derivative claim in Missouri

1987However, both Cragin and Wyatt , as well as preceding cases which stood for the same proposition such as Joggerst v. O’Toole, 513 S.W.2d 722 (Mo.App.1974), were decided prior to the Supreme Court's modification of M.A.I. in 1980 to mandate the packaging of instructions where there is more than one claim involved in a particular cause, M.A.I. 2.05 and See M.A.I. 2.00 General Comment B. 2 Instruction number six and twelve were patterned on M.A.I. 2.05.

1987However, both Cragin and Wyatt , as well as preceding cases which stood for the same proposition such as Joggerst v. O'Toole, 513 S.W.2d 722 (Mo.App.1974), were decided prior to the Supreme Court's modification of M.A.I. in 1980 to mandate the packaging of instructions where there is more than one claim involved in a particular cause, M.A.I. 2.05 and See M.A.I. 2.00 General Comment B. [2] Instruction number six and twelve were patterned on M.A.I. 2.05.

1987Appellants cite Cragin v. Lobbey, 537 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo.App.1976), Wyatt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 514 S.W.2d 366 (Mo.App.1974), and M.A.I. 33.01 for the proposition that while each defendant is entitled to a separate converse with respect to each asserted theory of liability, where both a claim for personal injury damages and a derivative claim for loss of consortium are asserted, the only allowable converse instruction with respect to the consortium claim is one directed to the consortium claim plaintiffs’ separate damage element.

1987Appellants cite Cragin v. Lobbey, 537 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo.App.1976), Wyatt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 514 S.W.2d 366 (Mo.App.1974), and M.A.I. 33.01 for the proposition that while each defendant is entitled to a separate converse with respect to each asserted theory of liability, where both a claim for personal injury damages and a derivative claim for loss of consortium are asserted, the only allowable converse instruction with respect to the consortium claim is one directed to the consortium claim plaintiffs' separate damage element.

2023Id. at 1037 .

2016Lawrence, 273 S.W.3d at 527 .

2014Id. at 131 .

1993In Lair , the policy said the “each person” limit was the “maximum for bodily injury sustained by any person in any one accident.” Again, the Supreme Court found the language unambiguous, held Cano inapplicable, and ruled that inasmuch as an injured minor’s claim for his bodily injuries exceeded the “each person” limit, no coverage remained from which his parents’ claim for medical expenses could be satisfied. 789 S.W.2d at 34 .

1993In Cano , the Supreme Court found a “sharp distinction” between the policy language there and the policy language in United States Fidelity, emphasizing that the latter expressly referred to “damages for loss of services,” something the Cano policy lacked. 656 S.W.2d at 272 .

1993Declaring Cano inapplicable, the Court held the “each person” limit was the most the insurer had to pay, in the aggregate, to a minor for her bodily injuries and to her mother for the latter’s derivative claim. 726 S.W.2d at 751-52 .

1993The Supreme Court held a father’s derivative claim for loss of his son’s services fell within the “each person” limit. 522 S.W.2d at 821 .

1982Barlow v. Thornhill, 537 S.W.2d 412 (Mo.banc 1976); Foster v. Rosetta, 443 S.W.2d 183 (Mo.1969); Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254 (Mo.1967); Kaelin v. Nuelle, 537 S.W.2d 226 (Mo.App.1976); Pietrowski v. Mykins, 498 S.W.2d 572 (Mo.App.1973); Stroud v. Govreau, 495 S.W.2d 682 (Mo.App.1973).

1982Barlow v. Thornhill, 537 S.W.2d 412 (Mo.banc 1976); Foster v. Rosetta, 443 S.W.2d 183 (Mo.1969); Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254 (Mo.1967); Kaelin v. Nuelle, 537 S.W.2d 226 (Mo.App.1976); Pietrowski v. Mykins, 498 S.W.2d 572 (Mo.App.1973); Stroud v. Govreau, 495 S.W.2d 682 (Mo.App.1973).

1982Barlow v. Thornhill, 537 S.W.2d 412 (Mo.banc 1976); Foster v. Rosetta, 443 S.W.2d 183 (Mo.1969); Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254 (Mo.1967); Kaelin v. Nuelle, 537 S.W.2d 226 (Mo.App.1976); Pietrowski v. Mykins, 498 S.W.2d 572 (Mo.App.1973); Stroud v. Govreau, 495 S.W.2d 682 (Mo.App.1973).

1982Barlow v. Thornhill, 537 S.W.2d 412 (Mo.banc 1976); Foster v. Rosetta, 443 S.W.2d 183 (Mo.1969); Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254 (Mo.1967); Kaelin v. Nuelle, 537 S.W.2d 226 (Mo.App.1976); Pietrowski v. Mykins, 498 S.W.2d 572 (Mo.App.1973); Stroud v. Govreau, 495 S.W.2d 682 (Mo.App.1973).

1982Barlow v. Thornhill, 537 S.W.2d 412 (Mo.banc 1976); Foster v. Rosetta, 443 S.W.2d 183 (Mo.1969); Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254 (Mo.1967); Kaelin v. Nuelle, 537 S.W.2d 226 (Mo.App.1976); Pietrowski v. Mykins, 498 S.W.2d 572 (Mo.App.1973); Stroud v. Govreau, 495 S.W.2d 682 (Mo.App.1973).

1977In Murphy v. Land, 420 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.1967) and in Watterson v. Portas, 466 S.W.2d 129 (Mo.App.1971), also cited by plaintiffs, the claim of an injured child and the derivative claim of his parent were in litigation.

1977In Murphy v. Land, 420 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.1967) and in Watterson v. Portas, 466 S.W.2d 129 (Mo.App.1971), also cited by plaintiffs, the claim of an injured child and the derivative claim of his parent were in litigation.

1958It is a derivative claim in which the Superintendent acts quasi judicially as the determining and assessing officer, subject to judicial review under Sec. 536.105." Plaintiffs cite State of Missouri v. Homesteaders Life Ass'n, 8 Cir., 90 F.2d 543, 548 , which held that the superintendent of insurance was "an entity distinct from the state with power to sue and be sued"; and therefore a suit by the superintendent was not a suit by the state.

1958It is a derivative claim in which the Superintendent acts quasi judicially as the determining and assessing officer, subject to judicial review under Sec. 536.105.” Plaintiffs cite State of Missouri v. Homesteaders Life Ass’n, 8 Cir., 90 F.2d 543, 548 , which held that the superintendent of insurance was “an entity distinct from the state with power to sue and be sued”; and therefore a suit by the superintendent was not a suit by the state.