mining claim in Colorado

1906Referring to a mine in a location notice casts upon the party attacking the notice the burden of showing that there is no such mine as referred to. ’ ’ In Riste v. Morton, 49 Pac. 656 , the court held (quoting from the syllabus): “A notice of discovery describing a mining claim as bounded by three other claims on three sides thereof, locates the claim with reference to permanent monuments, unless it affirmatively appears that such other claims are not permanent monuments.” The court, in the opinion, said: “There is no evidence or presumption in this case that the three mining claims referred t

1904A description in a location certificate of a mining claim which ties the claim by course and distance to a patented claim, is sufficient to comply with the statute requiring the description to refer to some natural object or permanent monument. — Duncan v. Fulton, 15 Colo. App. 140 ; Drummond v. Long, 9 Colo. 538 .

1893In the case of Smelting Company v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 , it was held that labor and improvements might be considered within the meaning of the statute when the labor was performed, or the improvements were made for its development, though in fact such labor and improvements were at a distance from the claim.

1891Louis Co. v. Kemp, supra, uses this language: “ Labor and improvements within the meaning of the statute are deemed to have been had on a mining claim, * * * when the labor is performed or the improvements are made for its development, that is, to facilitate the extraction of the metals it may contain, though in fact such labor and improvements may * * * be at a distance from the claim itself.” And in Mount Diablo v. Callison, supra, it is declared that, “Work done outside of the claim * * * if done for the purpose and as a means of prospecting or developing the claim * * * is as available for

1969The deed descriptions readily meet the test for sufficiency as stated in Harrison v. Everett, 135 Colo. 55 , 308 P.2d 216 : “If the description in a deed identifies, or furnishes the means for identifying, the property conveyed, it performs its function.” And contrary to plaintiffs argument, C.R.S. 1963, 137-2-14 does not require the delinquent tax list publication to identify the mining claim as “lode” or “placer.” We therefore hold that the following three Gilpin County Treasurer’s deeds which convey Plot 3 to defendant Russell are valid: (1) Treasurer’s deed, dated July 26, 1955, recorded i

1969The deed descriptions readily meet the test for sufficiency as stated in Harrison v. Everett, 135 Colo. 55 , 308 P.2d 216 : “If the description in a deed identifies, or furnishes the means for identifying, the property conveyed, it performs its function.” And contrary to plaintiffs argument, C.R.S. 1963, 137-2-14 does not require the delinquent tax list publication to identify the mining claim as “lode” or “placer.” We therefore hold that the following three Gilpin County Treasurer’s deeds which convey Plot 3 to defendant Russell are valid: (1) Treasurer’s deed, dated July 26, 1955, recorded i

1959In Wilson v. Harnette, 32 Colo. 172 , 75 Pac. 395 , it was held proper to admit the opinion of an expert witness as to whether a discovery vein on a mining claim ‘is such a lead as a reasonably prudent person would be justified in following, with an expenditure of time and money, with the hope of finding gold in paying quantities,’ although the validity of the location depended upon the finding of the jury on that every question.

1928In Wilson v. Harnette, 32 Colo. 172 , 75 Pac. 395 , it was held proper to admit the opinion of an expert witness as to whether a discovery vein on a mining claim “is such a lead as a reasonably prudent person would be justified in following, with an expenditure of time and money, with the hope of finding gold in paying quantities,” although the validity of the location depended upon the finding of the jury on that very question.

1933In Justice Mining Co. v. Lee, 21 Colo. 260 , 40 Pac. 444 , presenting questions not different in principle, and in which it was claimed that the mining claim involved had been filed on by an alien, disqualified, we held that inasmuch as the matter was pending in the land office, the department had exclusive jurisdiction and any attempt by the courts to control its action would be an unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction.

1910That case was carried to this court, however, and in 21 Colo. 260 was overruled, it there being held that the court of appeals was in error in assuming that the record in the case presented a question as to the right of an alien to acquire by location a transferable interest in a mining claim, as that question could not, under the facts there presented, be raised. • In Thomas v. Chisholm, 13 Colo. 105 , the title to a mining claim, based upon a prior location made by one Joseph Hudson and the Kansas City Mining and Smelting Company, a corporation, and by them assigned or conveyed to Chisholm,

1912Co. v. Boss, 32 Colo. 27 ; Brewster v. Shoemaker, 28 Colo. 176 ; McGinnis v. Egbert, 8 Colo. 41 ; Morrison’s Mining Rights (14th Ed.) 101.

1906Therefore, a discovery, though made after staking and record, will inure to the benefit of the locator, but only as of the date of such discovery, provided, of course, that others have not previously acquired rights to the premises upon which such discovery is made. — Beals v. Cone, 27 Colo. 473 ; Brewster v. Shoemaker, 28 Colo. 176 ; The Treasury T., M. & R.

1904A description in a location certificate of a mining claim which ties the claim by course and distance to a patented claim, is sufficient to comply with the statute requiring the description to refer to some natural object or permanent monument. — Duncan v. Fulton, 15 Colo. App. 140 ; Drummond v. Long, 9 Colo. 538 .

