119 California opinions name it 5 courts 1858–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richardson v. McNultygreen2 sentences2017(See Stevinson Water Dist. v. Roduner (1950) 36 Cal.2d 264 , 267-268, 223 P.2d 209 [enforcing agreement to transfer right to *412 reappropriate imported water]; see also Richardson v. McNulty (1864) 24 Cal. 339 , 344-346 [distinguishing the concepts of transfer and abandonment in the context of a mining claim].) This issue, the District's intent to reappropriate, was not a focus of the summary adjudication proceedings in the trial court. 2017(See Stevinson Water Dist. v. Roduner (1950) 36 Cal.2d 264, 267-268 [enforcing agreement to transfer right to reappropriate imported water]; see also Richardson v. McNulty (1864) 24 Cal. 339, 344-346 [distinguishing the concepts of transfer and abandonment in the context of a mining claim].) This issue, the District's intent to reappropriate, was not a focus of the summary adjudication proceedings in the trial court. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Lockegreen2 sentences2016Federal law “allow[s] United States citizens to go onto unappropriated, unreserved public land to prospect for and develop certain minerals. ‘Discovery’ of a mineral deposit, followed by the minimal procedures required to formally ‘locate’ the deposit, gives an individual the right of *659 exclusive possession of the land for mining purposes,” i.e., a mining claim, (United States v. Locke (1985) 471 U.S. 84, 86 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 64 , 105 S.Ct. 1785 ].) Such a claim may apply to a lode or placer, 1 and may be patented or unpatented. 2 Rinehart holds an unpatented placer claim. 2016Federal law “allow[s] United States citizens to go onto unappropriated, unreserved public land to prospect for and develop certain minerals. ‘Discovery’ of a mineral deposit, followed by the minimal procedures required to formally ‘locate’ the deposit, gives an individual the right of *659 exclusive possession of the land for mining purposes,” i.e., a mining claim, (United States v. Locke (1985) 471 U.S. 84, 86 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 64 , 105 S.Ct. 1785 ].) Such a claim may apply to a lode or placer, 1 and may be patented or unpatented. 2 Rinehart holds an unpatented placer claim. | 3 | 3 |
Stevinson Water District v. Rodunergreen2 sentences2017(See Stevinson Water Dist. v. Roduner (1950) 36 Cal.2d 264 , 267-268, 223 P.2d 209 [enforcing agreement to transfer right to *412 reappropriate imported water]; see also Richardson v. McNulty (1864) 24 Cal. 339 , 344-346 [distinguishing the concepts of transfer and abandonment in the context of a mining claim].) This issue, the District's intent to reappropriate, was not a focus of the summary adjudication proceedings in the trial court. 2017(See Stevinson Water Dist. v. Roduner (1950) 36 Cal.2d 264 , 267-268, 223 P.2d 209 [enforcing agreement to transfer right to *412 reappropriate imported water]; see also Richardson v. McNulty (1864) 24 Cal. 339 , 344-346 [distinguishing the concepts of transfer and abandonment in the context of a mining claim].) This issue, the District's intent to reappropriate, was not a focus of the summary adjudication proceedings in the trial court. | 2 | 3 |
Texaco, Inc. v. Shortgreen2 sentences1991In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, supra, the statute penalized the owner for the failure to use a mining claim for 20 years and failing to record a notice within two years after the effective date of the Indiana recording statute. ( 454 U.S. at p. 521 [70 L.Ed.2d at pp. 745-746].) The court noted that “Generally, a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply.” (Id. at p. 532 [ 70 L.Ed.2d at p. 752 ].) However, a mining claim is quite different from a reversionary interest. 1991In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, supra, the statute penalized the owner for the failure to use a mining claim for 20 years and failing to record a notice within two years after the effective date of the Indiana recording statute. ( 454 U.S. at p. 521 [70 L.Ed.2d at pp. 745-746].) The court noted that “Generally, a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply.” (Id. at p. 532 [ 70 L.Ed.2d at p. 752 ].) However, a mining claim is quite different from a reversionary interest. | 2 | 2 |
