representative cross-section rule in California

2022(Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158 ; see People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 549 ; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 276 [“when a party presumes that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds we may call this ‘group bias and peremptorily strikes all such persons for that reason alone, he not only upsets the demographic balance of the venire but frustrates the primary purpose of the representative cross-section requirement”].) The question before us is whether a justification for a stri

2022(Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158 ; see People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 549 ; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 276 [“when a party presumes that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds we may call this ‘group bias and peremptorily strikes all such persons for that reason alone, he not only upsets the demographic balance of the venire but frustrates the primary purpose of the representative cross-section requirement”].) The question before us is whether a justification for a stri

1989The representation on juries of these differences in juror attitudes is precisely what the representative cross-section standard elaborated in Taylor [v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522 ( 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , 95 S.Ct. 692 )] is designed to foster.'" (22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277, fn. 17.) In any event, the record shows that in the case at bar Ms. Storey's belief that the courts were lenient towards Whites did not bias her in favor of the specific Black defendants on trial here.

1989The representation on juries of these differences in juror attitudes is precisely what the representative cross-section standard elaborated in Taylor [v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522 ( 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , 95 S.Ct. 692 )] is designed to foster.'" (22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277, fn. 17.) In any event, the record shows that in the case at bar Ms. Storey's belief that the courts were lenient towards Whites did not bias her in favor of the specific Black defendants on trial here.

2003To establish a prima facie case, the defendant must (1) make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible; (2) establish the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule; and (3) from all of the circumstances of the case demonstrate a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged based upon their group association. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1153-1154 , 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 .) Once defendant has established the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecution to show a neu

2003To establish a prima facie case, the defendant must (1) make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible; (2) establish the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule; and (3) from all of the circumstances of the case demonstrate a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged based upon their group association. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1153-1154 , 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 .) Once defendant has established the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecution to show a neu

2022Lastly, . . . the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining [panelists] belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.’ ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280–281, fn. omitted; see also Batson [v. Kentucky], supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96–97 [in assessing a prima facie case, the trial court should consider ‘all relevant 119 PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ Opinion of the Court by Cor

2019Lastly, . . . the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.’ ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280–281, fn. omitted; see also Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96–97 [in assessing a prima facie case, the trial court should consider ‘all relevant circumstances,’ including ‘a “pattern” of strikes against black juro

2003The decisions in People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 173 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 , 862 P.2d 664 , and People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 987 , 2 Cal.Rptr .2d 112, 820 P.2d 214 , support the People's position.

2003The decisions in People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 173 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 , 862 P.2d 664 , and People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 987 , 2 Cal.Rptr .2d 112, 820 P.2d 214 , support the People's position.

2016Lastly, . . . the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his 10 alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.’ ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-281, fn. omitted; see also Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96-97 [in assessing a prima facie case, the trial court should consider ‘all relevant circumstances,’ including ‘a “pattern” of strikes against black j

2013We held that, in our state, “the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is guaranteed equally and independently by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and by article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 272 .) We also held that, if a jury “has been partially or totally stripped of members of a cognizable group by the improper use of peremptory challenges,” the trial court “must dismiss the jurors thus far selected” and “quash any remaining venire.” (Id. at p. 282.) Eight years after our holding

2014(See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 608 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 , 229 P.3d 12 ] [“ ‘[Ajdequate inquiry into possible racial bias is . . . essential in a case in which an African-American defendant is charged with commission of a capital crime against a White victim.’ (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 660 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782 , 937 P.2d 213 ]; see also Mu’min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 424 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 493 , 111 S.Ct. 1899 ]....)”]; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281 [“[T]he defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the repres

2014(See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 608 [“ ‘[A]dequate inquiry into 8 possible racial bias is . . . essential in a case in which an African-American defendant is charged with commission of a capital crime against a White victim.’ (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 660 ; see also Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415 , 424 . . . .)”]; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281 [“[T]he defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is

1992(See, e.g., People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 543 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ] (dis. opn. of Broussard, J.).) Indeed, in Wheeler we emphasized that "[t]he representation on juries of [such] differences in juror attitudes is precisely what the representative cross-section standard ... is designed to foster." ( 22 Cal.3d at p. 277, fn. 17 , internal quotation marks omitted.) I must admit a certain reluctance to conclude that reversal is required here in view of the apparently strong inculpatory evidence.

1992(See, e.g., People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 543 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ] (dis. opn. of Broussard, J.).) Indeed, in Wheeler we emphasized that "[t]he representation on juries of [such] differences in juror attitudes is precisely what the representative cross-section standard ... is designed to foster." ( 22 Cal.3d at p. 277, fn. 17 , internal quotation marks omitted.) I must admit a certain reluctance to conclude that reversal is required here in view of the apparently strong inculpatory evidence.

