honest error in New York

1966George v. State of New York ( 283 App. Div. 245 -248 [1954], affd. 308 N. Y. 681 ) wherein it is stated: 1 ‘ Thus the issue is narrowed to this: Are the doctors, or is the State which employs them, legally responsible * * * for an honest error of professional judgment made by qualified and competent persons?

1957George v. State of New York, 283 App. Div. 245 ) where it was said (p. 248): “ Are the doctors, or is the State which employs them, legally responsible in damages for an honest error of professional judgment made by qualified and competent persons?

1977George v State of New York, 283 App. Div. 245, 248 , affd. 308 N.Y. 681 ), the State cannot seek refuge behind the veil that generally protects a doctor’s medical judgment.” (O’Neil v State of New York, supra, p 940.) Here the psychiatrists, involved in this case, recognized their own lack of sophistication concerning internal medicine and the need for a specialist.

1966George v. State of New York ( 283 App. Div. 245 -248 [1954], affd. 308 N. Y. 681 ) wherein it is stated: 1 ‘ Thus the issue is narrowed to this: Are the doctors, or is the State which employs them, legally responsible * * * for an honest error of professional judgment made by qualified and competent persons?

2007Corp., 90 AD2d 270 [1982]).

1990Corp., 90 AD2d 270, 279 ; Larkin v State of New York, 84 AD2d 438 ).

2007It is plaintiffs’ contention that Hillside, in permitting Reznikov to make unaccompanied visits home in spite of his known pedophilic proclivities, did not merely make an honest error of professional judgment, but simply failed to exercise any professional judgment, thereby incurring liability to persons foresee-ably harmed as a result of that failure (see Huntley v State of New York, 62 NY2d 134 [1984]; Rattray v State of New York, 223 AD2d 356 [1996]; Bell v New York City Health & Hosps.

2007It is plaintiffs’ contention that Hillside, in permitting Reznikov to make unaccompanied visits home in spite of his known pedophilic proclivities, did not merely make an honest error of professional judgment, but simply failed to exercise any professional judgment, thereby incurring liability to persons foresee-ably harmed as a result of that failure (see Huntley v State of New York, 62 NY2d 134 [1984]; Rattray v State of New York, 223 AD2d 356 [1996]; Bell v New York City Health & Hosps.

1997The nature of an errors and omissions policy is “to insure a member of a designated calling against liability arising out of the mistakes inherent in the practice of that particular profession or business” (Schiff Assocs. v Flack, 51 NY2d 692, 700 ; see, Grieb v Citizens Cas.

1990Corp., 90 AD2d 270, 279 ; Larkin v State of New York, 84 AD2d 438 ).

1975Although it is well settled that the State is not responsible for an honest error of professional judgment made by qualified and competent doctors in its employ (Williams v State of New York, 30 AD2d 611 ; St.

1958In any event, an ‘ ‘ alibi ’ ’ defense has no legal value as a basis for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence (People v. Giordano, 144 Misc. 108 ).

1945At least a reasonable compliance as to the contents of the notice, considering the object of the law, is all according to most of the judicial decisions that should be exacted.” (6 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, § 2895; Weinstein v. City of New York, 156 App. Div. 541 .) In Schwartz v. City of New York ( 250 N. Y. 332 ) the court, after stating that substantial compliance is adequate, added that all that is required is enough to enable the municipality to investigate the claim. “ A requirement of greater particularity might defeat an honest claim; it could afford no needed protection to

1945At least a reasonable compliance as to the contents of the notice, considering the object of the law, is all according to most of the judicial decisions that should be exacted.” (6 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, § 2895; Weinstein v. City of New York, 156 App. Div. 541 .) In Schwartz v. City of New York ( 250 N. Y. 332 ) the court, after stating that substantial compliance is adequate, added that all that is required is enough to enable the municipality to investigate the claim. “ A requirement of greater particularity might defeat an honest claim; it could afford no needed protection to

1945At least a reasonable compliance as to the contents of the notice, considering the object of the law, is all according to most of the judicial decisions that should be exacted.” (6 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, § 2895; Weinstein v. City of New York, 156 App. Div. 541 .) In Schwartz v. City of New York ( 250 N. Y. 332 ) the court, after stating that substantial compliance is adequate, added that all that is required is enough to enable the municipality to investigate the claim. “ A requirement of greater particularity might defeat an honest claim; it could afford no needed protection to

1945At least a reasonable compliance as to the contents of the notice, considering the object of the law, is all according to most of the judicial decisions that should be exacted.” (6 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, § 2895; Weinstein v. City of New York, 156 App. Div. 541 .) In Schwartz v. City of New York ( 250 N. Y. 332 ) the court, after stating that substantial compliance is adequate, added that all that is required is enough to enable the municipality to investigate the claim. “ A requirement of greater particularity might defeat an honest claim; it could afford no needed protection to

1941Grossman v. Goldfogle ( 219 App. Div. 68 ).