Pascoe v. Richardsgreen2 sentences1986The resulting lack of recordation, as set forth in section 2315, shifts the burden of proof concerning whether "such labor has been performed and that such improvements have been made in any contest, suit or proceeding." (See Pascoe v. Richards (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 680 , 686- 687.) Accordingly, a mining claim is not forfeited under the terms of section 2315 and 5 85-702 2315.1 by the failure to pay unsecured taxes or by the failure to record the yearly labor and improvements affidavit. 1965(Pascoe v. Richards, 201 Cal.App.2d 680, 687 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 416 ].) All reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of a mining claim (Pepperdine v. Keys, supra) and against a forfeiture (Smith v. Daly, 181 Cal.App.2d 154, 162 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 176 ] ; 33 Cal.Jur.2d § 85, p.138). | 1 | 2 |
Betts v. Stephensongreen2 sentences1956“It was held in Betts v. Stephenson, 100 Cal.App.2d 361, at 363 [ 223 P.2d 651 ] that: “ ‘Every reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of a mining claim as against the assertion of a forfeiture. ’ “And in Kramer v. Sanguinetti, 33 Cal.App.2d 303 [ 91 P. 604 ], it was held that: “ ‘A statute specifying the requirements necessary for a valid location of a mining claim as between conflicting claimants should receive a liberal construction. ’ See also 58 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 79. 1956“It was held in Betts v. Stephenson, 100 Cal.App.2d 361, at 363 [ 223 P.2d 651 ] that: “ ‘Every reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of a mining claim as against the assertion of a forfeiture. ’ “And in Kramer v. Sanguinetti, 33 Cal.App.2d 303 [ 91 P. 604 ], it was held that: “ ‘A statute specifying the requirements necessary for a valid location of a mining claim as between conflicting claimants should receive a liberal construction. ’ See also 58 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 79. | 1 | 2 |
Kramer v. Sanguinettigreen2 sentences1960(Bank of America v. O'Shields, 128 Cal.App.2d 212, 218-219 [14, 15] [ 275 P.2d 153 ]; Wilson v. Madison, 55 Cal. 5, 8 ; Miller v. Luco, 80 Cal. 257, 265 [5] [ 22 P. 195 ].) As was said in Kramer v. Sanguinetti, 33 Cal.App.2d 303, 311 [4] [ 91 P.2d 604 ]: "It was not necessary for the court to adopt findings on the issues tendered by the cross-complaint for the reason that they were necessarily included in the issues presented by the complaint and the answer which were fully determined by the court. ..." "Since the court specifically found that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to possess 1960(Bank of America v. O'Shields, 128 Cal.App.2d 212, 218-219 [14, 15] [ 275 P.2d 153 ]; Wilson v. Madison, 55 Cal. 5, 8 ; Miller v. Luco, 80 Cal. 257, 265 [5] [ 22 P. 195 ].) As was said in Kramer v. Sanguinetti, 33 Cal.App.2d 303, 311 [4] [ 91 P.2d 604 ]: "It was not necessary for the court to adopt findings on the issues tendered by the cross-complaint for the reason that they were necessarily included in the issues presented by the complaint and the answer which were fully determined by the court. ..." "Since the court specifically found that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to possess | 1 | 2 |
Capron v. Van Horngreen2 sentences1957That when land of the United States is in the possession of one who is mining it, a third party may not intrude to locate a mining claim upon it, citing such authority as Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil Co. (C.C.A. 9), 112 F. 4, 13 [ 50 C.C.A. 79 , 61 L.R.A. 230 ] aff. 190 U.S. 301 [ 23 S.Ct. 692 , 47 L.Ed. 1064 ] ; Hendrickson v. California Talc Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 467 [ 130 P.2d 806 ] ; and Capron v. Van Horn, 201 Cal. 486, 497 [ 258 P. 77 ]. 2. 1957That when land of the United States is in the possession of one who is mining it, a third party may not intrude to locate a mining claim upon it, citing such authority as Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil Co. (C.C.A. 9), 112 F. 4, 13 [ 50 C.C.A. 79 , 61 L.R.A. 230 ] aff. 190 U.S. 301 [ 23 S.Ct. 692 , 47 L.Ed. 1064 ] ; Hendrickson v. California Talc Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 467 [ 130 P.2d 806 ] ; and Capron v. Van Horn, 201 Cal. 486, 497 [ 258 P. 77 ]. 2. | 1 | 2 |