1997Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association."'" ( Ibid., citing People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1153-1154 [ 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ] ( Howard ), italics in original.) "Once the moving party has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the other party to come forward with a race-neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. [Citations.]" ( People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 714 [ 286 Cal. Rptr. 792 , 818 P.2d 75 ].) (3) In reviewing

1997Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association."'" ( Ibid., citing People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1153-1154 [ 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ] ( Howard ), italics in original.) "Once the moving party has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the other party to come forward with a race-neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. [Citations.]" ( People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 714 [ 286 Cal. Rptr. 792 , 818 P.2d 75 ].) (3) In reviewing

1986Lastly, . . . the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention. [Fn. omitted.]” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-281; see also People v. Hall, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 167 ; People v. Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 688, fn. 20 .) In the case herein, the prosecutor peremptorily struck the only two Blac

1984Lastly, . . . the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.” {Id., at pp. 280-281, fns. omitted; see also People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 167 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 672 P.2d 854 ].) The court also expressed reliance on the judgment of trial courts in evaluating claims of racially based exclusion.

1994Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than because of any specific bias." ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280 ; see also Snow, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 222, fn. omitted.) If the trial court finds the moving party has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the opponent to explain its peremptory challenges. ( People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1216 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 ].) (3b) Respondent argues defendant waived the issue for appeal by failing to

1994Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than because of any specific bias." ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280 ; see also Snow, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 222, fn. omitted.) If the trial court finds the moving party has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the opponent to explain its peremptory challenges. ( People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1216 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 ].) (3b) Respondent argues defendant waived the issue for appeal by failing to

1989(People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal. 3d at p. 277; People v. White, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 749 ; People v. Hines (1939) 12 Cal.2d 535, 539 [ 86 P.2d 92 ].) What the representative cross-section requirement does mean, however, is that a litigant “is constitutionally entitled to a petit jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random draw permits.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 211 f 5 Defendant argues that his right to a jury panel drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is abridged by the jury selection pr

1989(People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal. 3d at p. 277; People v. White, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 749 ; People v. Hines (1939) 12 Cal.2d 535, 539 [ 86 P.2d 92 ].) What the representative cross-section requirement does mean, however, is that a litigant “is constitutionally entitled to a petit jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random draw permits.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 211 f 5 Defendant argues that his right to a jury panel drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is abridged by the jury selection pr

1989(People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal. 3d at p. 277; People v. White, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 749 ; People v. Hines (1939) 12 Cal.2d 535, 539 [ 86 P.2d 92 ].) What the representative cross-section requirement does mean, however, is that a litigant “is constitutionally entitled to a petit jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random draw permits.” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 211 f 5 Defendant argues that his right to a jury panel drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is abridged by the jury selection pr

1986On the contrary, the remark suggests yet another impermissible group bias behind this challenge, because trial by a jury from which working-class people are systematically excluded is also a violation of the representative cross-section rule. ( Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 217, 220 [ 90 L.Ed. 1181, 1184-1185 , 66 S.Ct. 984 , 166 A.L.R. 1412 ]; People v. White (1954) 43 Cal.2d 740, 752-754 [ 278 P.2d 9 ].) The cited cases refute *723 any implication that truck drivers as a class are not intelligent enough to be jurors.

1989It is well settled that previously arrested persons are not a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule and are subject to peremptory challenge for specific bias. 8 (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275 ; see also People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 348 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 803 , 673 P.2d 680 ]; Rubio v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 93, 100 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 734 , 593 P.2d 595 ].) We therefore hold that the trial court properly denied appellant’s repeated Wheeler motions, since the prosecution’s exercise of the peremptory challenge in each of the cont

1989It is well settled that previously arrested persons are not a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule and are subject to peremptory challenge for specific bias. 8 (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275 ; see also People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 348 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 803 , 673 P.2d 680 ]; Rubio v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 93, 100 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 734 , 593 P.2d 595 ].) We therefore hold that the trial court properly denied appellant’s repeated Wheeler motions, since the prosecution’s exercise of the peremptory challenge in each of the cont

1979California law is in accord, and it is for this reason that in Part I of this opinion we do not discuss the question of defendant's citizenship when we review his claim that the exclusion of aliens violates the representative cross-section requirement. [1] Although a number of lower federal courts appear to have imposed this additional requirement (see United States v. Guzman (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 337 F. Supp. 140 , affd. 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.1972) cert den. (1973) 410 U.S. 937 [ 35 L.Ed.2d 602 , 93 S.Ct. 1397 ]; United States v. Potter (9th Cir.1977) 552 F.2d 901 ), these cases cite no direct auth

