14 Virginia opinions name it 6 courts 1998–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mahony v. Beckergreen2 sentences2015The Virginia Supreme Court has considered the meaning of a derivative claim, holding it to be a claim “having no origin in itself, but one owing its existence to a preceding claim.” Mahony v. Becker, 246 Va. 209, 212 , 435 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1993) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 443 (6th ed.1990)). 2015The Virginia Supreme Court has considered the meaning of a derivative claim, holding it to be a claim “having no origin in itself, but one owing its existence to a preceding claim.” Mahony v. Becker, 246 Va. 209, 212 , 435 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1993) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 443 (6th ed.1990)). | 4 | 4 |
James v. Janegreen2 sentences2024James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 52 (1980). 2024James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 52 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
Will v. Michigan Department of State Policegreen1 sentence2025First, the majority reasons that as “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 89 (1989) (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)), such officials are entitled to invoke the absolute immunity of the sovereign, not the derivative immunity that they would normally be entitled to, solely due to the denoting of “official capacity” in the complaint. | 1 | 1 |
Lohr v. Larsengreen1 sentence2025Lohr v. Larsen, 246 Va. 81, 86-87 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Printz v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930-31 (1997) (noting under the federal Brady Act that the term “individuals” directs its application to officers in “their official capacities as state officers; it control[ling] their actions, not as private citizens, but as the agents of the State”). | 1 | 1 |
Brandon v. Holtgreen1 sentence2025First, the majority reasons that as “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 89 (1989) (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)), such officials are entitled to invoke the absolute immunity of the sovereign, not the derivative immunity that they would normally be entitled to, solely due to the denoting of “official capacity” in the complaint. | 1 | 1 |
Koffman v. Garnettgreen2 sentences2025Moreover, under the current rule pertaining to the derivative immunity of an otherwise immune government employee, “[a]llegations of gross negligence can pierce through a derivative sovereign-immunity defense asserted by an otherwise immune government employee.” Patterson v. City of Danville, 301 Va. 181 , 197 (2022); see, e.g., Koffman v. Garnett, 265 Va. 12, 15-16 (2003) (applying sovereign immunity to bar a plaintiff’s simple negligence claims against a football coach in his official capacity but reversing the circuit court’s dismissal in part, due to well-pleaded allegations of gross negli 2025Moreover, under the current rule pertaining to the derivative immunity of an otherwise immune government employee, “[a]llegations of gross negligence can pierce through a derivative sovereign-immunity defense asserted by an otherwise immune government employee.” Patterson v. City of Danville, 301 Va. 181 , 197 (2022); see, e.g., Koffman v. Garnett, 265 Va. 12, 15-16 (2003) (applying sovereign immunity to bar a plaintiff’s simple negligence claims against a football coach in his official capacity but reversing the circuit court’s dismissal in part, due to well-pleaded allegations of gross negli | 1 | 1 |
Giannotti v. Hamwaygreen2 sentences2012See Giannotti v. Hamway, 239 Va. 14, 29 , 387 S.E.2d 725, 734 (1990) (affirming the circuit court's judgment ordering directors to restore funds owed to the corporation at the dissolution stage but refusing to award plaintiff minority shareholders attorneys' fees and expenses). 2012See Giannotti v. Hamway, 239 Va. 14, 29 , 387 S.E.2d 725, 734 (1990) (affirming the circuit court's judgment ordering directors to restore funds owed to the corporation at the dissolution stage but refusing to award plaintiff minority shareholders attorneys' fees and expenses). | 1 | 1 |
Gilbreath v. Brewstergreen2 sentences2002See Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436, 442 , 463 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1995). 2002See Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436, 442 , 463 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Naccash v. Burgergreen1 sentence1998See Naccash, supra, and Boyd, supra. These claims would be based on the legal theory that the defendant owed a duty to both parents either by being patients of the defendant or direct victims of the defendant or a parent’s derivative claim of a child injured during delivery. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cooper v. Adler
green
2 sentences2015In analyzing whether a mother’s injury was separate and distinct from her infant’s injury, this Court rejected a mother’s claim for emotional distress stemming from her child’s neurological injuries reasoning, “but for the injury to the child, appellant would have no claim of emotional distress.” Cooper, 44 Va.App. at 279 , 604 S.E.2d at 752 . 2015In analyzing whether a mother’s injury was separate and distinct from her infant’s injury, this Court rejected a mother’s claim for emotional distress stemming from her child’s neurological injuries reasoning, “but for the injury to the child, appellant would have no claim of emotional distress.” Cooper, 44 Va.App. at 279 , 604 S.E.2d at 752 . | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Golden Tee, Inc. v. Venture Golf Schools, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Cf. Golden Tee, Inc. v. Venture Golf Schools, Inc., 333 Ark. 253 , 969 S.W.2d 625 , 628-29 (1998) (requiring a limited partner who is alleging indirect damage to himself based on a decrease in the value of the limited partnership to bring a derivative claim) (relying on Kenworthy v. Hargrove, 855 F.Supp. 101 , 106 (E.D.Pa.1994) ("When a limited partner alleges wrongs to the limited partnership that indirectly damaged a limited partner by rendering his contribution or interest in the limited partnership valueless, the limited partner is required to bring his claim derivatively on behalf of the 2007Cf. Golden Tee, Inc. v. Venture Golf Schools, Inc., 333 Ark. 253 , 969 S.W.2d 625 , 628-29 (1998) (requiring a limited partner who is alleging indirect damage to himself based on a decrease in the value of the limited partnership to bring a derivative claim) (relying on Kenworthy v. Hargrove, 855 F.Supp. 101 , 106 (E.D.Pa.1994) ("When a limited partner alleges wrongs to the limited partnership that indirectly damaged a limited partner by rendering his contribution or interest in the limited partnership valueless, the limited partner is required to bring his claim derivatively on behalf of the | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Kenworthy v. Hargrove
green
1 sentence2007Cf. Golden Tee, Inc. v. Venture Golf Schools, Inc., 333 Ark. 253 , 969 S.W.2d 625 , 628-29 (1998) (requiring a limited partner who is alleging indirect damage to himself based on a decrease in the value of the limited partnership to bring a derivative claim) (relying on Kenworthy v. Hargrove, 855 F.Supp. 101 , 106 (E.D.Pa.1994) ("When a limited partner alleges wrongs to the limited partnership that indirectly damaged a limited partner by rendering his contribution or interest in the limited partnership valueless, the limited partner is required to bring his claim derivatively on behalf of the | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Simmons v. Miller
green
1 sentence2006Id. at 572-76 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Chavis v. Gibbs
green
2 sentences2003The 1898 lease also referred to a “public road running through the lands of [Morgan Evans] and adjoining the public landing on North River.” “[T]he recordation of an instrument gives constructive notice of all the facts expressly stated in the instrument and other[] matters therein suggested which might be disclosed upon prudent inquiry.” Chavis, 198 Va. at 382 , 94 S.E.2d at 197 . 2003The 1898 lease also referred to a “public road running through the lands of [Morgan Evans] and adjoining the public landing on North River.” “[T]he recordation of an instrument gives constructive notice of all the facts expressly stated in the instrument and other[] matters therein suggested which might be disclosed upon prudent inquiry.” Chavis, 198 Va. at 382 , 94 S.E.2d at 197 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Rambone v. Critzer
green
1 sentence1998The Court expressly held that Rambone v. Critzer, 548 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.