Forbes v. Graceygreen2 sentences1939(Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762, 767 [ 24 L. 1932(Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762 [ 24 L. | 1 | 2 |
McInerny v. Allebrandgreen2 sentences1939(Schroder v. Aden Gold Mining Co., 144 Cal. 628, 629 [ 78 Pac. 20 ].) As was said in the case of McInerny v. Allebrand, 107 Cal. App. 457, 461 [ 290 Pac. 530 ], “ . . . the recitals in the location notice cannot be accepted as proof of the various steps essential to perfect a mining claim. . . . ‘And besides, if it [the location notice] had contained every essential requisite of a location notice, the copy of the record would have proved nothing except the bare fact that such notice had been recorded. 1939(Schroder v. Aden Gold Mining Co., 144 Cal. 628, 629 [ 78 Pac. 20 ].) As was said in the case of McInerny v. Allebrand, 107 Cal. App. 457, 461 [ 290 Pac. 530 ], “ . . . the recitals in the location notice cannot be accepted as proof of the various steps essential to perfect a mining claim. . . . ‘And besides, if it [the location notice] had contained every essential requisite of a location notice, the copy of the record would have proved nothing except the bare fact that such notice had been recorded. | 1 | 2 |
Harris v. Kellogggreen2 sentences1938(See 17 Cal. Jur. 405.) A mining claim is real estate (Harris v. Kellogg, 117 Cal. 484, 488 [ 49 Pac. 708 ]; Contreras v. Merck, 131 Cal. 211, 214 [ 63 Pac. 336 ]), and may therefore be conveyed as in the case of other real estate. 1938(See 17 Cal. Jur. 405.) A mining claim is real estate (Harris v. Kellogg, 117 Cal. 484, 488 [ 49 Pac. 708 ]; Contreras v. Merck, 131 Cal. 211, 214 [ 63 Pac. 336 ]), and may therefore be conveyed as in the case of other real estate. | 1 | 2 |
| In Re Kelsogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hansen Brothers Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Supervisorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Standard Pipe & Supply Co. v. Red Rock Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gregory v. Pershbakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Western States Bankcard Association v. City & County of San Franciscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Unger v. Mooneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Newman v. Corneliusgreen | 1 | 1 |
| West v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Hoargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crofoot Lumber, Inc. v. Fordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mann v. Budlonggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Dalygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. O'Shieldsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Lucogreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacDonald v. Midland Mining Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences1992Co. (1869) 37 Cal. 54 ; People v. Crockett (1867) 33 Cal. 150 ; People v. Cohen (1866) 31 Cal. 210 ; People v. Shearer (1866) 30 Cal. 645 ; State of California v. Moore (1859) 12 Cal. 56 .) That principle, which endures today, was expressed in the earliest of these cases, State of California v. Moore, supra, 12 Cal. 56 , in which taxation of an individual’s interest in a mining claim located on land owned by the United States was in issue. 1992Co. (1869) 37 Cal. 54 ; People v. Crockett (1867) 33 Cal. 150 ; People v. Cohen (1866) 31 Cal. 210 ; People v. Shearer (1866) 30 Cal. 645 ; State of California v. Moore (1859) 12 Cal. 56 .) That principle, which endures today, was expressed in the earliest of these cases, State of California v. Moore, supra, 12 Cal. 56 , in which taxation of an individual’s interest in a mining claim located on land owned by the United States was in issue. | 4 | 1866–1992 |
Williams v. Mountaineer Gold Mining Co.
