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22 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1919–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kolb v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. Crim. 1994Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2045 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). | 3 | 3 |
Juarez v. Statered2 sentences1994Schneckloth v. Bustamante , 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Juarez v. State , 758 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. Crim. 1994Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2045 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). | 3 | 3 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen2 sentences2015Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. Crim. 1994Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2045 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). | 2 | 5 |
In Re J.O.A.green2 sentences2011See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Tex.2009). 3 .The notice of appeal was due by August 3, 2010, appellate counsel was not appointed until August 10, 2010, and the order appoint *758 ing counsel was not signed until September 1, 2010. 2011See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Tex.2009). [3] The notice of appeal was due by August 3, 2010, appellate counsel was not appointed until August 10, 2010, and the order appointing counsel was not signed until September 1, 2010. | 2 | 2 |
Myers v. Stategreen2 sentences1993United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir.1971); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332 , 553 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (1976); People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418 , 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 416 , 439 P.2d 321, 328 (1968); State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493 , 624 P.2d 99, 103-04 (1981). " Notwithstanding an illegal arrest, one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause for a valid search is a search authorized by consent freely and voluntarily given." Myers v. State, 680 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 19 1993“Notwithstanding an illegal arrest, one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause for a valid search is a search authorized by consent freely and voluntarily given.” Myers v. State, 680 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1984, pet. ref’d) (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
Meekins v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Montelongo v. Goodallgreen1 sentence2008See Woolard v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., 479 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.1973); Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.1978); Brown v. Frontier Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.1963); Montelongo v. Goodall, 788 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Mrs. Gilbert Lee Woolard, a Widow v. Mobil Pipe Line Companygreen1 sentence2008See Woolard v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., 479 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.1973); Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.1978); Brown v. Frontier Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.1963); Montelongo v. Goodall, 788 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc.green1 sentence2007Draft No. 5, 1978)); see also Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 432 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting contention that plaintiffs’ individual direct claims would be barred because a class action, “of course, is one of the recognized exceptions to the rule against claim-splitting”) (citing 18 James Wm. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Maurice Deteige Sheppardgreen1 sentence1993United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir.1971); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332 , 553 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (1976); People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418 , 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 416 , 439 P.2d 321, 328 (1968); State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493 , 624 P.2d 99, 103-04 (1981). " Notwithstanding an illegal arrest, one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause for a valid search is a search authorized by consent freely and voluntarily given." Myers v. State, 680 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 19 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sesslingreen2 sentences1993United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir.1971); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332 , 553 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (1976); People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418 , 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 416 , 439 P.2d 321, 328 (1968); State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493 , 624 P.2d 99, 103-04 (1981). " Notwithstanding an illegal arrest, one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause for a valid search is a search authorized by consent freely and voluntarily given." Myers v. State, 680 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 19 1993United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir.1971); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332 , 553 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (1976); People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418 , 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 416 , 439 P.2d 321, 328 (1968); State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493 , 624 P.2d 99, 103-04 (1981). " Notwithstanding an illegal arrest, one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause for a valid search is a search authorized by consent freely and voluntarily given." Myers v. State, 680 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 19 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kennedygreen2 sentences1993United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir.1971); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332 , 553 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (1976); People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418 , 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 416 , 439 P.2d 321, 328 (1968); State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493 , 624 P.2d 99, 103-04 (1981). " Notwithstanding an illegal arrest, one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause for a valid search is a search authorized by consent freely and voluntarily given." Myers v. State, 680 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 19 1993United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir.1971); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332 , 553 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (1976); People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418 , 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 416 , 439 P.2d 321, 328 (1968); State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493 , 624 P.2d 99, 103-04 (1981). " Notwithstanding an illegal