derivative claim in Mississippi

2020In the context of an employer/employee relationship, “[a]n action against an employer based on the doctrine of respondeat superior is a derivative claim arising solely out of the negligent conduct of its employee within the scope of his or her employment.” J & J Timber Co. v. Broome, 932 So. 2d 1, 6 (¶19) (Miss. 2006) (emphasis added).

2017"An action against an employer based on the doctrine of respondeat superior is a derivative claim arising solely out of the negligent conduct of its employee within the scope of his or her employment." J & J Timber Co. v. Broome , 932 So.2d 1 , 6 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2006).

2024In Mathis v. ERA Franchise Systems, Inc., 25 So. 3d 298, 303 (Miss. 2009) (citing Bruno v. Southeastern Services, Inc., 385 So. 2d 620 , 622–23 (Miss. 1980)), this Court recognized that “[t]here is little case law in Mississippi which addresses the difference between derivative and direct actions, but the general rule is that derivative actions seek 47 recovery for injuries to the corporation.” The court then distinguished a derivative claim from a direct claim: (a) A derivative action may be brought in the name or right of a corporation by a holder . . . to redress an injury sustained by, or

2015Id. at 299 .

2014We find persuasive the statement of the Alabama Supreme Court that the freeze-out cause of action “is not a panacea for any and all conduct undertaken ... that could be deemed ‘unfair’ to the minority.” Stallworth v. AmSouth Bank of Alabama, 709 So.2d 458, 468 (Ala.1997). “[A] minority shareholder cannot parlay a wrong committed primarily against the corporation, which gives rise to a derivative claim only, into a personal recovery of damages under a squeeze out theory by simply stating the injury to the corporation is also ‘unfair’ to him as well.” Id. at 467 .

2014We find persuasive the statement of the Alabama Supreme Court that the freeze-out cause of action “is not a panacea for any and all conduct undertaken ... that could be deemed ‘unfair’ to the minority.” Stallworth v. AmSouth Bank of Alabama, 709 So.2d 458, 468 (Ala.1997). “[A] minority shareholder cannot parlay a wrong committed primarily against the corporation, which gives rise to a derivative claim only, into a personal recovery of damages under a squeeze out theory by simply stating the injury to the corporation is also ‘unfair’ to him as well.” Id. at 467 .

2007See Choctaw, Inc. v. Wichner, 521 So.2d 878, 881 (Miss.1988) (holding that a claim for loss of consortium is a derivative claim, not an independent cause of action). [9] The majority claims that my proposed construction of Section 11-1-60(2)(a) is intended to "correct [a] perceived legislative error by judicial fiat," and would constitute an "act of judicial activism." The majority is mistaken.

2006See Choctaw, Inc. v. Wichner, 521 So. 2d 878, 881 (Miss. 1988) (holding that a claim for loss of consortium is a derivative claim, not an independent cause of action). 13 such damages allowable by law as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit”) (emphasis added).

2020The Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized only two limited exceptions to this general rule: (1) a criminal defendant convicted of rape cannot relitigate his guilt in a subsequent civil action filed by the victim (i.e., the “prosecuting witness”), Jordan v. McKenna, 573 So. 2d 1371, 1377 (Miss. 1990), and (2) a finding against an injured party in a personal injury action estops that party’s spouse from relitigating the same issue in a derivative claim for loss of consortium, McCoy v. Colonial Baking Co., 572 So. 2d 850, 853-54 (Miss. 1990).

2020The Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized only two limited exceptions to this general rule: (1) a criminal defendant convicted of rape cannot relitigate his guilt in a subsequent civil action filed by the victim (i.e., the “prosecuting witness”), Jordan v. McKenna, 573 So. 2d 1371, 1377 (Miss. 1990), and (2) a finding against an injured party in a personal injury action estops that party’s spouse from relitigating the same issue in a derivative claim for loss of consortium, McCoy v. Colonial Baking Co., 572 So. 2d 850, 853-54 (Miss. 1990).

2014Additionally, “a suit barred by a statute of limitation against an agent will likewise bar the same claim against the principal whose liability is based solely on the principal and agent relationship.” Lowery v. Statewide Healthcare Serv., Inc., 585 So.2d 778, 779 (Miss.1991). ¶ 25.

1990The spouse may not pursue the claim independently but must recover any damages through the derivative cause of action."); Moody v. United States, 112 Wash.2d 690 , 773 P.2d 67 , 68 n. 2 (1989) ("[L]oss of consortium is a derivative claim.").

1990The spouse may not pursue the claim independently but must recover any damages through the derivative cause of action."); Moody v. United States, 112 Wash.2d 690 , 773 P.2d 67 , 68 n. 2 (1989) ("[L]oss of consortium is a derivative claim.").