mining claim in Oregon

1908Thus in Honaker v. Martin, 11 Mont. 91 ( 27 Pac. 397 ) the owner of a mining claim, not having performed in a certain year the required amount of assessment work, sought to prevent a forfeiture of his right to the possession of the premises by resuming the development early in the succeeding year, paying for that purpose $63 for logs, slabs, and lumber which were taken to the claim, but not used, and it was held that the work had not been resumed in good faith.

1908Thus in Honaker v. Martin, 11 Mont. 91 ( 27 Pac. 397 ) the owner of a mining claim, not having performed in a certain year the required amount of assessment work, sought to prevent a forfeiture of his right to the possession of the premises by resuming the development early in the succeeding year, paying for that purpose $63 for logs, slabs, and lumber which were taken to the claim, but not used, and it was held that the work had not been resumed in good faith.

2014Whittle, 249 Or at 220 .

1992If a filing is not made by the annual deadline set by FLPMA, the statute creates a conclusive presumption that the mining claim has been abandoned. 43 USC § 1744 (c). 2 For example, in United States v. Locke, 471 US 84 , 105 S Ct 1785 , 85 L Ed 2d 64 (1985), the Court held invalid a group of mining claims whose owners had filed affidavits one day late.

1992If a filing is not made by the annual deadline set by FLPMA, the statute creates a conclusive presumption that the mining claim has been abandoned. 43 USC § 1744 (c). 2 For example, in United States v. Locke, 471 US 84 , 105 S Ct 1785 , 85 L Ed 2d 64 (1985), the Court held invalid a group of mining claims whose owners had filed affidavits one day late.

1982Plaintiffs contend that Grant County may prohibit mining under either ordinance, because a mining claim which has been located is no longer a part of the public domain and under Lane County v. Bessett, 46 Or App 319, 328-29 , 612 P2d 297 , rev den 290 Or 1 (1980), is subject to local planning and control.

1982Plaintiffs contend that Grant County may prohibit mining under either ordinance, because a mining claim which has been located is no longer a part of the public domain and under Lane County v. Bessett, 46 Or App 319, 328-29 , 612 P2d 297 , rev den 290 Or 1 (1980), is subject to local planning and control.

1959See Hughes v. Helzer, 182 Or 205 , 185 P2d 537 and Jones et al. v. Jackson et al., 195 Or 643 , 246 P2d 546 . *290 From Mechem on Agency § 1217, we quote the following: “* * * an agent employed to do the annual assessment work on a mining claim, will not be permitted,' after having lulled his principal into a sense of security, to defeat his interests by omitting to do the work and thereby causing his principal’s claim to lapse, and relocating the mine in his own name and on his own account.” This is substantially the rule adopted in the Restatement of Agency 2nd § 403(d) which also approves t

1959See Hughes v. Helzer, 182 Or 205 , 185 P2d 537 and Jones et al. v. Jackson et al., 195 Or 643 , 246 P2d 546 . *290 From Mechem on Agency § 1217, we quote the following: “* * * an agent employed to do the annual assessment work on a mining claim, will not be permitted,' after having lulled his principal into a sense of security, to defeat his interests by omitting to do the work and thereby causing his principal’s claim to lapse, and relocating the mine in his own name and on his own account.” This is substantially the rule adopted in the Restatement of Agency 2nd § 403(d) which also approves t

1958This must, upon principle, be the object of such laws, * * Citing Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 US 527 , 28 L ed 1113, 5 S Ct 560 , hereinafter referred to.

1958This must, upon principle, be the object of such laws, * * Citing Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 US 527 , 28 L ed 1113, 5 S Ct 560 , hereinafter referred to.

1958This is made evident in Sharkey v. Candiani, 48 Or 112 , 85 P 219 , where the court says at page 123: “State legislation supplemental to the acts of Congress, which prescribes the method to be pursued by a locator as a condition precedent to making *63 a valid appropriation of the public lands of the United States, containing valuable mineral deposits, is designed as a rule of evidence only, to determine the rights of an adverse claimant of the premises, under a subsequent location thereon of a mining claim.

1958This is made evident in Sharkey v. Candiani, 48 Or 112 , 85 P 219 , where the court says at page 123: “State legislation supplemental to the acts of Congress, which prescribes the method to be pursued by a locator as a condition precedent to making *63 a valid appropriation of the public lands of the United States, containing valuable mineral deposits, is designed as a rule of evidence only, to determine the rights of an adverse claimant of the premises, under a subsequent location thereon of a mining claim.

1947In Wagner v. Dorris, 43 Or. 392, 399 , 73 P. 318 , there was evidence that two men had each performed nine days’ assessment work on a mining claim, and this court commented that such labor “could not by any reasonable wage scale bring the value of the work up to $100.” Even if it were competent to take judicial notice of the reasonable value of such labor (as to which the general rule is otherwise: 20 Am.

1947In Wagner v. Dorris, 43 Or. 392, 399 , 73 P. 318 , there was evidence that two men had each performed nine days’ assessment work on a mining claim, and this court commented that such labor “could not by any reasonable wage scale bring the value of the work up to $100.” Even if it were competent to take judicial notice of the reasonable value of such labor (as to which the general rule is otherwise: 20 Am.

1942Other decisions that warrant description by established name are Maney v. Dennison, 110 Ark. 571 , 163 S. W. 783 ; Hildreth v. White, 66 Cal. 549 , 6 P. 454 ; and Castro v. Gill & Gill, 5 Cal. 40 .

1942Other decisions that warrant description by established name are Maney v. Dennison, 110 Ark. 571 , 163 S. W. 783 ; Hildreth v. White, 66 Cal. 549 , 6 P. 454 ; and Castro v. Gill & Gill, 5 Cal. 40 .

