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18 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gilmoregreen2 sentences2021The representative-cross-section requirement serves to “make[] possible a diversity of perspectives that fosters an ‘overall impartiality of the deliberative process,’” ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 525 ), “not to guarantee proportional representation of every diverse group on every jury, let alone to mandate disproportional representation by setting aside a spot for every discrete group on every jury,” Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 525 ; see also Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 216 (“[A] defendant has no right to a jury that includes members of his own race.”). 2021The representative-cross-section requirement serves to “make[] possible a diversity of perspectives that fosters an ‘overall impartiality of the deliberative process,’” ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 525 ), “not to guarantee proportional representation of every diverse group on every jury, let alone to mandate disproportional representation by setting aside a spot for every discrete group on every jury,” Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 525 ; see also Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 216 (“[A] defendant has no right to a jury that includes members of his own race.”). | 3 | 15 |
People v. Wheelergreen2 sentences2013Adopting the California Supreme Court’s justification for the representative cross-section rule, as set forth in People v. Wheeler, we held that the jury system seeks “‘to achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction of diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experiences.’ ” Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. at 525 , 511 A.2d 1150 (quoting People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748, 761 (1978), overruled in part by People v. Willis, 27 Cal.4th 811 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 43 P.3d 130 (2002)). 2013Adopting the California Supreme Court’s justification for the representative cross-section rule, as set forth in People v. Wheeler, we held that the jury system seeks “‘to achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction of diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experiences.’ ” Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. at 525 , 511 A.2d 1150 (quoting People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748, 761 (1978), overruled in part by People v. Willis, 27 Cal.4th 811 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 43 P.3d 130 (2002)). | 2 | 6 |
Michael McCray v. Robert Abramsgreen2 sentences2002The Court cited with approval the statement in McCray v. Abrams, supra, 750 F.2d at 1132 , that defendant's showing must demonstrate "a substantial likelihood that the challenges leading to the exclusion have been made on the basis of the individual venireperson's group affiliation rather than because of any indication of a possible inability to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented." Id. at 1131 (emphasis added). 2002The Court cited with approval the statement in McCray v. Abrams, supra, 750 F.2d at 1132 , that defendant's showing must demonstrate "a substantial likelihood that the challenges leading to the exclusion have been made on the basis of the individual venireperson's group affiliation rather than because of any indication of a possible inability to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented." Id. at 1131 (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Porrogreen2 sentences1986See State v. Porro, 158 N.J. 1985See State v. Porro, 158 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Machipongo Club, Inc. v. Nature Conservancygreen2 sentences1986See State v. Porro, 158 NJ.Super. 269 (App.Div.1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 1047 , 99 S.Ct. 724 , 58 L.Ed.2d 706 (1978). [ 199 N.J.Super. at 398 .] Article I, paragraphs 5 and 1 define the core cognizable groups for purposes of impartial jury analysis under the representative cross-section rule, but are not necessarily definitive of those groups. 1985Super. 269 (App.Div. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 1047 , 99 S.Ct. 724 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 706 (1978). *399 The purpose of the representative cross section rule was summarized in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 , 66 S.Ct. 984, 985 , 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946). | 1 | 2 |
Houston Distribution Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences1986See State v. Porro, 158 NJ.Super. 269 (App.Div.1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 1047 , 99 S.Ct. 724 , 58 L.Ed.2d 706 (1978). [ 199 N.J.Super. at 398 .] Article I, paragraphs 5 and 1 define the core cognizable groups for purposes of impartial jury analysis under the representative cross-section rule, but are not necessarily definitive of those groups. 1985Super. 269 (App.Div. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 1047 , 99 S.Ct. 724 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 706 (1978). *399 The purpose of the representative cross section rule was summarized in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 , 66 S.Ct. 984, 985 , 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Ramseurgreen2 sentences2021The representative-cross-section requirement serves to “make[] possible a diversity of perspectives that fosters an ‘overall impartiality of the deliberative process,’” ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 525 ), “not to guarantee proportional representation of every diverse group on every jury, let alone to mandate disproportional representation by setting aside a spot for every discrete group on every jury,” Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 525 ; see also Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 216 (“[A] defendant has no right to a jury that includes members of his own race.”). 2021At the same time, however, “[t]he fair cross- section principle . . . is designed to achieve results, not just assure opportunities; thus ‘“compilers of jury lists may drift into discrimination by 29 not taking affirmative action to prevent it.”’” Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 227 (quoting People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433, 446 (Cal. 1984)). 3. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fullergreen2 sentences2021The representative-cross-section requirement “appl[ies] both to the initial selection of the venire and to the selection of the petit jury from the venire.” State v. Fuller, 182 N.J. 174, 195 (2004). 2021The representative-cross-section requirement serves to “make[] possible a diversity of perspectives that fosters an ‘overall impartiality of the deliberative process,’” ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 525 ), “not to guarantee proportional representation of every diverse group on every jury, let alone to mandate disproportional representation by setting aside a spot for every discrete group on every jury,” Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 525 ; see also Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 216 (“[A] defendant has no right to a jury that includes members of his own race.”). | 1 | 1 |
