, 951 A.2d 727, 733 (Del.2008) (holding that where “the damages allegedly flowing from the purportedly direct claim ... are exactly the same as those suffered by the corporation in the underlying derivative claim ... the injury alleged ... is properly regarded as injury to the corporation and not to the [shareholders]”); In re Triarc Companies, Inc., 791 A.2d 872, 878 (Del.Ch.2001) (“[W]hatever injury [the shareholder] suffered as a result of the payment of additional elements of compensation to [executives] gave rise to a derivative, not an individual, claim.”).	1	1
In Re Triarc Companies, Inc.green delch · 2001 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016See Feldman v. Cutaia, 951 A.2d 727, 733 (Del.2008) (holding that where “the damages allegedly flowing from the purportedly direct claim ... are exactly the same as those suffered by the corporation in the underlying derivative claim ... the injury alleged ... is properly regarded as injury to the corporation and not to the [shareholders]”); In re Triarc Companies, Inc., 791 A.2d 872, 878 (Del.Ch.2001) (“[W]hatever injury [the shareholder] suffered as a result of the payment of additional elements of compensation to [executives] gave rise to a derivative, not an individual, claim.”).	1	1
Adair v. Winchestergreen md · 1835 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 1 sentence 1996“In Maryland it has long been held that a chose in action may be validly assigned.” Medical Mutual v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 29 , 622 A.2d 103 (1993) (citing Adair v. Winchester, 7 G. & J. 114, 117-118 (1835)).	1	1
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co.green md · 1985 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 2 sentences 1988See also Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 302 Md. 383 , 403 n. 3, 488 A.2d 486 , 496 n. 3 (1985), where this Court noted that, if the "each claim” limit was in terms of bodily injury sustained by any one person, then the overwhelming majority of cases would apply only one liability limit to the bodily injury of the child and to the derivative claim of the parent combined. 5 . 1988See also Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 302 Md. 383 , 403 n. 3, 488 A.2d 486 , 496 n. 3 (1985), where this Court noted that, if the "each claim” limit was in terms of bodily injury sustained by any one person, then the overwhelming majority of cases would apply only one liability limit to the bodily injury of the child and to the derivative claim of the parent combined. 5 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

Case	Cited	Years
Werbowsky v. Collomb green md · 2001 2 sentences 2023Werbowsky, 362 Md. at 599 . 2023Werbowsky, 362 Md. at 599 .	2	2023–2023
Miller v. State green md · 2013 1 sentence 2025App. 453, 459-65 (2012), aff’d, 435 Md. 174 (2013), we explained the difference between a claim that a guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and a derivative claim of ineffective assistance attacking the guilty plea on the ground that trial counsel misadvised the defendant about the consequences of the plea.	1	2025–2025
Garcia v. Foulger Pratt Development, Inc. green mdctspecapp · 2003 2 sentences 2014The court did find that Mr. Bontempo was entitled to attorneys’ fees under Count III, the derivative claim, and that Quotient was responsible for these costs pursuant to the “common fund doctrine”: “If a derivative action is successful, in whole or in part, or if anything is received by the plaintiff as a result of a judgment, compromise, or settlement of an action or claim, the court may award the plaintiff reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, and shall direct him to remit to 109 the [close corporation] the remainder of those proceeds received by him.” Garcia v. Foulger 2014The court did find that Mr. Bontempo was entitled to attorneys’ fees under Count III, the derivative claim, and that Quotient was responsible for these costs pursuant to the “common fund doctrine”: “If a derivative action is successful, in whole or in part, or if anything is received by the plaintiff as a result of a judgment, compromise, or settlement of an action or claim, the court may award the plaintiff reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, and shall direct him to remit to 109 the [close corporation] the remainder of those proceeds received by him.” Garcia v. Foulger	1	2014–2014
Boland v. Boland green md · 2011 2 sentences 2012Derivative Claims In Boland v. Boland, 423 Md. 296, 316 , 31 A.3d 529 (2011), the Court of Appeals explained the distinction between a direct claim and a derivative claim, stating that Maryland courts look to “the nature of the right claimed to be violated, and the remedy sought” as guidance. 2012Derivative Claims In Boland v. Boland, 423 Md. 296, 316 , 31 A.3d 529 (2011), the Court of Appeals explained the distinction between a direct claim and a derivative claim, stating that Maryland courts look to “the nature of the right claimed to be violated, and the remedy sought” as guidance.	1	2012–2012
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado green del · 1981 1 sentence 2010Specifically, they assert that in reviewing the SLC’s decision not to pursue the derivative claim alleging self-dealing by the Director Appellees in the sales of stock, the court should not have applied the business judgment rule. 8 Rather, it should have followed the Delaware Supreme Court’s lead in Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 -89 (Del.1981), and exercised “its own independent business judgment.” They maintain that this Court’s holding in Bender did not mandate that a circuit court reviewing the decision of a demand committee in a wrongful refusal case should apply the business judgment	1	2010–2010
Bender v. Schwartz green mdctspecapp · 2007 2 sentences 2010Scalisi, 501 F.Supp.2d at 363 (citing Bender, 172 Md.App. at 672-73 , 917 A.2d 142 ). 2010Scalisi, 501 F.Supp.2d at 363 (citing Bender, 172 Md.App. at 672-73 , 917 A.2d 142 ).	1	2010–2010