1904A description in a location certificate of a mining claim which ties the claim by course and distance to a patented claim, is sufficient to comply with the statute requiring the description to refer to some natural object or permanent monument. — Duncan v. Fulton, 15 Colo. App. 140 ; Drummond v. Long, 9 Colo. 538 .

1934In Calhoun v. Girardine, 13 Colo. 103 , 21 Pac. 1017 (1889), cited by counsel for the defendants, the complaint was on a contract for assessment work on a mining claim.

1933This case was followed and approved in Calvat v. Franklin, 90 Colo. 444 , 9 P. (2d) 1061 .

1933This case was followed and approved in Calvat v. Franklin, 90 Colo. 444 , 9 P. (2d) 1061 .

1912Co. v. Boss, 32 Colo. 27 ; Brewster v. Shoemaker, 28 Colo. 176 ; McGinnis v. Egbert, 8 Colo. 41 ; Morrison’s Mining Rights (14th Ed.) 101.

1912We also held, on the authority of People ex rel. v. District Court, 27 Colo. 465 , that an owner of an undivided interest in a mining claim has no right to use the tunnel on such claim to convey ore from an outside claim.

1912Co. v. Boss, 32 Colo. 27 ; Brewster v. Shoemaker, 28 Colo. 176 ; McGinnis v. Egbert, 8 Colo. 41 ; Morrison’s Mining Rights (14th Ed.) 101.

1912The time within which the steps requisite to constitute a valid location of a mining claim' is completed, is immaterial, provided they are all completed and performed before the rights of third parties intervene.—Healey v. Rupp, 37 Colo. 25 ; Treasury T., M. & R.

1910That case was carried to this court, however, and in 21 Colo. 260 was overruled, it there being held that the court of appeals was in error in assuming that the record in the case presented a question as to the right of an alien to acquire by location a transferable interest in a mining claim, as that question could not, under the facts there presented, be raised. • In Thomas v. Chisholm, 13 Colo. 105 , the title to a mining claim, based upon a prior location made by one Joseph Hudson and the Kansas City Mining and Smelting Company, a corporation, and by them assigned or conveyed to Chisholm,

1910All these differences taken together, as they appear in this action, are cértainly sufficient to demonstrate that the pendency of the action in the county court can have no effect upon the right of the defendant, Lizzie A. Colburn, to set forth her interest in the mining claim and to have such interest determined in this action. — Bolton v. Landers, 27 Cal. 104 ; Ayers v. Bensley, 32 Cal. 620 ; Paige v. Wilson, 8 Bosw. 294; Pratt v. Howard, 109 Iowa 504 ; Walsworth v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 61 ; Thorne v. Towanda Tanning Co., 15 Fed. 289 ; Radford v. Folsom, 14 Fed. 97 .

1910All these differences taken together, as they appear in this action, are cértainly sufficient to demonstrate that the pendency of the action in the county court can have no effect upon the right of the defendant, Lizzie A. Colburn, to set forth her interest in the mining claim and to have such interest determined in this action. — Bolton v. Landers, 27 Cal. 104 ; Ayers v. Bensley, 32 Cal. 620 ; Paige v. Wilson, 8 Bosw. 294; Pratt v. Howard, 109 Iowa 504 ; Walsworth v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 61 ; Thorne v. Towanda Tanning Co., 15 Fed. 289 ; Radford v. Folsom, 14 Fed. 97 .

1910All these differences taken together, as they appear in this action, are cértainly sufficient to demonstrate that the pendency of the action in the county court can have no effect upon the right of the defendant, Lizzie A. Colburn, to set forth her interest in the mining claim and to have such interest determined in this action. — Bolton v. Landers, 27 Cal. 104 ; Ayers v. Bensley, 32 Cal. 620 ; Paige v. Wilson, 8 Bosw. 294; Pratt v. Howard, 109 Iowa 504 ; Walsworth v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 61 ; Thorne v. Towanda Tanning Co., 15 Fed. 289 ; Radford v. Folsom, 14 Fed. 97 .

1910All these differences taken together, as they appear in this action, are cértainly sufficient to demonstrate that the pendency of the action in the county court can have no effect upon the right of the defendant, Lizzie A. Colburn, to set forth her interest in the mining claim and to have such interest determined in this action. — Bolton v. Landers, 27 Cal. 104 ; Ayers v. Bensley, 32 Cal. 620 ; Paige v. Wilson, 8 Bosw. 294; Pratt v. Howard, 109 Iowa 504 ; Walsworth v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 61 ; Thorne v. Towanda Tanning Co., 15 Fed. 289 ; Radford v. Folsom, 14 Fed. 97 .