1935O’Neil v. Purdy, 188 App. Div. 485 .) “ While the courts are given wide power to correct defects, and should exerc.se this power wherever the defect is .technical and stands in the way of the court performing its proper function of passing upon the merits of an honest claim, yet I think that this power is not wide enough to cover an amendment which would have the effect of giving the court jurisdiction of litigation which is already barred by a statute of limitation.” (People ex rel.

1934Matter of United States Trust Co. ( 189 App. Div. 75, 80 ) involved the sale of railroad stock, and it was sought to surcharge the trustee for retaining what was at one time a good investment of railroad stock, for a period of thirteen years, the latter part in the face of a declining market, and during 1917 when general conditions were most extraordinary and the railroads had been taken over by the Federal government.

1931Frequently, scrutiny reveals that exterior defenses do not harmonize “ with the verities of the situation.” (McNulty Bros. v. Offerman, 221 N. Y. 98 .) If the door designated “ defense ” is not to be opened for investigation to ascertain whether a real or honest defense is beyond, and the door must remain closed until the trial, then indeed the rule will be of insignificant force and efficacy.

1904(White v. Benjamin, 150 N. Y. 258 ; Taylor v. Klein, 47 App. Div. 343 .) And where a person is held out as being the owner of property, and another is thereby induced to perform work, labor and services upon the strength of such ownership, the alleged owner and the party making such representations will not be heard thereafter in denial of such fact by any secret arrangement existing between them; nor will courts be astute to find reasons in support of a transaction which defeats a just debt.and an honest claim.

1904(Fritz v. Worden, 20 App. Div. 241 .) It appeared upon this trial that the plaintiff, in order to establish that the wife was insolvent, was in the main required to make use of the testimony of the husband.

1904(White v. Benjamin, 150 N. Y. 258 ; Taylor v. Klein, 47 App. Div. 343 .) And where a person is held out as being the owner of property, and another is thereby induced to perform work, labor and services upon the strength of such ownership, the alleged owner and the party making such representations will not be heard thereafter in denial of such fact by any secret arrangement existing between them; nor will courts be astute to find reasons in support of a transaction which defeats a just debt.and an honest claim.

1897(Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316 .) Mr. 'Stephens was properly appointed a receiver in supplementary proceedings against this.foreign corporation, and as such he had precisely the same right as any other receiver would have in any other action.

1897The creditor acquired no greater right because the property was taken than he had before that time, As is said by Brown, J., in Mandeville v. Avery ( 124 N. Y. 376 ): “ The mortgage being void, all proceedings under it were void; and although he (the mortgagee) may possess an honest claim, he cannot retain property obtained by him upon a fraudulent mortgage against a pursuing creditor.” It makes no difference .whether the creditor was one whose debt came into existence after the mortgage was given or before, if he actually became a creditor at a time when the property was in possession of the

1891The proceedings taken to collect the debt are unlawful Murtha v. Curley, 90 N. Y., 372 ; Billings v. Russell, 101 N. Y., 226 -231; Wells v. Langbein, 20 Fed.

1891The proceedings taken to collect the debt are unlawful Murtha v. Curley, 90 N. Y., 372 ; Billings v. Russell, 101 N. Y., 226 -231; Wells v. Langbein, 20 Fed.

1889(Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532 .) In view of this condition it was held by this court in Corkings v. State ( 99 N. Y. 491 ) that presentation to and prosecution of claims before the legislature, in the absence of other tribunals competent to hear them, would be sufficient to save them from the bar presented by the constitutional amendment against existing claims.

1889(Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532 .) In view of this condition it was held by this court in Corkings v. State ( 99 N. Y. 491 ) that presentation to and prosecution of claims before the legislature, in the absence of other tribunals competent to hear them, would be sufficient to save them from the bar presented by the constitutional amendment against existing claims.

1880(Insurance Co. v. Weides, 14 Wall., 375 ; Franklin Ins.