Deems v. Western Maryland Railway Co. green md · 1967 2 sentences 2006In Deems v. Western Maryland Railway, 247 Md. 95, 108-09 , 231 A.2d 514 (1967), Judge Oppenheimer discussed the symbiotic relationship between the underlying personal injury claim and the derivative claim alleging damage to the marital relationship itself. 2006In Deems v. Western Maryland Railway, 247 Md. 95, 108-09 , 231 A.2d 514 (1967), Judge Oppenheimer discussed the symbiotic relationship between the underlying personal injury claim and the derivative claim alleging damage to the marital relationship itself.	1	2006–2006
Oaks v. Connors green md · 1995 2 sentences 2006This was the ultimate holding of Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. at 38 , 660 A.2d 423 : Accordingly, we hold that a loss of consortium claim is derivative of the injured spouse’s claim for personal injury and, therefore, a single cap for noneconomic damages applies to the whole action. 2006This was the ultimate holding of Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. at 38 , 660 A.2d 423 : Accordingly, we hold that a loss of consortium claim is derivative of the injured spouse’s claim for personal injury and, therefore, a single cap for noneconomic damages applies to the whole action.	1	2006–2006
Sard v. Hardy green md · 1977 2 sentences 2004The chairperson of the arbitration panel (the “chairperson”) issued the following scheduling order on December 3, 2001: February 1, 2002 Claimants to name expert witnesses March 15, 2002 Appellants to name expert witnesses April 15, 2002 Claimants to name rebuttal witnesses June 21, 2002 Discovery cut-off June 24, 2002 Pretrial telephone conference July 22-24, 2002 Arbitration hearing On February 11, 2002, appellants filed a “Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alterative, Motion for Summary Judgment.” Relying on Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432 , 379 A.2d 1014 (1977), appellants argued that Counts II and 2004The chairperson of the arbitration panel (the “chairperson”) issued the following scheduling order on December 3, 2001: February 1, 2002 Claimants to name expert witnesses March 15, 2002 Appellants to name expert witnesses April 15, 2002 Claimants to name rebuttal witnesses June 21, 2002 Discovery cut-off June 24, 2002 Pretrial telephone conference July 22-24, 2002 Arbitration hearing On February 11, 2002, appellants filed a “Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alterative, Motion for Summary Judgment.” Relying on Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432 , 379 A.2d 1014 (1977), appellants argued that Counts II and	1	2004–2004
Smith v. Gross green md · 1990 2 sentences 2003In Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 144 , 571 A.2d 1219 (1990), Judge Orth stated the general rule that any act that would have barred recovery by the decedent, had he lived, will defeat a derivative claim either 1) by the personal representative in a survival action or 2) by the relatives in a wrongful death 697 action, notwithstanding his observation that wrongful death actions “are not as purely derivative as survival actions.” The general rule is that defenses which would have been good against the decedent, had the decedent survived, are good against the decedent’s personal representatives a 2003In Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 144 , 571 A.2d 1219 (1990), Judge Orth stated the general rule that any act that would have barred recovery by the decedent, had he lived, will defeat a derivative claim either 1) by the personal representative in a survival action or 2) by the relatives in a wrongful death 697 action, notwithstanding his observation that wrongful death actions “are not as purely derivative as survival actions.” The general rule is that defenses which would have been good against the decedent, had the decedent survived, are good against the decedent’s personal representatives a	1	2003–2003
Cogley v. Schnaper & Koren Construction Co. green mdctspecapp · 1972 1 sentence 2001In rejecting the insurer’s claim, this Court stated: Although the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides a right of subrogation to an employer and insurer § 58, Cogley v. Schnaper and Koren Construction Co., 14 Md.	1	2001–2001
Roberts v. Total Health Care, Inc. green md · 1998 2 sentences 2000Roberts, 349 Md. 499 , 709 A.2d 142 , was premised in substantial part on the government’s “strong interest in keeping its Medicaid program as efficient as possible and limited to its function of being the payor of last resort.” Roberts, 349 Md. at 519 , 709 A.2d at 152 . 2000Roberts, 349 Md. 499 , 709 A.2d 142 , was premised in substantial part on the government’s “strong interest in keeping its Medicaid program as efficient as possible and limited to its function of being the payor of last resort.” Roberts, 349 Md. at 519 , 709 A.2d at 152 .	1	2000–2000
MEDICAL MUTUAL LIABILITY INS. SOC. OF MARYLAND v. Evans green md · 1993 2 sentences 1996“In Maryland it has long been held that a chose in action may be validly assigned.” Medical Mutual v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 29 , 622 A.2d 103 (1993) (citing Adair v. Winchester, 7 G. & J. 114, 117-118 (1835)). 1996“In Maryland it has long been held that a chose in action may be validly assigned.” Medical Mutual v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 29 , 622 A.2d 103 (1993) (citing Adair v. Winchester, 7 G. & J. 114, 117-118 (1835)).	1	1996–1996
Zauber v. Murray Savings Ass'n green texapp · 1979 2 sentences 1986Further, to forestall any contention that consent could not make the derivative claim justiciable, defendants’ counsel embraced the holding of Zauber v. Murray Savings Association, 591 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.Civ.App.1979) that equity will consider the involuntary destruction of a stockholder’s status a nullity and allow that person to proceed with a derivative claim. 5 We shall assume that these concessions by the defendants mollify those effects of a freezeout which would be most damaging to Lawrence insofar as he is a minority shareholder plaintiff in a derivative claim. 1986Further, to forestall any contention that consent could not make the derivative claim justiciable, defendants’ counsel embraced the holding of Zauber v. Murray Savings Association, 591 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.Civ.App.1979) that equity will consider the involuntary destruction of a stockholder’s status a nullity and allow that person to proceed with a derivative claim. 5 We shall assume that these concessions by the defendants mollify those effects of a freezeout which would be most damaging to Lawrence insofar as he is a minority shareholder plaintiff in a derivative claim.	1	1986–1986