green
2 sentences1932Co., 102 Cal. 134 [ 34 Pac. 702 , 704, 36 Pac. 388 ], it was held that a claim of lien for materials furnished for the construction of a mill, tramway, boarding-house and reduction works upon a mining claim should be filed against the claim as a whole and not against the specific structures. 1899Co., 102 Cal. 134 , also cited by respondent, decides, upon the point in question, nothing more than that the lien should be taken against the mining claim and not against the specific structure-upon the mine. | 4 | 1898–1932 |
Helm v. Chapman
green
2 sentences1926In reaching this conclusion, we do not find it necessary to go as far as the court did in Helm v. Chapman, 66 Cal. 291 [ 5 Pac. 352 ], where it was held that a mine or pit sunk within a mining claim was a structure, within the meaning of the statute giving a lien on a building, improvement, or structure.” That decisions from other states are of little value in considering our statute arises from the fact that in almost every instance which we have examined there is a difference in the wording employed by the legislature, but in the Oregon case the language is identical with our own and *778 we 1926In reaching this conclusion, we do not find it necessary to go as far as the court did in Helm v. Chapman, 66 Cal. 291 [ 5 Pac. 352 ], where it was held that a mine or pit sunk within a mining claim was a structure, within the meaning of the statute giving a lien on a building, improvement, or structure.” That decisions from other states are of little value in considering our statute arises from the fact that in almost every instance which we have examined there is a difference in the wording employed by the legislature, but in the Oregon case the language is identical with our own and *778 we | 4 | 1895–1926 |
People v. Rinehart
green
2 sentences2017This point was made emphatically in a *31 recent California Supreme Court case, People v. Rinehart (2016) 1 Cal.5th 652 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 , 377 P.3d 818 ( Rinehart ), about which we solicited supplemental briefing. 2017This point was made emphatically in a *31 recent California Supreme Court case, People v. Rinehart (2016) 1 Cal.5th 652 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 , 377 P.3d 818 ( Rinehart ), about which we solicited supplemental briefing. | 3 | 2017–2017 |
Belk v. Meagher
green
2 sentences1942(Belk v. *472 Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 [ 26 L.Ed. 735 ].) Even in such cases the general ru¿e is that until a valid entry is made by another a mere occupancy of a mining claim, continued in good faith, may lead to a valid location and only the government can complain of such occupancy. (40 C.J. 777.) Even as against third parties the rights of an occupant were recognized in Capron v. Van Horn, 201 Cal. 486 [ 258 P. 77 ]. 1942(Belk v. *472 Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 [ 26 L.Ed. 735 ].) Even in such cases the general ru¿e is that until a valid entry is made by another a mere occupancy of a mining claim, continued in good faith, may lead to a valid location and only the government can complain of such occupancy. (40 C.J. 777.) Even as against third parties the rights of an occupant were recognized in Capron v. Van Horn, 201 Cal. 486 [ 258 P. 77 ]. | 3 | 1910–1943 |
Hammer v. Garfield Mining & Milling Co.
green
2 sentences1950(Hammer v. Garfield Min. etc. Co., 130 U.S. 291 [ 9 S.Ct. 548 , 32 L.Ed. 964 ].) Every reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of a mining claim as against the assertion of a forfeiture. 1950(Hammer v. Garfield Min. etc. Co., 130 U.S. 291 [ 9 S.Ct. 548 , 32 L.Ed. 964 ].) Every reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of a mining claim as against the assertion of a forfeiture. | 2 | 1897–1950 |
Hill v. Taylor
neutral
2 sentences1944The definition of tenant is, ‘one that holds or possesses lands or tenements by any kind of title, either in fee, for life, years, or at will. ’ ” The holding in Harris v. Reynolds was followed in Knight v. Truett (1861), supra, where the judgment debtor occupied the premises by his agent; in Hill v. Taylor (1863), 22 Cal. 191 , where the judgment debtor remained in possession and occupancy of a mining claim during the period of redemption; in Walls v. Walker (1869), 37 Cal. 424, 432 [99 Am. 1904The case of Hill v. Taylor, 22 Cal. 191 , relied upon by respondent, is *507 an exceptional case, as pointed out in White v. White, 130 Cal. 599 . 1 The mortgage in Hill v. Taylor covered a mining claim, and the mortgagor, after the issuance of the certificate of sale, remained in possession and mined the gold in the claim. | 2 | 1904–1944 |
People v. Rivera
neutral
2 sentences1943This was clearly held in Bewick v. Muir, 83 Cal. [368] 372 [ 23 P. 389 ], and the authority of that decision has never been questioned.” This is in accordance with a long, unbroken line of decisions which hold that where work is performed on a mining claim, or a group of claims worked as a mine, the laborer’s lien attaches to the entire claim or group of claims and not merely to the ground actually worked. 1943This was clearly held in Bewick v. Muir, 83 Cal. [368] 372 [ 23 P. 389 ], and the authority of that decision has never been questioned.” This is in accordance with a long, unbroken line of decisions which hold that where work is performed on a mining claim, or a group of claims worked as a mine, the laborer’s lien attaches to the entire claim or group of claims and not merely to the ground actually worked. | 2 | 1906–1943 |
