recognized exceptions rule in New York

2010One of the recognized exceptions to this rule exists where the plaintiff has suffered injury as a result of reasonable reliance upon the defendant’s continuing performance of a contractual obligation (see Church v Callanan Indus., 99 NY2d at 111-112 ; Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 139-141 [2002]; see also Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 92, at 658 [5th ed]; Restatement [Second] of Torts § 324A [c]; cf. Vignapiano v Herbert Constr.

2009The snow removal contractor thus failed to establish that none of the recognized exceptions to this rule exist (see Church v Callarian Indus., 99 NY2d 104, 111 [2002]; Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 139-140 [2002]).

2009Petitioner argues that it has “an express statutory authorization to bring such a suit,” creating an exception (City of New York v State of New York, 86 NY2d 286, 291 [1995]). 1 Specifically, petitioner relies on the fact that its Board of Commissioners is authorized by statute to “sue and be sued” (Nassau County Civil Divisions Act § 255.4 [L 1939, ch 273, as added by L 1949, ch 270])—authorization made necessary because municipal entities like petitioner have no inherent right to sue; “their right to sue, if it exists at all, must be derived from the relevant enabling legislation or some oth

2005By extension, representatives of municipal corporate bodies, such as NYSAC, are equally without legal authority to challenge state action, unless they invoke one of the recognized exceptions to the rule, namely, “(1) an express statutory authorization to bring such a suit ... (2) where the [s]tate legislation adversely affects a municipality’s proprietary interest in a specific fund of moneys ... (3) where a [s]tate statute impinges upon ‘Home Rule’ powers of a municipality constitutionally guaranteed under article IX of the State Constitution . . . and (4) where ‘the municipal challengers ass

2010One of the recognized exceptions to this rule exists where the plaintiff has suffered injury as a result of reasonable reliance upon the defendant’s continuing performance of a contractual obligation (see Church v Callanan Indus., 99 NY2d at 111-112 ; Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 139-141 [2002]; see also Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 92, at 658 [5th ed]; Restatement [Second] of Torts § 324A [c]; cf. Vignapiano v Herbert Constr.

2009The snow removal contractor thus failed to establish that none of the recognized exceptions to this rule exist (see Church v Callarian Indus., 99 NY2d 104, 111 [2002]; Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 139-140 [2002]).

2024"A final administrative determination cannot be reopened to give a party an opportunity to make a new argument based on the existing administrative record." See, Matter ofPantelidis v. New York City Bd. ofStds. & Appeals, 43 A.D.3d 314,315 (1st Dep't 2007), affd. 10 N.Y.3d 846 (2008) [no remand is appropriate where a party is "merely seeking a second chance to reach a different determination on the merits."] "That is simply not one of the recognized exceptions to the principle of administrative finality." See, Gersten v. 56 7th Ave.

2010Co., 46 AD3d 544, 545 [2007]).

2009While the general rule provides that a defamatory statement is not actionable absent a showing of special damages (see Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 434 [1992]; Yammine v DeVita, 43 AD3d 520, 521 [2007]), one of the recognized exceptions to such rule is when the statement “imputes incompetence, incapacity or unfitness in the performance of one’s profession” or trade (Clemente v Impastato, 274 AD2d 771, 773 [2000]; see Golub v Enquirer/Star Group, 89 NY2d 1074, 1076 [1997]; Nichols v Item Publs., 309 NY 596, 600-601 [1956]).

2009Petitioner argues that it has “an express statutory authorization to bring such a suit,” creating an exception (City of New York v State of New York, 86 NY2d 286, 291 [1995]). 1 Specifically, petitioner relies on the fact that its Board of Commissioners is authorized by statute to “sue and be sued” (Nassau County Civil Divisions Act § 255.4 [L 1939, ch 273, as added by L 1949, ch 270])—authorization made necessary because municipal entities like petitioner have no inherent right to sue; “their right to sue, if it exists at all, must be derived from the relevant enabling legislation or some oth

2009While the general rule provides that a defamatory statement is not actionable absent a showing of special damages (see Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 434 [1992]; Yammine v DeVita, 43 AD3d 520, 521 [2007]), one of the recognized exceptions to such rule is when the statement “imputes incompetence, incapacity or unfitness in the performance of one’s profession” or trade (Clemente v Impastato, 274 AD2d 771, 773 [2000]; see Golub v Enquirer/Star Group, 89 NY2d 1074, 1076 [1997]; Nichols v Item Publs., 309 NY 596, 600-601 [1956]).

2009While the general rule provides that a defamatory statement is not actionable absent a showing of special damages (see Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 434 [1992]; Yammine v DeVita, 43 AD3d 520, 521 [2007]), one of the recognized exceptions to such rule is when the statement “imputes incompetence, incapacity or unfitness in the performance of one’s profession” or trade (Clemente v Impastato, 274 AD2d 771, 773 [2000]; see Golub v Enquirer/Star Group, 89 NY2d 1074, 1076 [1997]; Nichols v Item Publs., 309 NY 596, 600-601 [1956]).

2009While the general rule provides that a defamatory statement is not actionable absent a showing of special damages (see Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 434 [1992]; Yammine v DeVita, 43 AD3d 520, 521 [2007]), one of the recognized exceptions to such rule is when the statement “imputes incompetence, incapacity or unfitness in the performance of one’s profession” or trade (Clemente v Impastato, 274 AD2d 771, 773 [2000]; see Golub v Enquirer/Star Group, 89 NY2d 1074, 1076 [1997]; Nichols v Item Publs., 309 NY 596, 600-601 [1956]).

2009While the general rule provides that a defamatory statement is not actionable absent a showing of special damages (see Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 434 [1992]; Yammine v DeVita, 43 AD3d 520, 521 [2007]), one of the recognized exceptions to such rule is when the statement “imputes incompetence, incapacity or unfitness in the performance of one’s profession” or trade (Clemente v Impastato, 274 AD2d 771, 773 [2000]; see Golub v Enquirer/Star Group, 89 NY2d 1074, 1076 [1997]; Nichols v Item Publs., 309 NY 596, 600-601 [1956]).

2005School Dist., 41 NY2d 283, 287 [1977] [citations omitted]).

1992While General Obligations Law § 15-301 (1) provides that a written agreement containing a provision that prohibits any oral change can be modified only by a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is one of the recognized exceptions to this rule (see, Rose v Spa Realty Assocs., 42 NY2d 338, 344 ; see, Marine Midland Bank v Quality Exterior Corp., 92 AD2d 662, 663 ).

1992While General Obligations Law § 15-301 (1) provides that a written agreement containing a provision that prohibits any oral change can be modified only by a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is one of the recognized exceptions to this rule (see, Rose v Spa Realty Assocs., 42 NY2d 338, 344 ; see, Marine Midland Bank v Quality Exterior Corp., 92 AD2d 662, 663 ).

1992As stated by the Court of Appeals, "[o]nce a party to a written agreement has induced another’s significant and substantial reliance upon an oral modification, [that] party may be estopped from invoking the statute to bar proof of [the] oral modification” (Rose v Spa Realty Assocs., supra, at 344).