1979California law is in accord, and it is for this reason that in Part I of this opinion we do not discuss the question of defendant's citizenship when we review his claim that the exclusion of aliens violates the representative cross-section requirement. [1] Although a number of lower federal courts appear to have imposed this additional requirement (see United States v. Guzman (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 337 F. Supp. 140 , affd. 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.1972) cert den. (1973) 410 U.S. 937 [ 35 L.Ed.2d 602 , 93 S.Ct. 1397 ]; United States v. Potter (9th Cir.1977) 552 F.2d 901 ), these cases cite no direct auth

2016We agree with the Attorney General that the trial court used the phrase “systematic exclusion” to express its finding that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing that the challenges were race-based in the first stage, rather than to articulate a more stringent standard than required. “‘In determining whether to infer a trial court finding of a prima facie case under Wheeler, we look to the whole record, examining the court’s remarks in context.’ (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 605, fn. 2 .)” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 612-613 (Taylor).) “It is a basic presumpti

2016We agree with the Attorney General that the trial court used the phrase “systematic exclusion” to express its finding that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing that the challenges were race-based in the first stage, rather than to articulate a more stringent standard than required. “‘In determining whether to infer a trial court finding of a prima facie case under Wheeler, we look to the whole record, examining the court’s remarks in context.’ (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 605, fn. 2 .)” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 612-613 (Taylor).) “It is a basic presumpti

2016Lastly, . . . the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his 10 alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.’ ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-281, fn. omitted; see also Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96-97 [in assessing a prima facie case, the trial court should consider ‘all relevant circumstances,’ including ‘a “pattern” of strikes against black j

2007Lastly, ... the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.” ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-281, fn. omitted; see also Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96-97 [in assessing a prima facie case, the trial court should consider “all relevant circumstances,” including “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors

2013Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood [or reasonable inference] that such persons are being challenged because of their group association . . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1187-1188 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10 .) When we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that a defendant failed to show a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, we do not “review the adequacy of counsel’s justifications for the peremptory challenges.’ ” (People v. Box, supra, 23 C

2013Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood [or reasonable inference] that such persons are being challenged because of their group association . . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1187-1188 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10 .) When we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that a defendant failed to show a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, we do not “review the adequacy of counsel’s justifications for the peremptory challenges.’ ” (People v. Box, supra, 23 C

1982It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.” (Id., at pp. 503-504 [ 33 L.Ed.2d at p. 94 ]; People v. Wheeler, supra, at p. 269 .) See People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d, at page 270, footnote 8, wherein Justice Mosk treated the various concepts with respect to which the representative cross-section rule was enunciated.

1982It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented." ( Id., at pp. 503-504 [ 33 L.Ed.2d at p. 94 ]; People v. Wheeler, supra, at p. 269 .) [6] See People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d, at page 270, footnote 8, wherein Justice Mosk treated the various concepts with respect to which the representative cross-section rule was enunciated. [7] After the prosecutor challenged the second black ju

2017Lastly, ... the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court's attention.' " ( *340 Bonilla , supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 342 , 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 160 P.3d 84 .) In this case, the record does not support an inference of discriminatory intent on the part of the prosecutor in peremptorily challenging Prospective Jurors Nos. 719 a

2017Lastly, ... the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court's attention.' " ( *340 Bonilla , supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 342 , 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 160 P.3d 84 .) In this case, the record does not support an inference of discriminatory intent on the part of the prosecutor in peremptorily challenging Prospective Jurors Nos. 719 a

2013Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood [or reasonable inference] that such persons are being challenged because of their group association . . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1187-1188 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10 .) When we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that a defendant failed to show a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, we do not “review the adequacy of counsel’s justifications for the peremptory challenges.’ ” (People v. Box, supra, 23 C

2013Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood [or reasonable inference] that such persons are being challenged because of their group association . . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1187-1188 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10 .) When we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that a defendant failed to show a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, we do not “review the adequacy of counsel’s justifications for the peremptory challenges.’ ” (People v. Box, supra, 23 C

2020Defendant asserts that if a party has not engaged in purposeful discrimination, “tinkering with the makeup of the jury by prohibiting the exercise of peremptory challenges, on the mistaken belief that a party is discriminating against a particular group, itself threatens the representative cross-section requirement.” A. The Third Stage of Batson/Wheeler If the proponent of the strike “has offered … nondiscriminatory reason[s] the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination. [Citation.]” (People v. Scott, supra, 61 Cal

2019Lastly, . . . the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.’ ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280–281, fn. omitted; see also Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96–97 [in assessing a prima facie case, the trial court should consider ‘all relevant circumstances,’ including ‘a “pattern” of strikes against black juro

1989(Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522 [ 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , 95 S.Ct. 692 ].) In Duren v. Missouri (1978) 439 U.S. 357 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 579 , 99 S.Ct. 664 ], the United States Supreme Court established the elements of a prima facie violation of the representative cross-section requirement.