arrest, one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause for a valid search is a search authorized by consent freely and voluntarily given." Myers v. State, 680 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 19 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Eugene M. Fikegreen1 sentence1993United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir.1971); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332 , 553 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (1976); People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418 , 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 416 , 439 P.2d 321, 328 (1968); State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493 , 624 P.2d 99, 103-04 (1981). " Notwithstanding an illegal arrest, one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause for a valid search is a search authorized by consent freely and voluntarily given." Myers v. State, 680 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 19 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fortiergreen2 sentences1993United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir.1971); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332 , 553 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (1976); People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418 , 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 416 , 439 P.2d 321, 328 (1968); State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493 , 624 P.2d 99, 103-04 (1981). " Notwithstanding an illegal arrest, one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause for a valid search is a search authorized by consent freely and voluntarily given." Myers v. State, 680 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 19 1993United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir.1971); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332 , 553 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (1976); People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418 , 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 416 , 439 P.2d 321, 328 (1968); State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493 , 624 P.2d 99, 103-04 (1981). " Notwithstanding an illegal arrest, one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of both a warrant and probable cause for a valid search is a search authorized by consent freely and voluntarily given." Myers v. State, 680 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 19 | 1 | 1 |
Modine Manufacturing Co. v. North East Independent School Districtgreen1 sentence1987Posey Corp., 566 S.W.2d 86, 89-90 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1978, writ ref’d n.r. e.); Modine Manufacturing Co. v. North East Independent School District, 503 S.W.2d 833, 845 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.). | 1 | 1 |
Mira-Pak, Inc. v. G. E. Posey Corp.green1 sentence1987Posey Corp., 566 S.W.2d 86, 89-90 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1978, writ ref’d n.r. e.); Modine Manufacturing Co. v. North East Independent School District, 503 S.W.2d 833, 845 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.). | 1 | 1 |
Oats v. Dublin National Bankgreen2 sentences1987One of the recognized exceptions to the rule that there may be no contribution or indemnity between wrongdoers is that “an agent, who in the performance of duties for his principal incurs liability for an act not morally wrong, may have indemnity from the principal.” Oats v. Dublin National Bank, 127 Tex. 2, 11-12 , 90 S.W.2d 824, 829 (1936); Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 572 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.1986); see Mira-Pak, Inc. v. G.E. 1987One of the recognized exceptions to the rule that there may be no contribution or indemnity between wrongdoers is that “an agent, who in the performance of duties for his principal incurs liability for an act not morally wrong, may have indemnity from the principal.” Oats v. Dublin National Bank, 127 Tex. 2, 11-12 , 90 S.W.2d 824, 829 (1936); Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 572 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.1986); see Mira-Pak, Inc. v. G.E. | 1 | 1 |
Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Browngreen1 sentence1987One of the recognized exceptions to the rule that there may be no contribution or indemnity between wrongdoers is that “an agent, who in the performance of duties for his principal incurs liability for an act not morally wrong, may have indemnity from the principal.” Oats v. Dublin National Bank, 127 Tex. 2, 11-12 , 90 S.W.2d 824, 829 (1936); Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 572 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.1986); see Mira-Pak, Inc. v. G.E. | 1 | 1 |
Cascio v. Stategreen1 sentence1944See Cascio v. State, 171 S. W. (2d) 356 , for a full discussion of the admissibility of this character of evidence. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Enix v. State
neutral
2 sentences1935It must show that the testimony complained of actually involved an extraneous crime, and show facts negativing the idea that it was within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule excluding proof of extraneous crimes; hence the bill is insufficient where it does not negative the fact that motive was an issue, or does not show that the proof was not materially related to some issue involved in the case at bar, or was not admissible as part of the res gestae or part of a system.” In support of the text many authorities are cited, among them being Enix v. State, 16 S. W. (2d) 818 ; Spillman v 1935It must show that the testimony complained of actually involved an extraneous crime, and show facts negativing the idea that it was within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule excluding proof of extraneous crimes; hence the bill is insufficient where it does not negative the fact that motive was an issue, or does not show that the proof was not materially related to some issue involved in the case at bar, or was not admissible as a part of the res gestae or part of a system.” In support of the text many authorities are cited, among them being Enix v. State, 16 S. W. (2d) 818 ; Spillman | 3 | 1932–1935 |
James v. State
green
2 sentences1935It must show that the testimony complained of actually involved an extraneous crime, and show facts negativing the idea that it was within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule excluding proof of extraneous crimes; hence the bill is insufficient where it does not negative the fact that motive was an issue, or does not show that the proof was not materially related to some issue involved in the case at bar, or was not admissible as a part of the res gestae or part of a system.” In the case of James v. State, 138 S. W., 612 , the accused was on trial for selling intoxicating liquor on the 1935It must show that the testimony complained of actually involved an extraneous crime, and show facts negativing the idea that it was within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule excluding proof of extraneous crimes; hence the bill is insufficient where it does not negative the fact that motive was an issue, or does not show that the proof was not materially related to some issue involved in the case at bar, or was not admissible as a part of the res gestae or part of a system.” In support of the text many authorities are cited, among them being Enix v. State, 16 S. W. (2d) 818 ; Spillman | 3 | 1935–1935 |
