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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Damrellgreen2 sentences2002The doctrine immunizes attorneys from liability “resulting from an honest error in judgment concerning a doubtful or debatable point of law.” (Davis v. Damrell (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 883, 887 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 257 ].) “[T]he controlling test [for judgmental immunity] invokes a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the state of the law was unsettled at the time the professional advice was rendered; (2) and whether that advice was based upon the exercise of an informed judgment.” (Ibid.) Village Nurseries directs its challenge to the first prong of the test, arguing the state of the law was not unsettle 2002The doctrine immunizes attorneys from liability “resulting from an honest error in judgment concerning a doubtful or debatable point of law.” (Davis v. Damrell (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 883, 887 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 257 ].) “[T]he controlling test [for judgmental immunity] invokes a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the state of the law was unsettled at the time the professional advice was rendered; (2) and whether that advice was based upon the exercise of an informed judgment.” (Ibid.) Village Nurseries directs its challenge to the first prong of the test, arguing the state of the law was not unsettle | 1 | 2 |
Royer v. Steinberggreen2 sentences1986(Royer v. Steinberg (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 490, 498 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 499 ].) Section 583 of the Restatement Second of Torts states as a general principle: “Except as stated in § 584, the consent of another to the publication of defamatory matter concerning him is a complete defense to his action for defamation.” Section 584 allows an honest inquiry by the defamed person to inquire into *1633 the defamatory publication. 1986(Royer v. Steinberg (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 490, 498 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 499 ].) Section 583 of the Restatement Second of Torts states as a general principle: “Except as stated in § 584, the consent of another to the publication of defamatory matter concerning him is a complete defense to his action for defamation.” Section 584 allows an honest inquiry by the defamed person to inquire into *1633 the defamatory publication. | 1 | 1 |
MJS Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1984The section allows "a party to amend any pleading...." Presumably the court is not authorized to do so on its own motion. [5] Section 473 allows amendments to "any pleading or proceeding." There is considerable doubt that a summons is a "proceeding," being defined as "the process by which a court acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil action." ( MJS Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App.3d 555, 557 [ 200 Cal. Rptr. 286 ].) In light of our resolution of the case on other grounds, this question need not be decided. [1] All statutory citations are to the Code 1984The section allows "a party to amend any pleading...." Presumably the court is not authorized to do so on its own motion. [5] Section 473 allows amendments to "any pleading or proceeding." There is considerable doubt that a summons is a "proceeding," being defined as "the process by which a court acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil action." ( MJS Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App.3d 555, 557 [ 200 Cal. Rptr. 286 ].) In light of our resolution of the case on other grounds, this question need not be decided. [1] All statutory citations are to the Code | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Lewisgreen2 sentences1981(Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 156 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 28 A.L.R.3d 368 ]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Attorneys, § 143, p. 154.) But it is equally settled that no liability will attach “‘for lack of knowledge as to the true state of the law where a doubtful or debatable point is involved.’” (Sprague v. Morgan (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 519, 523 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; accord Smith v. Lewis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 349, 358-359 ; see generally 1 Witkin, op. cit., §§ 150-152, pp. 161-164; Annot. (1977) 78 A.L.R.3d 255 .) In reaffirming the long-established principle immunizing the leg 1981(Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 156 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 28 A.L.R.3d 368 ]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Attorneys, § 143, p. 154.) But it is equally settled that no liability will attach “‘for lack of knowledge as to the true state of the law where a doubtful or debatable point is involved.’” (Sprague v. Morgan (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 519, 523 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; accord Smith v. Lewis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 349, 358-359 ; see generally 1 Witkin, op. cit., §§ 150-152, pp. 161-164; Annot. (1977) 78 A.L.R.3d 255 .) In reaffirming the long-established principle immunizing the leg | 1 | 1 |
