derivative claim in Tennessee

2021Co., 38 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tenn. 2001) (“Loss of consortium is ‘a separate claim from that of an injured spouse.’” (quoting Tuggle v. Allright Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1996))); Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (“Despite being a separate claim from that of an injured spouse for other damages, loss of consortium is also a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one’s spouse give rise to and establish the claim.”); McPeek v. Lockhart, 174 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that simply b

2002Ass’n, No. E2000-02713-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 603 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2001), which stated the following: A loss of consortium claim is “a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one's spouse give rise to and establish the claim.” Tuggle v. AllRight Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1996), (quoting Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).

2021Co., 38 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tenn. 2001) (“Loss of consortium is ‘a separate claim from that of an injured spouse.’” (quoting Tuggle v. Allright Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1996))); Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (“Despite being a separate claim from that of an injured spouse for other damages, loss of consortium is also a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one’s spouse give rise to and establish the claim.”); McPeek v. Lockhart, 174 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that simply b

2002Ass’n, No. E2000-02713-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 603 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2001), which stated the following: A loss of consortium claim is “a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one's spouse give rise to and establish the claim.” Tuggle v. AllRight Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1996), (quoting Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).

2002However, a person's "right to recover for loss of consortium is a right independent of the spouse's right to recover for the injuries themselves." Swafford v. City of Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d 174, 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-1-106 (providing that "there shall exist in cases where such damages are proved by a spouse, a right to recover for loss of consortium"). ***** . . .

1996In Tennessee, “despite being a separate claim from that of an injured spouse for other damages, loss of consortium is also a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one’s spouse give rise to and establish the claim.” Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn.App.1989); see also Swafford v. City of Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d 174,178 (Tenn.App.1987).

2021Co., 38 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tenn. 2001) (“Loss of consortium is ‘a separate claim from that of an injured spouse.’” (quoting Tuggle v. Allright Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1996))); Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (“Despite being a separate claim from that of an injured spouse for other damages, loss of consortium is also a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one’s spouse give rise to and establish the claim.”); McPeek v. Lockhart, 174 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that simply b

2019Co., 38 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tenn. 2001) (explaining that loss of consortium is a derivative claim that is “a separate claim from that of an injured spouse”) (internal quotation omitted).

2021Co., 38 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tenn. 2001) (“Loss of consortium is ‘a separate claim from that of an injured spouse.’” (quoting Tuggle v. Allright Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1996))); Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (“Despite being a separate claim from that of an injured spouse for other damages, loss of consortium is also a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one’s spouse give rise to and establish the claim.”); McPeek v. Lockhart, 174 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that simply b

2016In this Opinion, we set aside the approach for determining whether a shareholder claim is direct or derivative described by this Court in Hadden v. City of Gatlinburg, 746 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tenn.1988), and adopt in its stead the analytical framework enunciated by the Delaware .Supreme Court in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufltin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1039 (Del.2004).

2016In such a case, a shareholder would be permitted to bring a direct action if he was “directly harmed” by a “special injury” or a breach of a “duty owed.” Tennessee Decision in Hadden In 1988, the Tennessee Supreme Court set out its method for' distinguishing a derivative claim from a direct claim ■ in Hadden v. City of Gatlinburg, 746 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tenn.1988).

2016In this Opinion, we set aside the approach for determining whether a shareholder claim is direct or derivative described by this Court in Hadden v. City of Gatlinburg, 746 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tenn.1988), and adopt in its stead the analytical framework enunciated by the Delaware .Supreme Court in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufltin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1039 (Del.2004).

2016Id. at 1037 . 29 .

2016In re Sagent Tech., Inc., Derivative Litigation, 278 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1085 (N.D.Cal.2003) (“A shareholder does not have standing to sue in an individual capacity for injury to the corporation.”).

2010See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101 (stating that “the creditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to maintain derivative claims against directors on behalf of the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties”) (emphasis in original); cf. Intertherm, 569 S.W.2d at 468-69 (derivative action on behalf of all creditors against directors of insolvent corporation).

2010See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101 (stating that “the creditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to maintain derivative claims against directors on behalf of the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties”) (emphasis in original); cf. Intertherm, 569 S.W.2d at 468-69 (derivative action on behalf of all creditors against directors of insolvent corporation).

2010We adopt the reasoning of the Delaware Supreme Court in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del.2007), observing that corporate creditors are adequately protected by existing law, and that recognizing a new direct cause of action is unnecessary and would impede corporate governance.

2003See also Kramer v. Western Pacific Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 354 (Del.1988) (“To have standing to maintain a shareholder derivative suit, a plaintiff must be a shareholder at the time of the filing of the suit and must remain a shareholder throughout the litigation.”).

2001Cross v. City of Memphis, 20 S.W.3d 642, 645 (Tenn.2000); Tuggle v. Allright Parking Sys., 922 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn.1996); Evans v. Wilson, 776 S.W.2d 939 (Tenn.1989).

1997Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112 (c)(1); Cross v. Pan Am World Servs., Inc., 749 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 867 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tenn. 1993); Aetna Cas. & Sur.

1997Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112 (c)(1); Cross v. Pan Am World Servs., Inc., 749 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 867 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tenn. 1993); Aetna Cas. & Sur.