1989(Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522 [ 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , 95 S.Ct. 692 ].) In Duren v. Missouri (1978) 439 U.S. 357 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 579 , 99 S.Ct. 664 ], the United States Supreme Court established the elements of a prima facie violation of the representative cross-section requirement.

1979California law is in accord, and it is for this reason that in Part I of this opinion we do not discuss the question of defendant's citizenship when we review his claim that the exclusion of aliens violates the representative cross-section requirement. [1] Although a number of lower federal courts appear to have imposed this additional requirement (see United States v. Guzman (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 337 F. Supp. 140 , affd. 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.1972) cert den. (1973) 410 U.S. 937 [ 35 L.Ed.2d 602 , 93 S.Ct. 1397 ]; United States v. Potter (9th Cir.1977) 552 F.2d 901 ), these cases cite no direct auth

1979California law is in accord, and it is for this reason that in Part I of this opinion we do not discuss the question of defendant's citizenship when we review his claim that the exclusion of aliens violates the representative cross-section requirement. [1] Although a number of lower federal courts appear to have imposed this additional requirement (see United States v. Guzman (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 337 F. Supp. 140 , affd. 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.1972) cert den. (1973) 410 U.S. 937 [ 35 L.Ed.2d 602 , 93 S.Ct. 1397 ]; United States v. Potter (9th Cir.1977) 552 F.2d 901 ), these cases cite no direct auth

1986On the contrary, the remark suggests yet another impermissible group bias behind this challenge, because trial by a jury from which working-class people are systematically excluded is also a violation of the representative cross-section rule. ( Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 217, 220 [ 90 L.Ed. 1181, 1184-1185 , 66 S.Ct. 984 , 166 A.L.R. 1412 ]; People v. White (1954) 43 Cal.2d 740, 752-754 [ 278 P.2d 9 ].) The cited cases refute *723 any implication that truck drivers as a class are not intelligent enough to be jurors.

1986On the contrary, the remark suggests yet another impermissible group bias behind this challenge, because trial by a jury from which working-class people are systematically excluded is also a violation of the representative cross-section rule. ( Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 217, 220 [ 90 L.Ed. 1181, 1184-1185 , 66 S.Ct. 984 , 166 A.L.R. 1412 ]; People v. White (1954) 43 Cal.2d 740, 752-754 [ 278 P.2d 9 ].) The cited cases refute *723 any implication that truck drivers as a class are not intelligent enough to be jurors.

2014“Statistical underrepresentation of minority groups resulting from race-neutral . . . practices does not amount to ‘systematic exclusion’ necessary to support a representative cross-section claim. [Citations.]” (People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 706 , overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 .) Accordingly, “[a] defendant does not discharge the burden of demonstrating that the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion merely by offering statistical evidence of a disparity.

2001“Statistical underrepresentation of minority groups resulting from race-neutral . . . practices does not amount to ‘systematic exclusion’ necessary to support a representative cross-section claim. [Citations.]” (People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 706 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 838 P.2d 729 ].) A prima facie case of systematic exclusion, under Duren’s third prong, cannot be established through appellant’s claim that the county has failed to adopt other measures, which he suggests might increase the racial representation of African-Americans on jury venires in Contra Costa County.

2014A defendant must show, in addition, that the disparity is the result of an improper feature of the jury selection process. [Citation.]” (People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 857 .) Furthermore, “[s]peculation as to the source of the disparity is insufficient to show systematic exclusion [citation], as is evidence the disparity is unlikely to be a product of chance [citation] or has endured for some time [citation].” (Id. at p. 858; see Roddy v. Superior Court, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143 [“it cannot be reasonably believed, based solely on an apparent statistical disparity between

2013(People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 341-342.) ‗We review a trial court‘s determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor‘s justifications for exercising peremptory challenges ―‗with great restraint.‘‖ [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court‘s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on app

2001Our high court has repeatedly admonished that such reference to measures not taken by the county is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion: “ ‘Evidence that “race/class neutral jury selection processes may nonetheless operate to permit the de facto exclusion of a higher percentage of a particular class of jurors than would result from a random draw” is insufficient to make out a prima facie case. {[People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527 ,] 546 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 244 ], italics in original.)’ ” (People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 706 ; see also

2001Our high court has repeatedly admonished that such reference to measures not taken by the county is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion: “ ‘Evidence that “race/class neutral jury selection processes may nonetheless operate to permit the de facto exclusion of a higher percentage of a particular class of jurors than would result from a random draw” is insufficient to make out a prima facie case. {[People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527 ,] 546 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 244 ], italics in original.)’ ” (People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 706 ; see also