Timothy Scott Weeks v. Stategreen1 sentence2021As to technology-based arguments, we rejected in Vega-Larregui a similar unsupported contention that the virtual process led inexorably to an unrepresentative jury pool, noting -- as was the case here -- that prospective jurors were provided the equipment necessary to participate. 246 N.J. at 127 - 29; see also Weeks v. State, 396 S.W.3d 737, 742-45 (Tex. App. 2013) (dismissing the defendant’s challenge to an “e-juror” selection process). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Longgreen1 sentence2021Jury-selection processes are presumed valid and a defendant challenging a jury-selection process “must show by a preponderance of the believable evidence that the attacked process is fatally flawed.” State v. Long, 204 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2021At the same time, however, “[t]he fair cross- section principle . . . is designed to achieve results, not just assure opportunities; thus ‘“compilers of jury lists may drift into discrimination by 29 not taking affirmative action to prevent it.”’” Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 227 (quoting People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433, 446 (Cal. 1984)). 3. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Keli Dunnicangreen2 sentences2021See United States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859, 880 (6th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the defendant’s representative- cross-section claim premised on the removal and replacement of a lone Black juror due to illness). 2021See United States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859, 880 (6th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the defendant’s representative- cross-section claim premised on the removal and replacement of a lone Black juror due to illness). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Osoriogreen1 sentence2020A defendant can satisfy this first step by showing an opponent has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire[;] whether the opponent has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against a group[;] whether the jurors in question share only this one characteristic – their membership in the group – and that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous as the community as a whole[;] whether the opponent failed to engage those same jurors in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all[;] and although the defendant need not b | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fullergreen1 sentence2004Below, the Appellate Division majority determined that demonstrably religious persons are not members of a cognizable group, Fuller, supra, 356 N.J.Super, at 280, 812 A.2d 389 , whereas Judge Fuentes, in dissent, found that view to be unduly restrictive. | 1 | 1 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1986See Batson, supra, 476 US. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 1726 , 90 L.Ed.2d at 92 (Marshall, J., concurring); J. 1986See Batson, supra, 476 US. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 1726 , 90 L.Ed.2d at 92 (Marshall, J., concurring); J. | 1 | 1 |
| Berger v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gilmoregreen2 sentences1986On March 8, 1985, the Appellate Division issued its second opinion, interpreting the New Jersey Constitution as “proscribing the use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely by virtue of their membership in, or affiliation with, a cognizable group, a practice designed to defeat the purpose of the representative cross section rule.” State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J.Super. 389, 405-06 (1985). 1986See State v. Porro, 158 NJ.Super. 269 (App.Div.1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 1047 , 99 S.Ct. 724 , 58 L.Ed.2d 706 (1978). [ 199 N.J.Super. at 398 .] Article I, paragraphs 5 and 1 define the core cognizable groups for purposes of impartial jury analysis under the representative cross-section rule, but are not necessarily definitive of those groups. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences2002In State v. Clark, 316 N.J.Super. 462 , 720 A. 2d 632 (App.Div.1998), Judge Skillman cogently summarized the three-step procedure in which a trial court must engage in evaluating a prosecutor's challenged use of peremptory challenges: [D]efendant initially has the burden to make a "prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges on constitutionally-impermissible grounds." To satisfy this burden, a defendant "must establish that the potential jurors wholly or disportionately excluded were members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-s 2002In State v. Clark, 316 N.J.Super. 462 , 720 A. 2d 632 (App.Div.1998), Judge Skillman cogently summarized the three-step procedure in which a trial court must engage in evaluating a prosecutor's challenged use of peremptory challenges: [D]efendant initially has the burden to make a "prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges on constitutionally-impermissible grounds." To satisfy this burden, a defendant "must establish that the potential jurors wholly or disportionately excluded were members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-s | 2 | 1999–2002 |
Duncan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1986Even though New Jersey established the representative cross-section rule as early as 1949 in Stewart, the rule, however, was not made applicable to the states through the Sixth Amendment until the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), reh. den. 392 U.S. 947 , 88 S.Ct. 2270 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1968) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). 1986Even though New Jersey established the representative cross-section rule as early as 1949 in Stewart, the rule, however, was not made applicable to the states through the Sixth Amendment until the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), reh. den. 392 U.S. 947 , 88 S.Ct. 2270 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1968) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Taylor v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1986Even though New Jersey established the representative cross-section rule as early as 1949 in Stewart, the rule, however, was not made applicable to the states through the Sixth Amendment until the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), reh. den. 392 U.S. 947 , 88 S.Ct. 2270 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1968) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). 1986Even though New Jersey established the representative cross-section rule as early as 1949 in Stewart, the rule, however, was not made applicable to the states through the Sixth Amendment until the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), reh. den. 392 U.S. 947 , 88 S.Ct. 2270 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1968) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Lane v. Texas
green