Lind v. Baker
green
2 sentences1943(Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 [ 26 L.Ed. 735 ]; Holdt v. Hazard, supra; 17 Cal.Jur. secs. 17 and 18, p. 301, et seq; Garthe v. Hart, 73 Cal. 541 [ 15 P. 93 ]; Lind v. Baker, 31 Cal.App.2d 631 [ 88 P.2d 777 ].) The only other claim of plaintiffs to participation in any of the proceeds from the mining operations must be based upon their claimed rights under the so-called option agreement above set forth. 1939Such entry must always be peaceable, open and above board, and made in good faith (italics ours), or no right can be founded upon it.” See, also, Tweedy v. Parsons, 217 Cal. 447, 450 [ 19 Pac. (2d) 497 ]; Lind v. Baker, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 631 [ 88 Pac. (2d) 777 ].) A person who knows that a mining claim is in the actual possession of another cannot honestly believe that it is vacant and subject to entry and relocation; and the entry under such circumstances cannot be made in good faith unless it is made upon some right or color of right, or claim of legal right to make the entry. | 2 | 1939–1943 |
McKeon v. Bisbee
green
2 sentences1943The possessory interests involved in the two early eases, one to mining property, the other to agricultural land, were found to be ‘ ‘property. ’ ’ In the Moore case it was pointed out: “the right of the locator to sell, hypothecate, or in any manner dispose of his property in a mining claim, has been upheld, as well by legislative enactment as by judicial decisions.” “ ... in McKeon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137 [70 Am.Dec. 642], we held that the interest of the possessor of a mining claim was property under the law, and subject to be seized and sold under execution.” “The Legislature recognized a pr 1877(Tarter v. Spring Creels Co. 5 Cal. 395 ; McKeon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137 ; Crandall v. Wood, 8 Cal. 143 ; Partridge v. McKenney, 10 Cal. 181 ; State of California v. Moore, 12 Cal. 69 ; Boggs v. Merced M. | 2 | 1877–1943 |
Bell v. Bed Rock Tunnel & Mining Co.
neutral
2 sentences1938(Depuy v. Williams, 26 Cal. 309, 313 ; Bell v. Bed Bock etc. Co., 36 Cal. 214, 217 ; Seymour v. Wood, 53 Cal. 303 ; see, also, to the same effect as to a miner’s ditch, Integral Quicksilver Min. 1901Co., 36 Cal. 214 , where it was stated: “ The failure of a party to comply with a mining rule or regulation cannot work a forfeiture, unless the rule so provides.” Approved by the Arizona supreme court in Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. 99 ; Johnson v. McLaughlin, 1 Ariz. 493 ; also by Sawyer, J., in Jupiter M. | 2 | 1901–1938 |
Seymour v. Wood
neutral
2 sentences1938(Depuy v. Williams, 26 Cal. 309, 313 ; Bell v. Bed Bock etc. Co., 36 Cal. 214, 217 ; Seymour v. Wood, 53 Cal. 303 ; see, also, to the same effect as to a miner’s ditch, Integral Quicksilver Min. 1896Abandonment, it is true, is a matter of intent, but that intent may be proved by &e acts and conduct of a party even against his express declarations to the contrary (Myers v. Spooner, 55 Cal. 260 ); and if the intent has been formed and once acted upon, the abandonment is as absolute “if it exists for a minute or a second, as though it continued for years.” ( Waring v. Grow, 11 Cal. 366 .) In Seymour v. Wood, 53 Cal. 303 , plaintiff in ejectment moved his possessions from the mining claim, and went to Mexico, where he followed mining for several years. | 2 | 1896–1938 |
Caffrey v. Omilak Gold & Silver Min. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1932Co., 102 Cal. 134 [ 34 Pac. 702 , 704, 36 Pac. 388 ], it was held that a claim of lien for materials furnished for the construction of a mill, tramway, boarding-house and reduction works upon a mining claim should be filed against the claim as a whole and not against the specific structures. 1905Co., 102 Cal. 134 , 34 Pac. 702 , 36 Pac. 388 . | 2 | 1905–1932 |
Chambers v. Harrington
green
2 sentences1921The principal argument advanced in support of the appellant’s claim is that the object of requiring one hundred dollars’ worth of labor or improvements to be performed upon the mine each year was to promote the development of mines, *706 and that if by successive relocations a person could maintain his right to a mining claim from year to year without doing any delevopment work, he would be able to act as a “dog in the manger,” to use the language of the supreme court of the United States in Chambers v. Harrington, 111 U. S. 355 , [ 28 L. 1894(Chambers v. Harrington, 111 U. S. 350 .) It follows that the theory on which the court below acted was not correct, and the findings complained of were not justified by the evidence. | 2 | 1894–1921 |
Merced Mining Co. v. Fremont
green