Ness v. Males green md · 2001 2 sentences 1976I am not persuaded that Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235 , 93 A. 2d 541 (1953), or Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), support a different conclusion, especially in the light of the firm application of the rule in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238 , 297 A. 2d 235 (1972); Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426 , 330 A. 2d 196 (1974); and Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md. 1976I am not persuaded that Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235 , 93 A. 2d 541 (1953), or Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), support a different conclusion, especially in the light of the firm application of the rule in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238 , 297 A. 2d 235 (1972); Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426 , 330 A. 2d 196 (1974); and Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md.	1	1976–1976
Hensel v. Beckward green md · 1974 2 sentences 1976I am not persuaded that Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235 , 93 A. 2d 541 (1953), or Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), support a different conclusion, especially in the light of the firm application of the rule in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238 , 297 A. 2d 235 (1972); Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426 , 330 A. 2d 196 (1974); and Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md. 1976I am not persuaded that Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235 , 93 A. 2d 541 (1953), or Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), support a different conclusion, especially in the light of the firm application of the rule in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238 , 297 A. 2d 235 (1972); Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426 , 330 A. 2d 196 (1974); and Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md.	1	1976–1976
Creaser v. Owens green md · 1972 2 sentences 1976I am not persuaded that Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235 , 93 A. 2d 541 (1953), or Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), support a different conclusion, especially in the light of the firm application of the rule in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238 , 297 A. 2d 235 (1972); Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426 , 330 A. 2d 196 (1974); and Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md. 1976I am not persuaded that Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235 , 93 A. 2d 541 (1953), or Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), support a different conclusion, especially in the light of the firm application of the rule in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238 , 297 A. 2d 235 (1972); Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426 , 330 A. 2d 196 (1974); and Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md.	1	1976–1976
Grue v. Schmidbauer green md · 1964 2 sentences 1976I am not persuaded that Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235 , 93 A. 2d 541 (1953), or Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), support a different conclusion, especially in the light of the firm application of the rule in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238 , 297 A. 2d 235 (1972); Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426 , 330 A. 2d 196 (1974); and Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md. 1976I am not persuaded that Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235 , 93 A. 2d 541 (1953), or Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), support a different conclusion, especially in the light of the firm application of the rule in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238 , 297 A. 2d 235 (1972); Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426 , 330 A. 2d 196 (1974); and Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md.	1	1976–1976
Johnson v. Dortch green mdctspecapp · 1975 1 sentence 1976I am not persuaded that Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235 , 93 A. 2d 541 (1953), or Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), support a different conclusion, especially in the light of the firm application of the rule in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238 , 297 A. 2d 235 (1972); Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426 , 330 A. 2d 196 (1974); and Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md.	1	1976–1976

Where else courts name it

NY 181 (1913–2026) DE 124 (1957–2026) CA 81 (1962–2026) TX 77 (1977–2026) OH 69 (1968–2026) PA 68 (1962–2026) IL 65 (1984–2023) FL 39 (1977–2023) NJ 30 (1950–2024) NC 27 (1986–2025) MA 25 (1990–2025) CT 25 (1991–2025) GA 24 (1983–2025) WI 24 (1987–2023) MI 24 (1936–2023) IN 22 (1979–2024) MD 18 (1976–2025) TN 17 (1952–2021) MS 16 (1990–2024) WV 16 (1986–2025) LA 16 (1992–2024) NV 14 (2016–2025) VA 14 (1998–2025) AL 14 (1981–2016) MO 13 (1958–2023) NM 13 (1996–2025) MN 12 (1963–2017) CO 12 (1977–2021) AZ 10 (1996–2026) IA 10 (1975–2024) WA 10 (1968–2020) ME 9 (1990–2023) UT 8 (1999–2025) HI 7 (1983–2026) VT 5 (1998–2026) RI 4 (2003–2009) SC 4 (2000–2022) OK 4 (1996–2026) WY 4 (2019–2023) AK 3 (1971–2009) OR 3 (1994–2020) KY 3 (1999–2020) NE 2 (2021–2024) SD 2 (1998–1998) AR 2 (1998–2006) ND 2 (1994–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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