Lysick v. Walcomgreen2 sentences1981(Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 156 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 28 A.L.R.3d 368 ]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Attorneys, § 143, p. 154.) But it is equally settled that no liability will attach “‘for lack of knowledge as to the true state of the law where a doubtful or debatable point is involved.’” (Sprague v. Morgan (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 519, 523 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; accord Smith v. Lewis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 349, 358-359 ; see generally 1 Witkin, op. cit., §§ 150-152, pp. 161-164; Annot. (1977) 78 A.L.R.3d 255 .) In reaffirming the long-established principle immunizing the leg 1981(Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 156 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 28 A.L.R.3d 368 ]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Attorneys, § 143, p. 154.) But it is equally settled that no liability will attach “‘for lack of knowledge as to the true state of the law where a doubtful or debatable point is involved.’” (Sprague v. Morgan (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 519, 523 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; accord Smith v. Lewis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 349, 358-359 ; see generally 1 Witkin, op. cit., §§ 150-152, pp. 161-164; Annot. (1977) 78 A.L.R.3d 255 .) In reaffirming the long-established principle immunizing the leg | 1 | 1 |
Sprague v. Morgangreen2 sentences1981(Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 156 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 28 A.L.R.3d 368 ]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Attorneys, § 143, p. 154.) But it is equally settled that no liability will attach “‘for lack of knowledge as to the true state of the law where a doubtful or debatable point is involved.’” (Sprague v. Morgan (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 519, 523 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; accord Smith v. Lewis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 349, 358-359 ; see generally 1 Witkin, op. cit., §§ 150-152, pp. 161-164; Annot. (1977) 78 A.L.R.3d 255 .) In reaffirming the long-established principle immunizing the leg 1981(Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 156 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 28 A.L.R.3d 368 ]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Attorneys, § 143, p. 154.) But it is equally settled that no liability will attach “‘for lack of knowledge as to the true state of the law where a doubtful or debatable point is involved.’” (Sprague v. Morgan (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 519, 523 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; accord Smith v. Lewis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 349, 358-359 ; see generally 1 Witkin, op. cit., §§ 150-152, pp. 161-164; Annot. (1977) 78 A.L.R.3d 255 .) In reaffirming the long-established principle immunizing the leg | 1 | 1 |
In Re Imblergreen2 sentences1975In making such an attack, however, [the] petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that perjured testimony was adduced at his trial. .-. .” (In re Imbler, 60 Cal.2d 554, 560 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 387 P.2d 6 ], cert. den., 379 U.S. 908 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 181 , 85 S.Ct. 196 ].) “An honest error in expert opinion is not perjury even though further diligence and study might have revealed the error.” (In re Imbler, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 567 .) Here Kirschke failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Wolfer’s error in preparation of the enlarged photographs was anything 1975In making such an attack, however, [the] petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that perjured testimony was adduced at his trial. .-. .” (In re Imbler, 60 Cal.2d 554, 560 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 387 P.2d 6 ], cert. den., 379 U.S. 908 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 181 , 85 S.Ct. 196 ].) “An honest error in expert opinion is not perjury even though further diligence and study might have revealed the error.” (In re Imbler, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 567 .) Here Kirschke failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Wolfer’s error in preparation of the enlarged photographs was anything | 1 | 1 |
In Re Manchestergreen1 sentence1975“Unless [the] negligence has obstructed the defendant in challenging the case against him, it is not a ground for collateral attack.” (In re Imbler, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 567 ; see also In re Manchester, supra, 33 Cal.2d 740, 742 ; In re Waltreus, supra, 62 Cal.2d 218, 221 .) Here the negligence of Wolfer in the preparation of the demonstrative evidence did not obstruct Kirschke’s ability to challenge the case against him. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Lindleygreen2 sentences1963(See In re Howell, 114 Cal. 250, 254 [ 46 P. 159 ]; People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal. 128, 136-137 [ 52 P. 155 ]; In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 [ 177 P.2d 918 ].) Petitioner contends, however, that the fingerprint expert was negligent in analyzing the fingerprints and in testifying that they were too fragmentary to identify. 1963(See In re Howell, 114 Cal. 250, 254 [ 46 P. 159 ]; People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal. 128, 136-137 [ 52 P. 155 ]; In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 [ 177 P.2d 918 ].) Petitioner contends, however, that the fingerprint expert was negligent in analyzing the fingerprints and in testifying that they were too fragmentary to identify. | 1 | 1 |