2 sentences1904In Merced Mining Company v. Fremont, 7 Cal. 317 , 1 it was held that “the owner of a mining claim has, in practical effect, a good vested title to the property, and should be so treated, until his title is divested, by the exercise of the higher right of the superior proprietor. 1858This Court seems to have so regarded a mining claim in the case of The Merced Mining Co. v. Fremont, 7 Cal. Rep. 317 . | 2 | 1858–1904 |
Richards v. Dower
neutral
2 sentences1903The appellants claim that the decision is against law, because there is no finding that at the time of the entry of the townsite in 1877, or at any time thereafter, the land embraced in the mining claim was known to contain minerals of such extent and value as to justify expenditure for the purpose of extracting them, citing in support of the proposition that this is necessary Richards v. Dower, 81 Cal. 44 ; Smith v. Hill, 89 Cal. 122 ; Lindley on Mines, sec. 176; and a number of decisions of the United States supreme court. 1893The court also found that the said Cowan, the original grantee from the town authorities, did not occupy said lot 50 as a residence, or as a place of business, or for any purpose; and from a quotation made by counsel for respondent from the opinion of the court in Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392 , and quoted in Richards v. Dower, 81 Cal. 44 , it would seem that both court and counsel were of opin ion that mines discovered within the patented town site before the occupation of a lot for business or residence purposes could be held against the grantee from the town site, although not discovere | 2 | 1893–1903 |
Hill v. Smith
neutral
2 sentences1886But in Hill v. Smith, 27 Cal. 476 , where -water was appropriated through a ditch, and a mining claim was afterwards worked above, it was decided that the miner had no right to work his claim in such manner as to mingle mud and sediment with the water so as to fill up the ditch and reservoirs, and thus to lessen their capacity and increase the expense of cleaning them out; that the prior appropriator of the water was entitled to its use and enjoyment for the purposes for which he claimed it. 1886But in Hill v. Smith, 27 Cal. 476 , where -water was appropriated through a ditch, and a mining claim was afterwards worked above, it was decided that the miner had no right to work his claim in such manner as to mingle mud and sediment with the water so as to fill up the ditch and reservoirs, and thus to lessen their capacity and increase the expense of cleaning them out; that the prior appropriator of the water was entitled to its use and enjoyment for the purposes for which he claimed it. | 2 | 1886–1886 |
Pope v. Kinman
neutral
2 sentences1886Pope v. Kinman, 54 Cal. 3 , was an action to quiet title to the flow of a stream, the plaintiff being the owner of riparian lands by grant from Mexico. 1886Pope v. Kinman, 54 Cal. 3 , was an action to quiet title to the flow of a stream, the plaintiff being the owner of riparian lands by grant from Mexico. | 2 | 1886–1886 |
Tartar v. Spring Creek Water & Mining Co.
neutral
2 sentences1877(Tarter v. Spring Creels Co. 5 Cal. 395 ; McKeon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137 ; Crandall v. Wood, 8 Cal. 143 ; Partridge v. McKenney, 10 Cal. 181 ; State of California v. Moore, 12 Cal. 69 ; Boggs v. Merced M. 1859In Tarter v. Spring Creek Company, 5 Cal. 395 , the Court held that “ the policy of this State, as derived from her Legislature, is to permit settlers, in all capacities, to occupy the public lands, and, by such occupation, to acquire the right of undisturbed enjoyment againstj all the world but the true owner.” In evidence of this, Acts have been passed to protect the possession of agricultural lands acquired by mere occupancy; to license miners ; to provide for the recovery of mining claims, etc., “ and that an appropriation of a portion of the public domain, or any of its incidents,” establ | 2 | 1859–1877 |
| Pralus v. Jefferson Gold & Silver Mining Co. neutral | 2 | 1870–1870 |
| McGarrity v. Byington neutral | 2 | 1864–1868 |
| Table Mountain Tunnel Co. v. Stranahan neutral | 2 | 1863–1866 |
| Baker v. Waite green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Bambauer v. Menjoulet green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Phelps v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Crockett neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. The Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Shearer green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Cohen neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Topaz Beryllium Company v. United States green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Silliman v. Powell green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Bleak green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Whittaker v. Otto green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Southern Pacific Land Co. v. Kiggins green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Mobley green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Schwartz v. Magyar House, Inc. green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Empire Gold Mining Co. v. Bonanza Gold Mining Co. green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Nevills v. Shortridge neutral | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| B & B Sulphur Co. v. Kelley green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.