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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1922–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Boardgreen2 sentences1984(People v. Scott (1976) 16 Cal.3d 242, 246 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 39 , 546 P.2d 327 ].) But appellants argue this case comes within the recognized exceptions to the doctrine’s application: where there has been an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law or the establishment of a new precedent by controlling authority (Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 457, 465 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 901 ]); or where its application will lead to a harsh or inequitable result. 1984(People v. Scott (1976) 16 Cal.3d 242, 246 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 39 , 546 P.2d 327 ].) But appellants argue this case comes within the recognized exceptions to the doctrine’s application: where there has been an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law or the establishment of a new precedent by controlling authority (Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 457, 465 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 901 ]); or where its application will lead to a harsh or inequitable result. | 2 | 2 |
Ryan v. Mike-Ron Corp.green2 sentences1977We recognize that an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law or the establishment of a new precedent by controlling authority is one of the recognized exceptions to the rule of the law of the case (Ryan v. Mike-Ron Corp., 259 Cal.App.2d 91, 97 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 224 ]). 1977We recognize that an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law or the establishment of a new precedent by controlling authority is one of the recognized exceptions to the rule of the law of the case (Ryan v. Mike-Ron Corp., 259 Cal.App.2d 91, 97 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 224 ]). | 2 | 2 |
Arizona v. Gantgreen2 sentences2017I, § 24.) “A warrantless search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it is conducted pursuant to one of the few narrowly drawn exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a warrant.” (Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 916 ; see U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 338 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 485 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 ].) In Schmitz , the California Supreme Court discussed the recognized exceptions to the presumption of unreasonableness that apply to searches of parolees and probationers. 2017I, § 24.) “A warrantless search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it is conducted pursuant to one of the few narrowly drawn exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a warrant.” (Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 916 ; see U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 338 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 485 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 ].) In Schmitz , the California Supreme Court discussed the recognized exceptions to the presumption of unreasonableness that apply to searches of parolees and probationers. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Scottgreen2 sentences1984(People v. Scott (1976) 16 Cal.3d 242, 246 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 39 , 546 P.2d 327 ].) But appellants argue this case comes within the recognized exceptions to the doctrine’s application: where there has been an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law or the establishment of a new precedent by controlling authority (Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 457, 465 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 901 ]); or where its application will lead to a harsh or inequitable result. 1984(People v. Scott (1976) 16 Cal.3d 242, 246 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 39 , 546 P.2d 327 ].) But appellants argue this case comes within the recognized exceptions to the doctrine’s application: where there has been an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law or the establishment of a new precedent by controlling authority (Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 457, 465 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 901 ]); or where its application will lead to a harsh or inequitable result. | 1 | 1 |
Selby Constructors v. McCarthygreen2 sentences1984(Selby Constructors, Inc. v. McCarthy (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 517, 522 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 164 ].) We conclude these exceptions are inapplicable in the present case. 1984(Selby Constructors, Inc. v. McCarthy (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 517, 522 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 164 ].) We conclude these exceptions are inapplicable in the present case. | 1 | 1 |
Davies v. Krasnagreen2 sentences1982The principal ground for ignoring the doctrine ... is an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law.” (Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502, 507, fn. 5 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 705 , 535 P.2d 1161 , 79 A.L.R.3d 807 ].) “We recognize that an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law or the establishment of a new precedent by controlling authority is one of the recognized exceptions to the rule of the law of the case. ...” (Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 457, 465 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 901 ].) “It appears from the late California decisions that this doctrine [of 1982The principal ground for ignoring the doctrine ... is an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law.” (Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502, 507, fn. 5 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 705 , 535 P.2d 1161 , 79 A.L.R.3d 807 ].) “We recognize that an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law or the establishment of a new precedent by controlling authority is one of the recognized exceptions to the rule of the law of the case. ...” (Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 457, 465 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 901 ].) “It appears from the late California decisions that this doctrine [of | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1982This is particularly true where an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law has occurred by the overruling of former decisions or the establishment of new precedent by controlling authority. ...” (Ryan v. Mike-Ron Corp. (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 91, 96-97 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 224 ].) Under the foregoing authority we conclude that, because of the intervening change in the law followed by us in People v. Sequeira , by the later and higher authority of People v. Hernandez , the trial court erroneously applied the docrine of law of the case at Sequeira’s resentencing. *902 As said in Wilson v. Super 1982This is particularly true where an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law has occurred by the overruling of former decisions or the establishment of new precedent by controlling authority. ...” (Ryan v. Mike-Ron Corp. (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 91, 96-97 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 224 ].) Under the foregoing authority we conclude that, because of the intervening change in the law followed by us in People v. Sequeira , by the later and higher authority of People v. Hernandez , the trial court erroneously applied the docrine of law of the case at Sequeira’s resentencing. *902 As said in Wilson v. Super | 1 | 1 |