2 sentences1986Even though New Jersey established the representative cross-section rule as early as 1949 in Stewart, the rule, however, was not made applicable to the states through the Sixth Amendment until the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), reh. den. 392 U.S. 947 , 88 S.Ct. 2270 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1968) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). 1986Even though New Jersey established the representative cross-section rule as early as 1949 in Stewart , the rule, however, was not made applicable to the states through the Sixth Amendment until the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 491 (1968), reh. den. 392 U.S. 947 , 88 S.Ct. 2270 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 1412 (1968) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed. 2d 690 (1975). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Brennan v. New York
green
2 sentences1986Even though New Jersey established the representative cross-section rule as early as 1949 in Stewart, the rule, however, was not made applicable to the states through the Sixth Amendment until the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), reh. den. 392 U.S. 947 , 88 S.Ct. 2270 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1968) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). 1986Even though New Jersey established the representative cross-section rule as early as 1949 in Stewart , the rule, however, was not made applicable to the states through the Sixth Amendment until the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 491 (1968), reh. den. 392 U.S. 947 , 88 S.Ct. 2270 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 1412 (1968) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed. 2d 690 (1975). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
State v. Saladin Thompson(074971)
green
1 sentence2020The prosecution must "come forward with evidence that the peremptory challenges A-1139-17T4 27 under review are justifiable on the basis of concerns about situation-specific bias." Thompson, 224 N.J. at 341 (quoting Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 537 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Willis
green
2 sentences2013Adopting the California Supreme Court’s justification for the representative cross-section rule, as set forth in People v. Wheeler, we held that the jury system seeks “‘to achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction of diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experiences.’ ” Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. at 525 , 511 A.2d 1150 (quoting People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748, 761 (1978), overruled in part by People v. Willis, 27 Cal.4th 811 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 43 P.3d 130 (2002)). 2013Adopting the California Supreme Court’s justification for the representative cross-section rule, as set forth in People v. Wheeler, we held that the jury system seeks “‘to achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction of diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experiences.’ ” Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. at 525 , 511 A.2d 1150 (quoting People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748, 761 (1978), overruled in part by People v. Willis, 27 Cal.4th 811 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 43 P.3d 130 (2002)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Watkins
green
1 sentence2009These factors later were collected and restated in Watkins, supra, 114 N.J. at 266, 553 A.2d 1344 (explaining that Gilmore “suggested that trial courts consider the following factors: (1) that the prosecutor struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire; (2) that the prosecutor used a disproportionate number of his or her peremptories against the group; (3) that the prosecutor failed to ask or propose questions to the challenged jurors; (4) that other than their race, the challenged jurors are as heterogeneous as the community as a whole; and (5) that the challenged | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
green
2 sentences2006If a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts back to the party exercising the challenge to provide evidence that the "challenges under review are justifiable on the basis of concerns about situation-specific bias;" that is, the party "must articulate `clear and reasonably specific' explanations of its `legitimate reasons' for exercising each of the peremptory challenges." Id. at 537 , 511 A. 2d 1150 (quoting Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 258 , 101 S.Ct. at 1096 , 67 L.Ed. 2d at 218 ). 2006If a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts back to the party exercising the challenge to provide evidence that the "challenges under review are justifiable on the basis of concerns about situation-specific bias;" that is, the party "must articulate `clear and reasonably specific' explanations of its `legitimate reasons' for exercising each of the peremptory challenges." Id. at 537 , 511 A. 2d 1150 (quoting Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 258 , 101 S.Ct. at 1096 , 67 L.Ed. 2d at 218 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. Soares
green
2 sentences1987Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 , 387 N.E.2d 499 , 516 n. 32, cert. den., 444 U.S. 881 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). 1987Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 , 387 N.E.2d 499 , 516 n. 32, cert. den., 444 U.S. 881 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Castellano v. Spears
green
2 sentences1987Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 , 387 N.E. 2d 499 , 516 n. 32, cert. den., 444 U.S. 881 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 110 (1979). 1987Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 , 387 N.E.2d 499 , 516 n. 32, cert. den., 444 U.S. 881 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Kentucky v. Simpson
green
2 sentences1987Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 , 387 N.E. 2d 499 , 516 n. 32, cert. den., 444 U.S. 881 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 110 (1979). 1987Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 , 387 N.E.2d 499 , 516 n. 32, cert. den., 444 U.S. 881 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Massachusetts v. Soares
green
2 sentences1987Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 , 387 N.E. 2d 499 , 516 n. 32, cert. den., 444 U.S. 881 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 110 (1979). 1987Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 , 387 N.E.2d 499 , 516 n. 32, cert. den., 444 U.S. 881 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences1986That is, at minimum, cognizable groups include those defined on the basis of religious principles, race, color, ancestry, national origin, and sex (all of which are suspect or semi-suspect classifications triggering strict or intermediate scrutiny under federal equal protection analysis, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centers, 473 U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)). 1986That is, at minimum, cognizable groups include those defined on the basis of religious principles, race, color, ancestry, national origin, and sex (all of which are suspect or semi-suspect classifications triggering strict or intermediate scrutiny under federal equal protection analysis, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centers, 473 U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Smith v. Texas green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Duren v. Missouri green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.