In re Howellgreen1 sentence1963(See In re Howell, 114 Cal. 250, 254 [ 46 P. 159 ]; People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal. 128, 136-137 [ 52 P. 155 ]; In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 [ 177 P.2d 918 ].) Petitioner contends, however, that the fingerprint expert was negligent in analyzing the fingerprints and in testifying that they were too fragmentary to identify. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Von Tiedemangreen2 sentences1963(See In re Howell, 114 Cal. 250, 254 [ 46 P. 159 ]; People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal. 128, 136-137 [ 52 P. 155 ]; In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 [ 177 P.2d 918 ].) Petitioner contends, however, that the fingerprint expert was negligent in analyzing the fingerprints and in testifying that they were too fragmentary to identify. 1963(See In re Howell, 114 Cal. 250, 254 [ 46 P. 159 ]; People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal. 128, 136-137 [ 52 P. 155 ]; In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 [ 177 P.2d 918 ].) Petitioner contends, however, that the fingerprint expert was negligent in analyzing the fingerprints and in testifying that they were too fragmentary to identify. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cooley v. County of Calaveras
green
2 sentences1958(Cooley v. County of Calaveras, 121 Cal. 482 [ 53 P. 1075 ].) They cite a Washington decision, Southern Pac. 1958(Cooley v. County of Calaveras, 121 Cal. 482 [ 53 P. 1075 ].) They cite a Washington decision, Southern Pac. | 2 | 1958–1958 |
Milam v. Dickman Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1984(Stephens v. Berry, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 474 ; Milam v. Dickman Construction Co., supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 208 ; Thompson v. Palmer Corporation, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d 387 ; Kline v. Beauchamp, supra, 29 Cal.App.2d 340.) The dissent fails to make this distinction. 1984As has been pointed out, it is important to maintain the distinction between correcting an honest error in the name of a correctly named party and joining a new party in the litigation for the first time under the guise of a claim of misnomer. ( Stephens v. Berry, supra, 249 Cal. App.2d 474 ; Milam v. Dickman Construction Co., supra, 229 Cal. App.2d 208 ; Thompson v. Palmer Corporation, supra, 138 Cal. App.2d 387 ; Kline v. Beauchamp, supra, 29 Cal. App.2d 340 .) The dissent fails to make this distinction. [4] If the trial court had been asked to do so, it probably would have been improper for | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Thompson v. Palmer Corporation
green
2 sentences1984(Stephens v. Berry, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 474 ; Milam v. Dickman Construction Co., supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 208 ; Thompson v. Palmer Corporation, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d 387 ; Kline v. Beauchamp, supra, 29 Cal.App.2d 340.) The dissent fails to make this distinction. 1984As has been pointed out, it is important to maintain the distinction between correcting an honest error in the name of a correctly named party and joining a new party in the litigation for the first time under the guise of a claim of misnomer. ( Stephens v. Berry, supra, 249 Cal. App.2d 474 ; Milam v. Dickman Construction Co., supra, 229 Cal. App.2d 208 ; Thompson v. Palmer Corporation, supra, 138 Cal. App.2d 387 ; Kline v. Beauchamp, supra, 29 Cal. App.2d 340 .) The dissent fails to make this distinction. [4] If the trial court had been asked to do so, it probably would have been improper for | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Stephens v. Berry
green
2 sentences1984(Stephens v. Berry, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 474 ; Milam v. Dickman Construction Co., supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 208 ; Thompson v. Palmer Corporation, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d 387 ; Kline v. Beauchamp, supra, 29 Cal.App.2d 340.) The dissent fails to make this distinction. 1984As has been pointed out, it is important to maintain the distinction between correcting an honest error in the name of a correctly named party and joining a new party in the litigation for the first time under the guise of a claim of misnomer. ( Stephens v. Berry, supra, 249 Cal. App.2d 474 ; Milam v. Dickman Construction Co., supra, 229 Cal. App.2d 208 ; Thompson v. Palmer Corporation, supra, 138 Cal. App.2d 387 ; Kline v. Beauchamp, supra, 29 Cal. App.2d 340 .) The dissent fails to make this distinction. [4] If the trial court had been asked to do so, it probably would have been improper for | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Kline v. Beauchamp
green
2 sentences1984(Stephens v. Berry, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 474 ; Milam v. Dickman Construction Co., supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 208 ; Thompson v. Palmer Corporation, supra, 138 Cal.App.2d 387 ; Kline v. Beauchamp, supra, 29 Cal.App.2d 340.) The dissent fails to make this distinction. 1984As has been pointed out, it is important to maintain the distinction between correcting an honest error in the name of a correctly named party and joining a new party in the litigation for the first time under the guise of a claim of misnomer. ( Stephens v. Berry, supra, 249 Cal. App.2d 474 ; Milam v. Dickman Construction Co., supra, 229 Cal. App.2d 208 ; Thompson v. Palmer Corporation, supra, 138 Cal. App.2d 387 ; Kline v. Beauchamp, supra, 29 Cal. App.2d 340 .) The dissent fails to make this distinction. [4] If the trial court had been asked to do so, it probably would have been improper for | 1 | 1984–1984 |