People v. Serratogreen2 sentences1982This is particularly true where an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law has occurred by the overruling of former decisions or the establishment of new precedent by controlling authority. ...” (Ryan v. Mike-Ron Corp. (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 91, 96-97 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 224 ].) Under the foregoing authority we conclude that, because of the intervening change in the law followed by us in People v. Sequeira , by the later and higher authority of People v. Hernandez , the trial court erroneously applied the docrine of law of the case at Sequeira’s resentencing. *902 As said in Wilson v. Super 1982This is particularly true where an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law has occurred by the overruling of former decisions or the establishment of new precedent by controlling authority. ...” (Ryan v. Mike-Ron Corp. (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 91, 96-97 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 224 ].) Under the foregoing authority we conclude that, because of the intervening change in the law followed by us in People v. Sequeira , by the later and higher authority of People v. Hernandez , the trial court erroneously applied the docrine of law of the case at Sequeira’s resentencing. *902 As said in Wilson v. Super | 1 | 1 |
Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Boardgreen2 sentences1977However, the Utah decision is not controlling as to this court; also, it is based on the application of separate accounting *466 principles to the unitary business, which are contrary to the law of this state, as set forth in Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal.2d 406, 416 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 545 , 386 P.2d 33 ], and Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal.2d 417, 425 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 386 P.2d 40 ]. 1977However, the Utah decision is not controlling as to this court; also, it is based on the application of separate accounting *466 principles to the unitary business, which are contrary to the law of this state, as set forth in Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal.2d 406, 416 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 545 , 386 P.2d 33 ], and Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal.2d 417, 425 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 386 P.2d 40 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Boardgreen2 sentences1977However, the Utah decision is not controlling as to this court; also, it is based on the application of separate accounting *466 principles to the unitary business, which are contrary to the law of this state, as set forth in Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal.2d 406, 416 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 545 , 386 P.2d 33 ], and Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal.2d 417, 425 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 386 P.2d 40 ]. 1977However, the Utah decision is not controlling as to this court; also, it is based on the application of separate accounting *466 principles to the unitary business, which are contrary to the law of this state, as set forth in Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal.2d 406, 416 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 545 , 386 P.2d 33 ], and Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal.2d 417, 425 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 386 P.2d 40 ]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Schmitz
green
1 sentence2017I, § 24.) “A warrantless search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it is conducted pursuant to one of the few narrowly drawn exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a warrant.” (Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 916 ; see U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 338 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 485 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 ].) In Schmitz , the California Supreme Court discussed the recognized exceptions to the presumption of unreasonableness that apply to searches of parolees and probationers. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2013(Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2013) ¶¶ 8:214- 8:217.) Throughout their appellants’ reply brief, defendants contend, citing Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1050 , that “[a] discretionary order that rests on an erroneous legal conclusion is error, without regard to whether such an order might on other grounds have been proper.” However, Brinker involved one of the recognized exceptions to the rule—a class action certification. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Roth v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence1984Alleged delay in the hearing and alleged failure to follow personnel policies resulting in violations of preremoval due process rights do not excuse the failure to exhaust the administrative remedy where, as here, the allegations of the complaint fail to show that the grievance hearing machinery, if exhausted, would inevitably result in a denial of due process. ( Roth v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 53 Cal. App.3d at p. 687 .) Moreover, we note that plaintiff never requested a prelayoff hearing and the postlayoff grievance hearing was sufficiently prompt. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., supra, | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Pack v. Wise
green
1 sentence1969(See Housh v. Peth (1956) 165 Ohio St. 35 [ 133 N.E.2d 340 ] [harassment by continual telephone calls and letters]; Pack v. Wise (La.App. *701 1963) 155 So.2d 909 [malice; letter sent after defendant had been informed of plaintiff’s defense and had been requested not to contact the employer again]; Quina v. Roberts (La. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
People v. Doyell
green
1 sentence1922Co. v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 145 Cal. 124 , [ 78 Pac. 372 ]; People v. Rodley, 131 Cal. 240 , [ 63 Pac. 351 ]; People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 ; Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 10 Gray, (Mass.), 485; 40 Cyc. 2789.) The declarations here excluded do not purport to have been made to parties or under circumstances to bring them within any of the recognized exceptions to the rule. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Cal. Elec. Light Co. v. Cal. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1922Co. v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 145 Cal. 124 , [ 78 Pac. 372 ]; People v. Rodley, 131 Cal. 240 , [ 63 Pac. 351 ]; People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 ; Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 10 Gray, (Mass.), 485; 40 Cyc. 2789.) The declarations here excluded do not purport to have been made to parties or under circumstances to bring them within any of the recognized exceptions to the rule. 1922Co. v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 145 Cal. 124 , [ 78 Pac. 372 ]; People v. Rodley, 131 Cal. 240 , [ 63 Pac. 351 ]; People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 ; Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 10 Gray, (Mass.), 485; 40 Cyc. 2789.) The declarations here excluded do not purport to have been made to parties or under circumstances to bring them within any of the recognized exceptions to the rule. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
People v. Rodley
green
2 sentences1922Co. v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 145 Cal. 124 , [ 78 Pac. 372 ]; People v. Rodley, 131 Cal. 240 , [ 63 Pac. 351 ]; People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 ; Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 10 Gray, (Mass.), 485; 40 Cyc. 2789.) The declarations here excluded do not purport to have been made to parties or under circumstances to bring them within any of the recognized exceptions to the rule. 1922Co. v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 145 Cal. 124 , [ 78 Pac. 372 ]; People v. Rodley, 131 Cal. 240 , [ 63 Pac. 351 ]; People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 ; Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 10 Gray, (Mass.), 485; 40 Cyc. 2789.) The declarations here excluded do not purport to have been made to parties or under circumstances to bring them within any of the recognized exceptions to the rule. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.