1910All these differences taken together, as they appear in this action, are cértainly sufficient to demonstrate that the pendency of the action in the county court can have no effect upon the right of the defendant, Lizzie A. Colburn, to set forth her interest in the mining claim and to have such interest determined in this action. — Bolton v. Landers, 27 Cal. 104 ; Ayers v. Bensley, 32 Cal. 620 ; Paige v. Wilson, 8 Bosw. 294; Pratt v. Howard, 109 Iowa 504 ; Walsworth v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 61 ; Thorne v. Towanda Tanning Co., 15 Fed. 289 ; Radford v. Folsom, 14 Fed. 97 .

1910All these differences taken together, as they appear in this action, are cértainly sufficient to demonstrate that the pendency of the action in the county court can have no effect upon the right of the defendant, Lizzie A. Colburn, to set forth her interest in the mining claim and to have such interest determined in this action. — Bolton v. Landers, 27 Cal. 104 ; Ayers v. Bensley, 32 Cal. 620 ; Paige v. Wilson, 8 Bosw. 294; Pratt v. Howard, 109 Iowa 504 ; Walsworth v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 61 ; Thorne v. Towanda Tanning Co., 15 Fed. 289 ; Radford v. Folsom, 14 Fed. 97 .

1910All these differences taken together, as they appear in this action, are cértainly sufficient to demonstrate that the pendency of the action in the county court can have no effect upon the right of the defendant, Lizzie A. Colburn, to set forth her interest in the mining claim and to have such interest determined in this action. — Bolton v. Landers, 27 Cal. 104 ; Ayers v. Bensley, 32 Cal. 620 ; Paige v. Wilson, 8 Bosw. 294; Pratt v. Howard, 109 Iowa 504 ; Walsworth v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 61 ; Thorne v. Towanda Tanning Co., 15 Fed. 289 ; Radford v. Folsom, 14 Fed. 97 .

1906Referring to a mine in a location notice casts upon the party attacking the notice the burden of showing that there is no such mine as referred to. ’ ’ In Riste v. Morton, 49 Pac. 656 , the court held (quoting from the syllabus): “A notice of discovery describing a mining claim as bounded by three other claims on three sides thereof, locates the claim with reference to permanent monuments, unless it affirmatively appears that such other claims are not permanent monuments.” The court, in the opinion, said: “There is no evidence or presumption in this case that the three mining claims referred t

1906Therefore, a discovery, though made after staking and record, will inure to the benefit of the locator, but only as of the date of such discovery, provided, of course, that others have not previously acquired rights to the premises upon which such discovery is made. — Beals v. Cone, 27 Colo. 473 ; Brewster v. Shoemaker, 28 Colo. 176 ; The Treasury T., M. & R.

1906In Dillon v. Bayliss, supra, the reference in the location certificate of a mining claim was as follows: “The adjoining claims are the Marble Heart claims on the southeast, and Nine Hour lode claim on the southwest, and the St.

1906Referring to a mine in a location notice casts upon the party attacking the notice the burden of showing that there is no such mine as referred to. ’ ’ In Riste v. Morton, 49 Pac. 656 , the court held (quoting from the syllabus): “A notice of discovery describing a mining claim as bounded by three other claims on three sides thereof, locates the claim with reference to permanent monuments, unless it affirmatively appears that such other claims are not permanent monuments.” The court, in the opinion, said: “There is no evidence or presumption in this case that the three mining claims referred t

1906A patented claim will be presumed to be a well-known natural object or- permanent monument until the contrary appears. ’ ’ Following this case in Carlin v. Freeman, 19 Colo. App. 334 , it is said by Mr. Justice Maxwell, in speaking of the sufficiency of a reference to a natural object or permanent monument, in the location certificate of a mining’ claim: “A description in a location certificate of a mining claim which ties the claim by course and distance to a patented claim, is sufficient to comply with the statute requiring the description to refer to some natural object or permanent monumen

1906A patented claim will be presumed to be a well-known natural object or- permanent monument until the contrary appears. ’ ’ Following this case in Carlin v. Freeman, 19 Colo. App. 334 , it is said by Mr. Justice Maxwell, in speaking of the sufficiency of a reference to a natural object or permanent monument, in the location certificate of a mining’ claim: “A description in a location certificate of a mining claim which ties the claim by course and distance to a patented claim, is sufficient to comply with the statute requiring the description to refer to some natural object or permanent monumen

1905Jackson v. Roby, 109 U. S. 440 , decided that the extension of a flume upon a placer claim and the use of such claim for dumping purposes was not such improvement of the claim as contemplated by section 2324, although the claim so used and other claims were held in common.

1905The location or relocation of a mining claim can only be made upon unoccupied and unclaimed public domain, and it was incumbent upon plaintiffs to show as one of the material facts necessary to establish the validity of their location that the ground they sought to locate was unoccupied and unappropriated public mineral domain subject to location. — Kirk v. Meldrum, 28 Colo. 453, 457 , and cases cited.

1899Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279; Gwillim v. Donnellan, 115 U. S. 45 ; Del Monte M.

1899Co. v. Turner, 23 Colo. 400 ), in which it was said, in speaking of the rights conveyed by patent to a mining claim, that it conveys all lodes or veins having their apexes within the boundaries of such claim, except, perhaps, cross lodes.