1942Other decisions that warrant description by established name are Maney v. Dennison, 110 Ark. 571 , 163 S. W. 783 ; Hildreth v. White, 66 Cal. 549 , 6 P. 454 ; and Castro v. Gill & Gill, 5 Cal. 40 .

1942Other decisions that warrant description by established name are Maney v. Dennison, 110 Ark. 571 , 163 S. W. 783 ; Hildreth v. White, 66 Cal. 549 , 6 P. 454 ; and Castro v. Gill & Gill, 5 Cal. 40 .

1942Other decisions that warrant description by established name are Maney v. Dennison, 110 Ark. 571 , 163 S. W. 783 ; Hildreth v. White, 66 Cal. 549 , 6 P. 454 ; and Castro v. Gill & Gill, 5 Cal. 40 .

1936Such an averment carries with it all the facts essential *17 to establish his ownership, and the means by which he became the owner would be only evidence of his ownership and should not be alleged. ’ The same rule would apply to the defendants in setting up ownership in their answer. * * * It was competent for plaintiff to show that the location under which defendant Merck claimed ownership ‘had lapsed and become void’, and that when plaintiff initiated his claim the land was ‘vacant public mineral land of the United States’.” Again, in Trevaskis v. Peard, 111 Cal. 599 ( 44 P. 246 ), it was h

1936Such an averment carries with it all the facts essential *17 to establish his ownership, and the means by which he became the owner would be only evidence of his ownership and should not be alleged. ’ The same rule would apply to the defendants in setting up ownership in their answer. * * * It was competent for plaintiff to show that the location under which defendant Merck claimed ownership ‘had lapsed and become void’, and that when plaintiff initiated his claim the land was ‘vacant public mineral land of the United States’.” Again, in Trevaskis v. Peard, 111 Cal. 599 ( 44 P. 246 ), it was h

1915In Wimer v. Smith, 22 Or. 469 ( 30 Pac. 416 ), the property involved was a mining claim with an appurtenant water right.

1915In Wimer v. Smith, 22 Or. 469 ( 30 Pac. 416 ), the property involved was a mining claim with an appurtenant water right.

1908If the animals had been used in the tunnel to draw cars, or employed at a shaft to raise ore, etc., the reasonable compensation for their daily service might be treated as labor performed (Wright v. Killian, 132 Cal. 56 : 64 Pac. 98 ), but the sum of money paid for their purchase cannot be viewed as an expenditure incurred in the development of a mining claim. 6.

1908If the animals had been used in the tunnel to draw cars, or employed at a shaft to raise ore, etc., the reasonable compensation for their daily service might be treated as labor performed (Wright v. Killian, 132 Cal. 56 : 64 Pac. 98 ), but the sum of money paid for their purchase cannot be viewed as an expenditure incurred in the development of a mining claim. 6.

1905The trial court, inter alia, found, and we think the conclusion is fully warranted by the testimony: “That no markings of the Doctor claim for the purpose of marking out on the ground the boundaries thereof was ever made until the time of the survey for patent, other than such as was made by Dyson and Standish in December, 1899.” Though our statute has prescribed certain conditions which must be performed in order properly to locate a mining claim, and provided that a failure to comply therewith should annul every attempted location, the enactment was evidently designed as a guide only, to det

1900Co. 102 Cal. 134 ( 34 Pac. 702 , 36 Pac. 388 ), in which it was held, in the first case, that a mine or pit sunk in a mining claim was a structure, and in the second, that a claim of lien for materials furnished for the construction of a mill, tramway, boarding house and reduction works upon a mining claini should be against such claim, and not against the specific structures on the mine.

1900Co. 102 Cal. 134 ( 34 Pac. 702 , 36 Pac. 388 ), in which it was held, in the first case, that a mine or pit sunk in a mining claim was a structure, and in the second, that a claim of lien for materials furnished for the construction of a mill, tramway, boarding house and reduction works upon a mining claini should be against such claim, and not against the specific structures on the mine.

1898If this is not done, all inferior evidence that may have been given will be stricken out and disregarded.” In Crary v. Campbell, 24 Cal. 634 , which was an action to recover damages alleged to have been caused by defendant cutting a ditch, whereby the waters therefrom flowed upon and injured plaintiff’s mining claim, at the trial of which a witness testified that he purchased the claim from the original locator, and held the same until he conveyed it to plaintiff, who thereafter had possession of it, on cross-examination the witness stated that, when he purchased the mining claim, he obtained

1893Section 2324, Devised Statutes of the United States, does not require notice of a mining claim to to be either posted or recorded, but entrusts that matter to local regulation, subject to the condition that when a notice is required to be recorded, it shall contain, among other things, a description of the property; ( Carter v. Bacigalupi, 83 Cal. 187 ;) so that there is no possible ground upon which to predicate the idea that the boundaries of the Black Butte mining claim are not described and marked off so that they can be readily ascertained and traced.

1890In reaching this conclusion, we do not find it necessary to go as far as the court did in Helm v. Chapman, 66 Cal. 291 , where it was held that a mine or pit sunk within a mining claim was a structure within the meaning of the statute, giving a lien on a building, improvement or structure. 2.

1874(Pitman v. Pitman, 4 Or. 298 .) Article NY, § 5, provides that “the property and pecuniary rights of every married woman, at the time of marriage, or afterwards acquired by gift, devise or inheritance, shall not be subject to the debts or contracts of the husband, and laws shall be passed providing for the registration of the wife’s separate property.” As to where or how Flora obtained the money with which she purchased the mining claim from her husband, the evidence fails to disclose, and it must be presumed to have been the money of the husband, unless it appears that it came to her either b