Matthews v. State
neutral
2 sentences1935It must show that the testimony complained of actually involved an extraneous crime, and show facts negativing the idea that it was within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule excluding proof of extraneous crimes; hence the bill is insufficient where it does not negative the fact that motive was an issue, or does not show that the proof was not materially related to some issue involved in the case at bar, or was not admissible as part of the res gestae or part of a system.” In support of the text many authorities are cited, among them being Enix v. State, 16 S. W. (2d) 818 ; Spillman v 1935It must show that the testimony complained of actually involved an extraneous crime, and show facts negativing the idea that it was within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule excluding proof of extraneous crimes; hence the bill is insufficient where it does not negative the fact that motive was an issue, or does not show that the proof was not materially related to some issue involved in the case at bar, or was not admissible as a part of the res gestae or part of a system.” In support of the text many authorities are cited, among them being Enix v. State, 16 S. W. (2d) 818 ; Spillman | 2 | 1935–1935 |
Spillman v. State
neutral
2 sentences1935It must show that the testimony complained of actually involved an extraneous crime, and show facts negativing the idea that it was within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule excluding proof of extraneous crimes; hence the bill is insufficient where it does not negative the fact that motive was an issue, or does not show that the proof was not materially related to some issue involved in the case at bar, or was not admissible as part of the res gestae or part of a system.” In support of the text many authorities are cited, among them being Enix v. State, 16 S. W. (2d) 818 ; Spillman v 1935It must show that the testimony complained of actually involved an extraneous crime, and show facts negativing the idea that it was within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule excluding proof of extraneous crimes; hence the bill is insufficient where it does not negative the fact that motive was an issue, or does not show that the proof was not materially related to some issue involved in the case at bar, or was not admissible as a part of the res gestae or part of a system.” In support of the text many authorities are cited, among them being Enix v. State, 16 S. W. (2d) 818 ; Spillman | 2 | 1935–1935 |
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc.
green
1 sentence2010Id. 48 The situation presented is more similar to the recognized exceptions to the doctrine, where courts considering the issue have found it was unreasonable for a manufacturer to rely on an intermediary to convey a warning, given that direct advertising and changes in the provision of healthcare impact the doctor’s role and promote more active involvement by the patient. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Parker v. Highland Park, Inc.
green
1 sentence2008See Woolard v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., 479 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.1973); Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.1978); Brown v. Frontier Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.1963); Montelongo v. Goodall, 788 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Brown v. Frontier Theatres, Inc.
green
1 sentence2008See Woolard v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., 479 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.1973); Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.1978); Brown v. Frontier Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.1963); Montelongo v. Goodall, 788 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Brown
green
1 sentence1987One of the recognized exceptions to the rule that there may be no contribution or indemnity between wrongdoers is that “an agent, who in the performance of duties for his principal incurs liability for an act not morally wrong, may have indemnity from the principal.” Oats v. Dublin National Bank, 127 Tex. 2, 11-12 , 90 S.W.2d 824, 829 (1936); Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 572 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.1986); see Mira-Pak, Inc. v. G.E. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Harle v. Krchnak
green
1 sentence1978Irick v. Andrew, 545 S.W.2d 557 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston (14th Dist.) 1976, writ ref. n. r. e.); Hunter v. Robison, 488 S.W.2d 555 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1972, writ ref. n. r. e.); Harle v. Krchnak, supra. In the case at bar, Mrs. Williford has alleged she has “suffered severe pain and numbness in her lower lip and her jaw; she has sustained a loss of feeling and sensation in her jaw; she has sustained a loss and/or diminishment of her ability to speak and express herself, causing her great pain and suffering and mental anguish in the past and will in all probability continue to sustain pain and su | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Hunter v. Robison
green
1 sentence1978Irick v. Andrew, 545 S.W.2d 557 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston (14th Dist.) 1976, writ ref. n. r. e.); Hunter v. Robison, 488 S.W.2d 555 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1972, writ ref. n. r. e.); Harle v. Krchnak, supra. In the case at bar, Mrs. Williford has alleged she has “suffered severe pain and numbness in her lower lip and her jaw; she has sustained a loss of feeling and sensation in her jaw; she has sustained a loss and/or diminishment of her ability to speak and express herself, causing her great pain and suffering and mental anguish in the past and will in all probability continue to sustain pain and su | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Irick v. Andrew
green
1 sentence1978Irick v. Andrew, 545 S.W.2d 557 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston (14th Dist.) 1976, writ ref. n. r. e.); Hunter v. Robison, 488 S.W.2d 555 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1972, writ ref. n. r. e.); Harle v. Krchnak, supra. In the case at bar, Mrs. Williford has alleged she has “suffered severe pain and numbness in her lower lip and her jaw; she has sustained a loss of feeling and sensation in her jaw; she has sustained a loss and/or diminishment of her ability to speak and express herself, causing her great pain and suffering and mental anguish in the past and will in all probability continue to sustain pain and su | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Detroit Automatic Scale Co. v. G. B. R. Smith Milling Co. green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Oil Well Supply Co. v. Texanna Production Co. green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Culmer v. Wilson green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Kelley Island Lime & Transport Co. v. Masterson green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.