In Re Waltreus
green
1 sentence1975“Unless [the] negligence has obstructed the defendant in challenging the case against him, it is not a ground for collateral attack.” (In re Imbler, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 567 ; see also In re Manchester, supra, 33 Cal.2d 740, 742 ; In re Waltreus, supra, 62 Cal.2d 218, 221 .) Here the negligence of Wolfer in the preparation of the demonstrative evidence did not obstruct Kirschke’s ability to challenge the case against him. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Bynum v. United States
green
1 sentence1975In making such an attack, however, [the] petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that perjured testimony was adduced at his trial. .-. .” (In re Imbler, 60 Cal.2d 554, 560 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 387 P.2d 6 ], cert. den., 379 U.S. 908 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 181 , 85 S.Ct. 196 ].) “An honest error in expert opinion is not perjury even though further diligence and study might have revealed the error.” (In re Imbler, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 567 .) Here Kirschke failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Wolfer’s error in preparation of the enlarged photographs was anything | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Marshall, Springs & Co. v. Smith
green
1 sentence1975In making such an attack, however, [the] petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that perjured testimony was adduced at his trial. .-. .” (In re Imbler, 60 Cal.2d 554, 560 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 387 P.2d 6 ], cert. den., 379 U.S. 908 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 181 , 85 S.Ct. 196 ].) “An honest error in expert opinion is not perjury even though further diligence and study might have revealed the error.” (In re Imbler, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 567 .) Here Kirschke failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Wolfer’s error in preparation of the enlarged photographs was anything | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Collazo de Texidor v. People
neutral
1 sentence1963(See In re Howell, 114 Cal. 250, 254 [ 46 P. 159 ]; People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal. 128, 136-137 [ 52 P. 155 ]; In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 [ 177 P.2d 918 ].) Petitioner contends, however, that the fingerprint expert was negligent in analyzing the fingerprints and in testifying that they were too fragmentary to identify. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Reynolds v. Struble
green
1 sentence1935(Reynolds v. Struble, supra.) "It has been broadly held that a physician or surgeon is not liable for an honest error or mistake in judgment. *37 However, a limitation of this broad rule is recognized in cases that exempt from liability for errors of judgment only where there is a reasonable doubt ... as to the proper course to be followed, or where good judgments may differ. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Webb v. . Fulchire
neutral
1 sentence1910The ground of recovery in that and the like cases of Webb v. Fulchire, 25 N. C. (3 Ired.) 485 , [ 40 Am. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Barnes v. Jones
neutral
2 sentences1903In construing the section immediately following the one involved in this case,—section 733 of the Code of Civil Procedure,—this court, in Stewart v. Sefton, 108 Cal. 197 , has said: “ To entitle the plaintiff to treble damages under section 733 of the Code of Civil Procedure, she must have proved her allegation that plaintiff willfully or maliciously removed the trees, knowing them to be the property of plaintiff.” The court then goes on to cite Barnes v. Jones, 51 Cal. 303 , in which it was held that a complaint under this statute which did not state that the trespass was committed willfully, 1903In construing the section immediately following the one involved in this case,—section 733 of the Code of Civil Procedure,—this court, in Stewart v. Sefton, 108 Cal. 197 , has said: “ To entitle the plaintiff to treble damages under section 733 of the Code of Civil Procedure, she must have proved her allegation that plaintiff willfully or maliciously removed the trees, knowing them to be the property of plaintiff.” The court then goes on to cite Barnes v. Jones, 51 Cal. 303 , in which it was held that a complaint under this statute which did not state that the trespass was committed willfully, | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Stewart v. Sefton
green
1 sentence1903In construing the section immediately following the one involved in this case,—section 733 of the Code of Civil Procedure,—this court, in Stewart v. Sefton, 108 Cal. 197 , has said: “ To entitle the plaintiff to treble damages under section 733 of the Code of Civil Procedure, she must have proved her allegation that plaintiff willfully or maliciously removed the trees, knowing them to be the property of plaintiff.” The court then goes on to cite Barnes v. Jones, 51 Cal. 303 , in which it was held that a complaint under this statute which did not state that the trespass was committed willfully, | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.